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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the ways in which the authoritarian regime in
post-Soviet Kazakhstan maintained itself in power from 1991 until 2005. This study
endeavours to uncover the palette of the regime’s methods by analysing the ways in
which it went about controlling the oil industry – an industry with which the political and
economical future of Kazakhstan is inseparably intertwined. The empirical section of this
study investigates the interplay between the regime and the actors located in and around
two cores: the National Oil Company and the oil-rich areas. This thesis focuses in
particular on instances where players involved with the oil industry, whether directly or
indirectly, attempted to challenge the regime’s authority in those two centres either due to
greed or grievances. It is argued that these moments of crisis reveal the regime’s
maintenance techniques, and can precipitate the deployment of new methods of
maintenance in response to them. In order to account for the techniques that the Kazakh
ruling regime applied in structuring its relationships with the oil industry, this thesis shifts
the emphasis from the prevalent zhuz-horde, tribe, and clan-based approaches to Kazakh
politics towards formal (corporatism) and informal (patron-client) mechanisms of control.
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Aid practitioners and policy makers looking at politics in a country
that has recently moved away from authoritarianism should not start
asking, ‘How is its democratic transition going?’ They should instead
formulate a more open-ended query, ‘What is happening politically?’
Insisting on the former approach leads to optimistic assumptions that
often shunt the analysis down a blind alley. (Carothers 2002: 18)
There is nothing new in choosing to see the world via a microscope
rather than a telescope. So long as we accept that we are studying the
same cosmos, the choice between microcosm and macrocosm is a
matter of selecting the appropriate technique. (Hobsbawm 1997: 252)
How did the post-Soviet Kazakh regime sustain itself in power in the years 1991–2005?
What sort of regime maintenance techniques did the Kazakh regime use in the process of
establishing and upholding its position during this period? This thesis attempts to answer
these questions by scrutinising the tools that the Kazakh regime applied in order to: a)
bring under its control the country’s oil industry; and b) to maintain its grasp over it.
In Kazakhstan, an oil-rich country, the oil industry plays a key role in economic
and political life due to the country’s considerable oil revenues, and accompanying
conflicting interests. As an arena of political struggle, this industry provides a good test
case for uncovering regime maintenance techniques. In the oil industry, the critical
players consist of various interest groups in and around the National Oil Company
(NOC), and the oil-rich regions that attempt to capture parts of the industry for their own
benefit. An analysis of how the Kazakh regime chose to deal with these groups is at the
centre of this study. In order to account for the techniques that the Kazakh regime used in
the process of structuring its relationships with the oil industry, this thesis shifts the
emphasis from the prevailing zhuz-hordes, tribes, and clan-based approaches to Kazakh
politics towards formal (corporatism) and informal (patron–client) regime maintenance
techniques.
This thesis argues that in order to establish and sustain its control over the oil
industry, the Kazakh regime used formal, informal and quasi-formal tools, and entered
into a tacit agreement with foreign oil companies. The thesis shows that while informal
mechanisms of control dominated regime–oil industry relationships, formal mechanisms
2also played a role. Formal mechanisms were more used in the first years of independence,
when the Kazakh regime still largely relied on inherited Soviet methods of running the oil
industry. This arrangement was, however, progressively abandoned in favour of informal
mechanisms as the challenges to the regime’s dominant position increased. The transition
from formal to informal techniques accelerated during the process of privatisation of the
oil industry. Significantly, the introduction of the informal tools was accompanied by the
gradual Kazakhization of the oil industry, which aimed at strengthening the regime’s ties
with its clients.
Informal types of relationships proved to be a sufficient tool of control in the late
1990s and early 2000s. However, with the growth of the industry, new actors emerged
and began demanding a greater stake in the oil sector. The regime, in order to
accommodate and control those new players, began resorting to some previously
abandoned formal tools of regime maintenance. As a consequence, recent years have seen
a slow rise of quasi-formal relationships between regime and parts of the oil industry.
Thus, in some ways the Kazakh regime came full circle in the period 1991–2005: from
formal to informal, and then back to formal again. The foreign oil companies were
another reason why the Kazakh regime was able to sustain its position. The alliance
between the foreign oil companies and the regime has played a pivotal role in oil-rich
regions, where various interest groups have attempted to undermine the regime’s grip
over the oil industry. Nonetheless, as the Kazakh regime had to learn the hard way, this
tacit agreement had its limits.
In the majority of cases, the origins of the mechanisms used by the regime in the
period under discussion can be traced back to the Soviet period. However, this thesis does
not argue that there is a straight line between Soviet and post-Soviet Kazakhstan. For
instance, the quasi-formal types of regime–oil industry relationships had their basis in the
pre-1991 order. Yet, the implementation of this tool in the first half of the 2000s owed
more to the Kazakh regime’s attempts at accommodating emerging players than to the
Soviet experience per se. Whereas in the years 1991–2005 the post-Soviet Kazakh
regime did not radically break with the past, it did not entirely live in it either.
31. The Kazakh regime
To study the ways in which a regime sustains itself in power is to attempt to uncover ‘the
rules of the political game’ that determine the distribution of power. It is those rules that
in turn shape and define the regime itself, be it democratic or authoritarian (Mozaffar
1989: 54; Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 9; van de Walle 2001: 117). Robert Fishman
has argued that a regime ‘may be thought of as the formal and informal organisation of
the centre of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime
determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with
those who are not’ (1990: 428; see also Lawson 1993: 185). In this sense, regimes endure
for much longer than governments, but are less permanent than the state. This thesis
looks at the rules of the game in a regime that has been characterised as authoritarian.
At the beginning of the 2000s, a number of articles were published by leading
transitologists (McFaul 2002; Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Bunce 2003) in which the
authors attempted to define and categorise the political regimes that came to existence in
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics in the aftermath of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. This intellectual endeavour had its basis in the following puzzle: if the
Central Asian countries did not follow an evolutionary path towards democracy, what
kind of regimes did emerge in those republics? The analysis that followed stressed the
authoritarian character of the regimes in Central Asia, and this was reflected in labels that
scholars assigned to them, as, for instance: dictatorships, dominant-power systems or
competitive authoritarian regimes. Marian Ottaway – who coined the term semi-
authoritarian in order to describe some undemocratic regimes that were born in the post-
1991 world, including post-Soviet Kazakhstan – is a good example of a transitologist
who strongly advocated the use of the authoritarian prism. Ottaway pointed out that on
the surface, semi-authoritarian regimes do everything by the democratic book. They hold
regular multiparty elections, allow parliaments to function, and recognise, within limits,
the rights of citizens to freely form associations. At the same time, all of these
mechanisms generally associated with Western democracies are seen by those at the apex
of power as the end of the process rather than the initial phase of democratisation. Thus,
parliamentary or presidential elections may indeed take place every four or five years.
4But regardless of these, it is impossible for the opposition/outsiders – themselves not
necessarily dedicated democrats – to challenge the power of the incumbents. Semi-
authoritarian regimes pursue their aims in a highly controlled and sophisticated manner
when contrasted with more traditional authoritarian regimes that cast their shadows over
many corners of the world in the 1960s and 1970s. Rulers and their cronies rarely resort
to open repression or the crude stuffing of ballot boxes. Instead, they use subtler tactics –
for example, pressuring the independent press into self-censorship. Semi-authoritarian
regimes also enjoy a degree of popular support. Due to their Machiavellian-like
manoeuvrings, they manage to present themselves as the only capable political forces in
their respective countries. They address the issue of widespread poverty – to which at
times they have themselves greatly contributed – or ethnic or religious problems, in such
a way that ‘many citizens believe that they offer some public goods that democratic
governments are incapable of delivering’ (Ottaway 2003: 17).
The transitologists’ findings did not fundamentally diverge from the conclusion
reached by other Central Asian scholars, who for some time had already been pointing to
these regimes’ authoritarian nature (Roeder 1994; Treacher 1996; Kubicek 1998),
including Kazakhstan (Bremmer and Welt 1996; Olcott 1997). In recent years, a wide
range of other scholarly writings on the political and economic aspects of post-Soviet
Kazakhstan have also painted a picture of the ruling regime as essentially authoritarian
(Luong and Weinthal 1999; Brauer and Eschment 1999; Cummings 2000, 2002, 2003a,
2005; Olcott 2002; Nazpary 2002; Gleason 2003; Schatz 2004; Luong 2004; Furman
2005; Junisbai and Junisbai 2005; Satpaev 2007). According to these authors, the Kazakh
regime is not a failed democracy or democracy in transition, but rather a carefully
constructed and maintained system. At times, these detailed accounts echo the classical
definition of authoritarianism. Juan Linz considered limited pluralism as the most
distinctive feature of authoritarianism. According to him, in an authoritarian state one
should be able to locate some groups – legal or de facto – that are independent of the
regime and have some kind of political influence. Moreover, authoritarianism, as opposed
to totalitarianism, is largely free of any ideological underpinning, such as Marxist-
Leninism in the Soviet Union or National Socialism in Nazi Germany provided.
According to Linz, what matters most in authoritarian regimes are certain ‘distinctive
5mentalities’, which are apparently more emotional than rational, and not as future-
oriented as the utopianism of ideologies. Authoritarian regimes are also very unlikely to
politically mobilise large sections of their societies. If some groups are mobilised, it
should be always for a very short period of time and under the close supervision of the
authorities. Finally, in an authoritarian regime, a leader or a small group exercises power
within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable limits (Linz 1964: 255–6; 2000:
159–171; see also Purcell 1973: 30).
This thesis aims at contributing to these ongoing debates concerning the
authoritarian nature of the Kazakh regime. The oil industry in this thesis is treated as a
microcosm, which, examined in a focused way over a period of fourteen years, should
allow us to gain some insight into the different strategies adopted by the regime for its
survival that a broader analysis might lack sufficient detail to uncover. Such a thorough
analysis also provides us with an opportunity to observe more closely the transition from
one regime maintenance technique to another. Authoritarian regimes, like all other
political systems, develop over time and constantly try to find the ‘magic’ formula, so to
speak, that might assure their durability. Arguably, then, the study of one segment of
contemporary Kazakhstan can help to identify the specifics and stages of the regime’s
evolution.
Leading on, what makes it worthwhile to investigate the oil industry–regime
relationship is the fact that this relationship is not only shaped by political developments
in Kazakhstan – to an extent reflecting them – but also in turn has an effect on the
country’s politics. It would be no overstatement to assert that the task of bringing the oil
industry under the regime’s control is critical to its grip on power, and thus has absolute
priority. This in turn means that the oil industry can be a testing ground for clarifying the
regime’s maintenance techniques which, if successful, can be applied to resolve other
political problems outside this realm. Finally, the study of the oil industry in this thesis
aims at contributing to the growing oil literature on Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea
region.
62. The politics of oil
So far, scholars have discussed oil in relation to international politics, domestic politics
and countries’ economies. Students of international politics have focused their attention
on the importance of the Caspian Sea region to the neighbouring states, in particular,
Russia (Blank 1995; Shoumikhin 1999; Rutland 2000; Dannreuther 2001), Turkey
(Bolukbasi 1998; Aras and Foster 1999; Sayari 2000), Iran (Entessar 1999; Efegil and
Stone 2001) and China (Gladney 2000; Karasac 2002; Andrews-Speed, Liao and
Dannreuther 2002). Much also has been made of US interests in the Caspian (Lenczowski
1997; Starr 1998; Sobhani 1998; Rashid 2001), with some suggesting that in the 1990s,
the significance of this region to American foreign policy was grossly exaggerated
(Lieven 1999/2000). This however changed in the aftermath of September 11 (Rasizade
2002a; 2002b). Other strands of the broadly understood international politics literature
have preoccupied themselves with the headache-inducing problem of how to ‘get the oil
out’; in other words, with pipeline politics (Appendix 1). The number of scholarly works
dedicated to this and related problems is significant (Forsythe 1996; Menon 1998; Molla-
Zade 1998; Gorvett 1999; Olcott 1999; DeLay 1999; Manning 2000; Hill 2001; Sinker
2001; Terry 2001; Andrianopoulos 2003; Bahgat 2004). Finally, political scientists and
legal experts alike also have spent much time on addressing the issue of the legal status of
the Caspian Sea, the problem known as the ‘sea or lake dilemma’ (Croissant and
Croissant 1999; Raczka 2000; Bundy 2001).
The literature that focuses on the relationships between oil and domestic politics
looks at the ways in which oil, or more precisely petrodollars, aid the Caspian Sea
regimes in sustaining themselves in power. Scholars have tried to demonstrate how the
distribution of state prerequisites enabled rulers to capture key elites, thereby reducing
the potential threat of political opposition. Most of the work on the empowerment of
authoritarian rulers has been conducted in relation to post-Soviet Azerbaijan (Hoffman
2000; Bayulgen 2003, 2005; Rasizade 2002c, 2002d, 2003, 2004; Ottaway 2003); when it
comes to Kazakhstan, the study by Eric McGlinchey (2003) is particularly informative. In
order to explain the relationships between oil and regime maintenance in the case of
Turkmenistan, some authors (Kuru 2002; Ishiyama 2002; Kandiyoti 2002a) advocated
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is dominated by ‘rents’ rather than by productive enterprises like agriculture and
manufacturing, and where the origin of the income is external. In addition, the rents are
generated by a small elite, and the state is the principal recipient of these rents (Beblawi
1987: 51–53). Whereas Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia (Luong 2000; Kim 2003;
Wood 2007) also bear features of rentier states, only Turkmenistan comes close to the
classic version of this concept, due to the country’s excessive dependency on revenues
from natural resources (which the regime uses to gain popular support, as in other rentier
states, by providing free housing, electricity, water and bread).
Finally, the impact of petrodollars on the Caspian Sea economies has been
discussed within the framework of the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’ economic phenomenon.
Dutch Disease is a process whereby favourable price changes in one sector of the
economy lead to distress in other sectors, such as agriculture or manufacturing. This is
because large-scale petroleum related capital inflows from oil sales result in a long-term
sectoral reallocation of capital and labour resources. A persistent Dutch Disease state can
provoke a rapid, even distorted, growth of services, transportation, and other non-tradable
goods, while simultaneously discouraging industrialisation and agriculture. Moreover, the
booming oil sector generates high wages that attract workers from other sectors of the
economy, but drain these industries’ resources and cause output to decline (Karl 1997: 5).
Scholars and commentators throughout the 1990s have been arguing that this kind of
Dutch Disease is a realistic threat to Kazakhstan and other Caspian Sea countries (Auty
1997; Beddoes 1998; Amuzegar 1998; Karl 2000). Yet, by the mid-2000s, it was asserted
that while during the first decade or so Kazakhstan was susceptible to Dutch Disease, the
final outcome is by no means certain (Sabonis-Helf 2004; Pomfret 2005).
The oil literature underscores the importance of oil resources to Kazakhstan’s
stance on the international stage, the regime’s political survival, and the country’s
economic development. Thus, the existing literature demonstrates that oil plays an
important role in shaping post-Soviet Kazakhstan. At the same time, in the scholarly
1 The rentier state concept has been developed by the Middle East scholars (Mahdavy 1970; Chaudhry
1989; Crystal 1991; Brynen 1992; Shambayati 1994; Okruhlik 1999) and over time has been applied to
other parts of the world, pre-revolutionary Iran (Skocpol 1982), Gabon (Yates 1996), Congo (Clark 1997)
and Venezuela (Karl 1997).
8writings little has been said on how the Kazakh oil industry itself has been shaped over
the years. For instance, changes in the structure of the NOC, and its repercussions for the
Kazakh oil industry and the country’s politics, are rarely (Hoffman Fall 2000; Peck 2004)
addressed if at all. Moreover, fundamental events for the development of the Kazakh oil
industry, such as the privatisation of key parts, are generally treated in a rather
instrumental fashion.
An important exception is an article by Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal,
in which the authors ask why five post-Soviet republics rich in gas and oil, i.e. Russia,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which inherited very similar
political and institutional structures in the 1990s, pursued distinct strategies towards
developing their energy resources. In the course of the article, Luong and Weinthal assert
that in order to understand the reasons behind the different strategies pursued by these
respective republics, we should take under consideration the boundaries within which
leaders operate. These include: ‘(a) the availability of alternative sources of export
revenues; and (b) the level of political contestation’ (2001: 370).
This thesis demonstrates that while the reasons given by Luong and Weinthal are
significant, their analysis is not fully satisfactory in the Kazakh case, as it does not take
into consideration the situation in the country’s oil sectors with which the Kazakh
leadership was confronted on the eve of the independence. In other words, political
factors external to the oil industry did not exclusively determine the rulers’ strategies: the
internal politics of the oil industry also mattered. This thesis argues that in order to better
understand the development of the Kazakh oil industry, it is imperative to investigate
more closely the obstacles that the Kazakh regime faced in the course of achieving and
maintaining its grip over the oil industry.
To sum up, this thesis asks, how did the post-Soviet Kazakh regime sustain itself
in power in the years 1991–2005? What sort of regime maintenance techniques did the
Kazakh regime use in the process of establishing and upholding its position during this
period? This thesis attempts to answer this question by analysing the ways in which
Kazakh regime chose to deal with various interests groups in and around the NOC, and
the oil-rich regions that attempted to capture part of the oil industry for their own
benefits. The thesis focuses on the oil industry (or more precisely the political sociology
9of the oil industry) because oil plays a key role in the political and economical life of the
post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Arguably, the detailed study of this key segment of
contemporary Kazakhstan brings to the open the specifics and stages of the regime’s
evolution in the period under discussion. This thesis argues that in order to establish and
sustain control over the oil industry and interests groups in question, the Kazakh regime
used formal, informal and quasi-formal tools, and entered into a tacit agreement with
foreign oil companies. The thesis demonstrates that the Kazakh regime is far from static,
and that its durability and relative stability is largely the result of its ability to respond
promptly to the continuously evolving situation in the country.
3. Outline of the chapters
The focal point of this thesis is the broadly understood relationship between the regime
and the oil-industry. It is argued here that the oil industry is a good testing ground for the
type of relationship that has been developing in post-Soviet Kazakhstan due to the
importance that oil plays in the political and economic life of the country. The empirical
sections of this thesis predominantly focus on situations where the oil industry creates
problems for the regime. This is when oil increases the political risk for the regime. This
thesis argues that the process of addressing political threats on the part of the regime
brings into the open the dynamics of regime–oil industry relationships, and in addition is
likely to lead to the renegotiation of existing relationships between two parties. The thesis
is made up of six chapters, which are grouped into four sections, as described in the
following.
Part One: Theoretical overview
The first chapter demonstrates that the existing literature from other areas of study points
to two sources of threats that the rulers can face, namely: a) the NOC; and b) oil-rich
regions. Those two areas qualify as high-risk, since they constitute the entity (NOC) and
space (oil-rich regions) that is directly linked to the oil industry. Even the slightest
possibility of losing control over any of those areas challenges the rulers’ very authority.
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In both instances, the most problematic actors are various interest groups (as examples
from Venezuela and Russia demonstrate) which, for their own benefit, attempt to wrestle
as much control over the oil industry as possible from the regime. In addition, in oil-rich
areas, unsatisfied interest groups can turn into political manipulators and attempt to
destabilise the situation (the civil wars and resources literature analyses such cases).
Thus, an authoritarian ruler has to create a situation in which interest groups are relatively
satisfied and remain firmly under his/her control in order to prevent major crises.
Leading on, the second part of chapter 1 proposes to unravel the Kazakh regime–
oil industry relationship through the prism of formal (corporatism) and informal (patron–
client) mechanisms of control. In doing so, this thesis moves away from the zhuz-horde,
tribe, and clan-based approaches, which argue that post-Soviet Kazakh politics is
predominantly based on the pre-Soviet institutions that survived the Soviet assault.
Importantly, this thesis does not argue that existing zhuz, tribe, and clan-based
explanations are inappropriate per se, but rather that the adoption of different approaches
can broaden our understanding of the ways in which a regime sustains itself in power.
Arguably, formal and informal mechanisms of control can be applied to the analysis of
the regime–oil industry relationships, because those two concepts have been used in the
past in order to examine the regime–business relationships in countries that are run by
authoritarian regimes. Moreover, such formal and informal mechanisms were applied by
Sovietologists to explain state–society relationships in the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind
that post-Soviet Kazakhstan was marked by continuity on the elite and institutional
levels, these analytical tools can still be regarded appropriate.
Part Two: The NOC and the oil men
The second chapter argues that in the first years of independence, the Kazakh regime
attempted to control the country’s oil industry with the help of corporatist mechanisms.
The corporatist type of regime–oil industry relationship was largely a logical continuation
of the way in which the oil industry was governed in the Soviet period. However, this
arrangement proved unsustainable, due to the challenges from inside the oil industry in
which: a) the corporatist structure created the space for the emergence of a ‘strong man’,
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who attempted to take over the NOC from the president; and b) some parts of the oil
industry in the peripheries were captured by local oil men and notables. The inevitable
clash between the Kazakh president and these oil men led to a restructuring of the
existing relationships. In the next opening, the Kazakh regime began the slow process of
moving away from corporatist mechanisms and towards patron–client techniques. This
transition was greatly speeded up during the privatisation process of the oil industry,
which to an extent was motivated by the growing challenges to the president. In the
following years, the Kazakh president was able to consolidate his position further as he
successfully centralised the country’s oil industry and turned his adversaries into trusted
clients. Finally, the political manoeuvre discussed in the chapter worked largely because
of the split between the oil men and other notables over the disagreement concerning the
privatisation of the oil sector.
The third chapter argues that the introduction of patron–client mechanisms was
accompanied by the gradual Kazakhization of the oil industry, which intentionally and
unintentionally strengthened the patron–client ties between the Kazakh president and his
clients. This process of Kazakhization is discussed through the examples of: a) major
Kazakh sub-contracting companies, which at the beginning of the 1990s fell into the
hands of ethnic Russian directors; and b) the NOC KazMunaiGas. In the final section of
this chapter, we discuss the negative effects that the Kazakhization per se of the NOC
KazMunaiGas is having on the Kazakh oil sector. The third chapter should be read as a
continuation of, and supplement to, chapter 2. Whereas chapter 2 addresses the struggles
for the ‘soul’ of the Kazakh oil industry at the apex of power, chapter 3 looks at mid-
level players, whose submission to the ruling regime is no less important than that of the
major players. Finally, this chapter demonstrates the extent to which the study of sub-
contracting companies brings into the open the dynamics of the oil sector that a study of
NOC alone is not able to address properly.
Part Three: Oil-rich regions: the case of Atyrau
Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on the relationships between the regime and the oil-rich
peripheries, with a special focus on the Atyrau region. These chapters move away from
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the issue of oil men and concentrate on the larger population and interest groups in the
oil-rich regions. These did not gain from the privatisation of the oil industry as the oil
men did and, in the case of the interest groups, were further cut off from oil industry
related contracts. Chapters 4 and 5 argue that the way in which Nazarbayev’s regime
went about addressing the challenges that emerged in the oil-rich areas differs
significantly from the way in which it dealt with the threats posed by the major players in
the Kazakh oil industry. The most important difference between the two was the heavy
involvement of external actors (foreign oil companies) in addressing the problem of the
interest groups in the oil-rich areas. As a result of this, in the Atyrau region, the regime
structured its relationships with interest groups via the involvement of foreign oil
companies, which became an indispensable part of the equation. The notion that foreign
oil companies play a profound role in post-Soviet Kazakhstan – including the oil-rich
areas – is not new (Cummings 2000; Luong and Weinthal 2001). Yet, this thesis
elaborates considerably on the question of foreign oil companies as it: a) attempts to
demonstrate the genesis of the involvement of the foreign oil companies in the Atyrau
region; and b) shows the limits of the co-operation between the relevant foreign oil
companies and the regime through the Atyrau example of the local content policy.
Part Four: Renewal and consolidation
The first part of chapter 6 argues that the Kazakh regime, which throughout the 1990s
and beyond had been thriving on patrimonial networks, eventually began showing signs
of moving away from these established patterns. In the first half of the 2000s, the Kazakh
regime attempted to co-opt small- and medium-sized businesses across Kazakhstan in
response to the Kazakhgate scandal and the rise of a pro-business opposition. Although
the government’s initial actions failed to yield desirable results – while also not bringing
about any serious political consequences for the regime – the government did not cease
its pro-business politics, but persistently put forward new policies. It is argued here that
this determination on the part of the regime was a real attempt at gradually moving away
from a situation in which patrimonial networks had dominated the Kazakh polity,
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including earlier regime–oil industry relationships, to one in which quasi-formal
mechanisms – controlled by the regime – became the primary regulators.
The new type of relationship stems from a need to accommodate the ever-growing
Kazakh middle-classes, which are supposed to become the backbone of the ruling regime
by replacing the powerful and unpredictable financial/industrial groups that were
favoured before 2002. Thus, the regime pushes for a more coherent relationship between
small- and medium-sized businesses and the state in order to assure its long-term
stability. At the same time, not all mechanisms of control can be expected to alter
significantly. In the second part of chapter 6, we discuss a number of disputes that the
Kazakh state has entered into since 2002 onward with foreign oil companies, which could
potentially have far-reaching repercussions on the regime–companies’ tacit alliance in the
oil-rich areas. Yet, we argue that while the disputes over Tenigz and Kashagan were in
themselves major developments, they are unlikely to profoundly affect the co-operation
between the two parties in the Atyrau region.
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Chapter 1: The oil industry and techniques of regime maintenance
In the introduction, it is stated that the main aim of this thesis is to investigate the ways in
which the authoritarian regime in post-Soviet Kazakhstan (that came into existence with
the collapse of the Soviet Union) maintained itself in power from 1991 until 2005. The
techniques of regime maintenance are scrutinized through the example of the Kazakh oil
industry–regime relationship. It is argued here that the oil industry, which plays a critical
role in the political and economic life of the country, is fertile ground for studying ‘the
rules of the game’ in Kazakhstan. This thesis predominantly focuses on the ways in
which the Kazakh regime has brought the oil industry under its control, and how it has
managed to maintain its grip over it.
The first part of this chapter draws on the oil sector, political science and regional
studies literatures, and attempts to localise potential problem areas for the regime as far
as the oil industry and its key players are concerned. The second part argues that in order
to analyse the ways in which the Kazakh regime dealt with the possible challenges, we
should move away from the zhuz-horde, tribe, and clan-based approaches towards
alternative regime maintenance techniques – namely corporatism and patron–client
networks.
This chapter demonstrates that the regime, in order to ensure the uninterrupted
flow of petrodollars and in order to represent itself as a credible partner to the foreign oil
companies, had to gain full control over two crucial areas – firstly, the National Oil
Company (NOC), and secondly, the oil-rich regions of the country. This remains an
ongoing issue. Problematic for the regime in both instances is the fact that the interest
groups involved, for example presidents, directors, and managers working for the NOC,
and some notables in the remote oil-rich areas, will attempt to wrestle from the regime as
much control over the oil spoils as possible for their own benefit. Thus, the rulers at the
top of the regime structure have to maintain a delicate balance between all the interest
groups: on the one hand, they can not allow any of the groups to became too strong at the
peril of losing complete control over the oil industry, and on the other hand, nor can they
offer too little in a constant bargaining with interest groups, since this can lead to a
variety of political crises. In relation to the latter point, for example, those working in the
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National Oil Company (as well as their clients) can obstruct government policies, while
unhappy notables in the oil-rich areas – in the most extreme situation – can encourage the
creation of secessionist movements.
In order to explain the ways in which the Kazakh regime maintained its grip over
the oil industry in the period 1991–2005, this study shifts away from the zhuz-horde,
tribe, clan-based approaches that were first developed by Kazakh political scientists and
also applied in the 1990s by some Western academics in order to analyse post-Soviet
Kazakh politics. Whereas this thesis does not argue that these approaches are irrelevant, it
does however suggest that other approaches – most notably those emphasizing patron–
client networks and corporatism – can greatly enhance our understanding of the regime–
oil industry relationships, and should be taken under consideration. Arguably,
corporatism and patron–client networks should be utilized, because: a) these two
concepts have been widely used by political scientists and political-economists in order to
explain regime–business relationships in countries that are run by authoritarian regimes;
and b) corporatism and patron–client networks were used by Sovietologists to shed some
light on state–society relationships in the Soviet Union. Considering that post-Soviet
Kazakhstan was marked by continuity with its past on the elite and institutional levels,
these analytical tools can still be deemed to be useful. The second section of the chapter
also introduces two additional concepts – which derive from corporatism and patron–
client networks – quasi-corporatism and neo-patrimonial regimes, which were not used
by Sovietologists in order to analyse state–society relationships in the Soviet Union, but
which can prove useful in the study of post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Finally, the last section of
this chapter will briefly discuss the fieldwork and the reliability of the interviews with the
representatives of the Kazakh oil industry, foreign oil companies and major foreign sub-
contractors, on which the empirical part of thesis greatly rely.
1. The oil industry: battlegrounds and key players
In the first part of this section, we will discuss the NOCs, which in the last few decades
have become an essential part of the oil industry landscape in oil-producing countries.
The special role that NOCs play puts the bosses and managers of these companies in a
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unique position, which they are likely to abuse. Their greed for money and power leads to
the creation of an entire web of informal networks/power bases, which can threaten the
very positions of the rulers. The example of the general strike in Venezuela in 2002 is the
most striking one. In the second part, we will briefly discuss oil-rich areas in these
countries, where marginalised local elites and the local population can challenge the
authority of the regime. We will demonstrate the problems that the regime might possibly
encounter through the example of Aceh, Indonesia.
1.1. National Oil Companies (NOCs)
The story of the NOCs dates back to the 1920s and 1930s, when Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales (YPF) and Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) were founded in Argentina and Mexico
respectively. The main reason behind the creation of the companies was a drive on the
part of the then-ruling regimes to assert their independence in relation to foreign interests,
namely, foreign oil companies and Western states which had hitherto controlled the
petroleum industry. Likewise, in the 1970s and 1980s, the takeover of the oil industry
from foreign companies and the creation of such NOCs were driving elements in the
assertion of the independence of some African, Asian, and the Middle Eastern states
(Noreng 2002: 54).2 Thus, bringing the oil industries of these countries under the control
of their respective national governments, as Valerie Marcel and John V. Mitchell put it,
‘is a story of national emancipation in which the oil was taken back from the foreigners
and used to support national economic development and to purchase allegiance to the
new state’ (2006: 14). Having said all of that, the nationalisation and growth of these
NOCs would probably not have been so significant if foreign oil companies had proved
to be more flexible in renegotiating the existing oil contracts.
It should be kept in mind that in most of the cases, the tipping point in the
disputes between two parties – that eventually led to the creation and solidification of the
NOCs – were oil concession agreements, which were made in the first half of the century
and gave host countries little or no advantage. Rather, these concession agreements
2 Prior to 1973, the seven major oil companies, known then as the Seven Sisters, controlled 70 per cent of
the total oil produced in the world (excluding the then communist countries) and had 39 per cent and 77 per
cent of U.S. and Middle Eastern oil production respectively (Al-Moneef 1998: 205).
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provided foreign oil companies with extensive rights, privileges, and exclusive
appropriation of petroleum profits with relatively small royalty payments and few
other obligations in return. Consequently, the system did not produce a balanced
government–company relationship. This failure led to constant revisions and
amendments to the relationship, and the eventual phasing out of such agreements
altogether by the producing countries. (Gao 1994: 2)
Over the years, new types of contracts were introduced, such as joint ventures, production
sharing agreements (PSA) and service contracts agreements, which offered a role for the
host governments and their NOCs to varying degrees.
Kristen Bindemann states that the existing types of oil contracts can be broadly
categorised into risk-bearing and non-risk bearing agreements, with most arrangements
falling into the former category (1999: 11). The most common type of contractual
agreement is the PSA, under which mineral resources are owned by the state, which
brings in a foreign company as a contractor to provide technical and financial services for
exploration and development operations (Pongsiri 2004: 432). Under PSAs, the foreign
oil company carries the entire exploration risk. If no oil is found, the company receives
no compensation. The government or NOC usually has an option to participate in
different aspects of the exploration and development process. Moreover, the foreign
company operating under PSAs is normally obliged to buy 40 per cent of the essential
equipment and machines required for its operations from local producers. PSA contracts
operate on a profit sharing basis, sharing the volume of oil produced between the chosen
Western company and the host state. However, most of the time, almost half of the profit
produced goes towards compensation of the investor’s expenditure (cost-recovery
product), and only the second part is divided between investor and state in the proportion
stipulated in the PSAs.3 In the case of the Joint Venture type of contract, both the foreign
oil company and the NOC participate actively in the operation of the oilfield and acquire
ownership of specific parts of the production. This means that the host government on the
one hand shares the risk of the exploration to some extent – something that it does not
under the PSA – and on the other hand, in addition to royalties, taxes, and profit on the
3 Irina Paliashvili, ‘The Concept of Production Sharing,’ Seminar on the Legislation on Production Sharing
Agreements, 14, 1998.
http://www.rulg.com/documents/The_Concept_of_Production_Sharing.htm (Accessed 2 February 2004).
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oil produced, it is entitled to a share of profits (Bindemann 1999: 10). Thus, the joint
venture – if successful – can in the long run be much more profitable than the PSA.4
In the overwhelming majority of oil contract negotiations, the host government’s
principal representative is the NOC. Somewhat interestingly, the NOC is usually not only
a host government’s preferred choice, but also that of the foreign oil companies. From the
position of the foreign oil companies, the NOCs are the most desirable partners, since
they are likely to possess more and better information about the mineral deposits in the
country than any other agency and to understand the technological requirements.
Moreover, the NOC is sometimes seen as being less politically motivated than the
government (Bindemann 1999: 8). Rather ironically, over the years the position of the
NOCs has been reinforced by the foreign oil companies that were initially created to
replace them.5
The leading role that NOCs play in oil producing countries places the bosses and
the managers of those companies in ‘a privileged position with regard to access to capital,
access to economic rent, and competitive positions in the market’ (Noreng 1996: 208).
Their stand in the country is further strengthened by information asymmetries. The
government overseers usually do not possess adequate knowledge about the oil industry,
and are unable to sufficiently scrutinise these companies. This allows the managers of the
NOCs to pursue their own objectives, such as capturing economic rents for their own
benefit to the exclusion of the rest of society.6 In order to assert their own positions, the
bosses of the NOCs strive to build a vast system of personal networks that reach into
various segments of the society (Noreng 1996: 208; McPherson 2003: 8). The aim of this
exercise is to create, according to some commentators, a ‘state within a state’ structure
4 It should be added that most of the time, the PSAs are used when Western oil companies operate in an
unstable area which is characterized by: a lack of a sufficient legal framework (most of the time laws
contradict themselves), of strong ties between business and political elites, of respect for private property as
well as the presence of corruption, high level of crime and in some instances even civil wars. Over the
years, such PSAs have been applied in, for example, Angola, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, all of them
countries which have been politically and economically unstable. Most of the time, the host government is
left without much choice. It can either go along with PSAs, which are not the most lucrative type of
contract but guarantee a stable flow of funds into the government coffers, or not see any investments at all.
See also: Carola Hoyos and Roula Khalaf, ‘Oil groups dream of day they can enter Iraq,’ Financial Times,
7 December 2006.
5 Justin Blum, ‘National Oil Firms Take Bigger Role,’ Washington Post, 3 August 2005.
6 Paul Stevens, ‘Middle East Oil: State domination in the sector – an asset or a liability in a low price
world?’ http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/speeches/pstevens.htm (Accessed 27 September 04).
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that functions according to its own logic and is extremely difficult to break (Madelin
1975; Philip 1982; Randall 1987; Boue 1993; Gott 2005).
The web of political allies is usually built through awarding long-term exclusive
contracts to various subcontracting companies, which are in turn connected to the
relevant political actors (Pongsiri 2004: 435; Machmud 2000); as Noreng puts it:
‘established NOCs, such as Pemex in Mexico, Statoil in Norway, and Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) in Venezuela, all have close links with local subcontractors,
which ex post are not fully competitive, but which make up an important political
constituency’ (1996: 214). The amount of money being plundered by the managers of the
NOCs and/or being spent by the company on fuelling informal networks can be truly
staggering. McPherson pointed out that the recent audit of Pertamina, Indonesia’s NOC,
exposed losses of over US$ 2 billion per year, an amount equal to 10 per cent of the
national budget. A similar audit of the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC)
estimated losses at between US$ 800 million and US$ 1 billion annually (2003: 4). In
some instances, the government itself enhances the company’s position in society, as it
transfers to the NOC some of the responsibility for building schools, hospitals as well as
for creating jobs (Al-Rasheed 2002: 96). Finally, besides building a vast patronage
network, the bosses of the NOCs relentlessly push for the expansion of their companies,
as they ‘realise that the larger the firm, the greater its ability to influence or even to
control its social and political environment’ (Grayson 1981: 20).
The strength of the NOCs is most visible at times when rulers of authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian countries attempt to change the existing rules of the game. In
Venezuela for instance, Hugo Chavez, after coming to power towards the end of the
1990s, decided to bring PDVSA – the company which for years had been run ‘as a
corporatist enterprise, a state within the state, a vast conglomerate dispensing favours and
bribes’ – under his control (Gott 2005: 170). The sticking point in the disputes between
PDVSA’s bosses (or oligarchs) and the new government was the money that the
company spent on overseas investments, which the new president wanted to be diverted
to social projects at home (2005: 220). In order to impose his authority, Chavez appointed
a number of hostile bosses (former soldiers) to the PDVSA’s Board of Directors, a move
which did not go down well with the company’s management. In response to Chavez’s
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interference, the PDVSA managers joined a nationwide general strike in April 2002,
which was allegedly initiated by the regime’s opponents and made up of opposition
political parties, business groups, and the Confederation of Trade Unions (CTV).7
The involvement of the PDVSA was crucial as the company bureaucracy and
managers mobilised – through the PDVSA’s ultra-loyal trade union bosses8 – around
20,000 of the company’s employees. Most of them were skilled staff, including engineers
and technicians, and they stopped work for two months. This in turn brought Venezuela
to a virtual standstill (Sylvia and Danopoulos 2003: 70). Eventually, Chavez denounced
the strikers as saboteurs and sacked most of them – 18,000 in total. The toll was highest
amongst skilled workers: two-thirds of managers and technical staff went.9 In order to
consolidate his grip on the NOC, Chavez appointed political allies and members of his
family to high positions in the company;10 his cousin runs the firm’s shipping arm, while
the president’s brother helps to co-ordinate the company’s subsidised oil sales around the
Caribbean as ambassador to Cuba.11 The web of sub-contractors connected to the old
managers have been increasingly finding themselves being cut out of business, with a
new group of sub-contractors loyal to the current ruling regime slowly replacing them
(Briceno-Leon 2005: 21–22).
Leading on, Chavez’s Venezuela is a somewhat extreme example of a struggle for
the NOC, as in most situations the infighting between NOC bosses and the regime for
domination of the oil industry takes place behind the scenes. The ruler seeks to get rid of
a potentially threatening actor (the president of the company), but upholds the existing
relationships with other important players in the company. Only with time will he
introduce new clients or attempt to change relationships with the existing ones.
7 Some suggest that PDVSA was not merely one of the parties taking part in the strike, but was in fact a key
organiser: ‘This is clearly an oil strike, not a “general strike,” as it is often described. At the state-owned oil
company, PDVSA, which controls the industry, management is leading the strike because it is at odds with
the Chavez government’. Mark Weisbrot quoted in ‘Who’s to Blame in Venezuela?’ The Power and
Interest News Report, 8 January 2003.
8 The NOC’s trade unions are often one of the most important allies of the companies’ managements in oil
producing countries. For instance, when in 2005 some politicians in Mexico began taking about the back
door privatisation of Pemex, the managers of the company gave the union $1.3m just to celebrate the
annual anniversary of oil expropriation. That moved was aimed at keeping unions on the side of the
management. Source: ‘Pemex Change is needed but far from easy,’ Financial Times, 12 December 2005.
9 ‘Oil, missions and a chat show,’ The Economist, 14 May 2005.
10 Alma Guillermoprieto, ‘Don’t Cry for Me, Venezuela,’ The New York Review of Books, 52 (15), 6
October 2005.
11 ‘Oil’s dark Secret,’ The Economist, Aug 10th 2006; ‘Global or national?’ The Economist, 30 April 2005.
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Vladimir Putin’s first real big test after becoming president of Russia was to
remove the Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev from his post, something that his predecessor,
Boris Yeltsin, did not dare to do, due to the apparent strength of the company.12 From the
beginning of the 1990s, Gazprom has been a crucial element of the Russian economy,
since it is the largest gas supplier on the planet (market capitalization US$6.2 billion,
300,000 employees), controlling a quarter of the world’s gas reserves. On top of that,
Gazprom controlled hotels, airlines, firms and TV stations. Even more importantly
through its vast networks of clients, Vyakhirev headed the energy-industry lobby, which
included Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (whose government was often called
‘government of the energy complex’). For instance, during his four years in office,
Chernomyrdin protected Gazprom from division into several independent companies
(Kim 2003: 81). The money spent on fuelling informal networks at this time was second
to none. In 2001, Boris Fyodor, the minister responsible for taxation stated: ‘I have
evidence that between US$2 billion and US$3 billion a year [of company money] is
misused in strange transitions. It is clear there is asset stripping going on’.13 Forbes
magazine estimated that during his time in office, Vyakhirev pumped as much as US$8
billion out of the company.14
The initial wave of attacks by the Kremlin on Gazprom to impose more
transparency and accountability was met with strong opposition from the company’s
managers. Indeed, some speculated that Putin was politically too weak to take on
Vyakhirev.15 It took more than a year of persistent campaigning against Vyakhirev – that
the company boss was being primarily accused of mismanagement, corruption and
nepotism – for the company’s board to fire its chief executive. The new boss of the
company became the Putin loyalist Alexei Miller.16 Yet other leading officials from the
Vyakhirev era remained at the top of the company for a few more years.17 Their influence
only began to weaken once Miller attacked the complex web of companies which owned
many of Gazprom’s valuable assets, and implemented a reorganisation of the company
12 ‘Gazprom hit by allegations of massive corruption,’ Alexander Oil and Gas, 24 May 2001.
13 Ben Aris, ‘Gazprom and Rem,’ Alexander Oil and Gas, 29 May 2001.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Neil Buckley, ‘Russia’s shy man of energy,’ Financial Times, 28 April 2006.
17 ‘Vladimir Putin: Corruption Fighter,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8 (2), 18 January 2002.
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and a merger with Rosneft, the state oil company. It was stated that those steps finally
diminished the authority of the anti-Putin managers.18 In some ways, the sequence of
events that unfolded in Russia followed a well-established pattern. For instance, Oystein
Noreng argued that the reorganisation of a company is a very common outcome of the
struggle between the regime and the NOCs (1996: 205). Thus, in order to re-establish its
authority over the company, the government has to change institutional arrangements and
root out the informal networks on which the previous bosses have relied.
1.2. The oil-rich areas
The presidents, directors, and managers of the NOCs are actors who potentially threaten
those at the apex of power because of their access to capital, which they skilfully use to
build their own power bases. At the same time, in the oil-rich areas local notables are
potentially threatening because they lack privileged access to the capital – access which
is instead granted to the groups from the centre of the country. It should be kept in mind
that in an oil-rich country, one of the most lucrative ways to enrich oneself is to win a
long term contract – for instance for construction – with the foreign oil company.
Individuals and groups that are usually awarded those contracts – with the ruler or his
inner circle’s apparent approval and in co-operation with the foreign companies – are the
regime’s close allies. In real terms, however, the situation of the local actors is not
hopeless – with time, they also establish their own relationships with the foreign oil
companies. Locals, however, feel that they are not being treated fairly by the government.
This feeling stems from the fact that as inhabitants of oil-rich areas, they should be given
special access to contracts rather than being treated as third class clients of the regime.
Furthermore, the feeling of unfair treatment is also widespread among the wider
population of the oil-rich areas. People living in those areas assert that they are being
treated unfairly, even if their living standards do not necessary differ from those in other
areas of the country. Whereas on some occasions the grievances of the local populations
are fully justified, their demands – in number of cases – can also be exaggerated. Hence,
the population as well as the local notables almost uniformly maintain that the central
18 Arkady Ostrovsky, ‘Chief executive has a vision for Gazprom,’ Financial Times, 4 April 2005.
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authorities neglect their interests, whether this is in fact so or not. The combination of
greed on the part of the local notables and imagined or real grievances on the part of the
local population can – in the most extreme cases – lead to the emergence of secessionist
movements which, once set in motion, tend to endure for a very long time. Thus, from the
ruler’s perspective, satisfying interests groups and the local populations in the oil-rich
areas is as important (if not more) as bringing the NOC under the regime’s firm control.
The case of Aceh, Indonesia offers a good illustration of the tensions between local
notables, the population and the regime in a resource-abundant area that transformed
itself into a secessionist movement.
The rebellion in Aceh led by the Aceh Freedom Movement, known by the popular
acronym GAM,19 is often seen as a product of the region’s cultural, religious, and
primordial differences with other parts of Indonesia. Yet, it was argued that while
religious concerns were in fact mentioned by the GAM’s leaders, it was only in passing,
with the real demands focusing squarely on political and economic independence
(Robinson 1998: 132).20 Hence it was no accident that the secessionist movement was
formed in 1976, just as a large natural gas facility was beginning its operations. The
leadership and initial members of GAM came from a small, but growing business class,
which felt aggravated because outsiders, ‘particularly those with good political
connections in Jakarta, or with the military in Aceh, appeared to be winning more than
their share of [the] lucrative contracts’ that were awarded by the foreign companies
(Robinson 1998: 132; see also Crouch 1979: 577). For instance, in 1974 none other but
GAM’s leader, Hasan di Tiro, lost a bid to build a pipeline for Mobil Oil. In addition,
intellectuals and local government technocrats were frustrated by the fact that substantial
revenues generated by taxes and royalties were channelled directly to the central
government rather than being spent locally (Kell 1995: 27–30).21 This exclusion from the
regime’s networks left the Aceh elites with little scope for accumulating wealth and
status, thereby leading to a situation in which political change became ‘the only avenue
19 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
20 A similar sort of argument was made about the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Source:
‘Special report Sudan: glittering towers in a war zone,’ The Economist, 9 December 2006.
21 That money was primary spent by General Suharto and his inner circle on rewarding and buying off a
growing circle of beneficiaries, with the result that the stability of the regime was maintained (Crouch
1979: 578).
24
for satisfying their greed and aspirations, or expressing their grievances’ (Le Billon
2001a: 567). The local population came to share the local elites’/rebels’ views; however,
they were not obvious allies.
It was argued that generally, Aceh’s economy was in good shape, and as such did
not provide a basis for a widespread rebellion. According to a national survey in 1971,
Aceh’s per capita GDP was 97 per cent of the national average, and between 1971 and
1975, Aceh’s real annual growth rate averaged 5.2 percent (Ross 2003b: 7). Moreover,
there were considerable economic benefits for Aceh from the liquefied natural gas (LNG)
boom.22 Yet, the boom also brought a number of undesirable side effects, including the
expropriation of land from small farmers without adequate compensation, and a failure to
provide adequate social amenities and infrastructure for displaced communities
(Robinson 1998: 136). Whereas all those factors were important for the local population
themselves, they were not enough to generate sufficient support for the rebellion. Michael
Ross states that the locals’ belief that the jobs and the revenues from the natural gas plant
were not being adequately shared with the people of Aceh pushed them towards more
radical elements. These issues were seized upon by GAM, whose ‘propaganda suggested
that if independent, the Acehnese would become wealthy like the citizens of Brunei’
(2003a: 8). Hence, the key factor in gathering the local population behind GAM seems to
be the belief that secession would make them richer (2003a: 7). It should be added that in
the years to come, the factors sustaining the rebellion – besides greed and grievances –
were firstly, random brutality towards the general population, which led to a growing
radicalisation of Aceh’s people, and secondly, the geographical location of the region
itself.
In reference to the latter point, it is important to keep in mind that the rebellion in
Aceh, or indeed in other oil-rich regions, for instance, in the Delta region of Nigeria
(Watts 2001; Watts 2004; Frynas 2001), or the Cabinda enclave in Angola (Le Billon
2001b), would not have taken place or endured for long if the resource-rich regions were
not located far away from the centre of each country (Ross 2004). Philippe Le Billon
stated: ‘[T]he greater the distance or difficulty of access from the centre of control, the
22 ‘[D]uring construction, the new facility employed 8,000 to 12,000 people; during the peak years of
production, it employed 5,000 and 6,000. Since local infrastructure was poor, Mobil also built roads,
schools, medical facilities, and 4,000 to 5,000 new houses’ (Ross 2003b: 12).
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greater the cost of control and the higher the risk of losing the resource to the adversary.
In other words, a resource close to the capital is less likely to be captured by rebels than a
resource close to a border. Resources can thus be classified as proximate or distant’
(2001a: 570). Thus, the geographic proximity of the resource-rich areas is as important in
analysing the struggle for the soul of these regions as understanding the events that lead
to the radicalisation of the local elites and populations.
To sum up, in this section we discussed situations where the oil industry creates
problems for the regime. This is when the oil factor increases the political risk for the
regime. The existing literature points to two threats that authoritarian rulers can face,
namely: NOC and oil-rich regions. Those two areas are qualified as high-risk, since they
occur in the entities (NOC) and spaces (oil-rich regions) that are directly linked to the oil
industry. The very possibility of losing control over any of those areas challenges the
rulers’ authority. In both instances, various interest groups constitute the most
problematic actors, which will attempt to wrestle as much control over the oil industry as
possible from the regime for their own benefit. In addition, in oil-rich areas, unsatisfied
interest groups can turn into political manipulators that will attempt to destabilise the
situation. Thus, an authoritarian ruler has to create a situation in which interest groups are
relatively satisfied and remain firmly under his control in order to prevent major crises.
Leading on, this thesis argues that the process of addressing political threats that the
oil industry poses by the regime brings into the open the dynamics of the regime–oil
industry relationship. This thesis analyses the development of this relationship through
the prism of formal (corporatist) and informal (patron–client network) mechanisms of
control. In so doing, this thesis moves away from the dominant explanation, which says
that the Kazakh regime, in order to remain in power, relies primarily on zhuz-hordes,
tribes and clan-based systems (which were adapted to the Soviet power structures and
subsequently became a salient feature of Kazakh politics in the post-Soviet period).
The shift from the dominant explanation – as the next section discusses – is
predominantly but not solely dictated by growing scepticism towards the zhuz, tribe, and
clan prism among some key Central Asian scholars including leading anthropologists.
Furthermore, a study of the power structure of the Kazakh post-Soviet oil industry –
which is at the heart of this thesis – through a dominant prism ran the risk of getting lost
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in a maze of anecdotes which would be potentially difficult to verify. The outcome of
such an undertaking could far too easily end up being sensationalistic and journalistic in
nature rather than academic. Having said all of that, the following section concludes that
detailed ethnographic study of the Kazakh oil industry – conducted by an anthropologists
rather than political scientist - is much needed and that this thesis is a first step rather than
a decisive statement on the Kazakh regime-oil industry relationship.
Rather than looking at the regime-oil industry through a zhuz, tribe and clan prism,
this thesis proposes to reintroduce to the study of the post-Soviet Central Asia the concept
of corporatism as well as to build and expand on concepts of patron-clientalism and neo-
patrimonial regimes (borrowed by Central Asian scholars from the African studies)
which enjoyed a brief spell of interest in the 1990s but failed to make substantial inroads
into a Central Asian studies.
In reference to the first point, this thesis reintroduces the concept of corporatism
which – as discussed in the following sections of this chapter - was used by some leading
Sovietologists in order to analysis regime-society relationships in the post-Khrushchev
Soviet Union. Despite being an important and fully recognised tool of analysis
corporatism was omitted by the students of post-Soviet Central Asia in favour of kinship
and informal networks based explanations as the zhuz, tribes and clan driven analysis
fully demonstrate. Whereas this thesis does not argue that informal politics did not play a
key role in post-Soviet Kazakhstan in the 1990s, it contends however that scholars should
make more use of the corporatist prism when analysing – in particular - the first years
after the collapse of the Soviet regime. The institutional component of the Soviet Union
was far too easily disregarded as unimportant in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse even
though it can aid our understanding of the initial behaviour of the post-Soviet Kazakh
regime (as this study attempts to demonstrate through the example of the oil industry).
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the corporatist prism should be gradually applied in
order to explain the current post-transitional period and the survival of authoritarian
regimes in Central Asia. Hence while informal politics are a dominant ‘modus operandi’,
students of Central Asian regimes should start paying more attention to alternative regime
maintenance techniques. This thesis demonstrates that the corporatist prism – at least in
the Kazakh case – to a degree explains new ways in which the regime tries to co-opt the
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ever-growing oil industry related business class that is growing rich due to the sky
rocketing oil prices.
In reference to the second point, the following sections will demonstrate that in the
1990s, some Western scholars attempted to understand the direction into which post-
Soviet Central Asia was heading by comparing it - most notably – to sub-Sahara Africa.
Whereas those comparative studies made some valuable points about for example, the
similarities and difference in the structure of the post-colonial states in both regions, the
sub-Saharan prism did not endure for long. This thesis suggests that students of Central
Asia should not neglect sub-Saharan Africa and the neo-patrimonial prism to hastily.
Firstly, comparing Central Asia to sub-Sahara Africa allows us to better understand the
motivations behind decisions taken at crucial junctions by the Kazakh regime. Secondly
it allows us to uncover the nature of the Kazakh regime today and the course which it is
pursuing.
2. Techniques of regime maintenance: zhuz, tribe, and clan
It has been asserted that in order to legitimise and consolidate his political position amidst
the post-Soviet chaos, the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev has relied heavily on
the zhuz-hordes system, the logic of which is based in pre-Soviet structures. The Kazakh
hordes were largely ‘political-communal aggregates that were also understood through
kinship, although their origins owed little to blood relations’ (Schatz 2001: 20). The
traditionally nomadic Kazakh society was divided into three major hordes – separate
confederations of nomadic tribes each ruled by their own elected khan – in which
membership closely corresponded to distinct geographical areas: the younger or lesser
horde [kishi zhuz] occupied the western and central regions (including Kyzrloda), the
middle horde [orta zhuz] occupied the northern as well as the central regions, and the
elder or greater horde [uly zhuz] controlled eastern and southeastern Kazakhstan
(including Almaty and Shimkent). Nazarbayev’s alleged strength lies in his ability to
ensure that all zhuz receive equal representation in the top levels of government. In
addition, he abstains from inter-zhuz struggles for political domination by reserving for
himself the position of an arbiter, a power broker. At the end of the 1990s, the
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composition of the country’s power structure – when viewed through zhuz lenses –
looked as follows: ‘President Nazarbayev [Elder zhus], Chairman of the Senate O.
Baigeldi [Elder zhus], Prime Minister N. Balgimbayev [Younger zhus], Chairman of the
Majilis M. Ospanov [Middle zhus] and State Secretary A. Kekil’baev [Younger zhus]’
(Hoffman Fall 2000: 245).
Proponents of the zhuz approach point to the fact that Nazarbayev did not revive
some old, pre-modern political culture, but rather continued to build on the political
system that developed in the Soviet Kazakhstan in the form of traditional structures,
which merged and co-existed with the Leninist regime (Schatz 2000: 162; Schatz 2004:
98–103), in order to strengthen their point. That is to say, the politics in Soviet times
were largely controlled by traditional zhuz leaders behind a façade of Communist Party
organisation. Nurbulat Masanov, a late Kazakh political scientist turned political activist,
noted that Dinmukhammed Kunaev, who ruled Kazakhstan throughout Brezhnev’s era
(1964–1986), was partly able to stay in power for a period of more than twenty years
because he surrounded himself with party functionaries from the younger zhuz who could
not seriously compete with him for power, due to their insufficient influence in the
capital (itself partly because of their traditional place of residence in the countryside). At
the same time, his main rivals from the middle zhuz were allowed to occupy various
secondary positions, such as chairman of the council of ministers and secretaries of the
oblast party committees, but were not promoted to any sort of position in the Central
Committee Bureau of the Kazakhstan Communist Party.23
In recent years, a number of studies – explicitly and implicitly – have reinforced
the argument concerning the key positions that the zhuz system plays in Kazakh post-
Soviet life by trying to understand the ways in which pre-Soviet social organisations
survived and adapted to the Soviet reality on the local community level in Kazakhstan
and the other Central Asian republics. It has been argued that the Soviet project did not
eradicate these traditional social structures, but rather forced them to adapt to the formal
institutions. According to Kathleen Collins, ‘clan structure and identity should be more
likely to survive repression than other, more institutionalised identities, such as Islam’
23 Nurbulat Masanov, ‘Perception of Ethnic and All-National Identity in Kazakhstan,’ IDE-JETRO, ‘The
Nationalities Question in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan’, 51, March 2002; Nurbulat Masanov, ‘The role of clans
in Kazakhstan today,’ in Prism, 4 (3), 6 February 1998.
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(1999: 133). Bolsheviks could shut down mosques, but they could not shut down clans.
Moreover, even though the Soviets treated Central Asia as a special base of resource
extraction, there was little overall modernisation carried out there. Instead, both Lenin
and Stalin reinforced feudal-like relations, in which the majority of the native population
worked for little compensation, effectively creating a situation in which clan networks
remained vital for the survival of many (Alimov 1994: 14–17). Moreover the outsiders,
namely the Russians and Slavs, lived in the capital and in other big cities, whereas the
native populations lived in the countryside and were largely non-integrated, with little
regular contact between the two groups, which enabled traditional structures to coexist
with the Soviet regime in the peripheries.
It was suggested that the most important factor in sustaining clan structures was
‘the process of regionalizing and territorializing pre-Soviet clan and tribal groups within
Soviet administrative and political structures [which] left a particular legacy for the
transition at both the elite and mass level (…) [reinforcing] the traditional clan-based
organization of society and politics’ (Schatz 2000: 166). Edward Schatz further asserted
that ‘the Soviet state was critically responsible for the perpetuation and politicisation of
clan divisions in Central Asia’ (2001: 7). Moreover, the command economy recreated
subethnic clan divisions as networks of access to goods in short supply, and political
patronage ‘continued along subethnic lines long after the countryside had been
Sovietised’ (2001: 13; see also Roy 2000: 89–94). In the 1990s, the clans – which are
especially likely to be active in the periods of transition or economic hardship, and hence
during times of uncertainty when the state is unable to perform its basic functions – came
back into the open (Collins 1999: 134). Some argued that clans filled the post-Soviet void
and consequently emerged strengthened out of the collapse of the Soviet regime (Collins
2002; Schatz 2000).
The zhuz-horde, tribe, and clan-based explanations of the political structures in
post-Soviet Kazakhstan and studies that deal with the way in which pre-Soviet
institutions survived ‘Soviet assault’ (Zelkina 2003: 96) imply that in order to maintain in
power, the Kazakh regime has been prone to relying on informal techniques of regime
maintenance which have their roots in the country’s distinctive tradition. This thesis
attempts to broaden our understanding of the ways in which the regime sustains itself in a
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dominant position, as it analyses the regime oil–industry relationships through the prism
of alternative tools – primarily formal (corporatism) and informal (patron–clientelism),
which were also widely employed in the Soviet Union. It is important to stress that this
thesis does not argue that zhuz or clan affiliations do not play any role, but rather that
different approaches can bring to the open mechanisms that get lost or are omitted in
more traditionally based explanations. This study it should be added, is not the first one
to propose a move from the zhuz-hordes, tribe, clan-based approaches.
David I. Hoffman, for instance, pointed out that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan many
ties supposedly based on zhuz connections could also be explained by ‘regional
affiliations, kinship ties, or Soviet-era associations, be they ‘‘Komsomol connections’’
between Soviet-era schoolmates, professional associations gained while working in the
state economy, or political connections forged within the CPSU’ (Fall 2000: 246).
Similarly, Sally N. Cummings argues that zhuz ‘may best be understood as only one of
many techniques of power maintenance’ (2005: 100). Some anthropologists went one
step further, suggesting that the role of the zhuz in post-Soviet Kazakh politics has been
grossly overstated.
Joma Nazpary stated that ‘although the Kazakh elite regional divisions coincide
with the old Zhuz divisions, the Zhuz [in the post-Soviet period] no longer existed as a
form of social organisation but only as a myth’ (2002: 8). Shirin Akiner asserted that
under Soviet rule, ‘traditional structures were weakened to such extent that if they
retained any power at all (and whether they did or not is still matter of debate), it was
largely in the informal, private sphere’ (1995: 44). In addition to that, she goes to say that
modern ‘clans’ ‘drew on a wide range of social relationships, such as, for example,
school-friends, military service comrades, neighbours, people from the same town, work,
Komsomol and Party contacts’ (1995: 53). Finally, zhuz-based explanations imply that
post-Soviet Kazakhstan abandoned the Soviet institutions and began building new ones
based on traditional structures. Yet this assumption has been recently also called into
question by Luong, who argues:
The process of state-building in Central Asia (…) challenges the
presumption that the CARs were merely colonies of the Soviet Union and
would thus reject Soviet policies and institutions after independence.
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These states are neither being built from scratch nor being rebuilt based on
pre-Soviet or traditional structures. Rather, the Central Asian leaders have
consciously employed templates from their Soviet past as well as the
international present and often vigorously pursue Soviet policies that
counter Western political and economic prescriptions. (24: 2004)
Arguably, this cursory discussion validates the direction which this thesis
attempts to take, namely to shift from zhuz-horde, clan explanations to other possible
tools of regime maintenance. Despite the scepticism towards the role of the zhuz, this
study acknowledges that the lack of a thorough analysis of the role that these affiliations
could possibly play in regime oil–industry relationships is a considerable shortcoming.
Hence, this thesis should be seen as a starting point for further studies of the oil industry,
including detailed ethnographic work on the Kazakh oil industry power structures, rather
than a decisive statement on the Kazakh regime oil–industry relationship.
3. Alternative techniques of regime maintenance
Corporatism and patron–clientism are two concepts that are central to studies that deal
with the ways in which authoritarian regimes across time and space structured their
relationships with various sections of society. In particular, corporatism and patron–
clientism are widely used to illustrate the regime–business relationship, a type of
relationship that is also a focal point of this thesis. The universality of these two concepts
seems to be confirmed by students of the Middle East monarchies, who do not solely
concentrate on tribal interrelationships when unpacking the regime–business relationship
in what are traditional societies, but rather have also been applying broadly understood
corporatistic and patron–client approaches (Ayubi 2001; Chaudhry 1989; Shambayati
1994; Brynen 1992). As the following discussion will demonstrate, corporatistic and
patron–client concepts were also used by the Sovietologists in order to unravel the
political and economic power structures that traditional totalitarian models failed to
grasp. Given that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan the old Soviet elites held on to power
throughout the 1990s, analysing the regime–oil industry relationship through such
established lenses appears legitimate.
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The existing analyses of contemporary Kazakhstan stress the continuity that
existed from the Soviet to the post-Soviet political system on the elite and institutional
levels. For instance, Mark Beissinger and Crawford Young quote a study of 320 members
of the Kazakh political elite in 1997, which indicated that 64 per cent had been members
of the old nomenklatura during the Brezhnev era and 41 per cent had worked previously
in the Soviet Communist Party apparatus (2002: 43). Luong, in her examination of the
electoral systems in Kazakhstan as well as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, stated that the
‘entire process by which the Central Asian states adopted new political institutions
indicates the enduring strength of the Soviet system, rather than its impending demise’
(2002: 2). Similarly, Schatz pointed out that ‘the Soviet collapse brought not radical
rupture to the states of the Central Asia region, bur rather an unusual identity with past
practices. Elite choices in the construction of political institutions were heavily saddled
with institutional baggage from the Soviet period’ (2004: 73–74).
In this thesis, corporatism is labelled as a formal type of regime–society
relationship while patron–clientism is considered an informal one. The factor that
primarily conditions a ruler’s choice of structuring the relationship either along formal or
informal lines is the level of regime institutionalisation. Examples from different areas of
study demonstrate that the informal type of mechanism has been used either by regimes
that inherited weak institutions from the colonial powers (e.g. the Middle East), or have
seen a breakdown of underdeveloped colonial institutions during their rule (sub-Saharan
Africa). The formal type of mechanism emerged in situations in which authoritarian
rulers took over fairly strong institutions, either from pluralistic regimes or colonial
powers (South America, South East Asia), which in some instances rulers managed to
strengthen further during their reigns (South East Asia).
The following pages will discuss the corporatist and patron–client types of regime
society relationships in turn, in a parallel fashion. Each of the next two sections initially
define the term in question and then proceeds to explain how these were applied by
Sovietologists in their analyses of the regime–society relationships in the post-
Khrushchev Soviet Union. In addition, the section on corporatism also introduces the
concept of quasi-corporatism, which was not applied to the Soviet case, but can be useful
in analysing the post-Soviet Kazakh regime–business relationships.
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Furthermore, the section on patron–client relationships also looks at the sub-
Saharan neo-patrimonial regimes. The example of sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates how
a mixture of weak post-colonial institutions and the existence of patron–client
relationships before and during colonisation created an environment in which clientelistic
networks were able to penetrate almost every aspect of life, including regime–business
relations. It has been stated that some of the key structures that underpin neo-
patrimonialism also exist in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. In particular, the widespread culture
of clientelism across various segments of society and underdeveloped post-colonial
institutions must be mentioned here (Beissinger and Young 2002: 1–47; Grzymala-Busse
and Luong 2002: 541–546). Due to these factors, the case of neo-patrimonialism should
be considered as an additional prism that can also prove useful in analysing some aspects
of the regime–oil industry relationships.
4. Formal techniques: corporatism
The formal type of relationship is characteristic for those parts of the world that went
through the process of rapid late-industrialisation. Guillermo O’Donnell stated that this
rapid late-industrialization led to the breakdown of the traditional patron–client
relationships through which the agrarian elite tended to contain a small number of people.
Those relationships were impersonal, multifunctional, not meditated by formal or
bureaucratic organisations and restricted to a particular territory (1977: 66). With the
traditional, agrarian system in decline and new social forces emerging – most notably
trade unions – the emerging authoritarian regimes were left with the task of
accommodating these new social strata. This new formal type of relationship was
generally defined as state-led corporatism. The key to state-based corporatism is the
centralised state. Some authors argued that in the state-based corporatist set-up, a state is
a body over and above other political and economical actors (Hammergren 1977: 447).
Philippe Schmitter asserted that a strong, dominant state is the natural product of the
political systems ‘in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central
bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are
dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically
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exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on
class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed’ (1974: 105). The principal
pattern of these new formal relationships consisted of a vertical articulation between
classes, and linkages with the regime. The vertical relationship aimed at eliminating
spontaneous interest articulation through incorporating ‘societal interests into a decision-
making structure that guarantees a minimum of political stability and allows decision
makers to launch development-oriented policies’ (Malloy 1977: 5-6). In effect, the
regime effectively established a limited number of authoritatively recognised groups that
interacted with the government through designated leaders. In some other cases, the
regime went so far as to take charge of creating and maintaining all corporatist
organisations in order to pre-empt the emergence of autonomous organisations. The
watchword of state corporatism is top-down control (Unger and Chan 1995: 31).
The new type of relationship that developed, in O’Donnell words, ‘has no
territorial base, is not in principle multifunctional, can include multitudes, entails a high
degree of bureaucratization and formalization of social relations, and corresponds to an
active penetration of the state into diverse sectors of civil society’ (1977: 67). As stated
above, communication with the political centre occurs vertically. Horizontal
communication between groups or segments of groups is rare. At the same time,
corporations tend to enjoy a fairly high degree of autonomy in internal matters. On this
level, the relationship between a designated leader and the group is most likely to take on
the character of a patron–client relationship. Thus, when the relationship with the state
tends to be highly structured and administrative in nature rather than political, the relation
on the intermediate level is personal.
The corporatist type of regime–society relationship in its traditional form –
outside southern European countries – emerged in South America. In South America,
corporatism was brought about by the military bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) regimes
that came to life in the region in the 1960s and 1970s. It has been argued that BA is a
product of a political transformation derived from social and political tensions produced
by industrialisation and by changes in social structures at both the elite and mass levels
(Collier 1979: 25). The most important impulse for the emergence of the BA regimes was
the ‘exhaustion’ of import-subsisting-industrialisation (ISI), which ‘convinced the policy
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elite that certain necessarily unpopular economic changes would have to be made to
create the possibility of renewed growth’ (Philip 1985: 33). The main obstacle in
achieving that end was, in the opinion of the technocrats, a high level of popular sector
polarisation, i.e. growing tensions between the working class and the lower middle
stratum that had obtained a strong position during the populist period, and those in power
(Skidmore and Smith 1997: 57). This environment was far too unstable and unattractive
to foreign capital, which was seen as the only way of overcoming the economic crises.
Thus, according to O’Donnell, the key incentive for the emergence of the BA regimes
was a functional requirement for the change in the production structures in the dependent
capitalist economy ‘because the basic requirements for the deepening could hardly be met
within the political and social order of populism’ (quoted in Im 1987: 232).
The authoritarian regimes that structured their relationships with their societies
according to a corporatist logic achieved their aims because they had fairly strong
institutions at their disposal. In addition, at a time when corporatism was introduced the
traditional forces in the society were fragmented and new social forces – for instance,
trade unions and non-agrarian business elites were just developing. This, in turn, allowed
the regime to develop the kinds of relationships that served its interests best. It should be
kept in mind, however, that the corporatist type of regime–society relationships in their
traditional form developed under military regimes. Thus it could be said that military
regimes, due to their coercive powers, were able to implement new forms of
relationships, which could not have come into existence under different circumstances.
However, while corporatism is most commonly associated with military regimes, the
theory of corporatism does not explicitly say that state-led corporatism cannot emerge in
a situation where the country is ruled by non-military authoritarian regimes. Quite on the
contrary, the theory alleges that corporatist mechanisms do not define a political system
per se: ‘a polity can contain corporatist elements and at the same time be a dictatorial
Communist Party regime, or an authoritarian Third World government, or a liberal
parliamentarian state’ (Unger and Chan 1995: 31). In both cases the catchword is
harmony, regardless of whether this harmony is truly consensual or imposed from above
(Schmitter 1974).
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4.1. The Soviet Union and corporatism
In the beginning of the 1980s, a debate took place between the pluralists and corporatists,
the ultimate aim of which was to understand the way in which the Soviet Union was
governed. In the context of the Soviet Union, the pluralist and corporatist schools
developed as a reaction to the so-called totalitarian model, which was crafted and
advocated by people like Zbigniew Brzezinski.
The totalitarian model described an extreme form of regime in which a single
party, itself free of internal conflict, imposes its will on society. This approach came
under attack as early as in the 1960s, because in the opinion of many it did not gel any
more, if it ever had ever in fact done, with the changing situation on the ground.
Sovietologists pointed out that, firstly, the Communist Party was not as monolithically
united as had been assumed. Secondly, in a great number of cases policies did not
emanate from the top party leadership. Thirdly, the political change in the Soviet Union
(or other Communist state) did not have to be initiated by the top leadership, or by a
violent overthrow of the system (Brown 1983: 66). The critics of the totalitarian approach
were searching for a new paradigm that would help them to interpret events in the Soviet
Union, and in the final instance they turned to pluralism.
One of the key advocates of the pluralistic model, which itself is a North
American tradition, was Gordon Skilling (1971). Skilling challenged the idea of the
hierarchical nature of political control in the Soviet Union by focusing on the existence of
autonomous and intermediate associations between the state and society, and through
recognising group conflicts outside of the fractional struggles among the top leaders. He
argued that since the Khrushchev era, an increasingly vigorous debate on public policy
had been taking place in which ‘certain specialized elite groups were able to express their
views and interests and to exert some influence on the ultimate decisions in areas such as
education, military strategy, industrial management, legal reform, science, art, and
literature’ (1971: 10). The broadening of group participation in the preliminary stages of
policy deliberation and in the subsequent phases of implementation led Skilling to believe
that what was happening in the Soviet Union could be called a ‘pluralism of elites’, or in
Robert Dahl’s terms a ‘polyarchical’ system. When describing a similar kind of
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development in the Brezhnev era, Jerry Hough names it ‘institutional pluralism’. The
pluralistic approach did not bring an end to the debate that tried to go beyond the
totalitarian model, but rather its beginning. Archie Brown argued that the focus on the
substantial diffusion of influence within the Soviet Union, i.e. pluralism, should be seen
as a general correction to the totalitarian model, but in his opinion it did not constitute a
regime that was in anyway pluralistic.
According to Brown, scholars in favour of the pluralistic approach did not pay
enough attention to the amount of control which Soviet leaders had over the political
agenda (1983: 72). Along the same lines, Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols asserted that
institutional pluralism is indeed a very tempting approach, but one that leaves out the
conservative element of the Soviet system (1980: 3). Instead, Bunce and Echols proposed
the corporatist concept as a way of overcoming the shortcomings of both the totalitarian
and the pluralistic models. Corporatism was put forward because, firstly, it emphasised
the role of the state in promoting and planning for the common good. Secondly, unlike
the totalitarian model, corporatism, similarly to pluralism, focused on interest
representation. Thus, it was argued that corporatism finally managed to bridge the gap
between totalitarianism and pluralism by providing a new way of conceptualising state–
society relationships in the Soviet Union.
Bunce and Echols argued that in the Soviet Union, since the 1960s the state/party
had brushed aside Khrushchev’s conflictual approach to politics and tried to replace it
with cooperation, consensus, stability, and the inclusion of nongovernmental elements in
the policy-making process. Corporatism expressed itself in two ways: ‘as a process
whereby experts are regularly consulted in the making of policy and as a more subtle
procedure whereby party members take group interests into account by virtue of their
being group representatives themselves (‘‘virtual representation’’)’ (1980: 9). The
cooperation among major elements in policy-making, society, and the economy was
enforced and coordinated by the state/party. As in other corporate systems, this
cooperation was ‘designed to ensure continuous economic growth, political and social
stability, and the preservation of the existing order with at least incremental adjustments’
(1980: 15). Thanks to this consensus, the Soviet state, which had always projected the
image of a welfare state, was for the very first time truly able to deliver the goods.
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The above discussion suggests that the post-Soviet Kazakh leadership should have
had some experience of structuring its relationships with sectors of the society – most
notably key industries – in a corporatist fashion. This in turn implies that the Kazakh
regime could make some use of corporatist techniques when establishing its relationships
with the oil industry. For instance, Paul Kubicek argued that in the post-Soviet
environment, the corporatist type of regime–society relationship ‘may find strong appeal
among post-communist elites and the public because of their implied promise to reconcile
the often conflicting demands of change and control’ (1996: 28). One of the most telling
examples of corporatist type of relationships between a regime and business in the post-
Communist set-up is post-Mao China.
In China, the transition from a planned to a market economy led to the emergence
of a new business elite, which has gained a remarkable degree of independence from the
state in managing its affairs compared with the level of autonomy that managers working
in state owned enterprises enjoy. Margaret Pearson argues that the new business elite is
made up of foreign-sector managers and private entrepreneurs. She asserts that the
Chinese government was willing to grant the members of this new elite greater authority
and control over economic resources because it sees these groups as a crucial force in
promoting industrialisation (1997: 1). At the same time, the government fears that the
new elite can become too powerful, and the state has been visibly active in establishing
business associations through which it hopes to control them. The associations, which at
the top are dominated by retired officials from relevant ministries, aim at co-opting
potentially autonomous forces (1997: 5). Pearson calls this strategy a kind of ‘socialist
corporatism’.
The example of China, however specific and unique, demonstrates that a
corporatist type relationship can exist in a post-Communist environment. This is not to
say that Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics (due to their geographical
proximity to China and common communist past) are prone to directly copying the
Chinese model of relationships. If at all, the inspiration for structuring its relationships
along corporatist lines comes from the Asian ‘tigers’, which not only present examples of
authoritarian regimes that manage to stay in power for a considerable amount of time, but
are also shining illustrations of rapid economic development (Dong 1976; Im 1987;
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Unger and Chan 1995; Fields 1997). While the regime can attempt to structure its
relationships in a corporatistic fashion, this does not imply that it will succeed in doing
so.
4.2. Quasi-corporatism
Besides South America and Soviet Union, the corporatist type of relationship was also
applied by some sub-Saharan African authoritarian regimes that lacked adequate
institutions and were unwilling to grant some of its powers to, for instance, trade unions,
business or professional associations. In other words, those authoritarian regimes failed to
fulfil the basic criteria for fully functioning corporatist relationships to emerge. Michael
Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, when commenting on these sub-Saharan African
regimes, stated:
Leaders of postcolonial African countries may have pursued a corporatist
strategy to the extent that they promoted an organic ideology of national
unity and attempted to direct political mobilization along controlled
channels. But African leaders have rarely used bureaucratic formulas to
construct authoritative institutions or granted subsidiary sphere of influence
to occupational interest groups within civil society. Contemporary African
regimes do not display the formal governing coalitions between organised
state and social interests or the collective bargaining over core public policies
that characterize corporatism. (1994: 458)
Yet Dwayne Woods argues that those underdeveloped corporatist relationships should
not be simply dismissed as an unsuccessful corporatism, but should be rather seen as a
distinctive type of corporatism, which Woods calls quasi-corporatism (1998: 215).
According to Woods, authoritarian regimes that constructed quasi-corporatist types of
relationships, similar to those that make use of corporatist mechanisms, strived to co-opt
existing associations – for instance, students or trade unions – into the regime’s
structures. Moreover, those regimes organised urban professional groups such as
journalists, engineers, bankers, lawyers, and doctors into associations. The associations
were then recognised by the regime as the sole representative bodies of their professions,
and were closely controlled, either by the appointed members of the ruling party or key
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state ministers (Woods 1998: 216). However, in striking contrast to the South American
associations, the sub-Saharan associations did not have much input into the decision
making process, and were used instead as another mechanism through which key sections
of the society could be controlled.
Arguably, a variant of the quasi-corporatist system also came to existence in the
oil-rich Gulf countries as well. Ayubi Nazih argues that to view the Gulf region through
the prism of tribal relationships is a mistake, because ‘oil states uniformly practiced
corporatism on a grand scale, using distributive policies to create economic groups as a
base of social support on the one hand and to ameliorate conflict between sectoral,
occupational, economic and social groups on the other’ (2001: 247). Unlike in South
America, where the working classes and expatriates were the main targets of the
authoritarian regimes, in the Middle Eastern Gulf states the new middle and upper classes
were rounded up into different groupings. Moreover, in the Middle Eastern oil-rich states,
bureaucracies did not play the fundamental role they did in South America. More likely,
it would be a ruler and his immediate family who established direct relationships with
different groupings.
In the following section, we will turn to the patron–client type of relationships,
which provide another key concept in studies that deal with regime–society relationships.
In the case of the Soviet Union, this kind of patron–client relationship was employed to
shed light on the informal types of relationship, on the elite and local levels, that formal
approaches had not hitherto properly explored.
5. Informal techniques: patron–client relationships
Patron–client relations have been characterised as ‘an enduring dyadic bound based upon
informally arranged personal exchanges of resources between actors of unequal status’
(Grindle 1977: 53). The basic idea behind this notion refers to a personalised and
reciprocal relationship between an inferior and a superior. These patron–client relations
are primarily personal, because ‘unlike institutions, individual patron–client linkages are
contingent upon the persons in a relationship and ordinarily cannot outlast them’ (Jackson
and Carl 1984: 433). It has been asserted that the patron–client relation emerges ‘out of
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the sense of generalized insecurity that presumably exists in so-called ‘‘stateless’’ or
segmented societies’ (Lemarchand and Legg 1972: 158). At the same time, it has been
pointed out that in many societies, above all many Mediterranean, South American and
East Asian ones, in which clientelistic relations constituted part of the central mode of
institutional arrangements, clientelism ‘persisted despite changes in level of economic
development, the structure of political organisation and in their own concrete
organizational form’ (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 203). It is often argued that patron–
client networks were established because in societies where democratic political
organisations and interest groups are weak and non-existent, patrons create clientelistic
relations to secure the support of others. A client enters into a tacit agreement with a
patron because s/he seeks security in the unstable environment. This relationship is based
on loyalty and on trust. In the long run, each must honour the mutual obligations
associated with their roles as a patron and a client. The patron must give his/her client a
privileged treatment, and in return s/he expects to receive certain benefits.
This dyadic relationship, which involves some form of interaction between two
individuals, is at the heart of clientelism. This relationship can be wholly voluntary, or
can be obligatory for both members. It can last a very short period of time, a lifetime, ‘or
be carried on from generation to generation by descendants of those who created the
original dyad’ (Lande: 1977: xvi). Such alliances are created very easily. Favours done
on behalf of patrons are of a material nature, while those which the clients provide for
their patrons involve the expenditure of labour or effort. Most patrons are able to
maintain alliances with numerous clients (1977: xx). Clientelistic relationships can be
widely spread out, and it is possible for a large part of a society to be organised into a
relatively small numbers of clients. Clientelistic relationships tend to take on a pyramidal
shape, with one set of patrons with its clients above another. Thus, it often happens that
an individual may be both a patron and a client.
5.1. The Soviet Union and patron–clientelism
It was argued that in the Soviet Union, patron–client type relationships were present
among the members of a powerful clique at the top party level as well as among the
lower political hierarchy (Fitzpatrick 1999: 62–66; Jowitt 1992: 121–159). A number of
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closely interrelated factors were responsible for the initial development of these
relationships. Firstly, the Communist party, which on the surface promoted impersonal
ideological standards of behaviour in every day-to-day business, relied on a web of stable
personal networks that it upheld by providing preferential treatment to network members
in return for their loyalty and ideological faithfulness. Secondly, patron–client
relationships were the safest and most efficient way to move within the party hierarchy
(Lubin 1984: 163–164). For instance, Mikhail Voslenski suggested that patron–client
thinking was extremely important to the way in which the nomenklatura operated in
Soviet times. He says that a ‘loner does not get ahead in the party; one must belong to a
clique in which everyone supports everyone else, and one must try to become its leader,
for the latter will get the best job going’ (1984: 77). Thirdly, among the top levels of the
Communist Party clientelistic practices developed with a view to obtaining access to
public or semi-public goods (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1983: 186).
Patron–client relationships not only took roots at the apex of power, but also
among factory workers and shop managers or in local party branches (Berliner 1988).
Neo-traditionalists argued that Communist regimes – in which political loyalty was
rewarded systematically with career opportunities, special opportunities, and other
favours – ‘actively’ encouraged the creation of dyadic bonds (Jowitt 1983; Oi 1985).
According to Andrew Walder, this resulted in a highly ‘institutionalized network of
patron client relations that is maintained by the party and is integral to its rule: a
clientelist system in which public loyalty to the party and its ideology is mingled with
personal loyalties between party branch and their clients’ (1986: 6). Effectively, the
Soviet system led to a metastasising subculture of interpersonal ties through which
individuals could obtain flats, cars or better food from that available to the small ‘big
man’ as long as they were willing to grant their loyal support. Luong and Weinthal
suggested that dependence on patrons at the regional, local level led clients to a gradual
identification with the region in which they studied, worked, and/or resided (2001: 381).
The mechanism that has been held responsible for the growth of the clientelist
networks was Brezhnev’s policy of the ‘trust in cards’, which stood in firm opposition to
the way in which Stalin and Khrushchev used to run the Soviet Union (Gleason 1991a:
616). ‘Trust in cards’ in particular, strengthened the positions of the patrons which,
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unthreatened by the frequent rotations, could invest into building a vast system of
patronage networks. Boris Yeltsin, reflecting on his time as Communist Party secretary of
the Sverdlovsk province during the years of Brezhnev’s rule, stated: ‘[the] power of a
first secretary within his province is practically unlimited. And the sense of power is
intoxicating… In those days, a provincial first secretary of the party was god, a czar –
master of his province – and on virtually any issue, the first secretary’s opinion was final’
(Beissinger and Young 2002: 28).
The proliferation of informal networks created an opportunity for widespread
corruption, which ‘permeated entire strata of the party and state apparatus, reaching
epidemic propositions’ (Rumer 1989: 145). Ironically, it was the very nature of the Soviet
Union – the monopolistic and absolute authority of the party elite over all spheres of
public life and the total control exercised over the nationalised economy – that made theft
of the state property possible (Rumer 1989: 147; Gleason 1991a: 619). William Clark
argued: ‘Soviet officialdom, like society in general, was unable to separate itself from
reliance on illegal activities; if society in general came to embrace, if only out of
necessity, alternative systems for the distribution of goods and services, so had the class
of officials who were charged with the duty of administering Soviet society’ (1993: 261).
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the growth of patron–client networks was
helped by the devolution of administration in the post-Stalinist period, which allowed for
‘a greater penetration of local and unofficial social networks into party and government
affairs’ (Beissinger and Young 2002: 29; see also Roeder 1991: 203–210; Gleason
1991b: 350; Roy 2000: 101–109). During the Brezhnev era, Central Asia saw the rise of
all-powerful party bosses who, in most cases, managed to hold on to power until the late
1980s, when Gorbachev launched his anti-corruption campaign.24 It was argued that
during this time, all endemic elements of the Soviet system fused with clan and Islamic
traditions. At the end of the 1980s, Boris Rumer wrote: ‘[in Central Asia] clan structure,
with extraordinarily high degree of tribal fealty, has created especially propitious
conditions for the development of illicit economic activity and its corollary, organised
crime. The mafia-like clans form such resilient units that even tough apparatchiki from
24 It is widely agreed that Central Asia and Caucasus were the most corrupted regions in the entire Soviet
block (Vaksberg 1991: 137-204).
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Moscow are at a loss to smash this sticky web of tribal connections’ (1989: 148; see also
Trenin, Malashenko and Lieven 2004: 5).
In the following section, we will turn to sub-Saharan neo-patrimonial regimes.
The case of neo-patrimonialism demonstrates that the post-colonial elites, who with
independence inherited fairly weak institutions in order to maintain themselves in power,
are prone to resorting to informal rather than formal tools of regime maintenance. This
scenario is likely to unfold where previously colonial power structures relied on informal
relationships with local notables, both in the centre and in the peripheries. In should be
added that a similar scenario to the one in sub-Sahara Africa came into the open in the
post-colonial Middle East (Young 1998; Khoury and Kostiner 1990; Tibi 1990; Andreson
1987, 1990). However, due to space constraints, the Middle Eastern case will not be
discussed here.
5.2. Neo-patrimonial regimes
The key to understanding mechanisms that govern neopatrimonialism and patron–
clientism in sub-Saharan Africa is the legacy of the post-colonial institutions, which left
structural constraints on the emerging post-colonial elites. To start with, one of the main
problems was the post-colonial elites themselves, who ‘had mostly not been adequately
trained by the colonial government and had limited experience of operating a
governmental system on a national scale’ (Tordoff 1997: 82 see also Mansur 1995: 113).
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that many of the post-colonial elites were groomed by
the colonisers as they ‘tried with considerable success to exclude radical social forces
from the political playing field’ (Boone 1994: 120). Hence in most cases, on the eve of
independence, there was very little real alternative to the post-colonial elites, who easily
seized power. Another burning problem was the post-colonial administration, which
lacked the substantial capacity to run already existing institutions or new institutions,
such as a large number of parastatal bodies that post-colonial elites had themselves
created in order to ‘withstand the intense social pressures to which they were subjected
by universally enfranchised electorates’ (Tordoff 1997: 82). Finally, leaders had to
address the issue of a fragile national unity. It is worth mentioning that the problem of the
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weak state structures was compounded by the fact that ‘the state in Africa is a set of alien
political institutions, originally imported from abroad’, rather than home grown like in
the West (Bratton 1994: 238).
In the late 1950s and 1960s, across sub-Saharan Africa, an answer to these
problems was supposed to be a highly centralised presidential or one-party system, which
was thought to be better suited than a democratic system, be it liberal or socialist.
Guenther Roth called the new elites empire-builders due to their daunting tasks of
integrating greatly disparate elements: ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, or even
economic (1968: 204)25. However, instead of improving and using bureaucratic formulae
to construct authoritative institutions and to organise governing coalitions between state
and social interest, the post-colonial elites retreated to the pre-colonial logic of
patrimonialism, which they then successfully incorporated into their own bureaucratic
institutions.
Patrimonialism (Herrschaft) is Max Weber’s term, which has been adopted by
anthropologists in order to describe the political system of small, isolated communities
with rudimentary economies, including African chiefdoms in the pre-colonial era. The
most important feature of patrimonialism is a ‘big man’, who rules by dint of personal
prestige and power. In that relationship, ‘ordinary folk are treated as extension of the
‘‘big man’s’’ households, with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the
ruler. Authority is entirely personalised, shaped by the ruler’s preference rather than any
codified system of laws’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 61). It has been argued that in
modern times, patrimonialism in its purest form could be only found in Haile Selassie’s
Ethiopia (Roth 1968: 195). In other parts of Africa, the term was redefined in order to
make it compatible with existing bureaucratic institutions and written laws, however
weak. The outcome was neopatrimonialism, which Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de
Walle described as a ‘hybrid political system in which the customs and patterns of
patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions’ (1997: 62). In
25 Roth argues that in Europe, nation-building was a much easier task since it aimed at the integration of
population with ‘common culture, especially a common language and common historical legacies shared
by various strata’ (1968: 204). According to the author, it is no accident that pluralist democracy has been
successful on a large scale, only in family homogenous countries.
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essence, neopatrimonialism, like patrimonialism, stood on two pillars: a ‘big man’ and
personal relations, i.e. clientelism.
In sub-Saharan Africa were the presidents, the ‘big men’ who had been installed
for life; they established extensive chains of patron–client ties extending usually from the
centre of a personal regime to the rulers’ inner circle, immediate clients, and other
followers, through them to their followers, and through them to their followers, etc. The
primary role of the client was to mobilise political support and to refer all decisions
upwards as a mark of deference to patrons (Bratton and van de Walle 1994: 458). The
system worked, chiefly because of the nature of the narrow, largely incapable post-
colonial elites that the president needed to satisfy; this he did. Secondly, modern party
mechanisms enabled him to reach out equally to urban as well as remote countryside
communities. Thirdly, and most importantly, post-colonial state structures were
successfully colonised by the clientelistic logic of neopatrimonialism, and effectively
became an ultimate source of enrichment for those who were willing to support the
regime.
Officials who occupied bureaucratic institutions used their positions, not to
perform public services, but rather to acquire personal wealth and status: ‘although state
functionaries received an official salary, they also enjoyed access to various forms of
illicit rents, prebends, and petty corruption, which constituted a sometimes important
entitlement of office’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62). The most lucrative positions
were given to friends, family members or ethnic fellows, whereas state rules and
regulations were abandoned. One of the most effective mechanisms that allowed the ruler
to keep his clients satisfied was a rapid turnover of political personnel in order to
‘regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent rivals from developing their own power
base, and to demonstrate their own power’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1994: 463). The
clientelistic relationship effectively undermined the modern state, where formal rules
were replaced with systematic patronage and clientelistic practices that aimed at
maintaining political order. Personalistic networks came to fill the void: ‘in different
countries, new groups of intermediaries brokers, and emissaries oversaw the exchange of
goods for compliance’ (Bratton 1994: 265). As a result of those developments, the state
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in sub-Saharan Africa lost its powers to penetrate and control the society, which from the
outset of the post-colonial era was very fragile.
In a system that favours the ruler, his allies, and his clients, the essential activity
involves gaining access to the personal regime’s patronage. No one was allowed to (or
could) operate outside this relationship – including the business elite, which in fact was
one of the most visible products of neopatrimonialism. Nzongola Ntalaja argued that in
Mobutu’s Zaire, ‘the most prominent private entrepreneurs include politicians and former
state officials, all of whom rely heavily on state support, encouragement, and sponsorship
to promote their business’ (1984: 99). Their position at the apex of power enabled them
to use the state apparatus to constitute for themselves an economic base to sustain a
privileged life for themselves and their families. In most instances, ex-state officials
chose to open private businesses in order to invest their savings, or rather bribes, that they
have received during their time in office (1984: 99).
Neopatrimonial regimes emphasise the personal charisma of the ruler in their
attempts to legalize the rule of the president. In order to do this efficiently, these regimes
undercut civil society: they demobilize voters, eradicate popular associations and attempt
to weaken all independent centres of power. Harold Crouch asserted that the regime was
able ‘to rule in the interest of the elite without taking much account of the interests of the
masses because the latter were poor, socially backward, politically passive, and kept in
check by the regime’s military forces’ (1979: 572). Such regimes did not tolerate any
kind of dissent, because neopatrimonial regimes ‘tend to operate within the ‘‘rule’’ of
zero-sum conflict – that is the expectations of maximum allowable deprivation for losers,
their families, and associates’ (Le Vine 1980: 659). Bratton and van de Walle argued that
in a system structured according to neopatrimonial logic, political protest was not likely
to erupt, and when it did it was usually ‘spontaneous, sporadic, disorganized, and
unsustained’ (1994: 462). That effectively made the introduction or reintroduction of the
democratic regimes highly problematic.
Trying to understand the astonishing spread of clientelism in sub-Sahara Africa
from the perspective of the centre, as we have done up to here, tells only part of the story.
As mentioned before, the post-colonial elites retreated to the pre-colonial patrimonial
logic, because they lacked sufficient tools and the experience to run the country once the
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colonisers had left. However, those facts do not fully explain why the creation of a
strong, autonomous and capable state failed so badly, where clientelism ‘colonizes’ the
societal tissue so easily. Catherine Boone and Naomi Chazan, among others, argued that
the answer to this question lies in the way in which colonial powers exercised their rule
on the local level.
Colonies were run according to Lord Lugard’s concept of ‘indirect rule’. The aim
of indirect rule was to ‘weaken existing African political structures and subordinate them
to the colonial state without completely undermining the capacity of the local authorities
to control their subjects’ (Boone 1994: 114). European rules bypassed civil associations,
establishing control directly over ‘stringently demarcated local communities through their
sophisticated employment of local collaborators’ (Chazan 1994: 261). The most
important impact that indirect rule had on the local level was the effective confirmation
of many of the powers of the ‘big man’/patron over the land and peasants. ‘Big men’
were given free rein on the local level as long as they collected house and head taxes,
keeping a cut for themselves (or alternatively being paid by the colonial state). Moreover,
chiefs were not only responsible for mediating the flow of resources claimed, but were
also responsible for allocating resources coming from the centre.
From the outside, indirect rule looks like the easiest and the most effective way of
extracting resources from colonies. It certainly did just that. However, it must be kept in
mind that to a certain extent, using the local chiefs to do the ‘dirty’ work, who were using
‘their position in the colonial system to their own advantage, often in ways that were not
fully consistent with colonial ambitions’, also displayed a weakness of the colonial states
(1994: 118). Bratton argues that ‘the colonial state clearly lacked the political capacity to
implement policy in local arenas without collaboration from indigenous auxiliaries’
(1994: 239). Chazan asserted that ‘the British, and in many instances French, ruled
through local patrons and were as dependent on their durability as these strong-men were
dependent on the colonial state’ (1994: 261). The problems that the colonisers faced, that
of strong local chiefs, did not disappear on the various eves of independence, but
remerged in post-colonial environments. Thus, postcolonial regime consolidation and
ruling-class formation were constrained by the same contradictions that compromised the
colonial project (Boone 1994: 119). At the same time, since a great majority of the
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political notables already stood on the scaffolding of local and regional power bases, it
was not in their interest to uproot the existing practices. The lack of a strong state made
this maintenance of the status quo even more desirable, and naturally easier besides.
In section 4.1, it was argued that the post-Soviet Kazakh ruling elites are familiar
with corporatist regime–society relationships, and could and did use them to structure
their relationship with the oil industry. This section similarly demonstrated that this also
applies to the patron–client type of relationship. During the Soviet era, the patron–client
relationships played an important role in maintaining the unity of the Communist Party in
the centres and the peripheries. Considering that post-Soviet Kazakhstan is a post-
colonial state characterised by weak institutions (Olcott 2002), it could be suggested that
it is most likely to follow some form of neo-patrimonial regime. Still, the outcome is far
from obvious. While Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics inherited fairly
weak institutions, they were much more developed than the ones that African leaders
were left with by their colonial masters (Luong 1999). In addition, the post-Soviet
Kazakh elites were much better prepared to run independent countries than the African
elites were.26 Hence, it can be argued that the Kazakh regime had more room to
manoeuvre when structuring its regime–society relationships, including its regime–
business relationships than the sub-Saharan African or Middle East regimes. The
investigation of Kazakh regime–oil industry relationships in the following chapters will
present analysis of the choices that the Kazakh regime has made.
26 A good illustration of this is the example of Nursultan Nazarbayev himself. He was born in 1940 in the
village of Chemolgan in the south of Kazakhstan, an area that is predominantly inhabited by ethnic
Kazakhs. He was educated in Kazakhstan and in Ukraine’s Higher Technical School as a metallurgist and
graduated in 1960. Nazarbayev started being politically active in the Communist Party in the 1960s, first in
Komsomol and later on in his local party branch in Karaganda oblast (Karaganda Metallurgical Combine in
Temirtau), where he worked his way up to become a second secretary. In 1980, he moved upwards to the
post of the second secretary for industry in the republic’s central committee in Alma-Ata. In 1984, he was
promoted to the number two position in the republic as the chairman of Kazakhstan’s Council of Ministers
(Olcott 1995: 169; Gleason 1997: 56). It should be said at this point that in comparison to other leaders of
the Central Asian republics at that time, Nazarbayev came across as open minded, which in the years of
perestroika was a very important capital in itself. Furthermore, due to various positions that he had held
before arriving to Alma-Ata, he understood well the mechanisms behind the Soviet system which he
admitted were in need of reforming (Olcott 1995: 173-174). Olcott wrote: ‘[Nazarbayev] has an excellent
idea of how much Kazakhstan was supplying to Moscow’s coffers, and how little the republic was
receiving in return, particularly since as chairman of the Council of Ministers he was spending a third of
each year travelling about the republic, studying the various industries and enterprises on site’ (1997: 206).
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6. Researching the Kazakh oil industry
This thesis primarily looks at Kazakh companies involved in the oil industry, both
directly (extracting and production) and indirectly (supply and construction). I collected
information about these companies in the course of 85 interviews (see Appendix 2),
which I conducted during my fieldwork in Kazakhstan.
My fieldwork in Kazakhstan lasted from August until late December 2004. For
the first three months, I stayed in Almaty (from August until October); after that, I
travelled to Atyrau (November) and Astana (December). I chose those three cities for
various reasons. Almaty, which until 1997 was the capital of Kazakhstan, is home to
Kazakhstan’s biggest and medium-sized sub-contracting companies, as well as to
significant Kazakh oil companies and few NOC (KazMunaiGas) subsidiaries. It is also in
Almaty that most of the transnational oil and sub-contracting companies have their
headquarters and Almaty is where foreign embassies and institutions are located.
Moreover, Almaty is the centre of the Kazakhstan’s quasi-oppositional parties,
newspapers, NGOs, as well as state-owned newspapers and oil journals. In the new
capital Astana, the NOC KazMunaiGas and its subsidiaries have their headquarters. It is
also where the Ministry of Energy and Resources and the Contract Agency (which deals
with the relationships between foreign and local oil companies) are based. Atyrau, widely
considered the oil capital of Kazakhstan, is home to Kashagan, the biggest oil discovery
that the world has seen in the last 40 years, as well as to TengizChevron JV, the biggest
oil project already in operation in Kazakhstan. Moreover the Atyrau region borders
another extremely important oil region, Mangistau, about which I had a chance to talk
extensively when in Atyrau. Due to financial- and time constraints, I did not visit two
other key oil regions: West Kazakhstan and Kyzylorda. In Almaty however I interviewed
a number of local and foreign companies working in those regions and obtained agood
knowledge of them.
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of my fieldwork were the Kazakh
companies working in the oil sector, which I divided into three groups: a) the NOC
KazMunaiGas and its subsidiaries; b) local sub-contracting companies varying from the
biggest, medium to small and very small; and c) local oil companies. The most useful
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source of knowledge about foreign and local companies working in the oil and gas sector
that I obtained was a directory published annually by the Kazakh oil journal Petroleum. I
used the newest available edition, which had been published in April 2004, and was
entitled ‘Companies Working in the Oil and Gas Industry of Kazakhstan’. The 2004
edition lists 700 local and foreign companies with a very useful short note about each
company. Another important source of information about the companies presented itself
in the form of the local directory. In Atyrau, where information about local companies
was rather slight, the local directory proved to be the most useful source of information.
As of 2004, in Kazakhstan, no other widely accessible database that deals with local sub-
contracting and oil companies exists to my knowledge. During my interviews, I learned
that transnational companies (for instance, Halliburton and Flour, which since 2002 are
under legal obligation to work with local sub-contractors) have assembled their own
databases. Despite numerous requests, rather predictably, I was denied access to those
databases. On a more positive note, I came into direct contact with the biggest foreign as
well as Kazakhstani companies during the 12th International Oil and Gas Exhibition
KIOGE 2004 (5-8 October, Almaty), which is the most important event of its kind in
Central Asia and the Caucasus. The exhibition proved to be very useful, because through
this form of direct contact, I managed to secure interviews with the three most important
Kazakhstani sub-contracting companies (which for two months prior to this had
consistently refused to be interviewed). KIOGE also opened doors to NOC
KazMunaiGas, which in Kazakhstan has a reputation of being inaccessible to outsiders,
not to mention research students such as myself. Naturally, during my fieldwork I also
benefited a great deal from the so-called ‘snowball effect’. Diplomats that I interviewed
from various embassies (including the Polish, British, Canadian ones, and the European
Commission), proved to be especially supportive and helpful in pointing me to their
contacts. The companies themselves, with few exceptions, were unsurprisingly unwilling
to recommend me to other companies. Most of the time, their responses were evasive.
During my fieldwork I tried to be as open as possible, and when I was not able to secure
an interview with a president, a director or a vice-director of the company, I talked to
marketing managers, project managers, geologists and even oil workers. On a few
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occasions, marketing managers who were unable to answer my questions, and felt
uncomfortable about answering them, secured interviews for me with their superiors.
Whereas Kazakh companies working directly or indirectly in the oil sector were
my main targets, I also interviewed various actors who would allow me to gain a wider
perspective on the relationships between regime and oil business and the oil industry in
Kazakhstan. The most important of these were the transnational oil and sub-contracting
companies which, on a day-to-day basis, interact with Kazakh companies, the NOC
KazMunaiGas, and the national as well as local governments. During my fieldwork, I
became acutely aware of the fact that foreign companies were far from passive, marginal
actors in regard to the way in which the regime-oil industry relationships are shaped.
Rather, they are part of the equation - indeed, in some situations they are the dominant
actors. Another set of actors that I interviewed were oppositional parties, NGOs working
with the oil industry, newspapers and oil magazines, foreign diplomats (especially those
working in Economic and Commercial Sections), oil and political experts, and
associations of the companies working with the oil industry.
Arranging interviews was one of the most difficult parts of the fieldwork.
Presidents, directors, managers which I wanted to interview – in some instances – run
fairly large companies and do not – in their words - ‘have time for students’. However, I
was not put off by this sort of answer and tried to persistently arrange a meeting. In some
instance I got the impression that this was part of a powergame in which persistence
finally paid off. The most problematic people to deal with were company’s secretaries
who naturally acted in their capacity as gatekeepers and refused to connect me directly
with the directors and managers of the companies. I quickly learned to bypass them,
where possible and to insist on taking to the directors and managers directly. This
strategy worked very well in the second half of the fieldwork when I learned how to
handle the interviewee by relentlessly stressing the importance of the interview for my
project. The fact that I was a student at a British university located in Scotland, which due
to the North Sea oil resources is seen in those circles as the ‘Texas of the north’, helped a
great deal.
The interviews were conducted in director’s and manager’s offices. The
interviewees themselves insisted that I visit them during office hours. Undoubtedly, this
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gave them a sense of control and served to underline the strict business nature of the
meeting, which also served my purposes. At the beginning of the interviews, I aimed to
establish a link with the interviewee and get a sense of how willing s/he would be to talk.
While it always took time to establish some sort of a trust relationship, my assurances
that I was not going to quote the interviewee helped in establishing this sense trust.
In most instances the interview began in earnest, once the interviewee understood
that I am no more than a student who simply wants to learn about the Kazakh oil
industry, rather than someone with an agenda of his own. Interviewees were especially
fond of initial questions that allowed them to talk about themselves, concerning their
education, professional career and their role within the company. This created the
necessary framework for the more difficult questions about their company’s relationship
with the NOC and other foreign oil companies, as well as with the state bureaucracy, tax
police or local governors. In addition I asked at length about tenders, licences, business
partners etc. Where I could not get answers to my questions immediately, I rephrased
them and asked them again a few minutes later. I left the most difficult questions to the
end of the interview. In most of the cases, the interviews lasted from about one to one and
a half hours.
Most interviewees spoke rather freely about the situation in Kazakhstan. For
instance, directors, managers often admitted that it would be silly to deny the fact that
corruption is a big problem for their companies since Kazakhstan is one of the most
corrupted countries in the world which is an open secret. Yet, it varied from interview to
interview how extensively interviewees were prepared to talk about this topic. I found
that the interviewees’ openness strongly correlated with his/her status in the company.
Hence, the presidents and high ranking directors were more open than low-ranking
managers. It is worth mentioning that I conducted my interviews around the time of the
2004 parliamentary elections; this fact greatly contributed to the quality of the gathered
data as a numbers of interviewees were in a surprisingly critical mindset which they were
willing to voice. The situation began to change rather visibly after the ‘Orange
Revolution’ in the Ukraine which was followed by a wave of criticism in the Kazakh
official media of the Western ‘outsiders’ who intrude on the internal politics of the post-
Soviet republics.
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During my field work I spent as much time as possible on analysing the
interviews themselves. I concentrated on the emerging themes which I tried to develop in
the course of the following interviews. In other words, I made sure that the picture which
was emerging from the initial series of interviews was valid. I found this process very
productive as some of my initial findings were proven to be wrong or only partially
correct. One of the most productive ways of validating the data was by cross-checking it
in subsequent interviews with other Kazakh and foreign interviewees. This method
enabled me to assemble a fuller and more reliable picture of the regime-Kazakh oil
industry relationship.
This thesis is largely based on interviews conducted in Kazakhstan in late 2004,
however they are not the only source of information. It should be stressed that the data
gathered during the fieldwork was carefully checked also against the information
contained - most importantly – in oil industry journals. The oil journals are a good source
of information as they discuss on a monthly basis events that have shaped the oil sector.
In instances where there was a lack of reliable information on a particular sequence of
events, for example the rise and fall of small and medium sized oil companies in the
Atyrau region throughout the 1990s, I made sure to rely on more than the interviews. I
also avoided in my thesis the use of anecdotes where there was no way of verifying them.
In conclusion, the aim of the first part of this chapter was to point to the problem
areas for the regime as far as the oil industry is concerned, and to identify the key players
in that industry. The second part of this chapter dealt with alternative regime maintenance
techniques that the Kazakh regime might use in order to: a) bring under its control the
country’s oil industry; and b) to maintain its grasp over it. The ensuing discussion dealt
with patron–client relationships, corporatism as well as quasi-corporatism and neo-
patrimonial regimes. It was argued that these formal and informal mechanisms of control
should be applied to the analysis of regime–oil industry relationships, because: a) those
concepts have been used in the past in order to shed light on the regime–business
relationships in the countries that are run by the authoritarian regimes; and b) corporatism
and patron–clientism were used by Sovietologists to explain state–society relationships in
the Soviet Union. Since post-Soviet Kazakhstan was marked by political and institutional
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continuity, these tools can likely still prove useful in the analysis of its regime–oil
industry relationship.
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Chapter 2: The Kazakh oil industry in transition: de-formalising formal relations
In the first part of this chapter, we will briefly analyse the development of the Kazakh oil
industry in the Soviet Union, the legacy of which is crucial for understanding events in
the first years of independence. In the second part of this chapter, we will discuss how in
the beginning of the 1990s, Nazarbayev attempted to partly privatise the Kazakh oil
sector with the involvement of Kazakh oil men. The relationships between the regime and
different branches of the oil-industry were structured in a corporatist fashion – a direct
legacy of the state–oil industry relationship structure from the Soviet times. However,
this relationship proved unsustainable due to challenges from inside of the oil sector in
which: a) a corporatist structure created space for the emergence of a ‘strong man’ who
attempted to take over the NOC (Kazakhstanmunaigaz, later renamed Munaigas) from
the president; and b) parts of the oil industry in the peripheries were captured by local oil
men and notables who were afraid to lose out in the privatisations driven by people
associated with oil enterprises created in the 1980s. A collision between Nazarbayev and
the oil men sparked the restructuring process of the relationship between the two parties
by the regime. In the third part of this chapter, we discuss how, in the latter half of the
1990s, Nazarbayev decided to pursue the almost full-scale privatisation of the oil industry
with the help of outsiders and only the minimal involvement of Kazakh oil men. The
privatisation of the oil industry was accompanied by a major change in the relationship
between the regime and the oil men, at a time when the corporatistic structure was
replaced by patrimonialism. In the fourth part of this chapter, we show that since the
relationship was restructured, the Kazakh oil men have proven to be dependable allies of
the Nazarbayev regime. Their unquestionable support was visible during the 2001
political crises.
The transition from formal to informal mechanisms of control that took place in
regime–oil industry relationships echoes the experience of the sub-Saharan regimes,
which in order to retain power created a neo-patrimonial political system in which
patron–client relationships suffused rational-legal institutions (chapter 1, section 5.1). It
is argued in this thesis that the Kazakh ruling regime, similarly to other neo-patrimonial
regimes, was able to resort to the informal type of mechanism due to the widespread
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culture of clientelism on the central and local levels during the colonial period. Be that as
it may, neo-patrimonialism was not the path the Kazakh regime was set to follow from
the outset.
The corporatist type of regime–oil industry relationship indicates that the Kazakh
regime had the capacity to structure relationships in a formal manner. Corporatist
regime–oil industry relationships could only emerge because the regime had relevant
institutions at its disposal, hand- in-hand with a managerial class that had been socialised
into a corporatist mode of running the industry. Arguably, on their respective eves of
independence the sub-Saharan African elites lacked both these prerequisites for putting
formal relationships in place. Comparatively, the Kazakh regime was in a better position
than the African regimes. In spite of that, Nazarbayev chose to turn away from a formal
type of relationship and towards patron–clientelism as soon as he realised that any other
arrangement would give his opponents ample room to manoeuvre. In view of these
factors, this chapter argues that the Nazarbayev regime’s choices were largely
conditioned by the leadership’s fear of being outmanoeuvred, rather than by any
structural constraints.
1. The Kazakh oil industry in the Soviet era
Stephen Kotkin, in his book Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000,
argued that from the 1970s until the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union,
abundant oil revenues were the most significant factor that enabled the Kremlin’s rulers
to sustain the communist system. From 1973 to 1985, mineral resources accounted for 80
per cent of the USSR’s expanding hard currency earnings. Two factors bear
responsibility for this: first, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the oil shock that led to
unprecedented increases in the world oil prices, and second, the discovery, between 1961
and 1969, of five dozen new oil-fields in Western Siberia that catapulted the Soviet
Union to the undisputed first place among the world’s oil producers (2001: 15; see also
Kuhnert 1991: 496). The full-scale development of the oil-fields of Western Siberia that
commenced in the 1970s marked the beginning of the third generation of development of
the Soviet oil industry.
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The first generation was based on the oil resources of the North Caucasus and
Azerbaijan, particularly, the oil city of Baku, and encompasses the period from 1917 to
until the end of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945). The second generation, which
lasted until the end of the 1960s, was associated with the Volga Basin and the Ural
Mountains. At the beginning of 1960s, as much as 80 per cent of the Soviet production of
crude oil came from fields in the Urals–Volga region (Ebel 1961: 65). The Central Asian
region, and most importantly the Kazakhstan SSR, remained largely underdeveloped
during the Soviet Union when compared to other regions of the Union (Appendix 3a).27
This region was the jewel in the crown, and was planned to make it a base for the fourth
generation in the development of the Soviet oil industry, possibly some time at the end of
the 1990s, together with the Barents and Kara seas north of the Artic Circle (Gustafson
1989: 64; Ebel 2000: 6).
The full-scale development of Kazakh SSR oil resources at an earlier date was
significantly hampered throughout the 1980s by several factors. The significant drop in
the oil prices in the second half of the 1980s, in tandem with the chronic energy shortages
which arose as an effect of wasteful consumption of energy by the Soviet industrial
giants, prompted Soviet leaders to hastily increase production from the existing Siberian
fields – especially those in Tiumen province – rather than investing into developing the
Kazakh fields (Gustafson 1989: 9). This strategic choice was closely linked to the fact
that this region was much more technically demanding and required offshore drilling, as a
result of which Soviet planners proved reluctant to explore it much more vigorously
(1989: 215). In fact, the most significant discoveries in Kazakhstan came in 1979 with the
discovery of two gigantic fields Tengiz (oil)28 and Karachaganak (gas and oil)29 – both
located in the western regions of Kazakhstan. Another important breakthrough came in
1981 with the discovery of the Kumkol field (oil)30 in the south of the republic. Due to
27 An exception in the Central Asian region was Turkmenistan, which was a major supplier of natural gas in
the Soviet Union with its share exceeding 24 percent as early as 1970, and rising to just under 33 percent by
1975 (Ebel 2000: 4).
28 A ‘giant’ field is one that contains between 500 million and 5 billion barrels of oil in reserves. Tengiz is
estimated to contain more than 3.3 billion tons of oil (Sagers 1994: 275, 278), which is as much as
Algeria’s total reserves.
29 Karachagank contains as much as 1,300 bcm of gas and 6.8 billion barrels of condensate and some crude
oil (Skagen 1997: 19).
30 It contains around 400 million tons of oil (Sagers 1994: 277).
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the abovementioned technical problems, however, work on all three fields progressed
relatively slowly. Karachagank was put on-steam in 1984, production from the Kumkol
field by Yuzhneftegaz enterprise began only in 1989, whereas work on Tengiz by
Tengizmunaigaz started as late as 1985, and it did not yield its first commercial oil until
1991 (Ebel 2000: 7).
Having said all of that, whereas the Kazakhstan SSR did not go through the full-
scale energy development that Siberia did, it nevertheless was a republic in which: a)
over the years necessary geological works were carried out, which gave Soviet specialists
a good idea about the republic’s potential (including Caspian Sea)31; and b) since the
mid-1960s,32 a number of enterprises specialising in drilling and production operations
were established, which at the beginning of the 1990s produced between 5–6 per cent of
the former Soviet total33 (Sagers 1994: 271). The bulk of Kazakh oil production came
from the republic’s oldest producing areas on the Mangyshlak and Buzachi peninsulas
that were discovered in the late 1950s and mid-1970s,34 respectively. Enterprises
responsible for developing those fields have been Mangistauneftegaz (1963) (later on
renamed Mangistaumunaigaz), and Uzenmunaigaz (1964) located in the western region
of Kazakhstan. Another key enterprise had been Aktobemunaigaz, also west of
Kazakhstan, which began production in 1967.35 In the first years of independence,
Aktobemunaigaz still employed around 10,000 workers and produced 2.5 million tons of
oil annually.36 Lastly, Kazakhstan also had three fairly small refineries built in the space
of 40 years in three corners of the country.37
31 ‘The second largest concentration of oil reserves within the former USSR was in the region surrounding
the Caspian Sea, particularly north-western Kazakhstan; the oil resources of Kazakhstan’s North Caspian
Basin were judged uniformly to be in second place after Western Siberia by Soviet geologists and other
knowledgeable experts within the industry’ (Sagers 1994: 268).
32 Kazakhstan’s oil production reached 1 million tons annually in 1950.
33 In 1975, total Kazakh production was believed to be around 23.9 million tons. Source: ‘News Notes’
Soviet Geography, 20, 1 (1979), p. 617. However, after that it went through a prolonged phase of decline
and began to recover only in the mid-1980s. On the eve of independence, Kazakhstan’s oil production
stood at around 26.6 million tons (Sagers 1994: 272). In 1991’s rating of 55 countries producing
hydrocarbon raw materials, Kazakhstan holds 24th place. Source: ‘Kazakhstan's Oil 1991 – 2001,’
Petroleum Magazine, December 2001.
34 The key fields were Uzen, Zhetybay, and Aktas, which, between 1989-1990, produced roughly 9–10
million tons (Sagers 1994: 278).
35 Principal oil fields: Kenkiyak and Zhanazhol.
36 ‘Caveat Emptor,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, July/August 1995a.
37 Shymkent Refinery (1984) – Southern Kazakhstan by the Kyrgyzstan border with 6 million tons annual
capacity; Pavlodar Refinery (1976) – Northwestern Kazakhstan by the Russian border; this refinery was
60
The oil enterprises which started to operate in the 1960s became natural breeding
grounds for the ‘Kazakh oil men’ (neftyanik), who typically would grow up in the
western regions of Kazakhstan and begin working for the oil enterprises in their late
teens. Slowly, over the years, these men would manoeuvre themselves into the top
positions. They would obtain their basic technical education in local institutions such as
the Oil Technical School in Guryev38 that opened as early as 1930, and the Geology and
Geophysics Institute of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences in Guryev (1960). The most
promising ones went to study at the Kazakh Polytechnic Institute in Almaty, and some
even travelled to neighbouring republics and Moscow. Moreover, it was not uncommon
for young technicians, engineers, and geologists to become members of the Communist
party, and in some instances to claim the top positions in their local branches39. It is
important to keep in mind that Kazakhstan SSR, which did not became a major centre of
the Soviet oil industry and lacked major oil academies as the ones in Baku and Grozny,
failed to produce a substantial indigenous oil class (Kim 2003: 74; Hoffman Fall 2000:
302–303). Thus, the group of oil men that came into existence was relatively small but
well-defined. The fact that Kazakhs who were employed in the oil-industry came from
sparsely-populated desert areas, and that working in the oil sector was a family ‘business’
in which the father or in some instances even grandfather was involved. This created a
sense of belonging to a distinct group40 similar to what happened in other oil-industry
dominated parts of the Soviet Union (Lane 2001: 103). Among the key oil families in
Kazakhstan, we find: Balgimbayev, Cherdabayev, Mamyrbayev, Utebayev, Karabalin,
Khasanov, Saghingaliyev, Batyrbaev, Dauletov, Zhumagaziyev, Nursultanov,
Atchibayev, Akhmetov, Kilibayev, and Salikhov.41
However, despite the high level of homogeneity of people working in the oil
industry in Soviet Kazakhstan since the beginning of the 1980s, divisions between
different groups began to emerge. The fraction of the Kazakh oil men who were involved
considered one of the most modern processing plants in the former Soviet Union with 8 million tons annual
capacity; Atyrau Refinery (1945) – Western Kazakhstan by the Caspian Sea.
38 Since 1992, Atyrau.
39 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan,1. Azholdas & Company Publishing House, Astana (1999), pp.
46–94.
40 Interview with a business development manager working for a major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: 14 November 2004.
41 Source: Interviews Kazakhstan Autumn: 2004.
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in the discovery of the Tengiz oil field in the initial stages of that project were able to
gain considerable prominence over those working on other oil enterprises. This was
largely due to the central character of the Tengiz venture for the development of not only
the Kazakh, but also the larger Soviet oil industry, which meant that funds and the
attention of the decision makers were concentrated on this particular field and those
involved in its exploration.42 The legacy of this state of affairs would become all too
visible in the 1990s.
Lastly, the business of running the Kazakhstan SSR’s oil industry was in the
hands of Moscow, with little involvement of the republic’s local authorities. The bodies
responsible for governing the Soviet oil industry were horizontally organised within
different ministries, and their local divisions were responsible for different aspects of the
industry, as opposed to a vertically integrated structure with one ministry in charge of the
entire process (Gustafson 1989: 10; Kuhnert 1991: 499–500). The transformation of the
Soviet oil industry began as early as the mid-1950s, and was triggered by the incapability
of the existing bodies to deal with the excessive work schedules. In the mid-1960s, the
Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, USSR was split into two independent divisions – the
Ministry of the Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Gas Industry – which were
responsible for development, transmission, and sale of oil and gas. Additionally, the
Ministry of Geology was reinstated to oversee the preliminary stages of exploration of
the mineral resources (Considine and Kerr 2002: 67–88). The atomisation of the oil
industry governing bodies did not stop there and progressed farther over time. In the late
1980s, there were six central ministries responsible for the exploration, extraction,
production, refining, export and distribution of oil products (Lane 2001: 103 and 126).
To sum up, towards the end of the existence of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was
considered by the Soviet planners as the most promising oil-rich region in the Soviet
Union, and was identified as a future vehicle for the development of the oil industry due
to the discoveries at the beginning of the 1980s and the untapped potential of the Caspian
Sea. In the Kazakhstan SSR, full-scale oil production began on several fields in the mid-
1960s, and in 1991 the enterprises developing those fields were still responsible for most
42 Interview with the executive director of a major oil project in Kazakhstan: Atyrau, 17 November 2004;
see also: Peck 2004: 44.
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of the oil extracted in Kazakhstan. Moreover, those oil producing enterprises were also
the birthplaces for the Kazakh indigenous oil men. They constituted a distinct group, but
one which was not, however, free from internal divisions and characterised by rivalries
between those working on old and new projects. Lastly, the Kazakhstan SSR oil industry
was run by a number of Moscow based ministries and their local branches, organised in a
horizontal fashion.
2. The Kazakh oil industry after independence: challenges (1991–1994)
Kazakhstan declared its sovereignty on October 25, 1990 and became an independent
country on December 16, 1991(Appendix 3b). With Kazakhstan gaining independence,
the Kazakhstan SSR oil-industry came under the control of the new state. As the Russian
authorities liquidated the All-Union energy related ministries in 1991, Kazakhstan was
left, somewhat unexpectedly, in charge of the existing oil enterprises within the borders
of the former Soviet republic. The first body to feel this organisational vacuum was the
Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Corporation, which came into existence in July 1991. In 1992,
the Corporation changed its name to Kazakhstanmunaigaz and became an NOC (or
‘holding company’).43 The NOC Kazakhstanmunaigaz was supposed to engage, through
various state-owned operating units, in oil and gas exploration, development, production,
transportation, and refining throughout the country. In the same year, Kazakhstan set up
the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources, which was held responsible for regulating oil
and gas production and refining. Finally, the Ministry of Geology and Protection of
Mineral Resources was set up to regulate the development of Kazakhstan’s mineral
resources.44
Within this rather chaotic structure of the Kazakh oil industry that came to
existence on the eve of independence, the jurisdictions of three different bodies
overlapped in various areas. This state was: a) a legacy of the horizontally organised
Soviet oil industry, where numerous ministries were responsible for different parts of the
industry; and b) also an endeavour to accommodate different political and professional
43 http://eng.kmgep.kz/history (Accessed 3 December 2005).
44 A.D. Koen, ‘Kazakh state oil enterprises move toward privatization,’ The Oil and Gas Journal, 21
August 1995.
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groups through creating institutions that would represent their interests. This will become
clearer when we analyse the background of the leading figures involved in running the oil
industry, for example, that of Bulat. D. Yelemanov, the president of
Kazakhstanmunaigaz. An engineer from western Kazakhstan, he was among the people
who discovered the Tengiz field and the first director of the producing enterprise there
(Tengizmunaigaz).45 The Minister of Energy and Fuel Resources was Kadry Baikenov,
(also a deputy minister at that time), himself not a professional oil man but a high-ranking
Communist Party functionary during the Soviet era, who was put in this position to
oversee the actions of the oil men and guard the nomenklatura’s interests.46 A further
important figure in the ministry was deputy minister Baltabek Kuandykov, a geologist
from the west of Kazakhstan who had studied in Almaty and Moscow. He held the
position of Secretary in the ‘Guryev regional Committee of Young Communist League’,
and subsequently held posts in numerous geological associations in the west of
Kazakhstan, including Gurievneftegazgeologiya, which worked on the Tengiz oil field.
Moreover, he has been also closely affiliated with the Balgymbayev family, one of the
key oil families in Kazakhstan.47 Finally, the minister of Geology was Lev Trubnikov and
his deputy was Serikbek Daukeyev, who was in reality the most important official in the
ministry. Daukeyev was a mining engineer educated at the Kazakh Polytechnic Institute
and participated in introducing advanced technology in various oil-producing enterprises
with which he was closely affiliated.48
Arguably, what emerged from this mix of Soviet legacy and the effort to contain
diverse interests was a corporatistic structure where the people in charge of the industry
at the central level were to play the role of intermediaries between the centre and
different branches of the oil- industry with which they were involved. Nazarbayev most
likely acceded to this arrangement for two reasons. First, he was familiar with it as it
follows in a continuous line from the way in which industry was governed in the Soviet
Union (see chapter 1, section 4.1), and second, he needed a structure which appeared to
take into consideration different interests, something that could be crucial for a further
45 Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 September 2002.
46 ‘Going Vertical,’ Russian Petroleum Investors, October 1994a; ‘Soviet oil investment remains guessing
game,’ The Oil Daily, 15 April, 1992.
47 ‘Someone to watch over them,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1997.
48 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, 2, p. 145; Kazakhstan State Directory, Astana, June 1998.
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restructuring of the oil sector.49 These formal mechanisms, which were to be used to
negotiate the future development of the Kazakh oil industry, are in striking contrast to the
informal mechanisms which Nazarbayev has been using to run the oil sector from the
second half of the 1990s.
It is argued here that the transition from formal to informal mechanisms was
dictated by an inherent faultline in the corporatist structure that encouraged competition
between different bodies for influence. This competition created space for the emergence
of a ‘strong man’ to seize control over the oil-industry. Another challenge to the way in
which the industry would be run emerged from the oil men in the peripheries (most
notably the ones that were not involved in Tengiz), who refused to subordinate
themselves to the new institutions and began questioning the authority of the centre. They
came to the forefront with the ‘wild’ sales of some parts of the industry to predominantly
unknown foreign oil companies.
2.1. The NOC Kazakhstanmunaigaz
The biggest faultline of the corporatistic structure of the post-independence Kazakh oil
industry was the NOC Kazakhstanmunaigaz. Kazakhstanmunaigaz was put in charge of
administering the Kazakh oil industry,50 and was thus a body which gathered together all
the key enterprises, but it officially did not have a say in the future direction of the
Kazakh oil industry. At the same time, the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources and
the Ministry of Geology, which on paper were responsible for determining the direction
of the oil industry, was not directly in charge of oil and gas enterprises.51 Moreover, due
to ill-defined administrative boundaries, they were inherently prone to struggle for
influence over Kazakhstanmunaigaz as well as over the direction that it should take.52
49 To an exten,t a corporatistic nature of the relationship in question was a product of its time. In the first
years after gaining independence, Nazarbayev tried to established a quasi-pluralistic political system;
however, he found it too unpredictable and hard to control (Cummings 2005: pp. 22–29; Olcott 2002: pp.
87–128; Olcott 222: 1997); see also: chapter 3 (section 1.2).
50 Its main divisions were: Mangistaumnaigaz (Atyrau region); Embanaft (Atyrau province);
Kazakhstancaspishelf (Caspian Sea); and Tengizmunaigaz (Tengiz oil filed). Major Oil fields: Tengiz,
Korolev, Tenge. Major Gas Fields: Karachaganak. Quoted in ‘Kazakhstan: Country Analysis.’ Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, October 1994.
51 Interview with oil expert: Almaty, 17 September 2004.
52 ‘The Kazakh Oil Labyrinth,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1993a.
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This situation in which ministries which traditionally would control at least some parts of
the industry were left standing with nothing came about as a product of two separate
trends that came together in the 1990s, and culminated in the creation of
Kazakhstanmunaigaz.
By contrast, Kazakhstanmunaigaz, when created, fitted well with the general
legacy of the horizontally organised Soviet oil industry, but it nevertheless was an
experimental body. The NOCs which, as outlined in chapter 1 (section 1.1), are normally
responsible for running the oil industry in oil-producing countries all over the world, did
not exist in the Soviet Union. The idea of creating such an organisation came to the
surface in Russia only towards the beginning of the 1990s. The plan was to restructure
the Russian oil industry into few large, vertically integrated companies, which would
combine crude production, refining, and distribution and retailing in one integrated
structure (Sagers 1998: 298). The government was to maintain a large stake in the
ownership of these companies; however, they were required to compete amongst
themselves on a free-market basis (Lane 2001: 124). The central oil body, Rosneft, was
designed to hold the state shares in those enterprises; subsequently Rosneft was
transformed into a special ‘national’ oil company in 1994–1995 by Yuriy Shafranik, the
then Minister of Fuel (Sagers 1998: 298). Rosneft undoubtedly served as a model for
creating Kazakhstanmunaigaz; however, the real incentive for the Kazakh NOC to come
into existence was the nature of the contracts that Kazakhstan signed with a number of
foreign oil companies at the beginning of the 1990s.
In chapter 1 (section 1.1), it was demonstrated that typical oil contracts (joint
ventures arrangements, production sharing agreements and service contract agreements)
reached between host governments and foreign oil companies require either the existence
of an NOC or at the very least an oil ministry to monitor and regulate the activities of
foreign companies. The NOC is usually the preferred, if not required, partner, because
foreign contractors ideally want to deal with the people that possess all the necessary
information about the mineral deposits and the technologies best suited for exploration,
and who are able to conduct the required work. In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan signed
66
two types of contracts from the above list (joint ventures arrangements and production
sharing agreements).53
The preliminary negotiations concerning the involvement of the foreign oil
companies in Kazakhstan began well before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
December 1988, the Oil Ministry of the USSR and Chevron Corporation54 signed a
preliminary agreement on carrying out work to survey the Korolevskoye oil field located
in the North Caspian basin, east of the Tengiz field.55 It was also reported at that time that
Chevron had formed a local ‘consortium’, including several local enterprises,56 to help
study the field. Another field under discussion was Tengiz itself. The Soviets, who had
tried and failed to develop special-purpose equipment on their own, finally decided to
turn to foreign oil companies.57 It should be added that inviting outsiders to participate in
the exploration and development of the Soviet fields was rather unusual, as even in the
last years of perestroika Western companies were predominantly involved only in
petrochemicals, gas treatment, and petroleum refining (Gustafson 1989: 223–224).
Somewhat unsurprisingly, the negotiations proved extremely difficult and meant
that terms offered to the outsiders by the Soviets were ‘hopelessly complex, and, in the
perspective of Western investors, poorly conceived’ (Considine and Kerr 2002: 222–
224). After gaining independence, the Kazakh authorities decided to cancel all
agreements reached between Moscow and Chevron in 1990 as being too favourable
towards Western partners. It took yet another two years of negotiations and disputes
before a new agreement was reached in April 1992, and named ‘Operation
53 Kazakhstan was not the only country in the post-Soviet space that set up a National Oil Company in
order to ease co-operation with the foreign oil companies; another country was Azerbaijan, with its State
Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) formed in September 1992. Source: Interview with a high-
ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty, 6 October 2004. Also in 1998 in effort to create
a better business climate to attract foreign investment Turkmenistan restructured its oil and gas industries
into several state-owned companies Turkmenneft, Turkmengeologya, Turkmengas, Turkmenneftegas and
Turkmenneftegazstroy. Although the country has attempted to ease restrictions on foreign investments,
many sets of regulation remain in place. Sources: ‘Overview of Oil and Gas sector,’ EC Delegation and
Tacis National Co-ordinating Unit, 2004; Canzi 2004: pp. 181–200; Lubin 2000: pp. 107–123.
54 Chevron Corporation was part of a bigger consortium of companies that comprised several American
firms known as the American Trade Consortium, which included Archer Daniels Midland, Ford Motor
Company, RJR Nabisco, Eastman Kodak, Johnson and Johnson, Chevron and the Mercator Corporation.
55 ‘News Notes,’ Soviet Geography, 30 (3) (1989), pp. 253–254.
56 Tengizneft (oil production), Gurievneftegazgeologiya (geology), and Prikaspiiburneft (well drilling).
57 This initial co-operation between Soviet and Western companies was part of a bigger plan that aimed at
encouraging Soviet firms ‘to attain the efficiency levels prevailing in global industry’ (Rutland 1990: 180).
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TengizChevrOil Joint Venture’58 (Munns, Aloquili and Ramsay 2000: 410–411).
TengizChevrOil JV was created between Tengizneftegaz, a local enterprise established in
1985, and Chevron Overseas Petroleum. It was estimated at that time that the 50:5059
limited liability joint venture was worth about $80 billion in revenues to Kazakhstan and
$20 billion to Chevron over a period of 40 years. According to the final agreement, the
Kazakh government would receive 80.4 per cent of net revenues, while Chevron would
receive the remaining 19.6 per cent (Dorian, Zhanseitov and Indriyanto 1994: 691).
Another major contract concluded at that time concerned the Karachagank gas oil field.
British Gas60 and Agip were awarded the rights to negotiate a field development plan and
production sharing agreement (Skagen 1997: 19).61 The signing of those two crucial
contracts revealed the Kazakh tendency to copy Russian examples, and led to the ad hoc
creation of Kazakhstanmunaigaz without an apparent understanding the of problems that
it would create for the oil industry that for decades had been run by all powerful ministers
and not technical entities.62
The struggle over Kazakhstanmunaigaz between the Ministry of Energy and Fuel
Resources and the Ministry of Geology came into the open in 1993 when the government
began talking about a partial privatisation of Kazakhstanmunaigaz.63 The key
disagreement arose over the issue of who should be in charge of negotiating the terms of
privatisation with foreign investors. Serikbek Daukeyev from the Ministry of Geology
argued that his ministry should monitor the process of negotiations on all key projects
58 It was widely argued at that time that Nazarbayev was directly responsible for the fact that the deal was
reached at all. If it had not been for his ‘political grip’, Kazakhstan would most likely have behaved like
Russia, which in the beginning of the 1990s, due to internal struggles, failed to open its oil industry to
foreign investors. Source: ‘Tomorrow’s gusher,’ The Economist, July 25 1992.
59 Chevron agreed to pay $420 million for their 50 per cent interest (Peck 2004:153) and invested $1.5
billion during the first three years of the project (Dorian, Zhanseitov and Indriyanto 1994: 691).
60 In 1991, Great Britain invited Nazarbayev for a five-day visit to ‘encourage oil trading with Kazakhstan.’
During the visit, Nazarbayev met BP and British Gas officials and was reported to have discussed at length
the involvement of British companies in Kazakhstan. Source: ‘British wooing underlines immense energy
potential in Kazakhstan,’ The Oil Daily, 24 October 1991.
61 Initially British Gas and Agip were expecting to spend $5 billion on the further development of the field
(Sagers 1994: 281); In addition to those two deals, in accordance with the Resolution of the Republic of
Kazakhstan Government, the Kazakhstancaspishelf Company was established in 1992 to conduct
exploration works in the Kazakhstan sector of the Caspian Sea. The first foreign partner in the newly
formed Kazakhstancaspishelf Consortium became the American major Mobil.
62 Interview with a general director of a foreign small drilling company: Almaty, 10 September 2004.
63 The controlling block of Kazakhstanmunaigaz (51 per cent of total stock) was to stay with the state,
while only 15 per cent out of the remaining 49 per cent was to be sold to foreign investors. Source: ‘Big
Brother,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1993b.
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until the contracts were finally signed.64 The right of this particular ministry to preside
over the privatisation process derived from the fact that the Ministry of Geology had the
power to issue licenses to explore and develop the country’s oil and gas resources.65
Rather understandably, this was greeted with much scepticism by the Ministry of Energy,
which thought of itself as the body designated to negotiate the development terms with
foreign investors.66 The situation was further complicated by Kadry Baikenov, the
minister of Energy, who began questioning the process of privatisation altogether,67
somewhat echoing the criticisms expressed by some nationalistic parties at that time. In
the opinion of the leader of Zheltoksan, Khasen Kozhakhmetov, ‘irreplaceable resources,
Kazakhstan’s riches, are being sold off cheaply, bringing profits first and foremost to
corrupt bureaucrats’.68
In response to the tensions that were caused by the increasingly politically driven
Ministry of Energy, in the summer of 1994 Nazarbayev disbanded it and formed two
ministries to replace it – the Ministry of Energy and the Coal Industry, and the Ministry
of the Oil and Gas Industry. Moreover, he signed a decree that greatly enhanced the
authority of the Ministry of Geology by delegating to it the right to sign contracts with
foreign investors and to cover all aspects of negotiations and explorations.69 Finally, the
NOC Kazakhstanmunaigaz was renamed Munaigas.
At the same time, Nazarbayev did not attempt to merge Kazakhstanmunaigaz with
the Ministry of Geology, or in any way to subordinate the national company to the
ministry’s authority. Although, such a move would have led to full centralisation of the
64 Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1993a.
65 For instance, in February 1993 a joint Kazakh–Turkish enterprise, KazakhTurkMunai, was created by the
Ministry of Geology and Subsoil Protection of the RK and the Turkish National Petroleum Corporation.
KazakhTurkMunai began its subsoil-use activities with seven permits covering an area of about 26,000 sq.
km. In addition, on 9 June, 1993, a preliminary contract was signed between the Ministry of Energy and six
international oil firms (Agip Corporation, BP, Mobil, Shell and Total) to conduct broad geological and
seismic exploration programs aimed at providing more accurate information and helping members to select
parts of the Caspian Sea for development and commercial viability (Karibdzhanov and Taishibayev 1998:
558).
66 Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1993a.
67 Russian Petroleum Investors, October 1994a.
68 Mikhail Ustiugov and Oleg Puzanov, ‘Big oil moves in,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1993.
69 Russian Petroleum Investors, October 1994a.
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decision-making process and arguably would have helped to avoid future crises,70 he
instead left the corporatistic structure in place, indirectly encouraging further struggles
over the direction that Kazakhstanmunaigaz should take between the Ministry of Geology
and the new/old Ministry of Oil and Gas. The status of the NOC stayed largely
unchanged, because Nazarbayev, who considered himself as an enlightened leader in tune
with the new demands,71 was interested – at least rhetorically – in governing the oil
industry in a modern, rather than an outdated fashion. As one Western oil executive put it
at the time: ‘Nazarbayev has a global view, [he] is interested in Westernizing the energy
industry and views foreign investment as a way for Kazakhstan to move forward.
Nazarbayev is the right man in the right place at the right moment.’72 Moreover, the
corporatistic structure of the oil industry allowed Nazarbayev to uphold the status quo
rather than antagonising the sectors of the oil industry in the peripheries, which were
increasingly unhappy with Nazarbayev’s politics. The main problem was the
overrepresentation in the decision-making group of people in various technical
enterprises that worked on Tengiz, men who were pro top-down privatisation without the
involvement of those working in older enterprises.73
It should be mentioned here that the clash between the two ministries need not
have repeated itself if Nazarbayev had appointed someone fairly weak to the post of the
newly created ministry. However, he chose to do quite the opposite and appointed Ravil
Cherdabayev from the Atyrau region, western Kazakhstan, as the new minister of Oil and
Gas. His initial role was to demonstrate to foreign investors Kazakhstan’s commitment to
privatisation, which had been shaken by Baikenov. Cherdabayev had studied in Moscow
at the Petroleum Institute and at the Higher Party School at the SU Communist Party’s
Central Committee. Furthermore, he also held a PhD in Economic Sciences. In the
beginning of his career, he worked in executive positions in the Communist Party and
70 In Azerbaijan, Aliyev’s regime, after bringing SOCAR under its control, managed to avoid any
challenges from inside or outside of the National Oil Company throughout the 1990s (Hoffman 2000;
Heradstveit 2001; Cornell 2001; Fairbanks 2001).
71 Victoria Pope, ‘Back to the future in Central Asia: Kazakhstan is a post-Soviet success story,’ U.S. News
& World Report, 8 March, 1993; ‘The U.S. and Kazakhstan: a strategic economic and political relationship.
President Bill Clinton, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev speeches (Transcript),’ US Department of State
Dispatch, 21 February, 1994.
72 ‘The Purge,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1994.
73 Interview with a general director of a foreign small drilling company: Almaty, 10 September 2004.
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government authorities in the Atyrau and Mangistau region, and later on at
Tengizneftegaz. After independence, Cherdabayev became a deputy chairman of the
Guryev regional executive committee and took active part in negotiations over the
creation of TengizChevrOil and signed its foundational agreement. From April 1993 to
June 1994, he was the first director of TengizChevrOil JV.74 On top of that, Cherdabayev
came from one of the most respected oil families in Kazakhstan, whose members had
worked on oil enterprises since the beginning of the 20th century. His first deputy minister
became Bulat D. Yelemanov, who had previously headed the Kazakhstanmunaigaz.
Another oil man, Tulegen Khasanov, was then installed as the new boss of the freshly
renamed national oil company, Munaigas. Previously, he had worked as director of one
of the key oil enterprises in Kazakhstan, Yuzhneftegaz75. Both of them had roots in the
oil-rich regions, and from the perspective of the new minister were easy partners to deal
with.
Upon his arrival at the Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry, Cherdabayev
reshuffled the staff left over from the defunct Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources and
proposed that Munaigas would be transformed into the NOC the Kazakh Oil Company.
His plan was to transform it into a vertically integrated holding company that would
consist of numerous production, refining, and transportation joint stock companies in
Kazakhstan. Moreover, whereas partial privatisation was envisaged, the majority of the
shares of the vertically integrated NOC would be held by the state. Crucially, the
Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry and the State Property Committee would monitor
the company’s performance. It was then widely assumed that if Cherdabayev’s ministry-
led plan were introduced, it would spell a significant degree of control over the republic’s
most important industry and allow the ministry to regain the authority that its predecessor
had lost to the Ministry of Geology.76 Cherdabayev’s vision for the oil industry yet again
led to the clash between two ministries;77 however, not just the Ministry of Geology was
alarmed by the new plans: Nazarbayev himself, judging by his future steps, was not
pleased with the actions of his new minister.
74 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, 2, p. 543; TengizChevrOil Publications, Almaty, 2003.
75 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, 2, p. 514.
76 Russian Petroleum Investors, October 1994a; see also: (Peck 2004: 149).
77 Ibid.
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Firstly, an in-depth reconstruction of the oil industry meant that more time would
be spent on bureaucratic infighting, and this would effectively prolong the opening of the
industry to foreign investments. Secondly, and much more importantly, going along with
Cherdabayev’s plan meant handing the oil industry into the hands of one man, something
that Nazarbayev had clearly wanted to avoid from the beginning of the 1990s.
Cherdabayev was seen particularly dangerous due to his good base in the oil industry and
close connections to a number of ex-party officials, with whom he was even willing to
negotiate the terms of any privatisations. For example, he demanded that the restructuring
plans for the energy sector be subject to debate and approval by the heads of the regional
administrations.78
Moreover, his brothers clearly began positioning themselves in strategic positions
in anticipation of future privatisations. In 1994, Boris Cherdabayev became president of
Mangistaumunaigaz, one of the most important oil enterprises in Kazakhstan, whereas his
other brother, Magauiya Cherdabayev, has since 1991 held the position of director
general of the Embavedoil JV, the first semi-private JV established in Kazakhstan.79
Finally, and arguably most importantly, Cherdabayev strove for a good relationships with
foreign oil companies, especially his former employees TengizChevrOil JV. Thus, when
Ravil Cherdabayev was appointed minister, his first decision was to considerably
increase Chevron JV’s export quotas at the expense of domestic producers.80 Also, before
becoming a minister, he had spent some time in Chevron’s headquarters in San Ramon,
California where he allegedly underwent ‘a capitalist indoctrination’81 under the watchful
eye of Chevron.82
It is argued here that with Cherdabayev’s arrival, Nazarbayev became exposed to
the same problem that so many other either semi-democratic or authoritarian rules face.
In chapter 1 (section 1.1), it was demonstrated how presidents and managers in charge of
NOCs, due to their strategic positions, tend to emerge as some of the most influential
people in their countries, with their own webs of powerful patron–client networks. The
78 ‘Carrot-and-Stick Strategy,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, February 1995b.
79 Interview with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 12 November 2004.
80 ‘The Quick Fix,’ Russian Petroleum Investors, September 1994.
81 Cherdabayev was not the only person who worked on Tengiz in the 1980s and went to study in the US in
the beginning of the 1990s. Other examples include Satybai Duzbayev (chief engineer of the
Tengizneftegaz 1984–1993) and Nurlan Shmanov (pipeline specialist 1988–1992).
82 Russian Petroleum Investors, October 1994a.
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examples of Gazprom in the 1990s, and the 2002 general strike in Venezuela, are the
most telling examples. Nazarbayev was clearly not prepared for this to happen, and was
very quick to bring Cherdabayev’s plans to a halt. The latter was forced to step down in
October 1994 and finished as the controversial head of the Atyrau regional
administration, a function that he abused to its limits (chapter 4, section 1.1). In the next
opening of the game for the control over the Kazakh oil industry, Nazarbayev would
make sure that such a ‘mistake’ as Cherdabayev did not happen again. Decisive in
achieving this goal was a change from corporatistic techniques of running the oil industry
to a structure based on informal networks, a process that was greatly accelerated during
and after the sell-off of the oil industry to foreign investors.
It should be mentioned at this point in the discussion that the first moves towards
creating patron–client relationships in relationship to the oil industry could be observed in
the examples of individuals that held top positions in the oil industry at the beginning of
the 1990s. All of them, after leaving their posts sometime in the mid-1990s, ended up in
high positions that required direct state support and sponsorship. Thus, Bulat Yelemanov
became chairman of the Committee of Investments and later on chairman of Azimut
Energy Services, one of the biggest companies in Kazakhstan that specialises in
geophysical works; among its clients are companies such as Chevron.83 Another ex-boss
of the NOC, Tulegen Khasanov, became a special advisor to TengizChevrOil. The ex-
minister Kadry Baikenov, with his brother Aset Baikenov, founded Interconsulting,
which assists and supports foreign investors in the selection and implementation of
investment projects,84 whereas his number two Baltabek Kuandykov became an
executive consultant to the Euroasian Group of Chevron in the United States. He later on
became an executive director of one of the biggest private oil companies in Kazakhstan –
Nelson Resources.85 Finally, Serikbek Daukeyev was first elevated to the position of
Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources and later on was moved to the post of
Atyrau’s akim (see also chapter 5).
83 Far Eastern Economic Review, September 3, 2002.
84 Interconsulting materials, Almaty, 2004.
85 http://www.nelsonresources.com/NR/2_news/2004_06_14.htm (Accessed 9 December 2005).
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2.2. Peripheries
If the challenge posed by Cherdabayev had showed Nazarbayev that formal mechanisms
can became potentially threatening, it was the peripheries that played a decisive part in
Nazarbayev’s decisions to re-structure the relationship with the oil industry. As it was
said in the beginning of this section, the corporatistic structure was put in place in order
to incorporate various groups that worked in the oil sector. However, these mechanisms
never became a vehicle for these interests, since the interests of those involved in the
newly discovered fields of the late 1970s – primarily Tengiz – were over represented. In
reality, this meant that while the Tengiz oil men tried to wrestle from Nazarbayev greater
control over the oil sector, they did not in principle object to the process of privatisation
per se. Yet, top-down privatisation for those working on older oil enterprises –
underrepresented ones – meant that they would lose influence over ‘their’ enterprises and
moreover be excluded from the process of privatisation. It should be added that the same
applied to local nomenclature.
Hence, immediately after independence, federal government officials, regional
administration heads, and heads of departmental working groups and oil enterprises
began signing licenses and contracts for subsoil development without coordinating with
the Ministry of Geology and Subsoil Protection. This situation spun out of control to such
an extent that by 1995, no one knew how many signed contracts existed in the country,
much less what their terms might be. On occasion, several companies signed similar
contracts for the same area.86 The companies that were formed during that time were
primarily interested in the fields already discovered during the Soviet era, predominantly
in the 1980s. However, because those fields had been declared too small for full-scale
exploration at the time, they were conserved or only partly explored.
The companies that were issued wild licences were founded by individuals who
either held an important position in the local Communist party structures in the 1970s and
1980s, or had already worked in the local oil industry for a number of years. The latter
group were oil men who were relatives or had close ties to the major oil families. The
initial capital of those companies came from various sources. For instance, in the Atyrau
86‘Order out of Chaos,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, 1995 May.
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region there were number of companies which, prior to becoming involved in oil
exploration, were engaged in oil trading87 and oil-related products as well as foodstuffs
among other things.88 Another source of obtaining capital was through the formation of
joint ventures between Kazakh and outside interests.
In a well-rehearsed pattern, the Kazakh partner provided access to the oil fields
(licences) and the outside interests would provide the much-needed capital. However,
whereas in some cases foreign capital seemed to be truly foreign, for instance,
Hungarian,89 in other cases this ‘foreign’ capital was most likely Kazakh. It is common
knowledge that in the early nineties in Kazakhstan as in other post-Soviet countries,
capital that came from places such as Cyprus90, was native capital. It had been taken out
of the country, sometimes literally in huge suitcases stuffed with dollars and, for tax
purposes, was only later to be reinvested as foreign capital (Kryukov and Moe 1999: 67–
68; Pleines 1999: 97–111). Thus, a joint venture that from the outside looked like an
enterprise combining Kazakh and foreign partners was in fact a Kazakh–Kazakh
company. Given the dubious nature of this ‘outside capital’, one cannot exclude the
possibility of criminal elements being heavily involved in those early joint ventures
(Satpaev 1999: 98–100)91. The biggest joint ventures formed at that time were
Embavedoil92, Kazpromstavba93, Gyural Oil94, and Tasbulat Oil Development95.
87 In the beginning of the 1990s, trade in oil was hugely profitable in the oil-producing parts of the former
Soviet Union thanks to a number of loopholes that were quickly explored by directors, members of the
nomenclature and high ranking military personnel. In the words of Joseph Stiglitz: ‘While most of the
processes were completely freed, some of the most important prices were kept low – those for natural
resources. With the newly declared ‘market economy,’ this created an open invitation: If you can buy, say,
oil and resell it in the West, you could make millions or even billions of dollars. So people did. Instead of
making money by creating new enterprises, they got rich from a new form of the old entrepreneurship –
exploiting mistake government policies’ (2002: 142). It was speculated that Roman Abramovich made his
first money in 1992 (at the age of 25) in this fashion. Source: Waclaw Radziwinowicz, ‘Abramovich –
supernew Russian,’ Gazeta.pl, 9 April, 2004; see also: Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, ‘Britain’s
richest man and Russian’s millions’ Guardian (Weekend), 8 May 2004.
88 Interview with a director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 8 November, 2004.
89 Interview with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 12 November, 2004.
90 Interview with a technical director working for a local oil company: Atyrau, 22 November 2004.
91 For the involvement of criminal elements in the post-Soviet space see: Volkov (2002), pp. 81–105;
Luneev (1999), pp. 71–82; Gustafson (1999), pp. 134–151; Riha (1996), pp. 245 – 268.
92 Vegyepszer (Hungary) and Embamunaigaz, Akbota.
93 Promislove Stavitelstvi Brno (Czech Republic) and Tengizneftegas.
94 Urals Trading (Cyprus) and Akbota, Atyrau refinery.
95 Gendor Resources (Cyprus) and Mangistaumunaigaz.
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In other cases, local officials and oil men challenged the contracts negotiated by
the central authorities only to set up their own companies that were designed to develop
local oil fields. The most famous example from that era is the one of Biedermann
International. In 1993, Biedermann International, a small Californian firm, which had
more experience in the banking business that in oil exploration and production – signed a
contract with Kazakhstanmunaigaz to develop the Kenbai field96 located in the Atyrau
region. The company was estimated to have made as much as $500 million in after-tax
profits over the 30-year life of the project.97 Rather unsurprisingly, the agreement came
under attack from a number of senior Atyrau officials. Sagat Tugelbayev, governor of the
Atyrau region (1992–1994), was the biggest critic of the deal. He argued that the US
company had been forced on his region by the Almaty government, and that granting the
rights to Biedermann was contrary to the interests of not only Atyrau, but to Kazakhstan
as a whole.98 An attempt was made at co-opting regional interests when the Atyrau
regional administration and the Embanaft production association became partners in the
Kenbai field; however, the oil men were not satisfied with the outcome. Eventually, the
government decided to terminate a contract with Biedermann International and argued
that the company had failed to live up to its contractual obligations.99
Interestingly, once Biedermann International was ousted, the Atyrau
administration promptly announced plans to develop the field on its own, with the Atyrau
Oil Joint Stock Company (Anaco) in charge. Koblan Dosmukhamedov, Embanaft’s
deputy director, was appointed president of the new company, while Atyrau’s mayor,
Sagat Tugelbayev, and Mokhambet Khakimov (who had been the acting general director
of the Munai joint venture – established with Biedermann to develop Kenbai before the
production-sharing agreement was signed) became the owners of a portion of the 25 per
cent of stock already distributed.100
The actions of the regional leaders and those surrounding them in the beginning
of the 1990s were greatly hampered by the lack of a legal framework which specified the
rules of joint ventures and privatisation in the oil sector. The basic petroleum legislation
96 The Kenbai field contains recoverable reserves of nearly 100 million tons.
97 ‘The Mouse that Roared,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1993.




in Kazakhstan was the ‘Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Subsoil and Refining
of Mineral Raw Materials’, dated 30 May 1992. Within the next two years, the original
petroleum law was revisited a staggering 18 times, and created confusion that was
skilfully exploited by those in the peripheries (Dorian, Zhanseitov and Indriyanto 1994:
689). This initial chaos meant that even those who did not have much to do with the oil
industry in the past obtained the necessary licences, something that they admittedly stated
would have been virtually impossible previously: ‘we managed to obtain a licence
because there was no legal framework, bureaucrats were not aware of what was
happening, they gave us a licence without seeing how they could benefit from that’.101
The clarification of the rules of the game in the Kazakh oil sector progressed
rather slowly. By late 1993, about fifty laws had been passed governing foreign
investments, which were seen as moves in the right direction, but still insufficient. Ray
Darnell, the director of petroleum services for Price Waterhouse Coopers, said: ‘[t]he
ability of the government to put these laws into place is very limited. They are just now
learning how to run their own country’.102 Thus, the lack of a legal framework at the
beginning of the 1990s encouraged regional leaders directly and indirectly to act on their
own and assert a greater influence over regional affairs, which in turn created problems
for the central authorities.
The further empowerment of regional leaders had its roots in: (a) the perestroika
era’s policy – strong centre and strong republics – that led to the transfer of power from
Moscow to the republican-level and inevitably regional levels103; and (b) the construction
of a ‘mixed political system’ – a response to the northern movements – which spelled the
move towards a more politically and economically liberal system on a central and local
level (discussed in chapter 3, section 1). In addition, Cummings pointed out that the fiscal
crisis which hit Kazakhstan by the mid-1990s led to a widening gap between policy
guidelines and the means available to implement them, ‘leaving the central authorities
with no better solution than to let provincial administration cope independently’ (2000:
101 Interview with a director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 8 November, 2004.
102 Paula Dittrick, ‘Kazakhstan to consider new oil and gas law,’ The Oil Daily, 24 May, 1993.
103 The Law on General Principles of Local Self-government and Local Economy, April 1990; the Law on
Property in the Kazakh SSR, 15 December, 1990; the Law on Local Self-government and Local Councils
in the Kazakh SSR, 15 February 1991 (Makhmutova 2001: 411); Additionally, in the last years of
Gorbachev’s rule, leaders of oil and gas enterprises were given unprecedented prerogatives: their rights
over production were extended to finance and marketing (Lane 2001: 104).
77
18). This strengthened the powers of the regional leaders. In this new reality, the local
administration successfully wrestled powers from the local councils that often duplicated
its powers, and hence provided some source of checks and balances (Makhmutova 2001:
412). However, whereas in oil-rich areas, the increase in powers of the local elites lead to
a wild privatisation, in the other parts of the country the same increase in powers was
used to stop the market reforms advocated by the centre. Luong argued that the growing
independence of the regional leaders was most visibly expressed in the problems that
Nazarbayev encountered when he tried to implement his initial economical reforms
(2000a: 3).
The reforms were made up of two key elements. First, they freed the prices for
retail goods and services and eliminated subsidies and, second, they led to the
privatisation of state-owned enterprises and assets (Kaser 1997: 33). On the local level,
reforms were expected to be brought into effect by the regional leaders. During Soviet
times, regional first secretaries and their deputies were responsible for fulfilling the
production quotas set in Moscow’s ministries and solving the economic problems in their
regions (Fainsod 1970: 225). In the first years of independence, Nazarbayev continued
working within this structural arrangement, demanding that regional leaders implement
his economic reforms.
However, those new economic reforms were greeted with much scepticism
(Gleason 2003: 46), the main reason being that any rearrangements in the economic
structure of the region inevitably meant upsetting the entrenched patronage networks
(Luong and Weinthal 2001: 387–388), especially in the rural regions of the south (Rumer
1989: 148; Rakowska-Harmstone 1994: 32). In effect, the regional leaders, on whom
Nazarbayev relied to implement economic reforms, failed to follow the Alma-Ata line
and seemed to grow even more independent. As Luong put it: ‘Rather than following the
President’s directives, many regional leaders adopted independent courses of action
based on what they perceived to be in the best interest of their respective oblast [i.e.
regions]’ (2000a: 5). In real terms, it meant that subsidies on wholesale prices continued
to exist, and the privatisation of Kazakhstan’s large enterprises was largely brought to
halt.
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To sum up, during the first years of independence, the relationships between
Nazarbayev and oil industry were structured along corporatistic lines. However, this
arrangement, from the point of view of the regime, proved to be unsustainable due to the
infighting over the control of Kazakhstanmunaigaz by groups in the centre and the
peripheries. This dual challenge – especially the one from the oil families in oil-rich
peripheries – pushed the regime towards restructuring its relationships with the oil
industry. The transformation came into the open during the process of privatisation of the
Kazakh oil industry. In the next section, we will discuss how Nazarbayev decided to
carry on privatisation without the apparent involvement of the oil men – who proved far
too problematic and indeed politically dangerous. At the same time, whereas the oil men
were not involved in the process of privatisation, Nazarbayev ensured that the key
individuals benefited in different ways from the process.
3. The Kazakh oil industry after independence: privatisation (1994 –1997)
After the abrupt departure of Ravil Cherdabayev, the deeply pro-presidential Nurlan
Balgymbayev became the new Minister of the Oil and Gas industry.104 Essentially, the
main task of the new minister was to create an atmosphere in which the anti-reformers in
the centre and the peripheries felt that their views were being taken under consideration.
At the same time, when Balgymbayev was calming down the heated atmosphere that had
developed around the oil industry, Nazarbayev with his new Prime Minister Akezhan
Kazhegeldin, were plotting the ‘sale of the century’ on a scale and speed which came as a
surprise to everyone, including the new oil minister of oil and gas.
Balgymbayev, like Cherdabayev, came from the Atyrau region in western
Kazakhstan, where he had studied at the Kazakh Polytechnic Institute and held different
positions, including that of deputy general director of Aktyubinskneft oil enterprise. From
1986 to 1992, Balgymbayev worked at the USSR Ministry of Oil and Gas, where he
became close friends with people such as the future Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, Gazprom Chief Executive Rem Vyakhirev, and Lukoil President Vakit
104 Nurbulat Masanov, ‘Political elite of Kazakhstan Psychology of the regime - "After us the flood" Round
Table.’ "Political Elite of Kazakhstan", Almaty, 2000.
http://kazhegeldin.addr.com/english/iim0j_17_10_00.html (Accessed 5 May, 2004).
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Alekperov.105 Thus, he had strong ties to the most powerful people in the Russian oil and
gas sector (Freeland 2001: 70–73). After independence, he worked for the Russian
company Rosneftegas. In the years 1993–1994, Balgymbayev became a consultant for
Chevron. According to reports, he also studied at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and then undertook a training stint at Chevron’s U.S. headquarters.106 Last
but not least, he comes from one of the most respected and biggest oil families in
Kazakhstan.107 Yet there was one crucial difference between the two ministry heads.
Whereas Cherdabayev wanted to bring the oil industry under his sole command,
Balgymbayev lacked the drive to challenge Nazarbayev, or indeed the capacity to do so.
In the words of his former colleagues from the Soviet ministry, who did not think very
highly of his professional and administrative abilities: ‘Wherever he went, Balgymbayev
seemed to rise no higher then second-in-command.’108
Balgymbayev’s initial plans for reforming the Kazakh oil sector were grand and
in line with what was happening at that time in the Russian oil sector. Until loans for
share privatisation came into being109 – partly reversed in recent years110 – the managers
of Russian oil enterprises managed to resist the general plans for privatisation (Watson
1996: 445–448), which Balgymbayev seemed to favour. Only two weeks after his
appointment, the new minister presented the cabinet with an outline of his development
plan for the Kazakh oil and gas industry. Its main goal was to increase the production of
oil from the projected 26.8 tons in 1995 to 45 million tons by the year 2000. As a result,
the annual profit from the oil and gas industry was expected to increase from US$220
million in 1995 to over $2.5 billion by the end of the decade. In order for such an
105 Interview with the executive director of a major oil project in Kazakhstan: Atyrau , 17 November 2004.
106 ‘Kazakhstan-Nurlan Balgimbayev, President of KazakhOil.’ Review Downstream Trends, 31 July 2000;
Seymour Hersh, ‘The Price of Oil,’ The New Yorker Magazine, 9 July 2001.
107 For instance, his brother Makhash Balgimbayev was among a group of geologists that discovered the
Tengiz oil field. His other brother, Nurbergen Balgymbayev, at the beginning of the 1990s was in charge of
foreign relationships in the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources.
108 ‘Step on It,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1994/January 1995c.
109 For details see: Hoffman (2002), pp. 296–325; Freeland (2001), pp. 161–181; ‘Interview Donald
Jensen.’ Frontline. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/yeltsin/interviews/jensen.html
(Accessed 23 February 2004).
110 ‘Russia’s robber barons,’ Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2003; Don Hill, ‘Putin Versus The
Oligarchs,’ RFE/RL, 6 November, 2003; ‘A survey of Russia: Taming the robber barons’, The Economist,
22 May 2004; ‘Special report: The Khodorkovsky case’, The Economist, 21 May 2005.
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ambitious plan111 to get off the ground, the total investment required amounted to $6.6
billion112. Moreover, Balgymbayev argued that this massive restructuring of the oil and
gas industry would happen without privatisation and without the need to sell shares in
energy companies to foreign investors.113 This new line was evidently received positively
by groups in the centre and peripheries that opposed the privatisation of the oil sector.114
At the same time, Balgymbayev did not rule out the possibility of future joint
ventures between one or more designated Kazakh parties and a foreign oil company.
Negotiations in the spirit of corporatism were to be conducted by the interagency
working group comprised of representatives of the oil and gas ministries, representatives
of the government departments of economics, geology and the preservation of
underground resources, as well as finance, ecology, bioresources, and justice.
Representatives of all relevant regions were included in the group.115 In addition,
Balgymbayev advocated yet another reform of Munaigaz, which was supposed to then
consist of three fully integrated divisions.116
However, Balgymbayev’s imposing plans, with their taste of Soviet-style
planning, had little, if anything, to do with the real strategy that was being prepared in
relation to the Kazakh oil industry – a strategy which envisioned the almost full-scale
privatisation of the oil sector. The main incentive for a new direction was the steadily
worsening economic situation – in the words of an governmental insider at that time,
‘[t]he government is basically broke’117 (see also chapter 3, section 1). There was also
competition from Azerbaijan. By 1994, Azerbaijan had proved to be much better at
111 The plan included: construction of a refinery at Mangystau, rehabilitation of Kazakhstan’s second
largest oil field (Uzen), expansion of a gas processing plant (Aktyubinsk), reconstruction of Atyrau’s
refinery, construction of a new refining unit at Chimkent, construction of a western Kazakhstan-Kumkol oil
pipeline, development of Kumkol field. Source: The Oil and Gas Journal, 21 August 1995.
112 Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1994/January 1995c.
113 Russian Petroleum Investor, February 1995b.
114 Interview with ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty, 27 October
2004; Interview with a general director of a foreign small drilling company: Almaty, 10 November 2004.
115 The Oil and Gas Journal, 21 August 1995.
116 The first integrated division was to consist of the Atyrau refinery, the Embanaft, Uzenneft,
TengizMunaiGaz production associations, and regional branches of Munaionimderi, a petroleum products
retailer. The second was to consist of the Chimkent refinery, the Yuzhneftegas, and Aktyubinskneft
production associations, and local Munaionimderi units. The third company was to unite the Pavlodar
refinery, the Mangistaumnaigaz production association, the local branches of Munaionimderi, and the
Kazakhstan Oil Research Institute. Source: Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1994/January 1995c.
117 Peg Mackey; Stephen MacSearraigh and Campion Walsh, ‘Kazakh Cabinet moves likely to benefit
energy investors,’ The Oil Daily, 14 October 1994.
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attracting foreign investors than Kazakhstan118, much to Nazarbayev’s jealousy.119 The
key to understanding the ensuing developments are the figure of the then Prime Minister,
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, and the gradual centralisation of power in the presidential office,
which are discussed next.
3.1. Setting the stage for privatisation
By 1994, the second phase of privatisation was well under way120 and encompassed
medium-sized firms and factories with more than 200 employees. The third phase, a case-
by-case privatisation designed to privatise the largest factories, was scheduled for 1995
(for a detailed discussion concerning privatisation see chapter 3, sections 2 and 2.1).
However, during the second phase, the Kazakh parliament consisted of Communist-era
legislators who felt entitled to maintain control over the economic transition and who
criticised the government’s plans. Parliamentarians questioned ‘the speed, direction, and
objectives of privatisation, echoing many of the criticisms levelled against the
privatisation program and its execution’ (Haghayeghi 1997: 334). Not surprisingly, the
most outspoken critics were ‘those who had not directly benefited from the privatization
process’ (Olcott 2002: 138). In addition, Nazarbayev’s popularity began to wane rapidly,
with the presidential elections only 18 months away. In response to the looming crisis,
Nazarbayev in October 1994 appointed a new cabinet and gave his ministers 15 months
to take the nation out its prolonged economic crisis. The reigning Prime Minister
118 In 1994, Azerbaijan signed a production sharing agreement with eleven shareholders for the
development of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (AGG) oil fields, located offshore in the Azeri sector of the
Caspian Sea. The project is operated by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AICO). At that
time when PSAs were finalized, the press called it “the Contract of the Century”, as ‘almost $8 billion were
earmarked for investment over 30 years, during which time 511 million tons of oil were expected to be
produced from the three offshore fields’ (Nassibli 107: 1999). The actual foreign capital invested in the oil
sector by that point was $4 billion (Bayulgen (2003), p. 209; see also: Olsen (2004), pp. 127–145; Nanay
(2000).
119 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty, 15 September 2004.
120 The initial privatisation in Kazakhstan progressed in two stages: (1) small scale privatisation using
voucher coupons, 1991–1992; (2) mass privatisation using investment privatisation coupons, 1993–1995
(Pomfret (2005), pp. 863 – 867; Haghayeghi (1997); Varanese (1995); see also: Richard Pomfret,
‘Economic developments during the 1990s and prospects for the future,’ Central Asia 2010 Conference,
UNDP Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 20–22 July 1998; For reforms in Kazakhstan in the broader context of the
former Soviet republics see: Schroeder (1994).
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Tereshchenko,121 an ethnic Russian, was replaced by an ethnic Kazakh, Akezhan
Kazhegeldin.
According to his personal web page,122 the new Prime Minister Akezhan
Kazhegeldin, comes from the Semipalatinsk area and holds a PhD in Economics. His
career began in the Semipalatinsk Region Department of KGB (State Security
Committee) in 1976. In subsequent years, he studied at the Officers’ Training Courses of
the USSR KGB High School (Moscow). Kazhegeldin allegedly retired from the KGB in
1989, and after that openly participated in the Russian democratic movement (Furman
2005: 224). Upon his return to Kazakhstan in the early 1990s, he first became a
businessman and soon after – in his own words – ‘resumed working for governmental
bodies’. In 1992–1993, he held the posts of Deputy Chairman of the Executive
Committee of Semipalatinsk Regional Soviet of People's Deputies and Deputy Head of
Semipalatinsk Region Administration.123
The fact that Kazhegeldin, an ex-KGB officer, became prime minister was not in
any way accidental, and should be seen as an expression of a broader trend that began
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amy Knight has demonstrated that since the
second half of the 1980s, as KGB officers began their journey from the security apparatus
into politics and business:, ‘[t]hey professed democratic values, endorsed economic
reform, and complained openly about various shortcomings in the Soviet system’ (1996:
7). By the mid-1990s, many of those who had previously worked in the KGB became
entrepreneurs involved in private security and investigation businesses, and some also
found work in the local and central bureaucracy (Volkov 2002: 92–93).124 Additionally,
121 Tereshenko’s government came under criticism also from other quarters. Foreign investors criticised his
government for providing grossly inflated figures about the country’s oil and gas reserves as well as for
reversing decisions on tax exemption that were already issued. Moreover, ministers in the Tereshenko-led
government opposed the reforms, which delayed many decisions related to the privatisation of state
companies. However, most important was the fact that in oil-dealing the prime minister favoured John
Deuss, an oil trader from the Netherlands who was an adviser to Sultan Qaboos of Oman and the head of
Oman’s state oil company OOC, which clearly disadvantaged other potential investors. Source: Review
Downstream Trends, 31 July 2000.
122 http://kazhegeldin.addr.com/biograf_e.htm (Accessed 5 May 2004).
123 See also: The Economist, 28 November 1998; Olcott 160: 2002.
124 Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a Russian sociologist, estimates ‘that KGB-trained officials have come to
account for up to 25 per cent of civilian administrative posts throughout the Russian bureaucracy, up from
just 3 per cent prior to Gorbachev’ Source: Stephen Kotkin, ‘What is to be done?’ FT.com site; 5 March
2004. http://search.ft.com/s03/search/article.html?id=040305008758 (Accessed 20 April 2004).
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secret service operatives acted as facilitators in arranging Western investments in Russian
enterprises.
The co-operation between Western companies and the ex-Chekist was in no way
unique to Russia and could be found all across post-Soviet,125 and indeed most ex-
Socialist countries, as Maria Los and Andrzej Zybertowicz have described with regard to
Poland:
Former secret service operatives were in a unique position to become
intermediaries between the global economy and the new Polish economy. The
communist obsession with secrecy meant that the secret service were probably
the only agencies with comprehensive knowledge of the Polish economy and its
individual units. They were in a position to offer strategic information and
services sought by foreign actors, and they had powerful networks ready to
engage in complex economic operations, arrange deals or peddle influence.
(2000: 206)
Nazarbayev hired Kazhegeldin to aid in the process of privatising major enterprises –
including the oil sector – due to his ability to attract foreign investors (Furman 2005:
225). In Kazhegeldin’s own words: ‘When I entered the government in 1993 after having
held the position of President of the Entrepreneurs' Union, I considered it my main task to
attract foreign investment capital. I travelled the world meeting with businessmen and
touting our mineral resources, our highly qualified labour force and engineers, and the
possibility of unlimited new markets.’126 Kazhegeldin become prime minister also due to
the fact that he was an outsider, one who constituted a good buffer zone between
Nazarbayev and the powerful groups whose interests were to be upset during
privatisation. Interestingly, the arrival of Kazhegeldin on the political scene coincided
with the appointment in February 1995 of the ex-KGB officer Evhen Marchuk to the post
of prime minister of Ukraine. Thus, Kazhegeldin was not an odd case, but part of a larger
125 For a discussion concerning police reform and related issues in Central Asia see: ‘Central Asia: The
Politics of Police Reform,’ International Crises Group, 10 December 2002.
126 ‘Speech by Akezhan Kazhegeldin in the City Club of Cleveland,’ 12 November 1999.
http://kazhegeldin.addr.com (Accessed 15 February 2005). It is well known that Kazhegeldin had close ties
to powerful interests in Russia with a rather dubious past (Olcott 2002: 115).
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pattern that culminated with the ex-KGB low-ranking officer Vladimir Putin becoming
president of Russia in 2000 (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003; Barnes 2003).127
Kazhegeldin painted himself as a free-market, pro-privatisation politician. His
statements in relationship to the oil sector directly contradicted Balgymbayev’s position
from the outset. Speaking in November 1994, he said, ‘I look with profound indifference
at who may own the stock of, say, the Pavlodar refinery. It may be Kazakhs, Russians, or
Americans. It’s the steady production output that matters.’128 In turn, he was seen by
Western investors ‘as a guarantor of market reforms and their multi-billon dollar
investments in the republic’.129 A clash between Kazhegeldin and Balgimbayev was
inevitable. It was reported at that time that Balgimbayev – a minister in Kazhegeldin’s
government – ‘typically ignores the prime minister, preferring to work directly with
President Nursultan Nazarbayev’.130 However, despite these clashes it was Kazhegeldin’s
vision that clearly took precedence.
The new cabinet concluded work on a Law on Oil in a speedy fashion, which had
been in the pipeline since 1993, and defined the procedures for granting exploration and
production licences and outlined the basic tax provisions.131 Moreover, the allegedly
autonomous entity called the State Investment Committee (SIC) was created. SIC was
made the sole organisation empowered by law to deal with potential investors in the
priority sector. It was designed to become a so-called ‘one-stop shop’.132 In short, SIC is
an institution that has allowed foreign investors to bypass Kazakhstan’s bureaucratic
maze, including most importantly the problematic ministries of geology and oil. This new
direction of the Kazakh oil industry was fully unravelled on 8 June 1995 when
Kazhegeldin – without any advance notice – announced that Kazakhstan planned to sell
Kazakh interests in three oil and gas companies: Yuzhneftegas, Aktyubinskneft, and
Shymkentnefteorgistez. The government hoped to receive a total of at least $3 billion in
127 See also: Ewa Paszyc and Iwona Wiśniewska, ‘Big business in the Russian economy and politics under
Putin's rule,’ May 2002. http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/get.pl?r=/en/epub/eprace/05/01.HTM (Accessed 29
June 2004). ‘Russian reform. Slaying his own dragons.’ The Economist, 1 May 2004.
128 Russian Petroleum Investor, February 1995b.
129 Review Downstream Trends, 31 July 2000.
130 ‘Sale of the Century,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1996.
131 ‘One Up on Russia,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1994/January 1995.
132 Review Downstream Trends, 31 July 2000.
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exchange for 90 per cent of its equity holdings in these three enterprises.133 In addition,
the plan virtually eliminated the roles for Munaigas and the Ministry of Oil and Gas in
the sector (Peck 2004: 150). Arguably, the main reasons for finally embarking upon the
process of privatisation at this particular time was the centralisation and concentration of
power by Nazarbayev that had commenced only a few months before.
In March 1995, Nazarbayev utilised a Constitutional Court ruling on the legality
of the 1994 parliamentary elections as an excuse to dissolve parliament (Bremmer and
Welt 1996: 192). In his next move, in April 1995, he called for a referendum that
extended his presidential term until 2000, and finally initiated the process of drafting a
new constitution which was adopted on 30 August 1995. The main feature of the new
constitution – the previous one dated back to 1993 – was a considerable expansion in the
powers of the executive branch. In the new constitution, Kazakhstan’s judicial and
legislative branches on the national and local levels were to be subordinated to the
executive branch. Presidential decrees essentially have the force of law, and the president
can disband parliament and appoint and remove key state officers: the prime minister,
senior ministers, as well as seven members of the 47-seat strong senate (Anderson 2003:
79; Dosmukhamedov 2002: 150–157).134 As a result, Zhovtiz points out that ‘the powers
of the president as well as the activity of the government cannot be controlled by the
society. The legislative and representative branches – the parliament and the local
legislatures, or maslikhats – are deprived of any control and functions’ (1999: 57).
It would be wrong to assume that the centralisation of power immediately silenced
all critics – far from it. The process of consolidating power would take at least a few
more years before Kazakhstan was to truly turn into a republic ruled solely by
Nazarbayev himself, his close associates and his family.135 In relationship to the
privatisation of the oil industry, the best testimony to the fact that the critics were not
silenced were the criticisms raised by the mid-level industry management, which insisted
on ousting foreigners and ‘taking business into its own hands’ after the plans for
privatisation were publicised.136 Moreover, the preparation of tender documents by
133 Russian Petroleum Investor, July/August 1995a.
134 The Majilis is the lower house of parliament and comprises 77 deputies.
135 APS Diplomat Operations in Oil Diplomacy, 25 August 2003.
136 ‘Upping the Ante,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, July/August 1995.
86
Kazkommertzbank and its two foreign advisers Merrill Lynch and Price Waterhouse
were concluded in secret – after centralisation – precisely because of government
concerns about a possible public backlash.137 Arguably, it is for those very reasons that
Nazarbayev, who embarked on the process of privatisation in tandem with Kazhegeldin
and with initial minimal involvement of people from the oil and gas industry, ensured
that they would also gain from the process. However, not everyone stood to gain from it:
whereas those close to the industry did reap substantial rewards, various interest groups at
the peripheries that were not directly working for the oil enterprises were largely
overlooked. This, in turn, created for the regime a whole host of problems, which are
discussed in full in chapter 5.
3.2. Privatisation and the NOC KazakhOil
By 1996,138 the Kazakh government had further radicalised its position on the
privatisation issue,139 and openly stated its readiness to sell most of its exploration and
production companies, refineries, petrochemical enterprises, and domestic gas delivery
networks – which were subsidised by the government for the first part of the 1990s – to
foreign investors.140 However, despite the fact that Kazakhstan appeared to be willing to
unlock its oil industry to foreign investors, major foreign oil and gas companies were far
from ready to simply invest in Kazakhstan – which in the opinion of some was partly due
to the unstable political situation. Whereas the concentration of power by the country’s
leader is considered a good thing from the perspective of foreign investors, the political
earthquake taking place in Kazakhstan was proving to be one change too many. Vladimir
Dumchev, a political expert and adviser to TengizChevrOil, commented at that time:
‘Investors cannot pour any significant amount of money into a country where the
137 ‘Tender Treatment,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1995/January 1996.
138 In 1996. the economy had bottomed with a growth of 1 per cent.
139 On January 1, 1996 the Law of the RK ‘On Privatization’ came into force, which formed a base for the
sale of state property into the ownership of physical and legal entities. In addition, on January 27
Nazarbayev signed the decree ‘On Subsoil and Subsoil Use’ that regulated the issues of licensing and
contract system. Source: ‘Kazakhstan's Oil 1991 – 2001,’ Petroleum Magazine, December 2001; see also:
Dosmukhamedov (2002), pp. 101–124.
140 ‘Everything Must Go,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, October 1996a.
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president rewrites the constitution with astonishing ease. Capital investment decisions
cannot depend on one man’s will and mood.’141
In other instances, the alleged problem was the Kazakh government’s
expectations, which were viewed unrealistic when confronted with the reality on the
ground.142 In the early privatisation stages, the Kazakh government planned to grant
foreign companies a fifteen-year concession to ship and market gas on its territory. At
first, consortia such as Enron, Gaz de France, Agip and Bridas143 signalled interest, but
backed down when it became apparent that Kazakh officials required foreign companies
to make a $25 million lump-sum payment immediately and invest at least $125 million
over the next five years. All this was expected to take place when the Kazakgaz pipeline
system had reported a profit of barely $17.6 million in 1995144. However, from the
perspective of foreign investors, the most problematic issues – and arguably ones
reflecting the actual situation – were the unclear tender procedures which, combined with
the fractional struggles that accompany any process of privatisation, made the outcome of
the tender highly unpredictable, and hence the future of the investment unstable.
During the tender procedures for the Yuzhneftegaz enterprise, for example –
which by the mid-1990s produced 10 per cent of Kazakhstan’s oil – the chairman of the
interdepartmental tender commission responsible for the oil industry and head of
Kazakhstan’s Committee for the Management of State Property, Sarybay Kalmurzayev,
revealed that Samson International (US) was the likely winner.145 Yet, only a few months
later in the summer of 1996, it was announced that the winner was the little-known
Hurricane company146 instead. No formal explanation was given for this sudden change.
141 ‘Too Much of a Good Thing,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, October 1995; see also: Richard Dion, ‘How
oil, gas investment prospects compare for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,’ The Oil and Gas Journal, 28 July
1997.
142 ‘Kazakhstan Sets Up Test Case for Oil Privatization,’ Financial Times, 30 April 1996.
143 Bridas is a small Argentinean (Buenos Aires) based company, which in the first decade of the 1990s was
involved in a whole range of projects across Central Asia including Turkmenistan and Afghanistan (Rashid
(2001), pp. 157–170.
144 ‘Betting on the Future,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1996/January 1997; See also: Kuanysh
Zhumangazinov, ‘Southern gas: from theory to practice.’ Vremia Po, 18 April 2001.
145 Indeed, some sources began reporting that the Samson Investment Company had won a 100 per cent
stake in the Kazakh producer Yuzhneftegas, together with local investment firm Munainvest. Source:
‘Samson Blows Away Hurricane, Wins Bid For Kazakh Producer,’ The Oil Daily, 7 June 1996.
146 The company was incorporated and registered in Calgary, Canada in 1986. However, some argued that
Hurricane was an offshore zone based company. It was reported that it first commenced operations in
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Almost immediately, Hurricane Hydrocarbons came under attack from Balgymbayev and
other oil men, who believed that the company – which was supposed to invest $280
million in Yuzhneftegaz – was unable to meet its contract obligations.147 Others called
the deal ‘the sellout of the motherland’.148
According to reports, at that time Nazarbayev himself began adopting the view
that investors were doing too little for the development of privatised companies, and that
the process of privatisation should yield larger profits.149 Moreover, he also became
alarmed by the amount of power that Kazhegeldin and Kalmurzayev had over the
privatisation of oil and gas, and the fact that the pair acted far too independently for his
taste.150 Kazhegeldin’s actions were aimed at building his own independent power base
(Olcott 2002: 115; Furman 2005: 227–228).151 In order to speed up privatisation, to
regain control over Kazhegeldin,152 and to demonstrate Kazakhstan’s commitment to
privatisation, Nazarbayev decided to take charge of the oil sector himself.153 On 4 March
1997, he signed Decree № 3378 on ‘Additional Measures to Reform the Organisation of
State Entities in the Republic of Kazakhstan’. The decree dissolved the Ministry of
Kazakhstan in 1991. (Smirnov (2000), p.163; Kazakhstan Petroleum Association Publication, Almaty,
2004).
147 The expected amount of royalties to be paid during a 20-year development period of Yuzhneftegas was
expected to amount to $530 million, while the cumulative amount of tax payments to the republican budget
amounted to $ 1.7 billion (Peck (2004), p. 159).
148 Russian Petroleum Investor, October 1996a.
149 ‘Twisting in the Wind,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, May 1997a.
150 ‘The Kazak Shuffle,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1997; For instance, in October 1996 Sarybay
Kalmurzayev stated that around half a billion dollars raised from oil sales ‘disappeared without trace’,
which amounted to little more than a direct attack on Balgymbayev and Nazarbayev. Source:
Komsomolskaya Pravda Kazakhstan , 1 March 2002.
151 Kazhegeldin’s prime constituency after becoming PM ‘consisted of industrialists, businessmen and the
emerging new entrepreneurial class, and it was these groups’ interests that the Prime Minister most ardently
supported’ (Hoffman Fall (2000), p. 301).
152 At that time, one source in the president’s administration commented: ‘Kazhegeldin forgot who is the
boss in the house, and [he has] paid for his forgetfulness.’ Source: Russian Petroleum Investor, November
1997.
153 By 1996, a number of key oil projects began entering a decisive stage. In the atmosphere of infighting
and instability, Nazarbayev’s direct control over those projects – from the perspective of the regime –
became indispensable. In April 1996, a multilateral agreement was signed by Kazakhstan, Russia, Оman 
and a consortium of foreign oil companies on the construction of an export pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC) with a throughput capacity of 67 million tonnes. The CPC was designed to provide an
alternative route through Russia, which cut transport costs from Tengiz in half. Moreover, in August 1996,
Kazakhstancaspishelf finally completed a topographical survey of the oil fields in the Kazakhstan sector of
the Caspian Sea shelf, according to which the region’s forecasted potential was estimated to have between
26 and 60 billion barrels of recoverable reserves; For more see: Sergey Illarionov, ‘Politico-economic
strategy of Kazakhstan - first fruits,’ Nowyje Izvestia, 30 August 2001.
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Geology and Subsoil Protection, the Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry, the State Tax
Committee, the State Pricing committee, and the State Property Management Committee,
and established in their place the KazakhOil National Oil and Gas Company.
The NOC KazakhOil was charged with the control and management of the
government’s interests in all oil and gas enterprises, including joint ventures and
production-sharing projects with foreign inventors. Furthermore, 90 per cent of the shares
from Munaigas were transferred to KazakhOil. Crucial for the purposes of our discussion
is the fact that the creation of KazakhOil gave Nazarbayev the leverage to ‘shift control
over the country’s oil industry (a sector that provides as estimated 37 percent of state
revenues) firmly within the presidential apparatus and away from the jurisdiction of the
Prime Minister’ (Hoffman Fall 2000: 282; see also Furman 2005: 226). It is worth
keeping in mind that since March 1997, the previously autonomous SIC has begun
reporting directly to Nazarbayev. SIC most importantly determined which preferences
were to be granted to investors and for how long. Balgimbayev became president of
KazakhOil, whereas his son-in-law Kuandykov was nominated to the position of vice
president.
Balgymbayev was reinstalled in charge of the oil industry for largely the same
reasons as during his previous spell as oil and gas minister in 1994: to quieten the oil men
who were becoming increasingly wary of the government’s rapid sell-out of the oil
enterprises. The situation became especially explosive in the Mangistau region – home to
Mangistaumunaigas – where the management and a number of employees organised a
protest against the prospective privatisation. Mendesh Salikhov, an ex-communist
apparatchik and president of the enterprise since 1995, argued that since 1996, the
production of oil had begun increasing and that the firm was profitable. Moreover, he
demanded that indigenous oil enterprises should be given the same tax breaks as foreign
companies, and he also argued for raising ‘the capital by placing shares, possibly in the
form of depositary receipts, on the London or New York stock exchanges’.154 In response
to those criticisms, the initial trend was brought to a halt, albeit not for long.
154 ‘Kazakh oil barons, government, clash on energy sell-off,’ Reuters Newswire, 3 February 1997.
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Balgymbayev’s reinstatement as president of KazakhOil did not stop the
privatisation process.155 Quite to the contrary, he presided over the period of the most
aggressive privatisations that took place between March and July 1997.156 In March, 85
per cent of Mangistaumnaigaz157 was sold to the Virgin Islands based company Central
Asia Petroleum Ltd. (part of Indonesian group of Medco Energy Corporation) for $248
million,158 and in June and July, 60 per cent of Aktyubinskmunaigas159 and 60 per cent of
the Uzen Oil Field were sold to Chinese National Petroleum Co. for a total of $13.5
billion160 (Luong 2000: 89; Peck 2004: 165–172; Smirnov 2000: 163). Ironically, at the
height of selling key oil enterprises to foreign companies, Kazhegeldin tried to postpone
privatisation tenders for Embamunaigas and deleted the announcement of a tender for
Tengizmunaigas,161 However, by that time he felt that he had fallen out of favour, and in
October 1997, Kazhegeldin stepped down from the post of Prime Minister, allegedly
because of health problems. In reality he was forced to resign but he did not go down
quietly. In the late 1998, he formed the Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan, which
sought to oust Nazarbayev. Hence, Kazhegeldin turned into Nazarbayev’s most visible
and strongest opponent. Soon thereafter, Kazakhstani taxation authorities began
investigating Kazhegeldin for suspected tax violations and corruption. Kazhegeldin left
155 Balgymbayev was a Nazarbayev loyalist and acted as instructed by the president. This fact was apparent
from 1994: ‘If Nursultan Nazarbayev asks him to become a fervent liberal, be will be one, if conservative is
the order of the day, he will turn conservative. In his attitude towards foreign investors, state control,
privatisation, and other important issues, Balgimbayev will support the president’. Source: Russian
Petroleum Investor, December 1994/January 1995.
156 By mid-1998, only 41.6 per cent of the country’s oil production remained under the auspices of
KazakhOil. (Hoffman Fall (2000), p. 292). However, the process of privatising the Kazakh oil sector did
not stop there. By 2002, 75 per cent of geological reserves of oil and 79 per cent of gas reserves would be
controlled by foreign capital. Source: Aldar, Kusainov. ‘A Struggle Over Energy May Alter Kazakhstan’s
National Found,’ EuroasiaNet, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav111302.shtml
(Accessed 13 November 2002).
157 In 1996, Mangistaumunaigas was still the second largest production association after TengizChevrOil.
158 The expected volume of capital investments within a 20-year investment program were expected to
amount to more than $4 billion, of which $2 billion were to be made in the first five years.
159 The CNPC received the right to develop the Zhanazhol and Kenkiyak fields.
160 Under the contract, the CNPC would pay a bonus amounting to $320 million and a subscription bonus
amounting to $5 million. The company would also pay the debts of Aktyubinskmunaigas JSC to the
amount of $81 million; and make investments to the amount of $4 billion within 20 years, of which $585
million would be made in the first five years. Furthermore, $500,000 would be allocated annually to
ecological programmes within 20 years.
161 Russian Petroleum Investor, May 1997a.
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the country and was banned from taking part in the 1999 presidential elections162 (see
also chapter 6, sections 1, 1.1).
3.3. After privatisation (clients and control)
Nazarbayev wrestled control of the oil industry from his opponents in a process which
took six years to accomplish. In order to keep the NOC KazakhOil firmly in check – and
not to repeat a Chedabayev-like scenario – in 1998 Nazarbayev appointed Nurlan
Kapparov, a neophyte, as president of the company, whereas Balgimbayev was moved to
the post of Prime Minister. Moreover, Nazarbayev began introducing members of his
family to the highest positions in the country in an open manner.163 Timur Kulibayev,
Nazarbayev’s son-in-law (he is married to his second daughter Dinara), became financial
director and Vice-President of KazakhOil.164 At the time of his appointment, Kulibayev’s
only connection to the oil sector was his father Askar Kulibayev, once a communist boss
in the oil-rich Atyrau region in the 1980s.165
The arrival of Kapparov and Kulibayev, close business partners who were born in
1970 and 1966 respectively, signalled a generational shift in the Kazakh oil industry
(Satpaev 1999: 81). In the name of efficiency and professionalism, it was now to be run
by the young group of technocrats whose allegiances rested with Nazarbayev and not
with one of the fractions in the oil-rich regions. In order to achieve this end, Nazarbayev
162 ‘Interpol drops arrest warrant against Kazakhstani opposition Leader,’ Eurasia Insight, 26 June 2002.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062602a (Accessed 27 June 2004).
163 It was a strategy that had been in development already for some time: ‘by 1997 Nazarbayev has
surrounded himself with a core elite considerably smaller than that of 1991, largely consisting of relatives
and close friends. These included, his daughter Dariga’s husband, Rakhat Aliev, a surgeon who in October
1997 was made head of the Tax Inspectorate while continuing to own a 60 per cent state in the national
sugar company, and Sakharniy Tsentr; (…) and Akhmetzhan Esimov, a more distant relative, who in 1997
was appointed head of the presidential administration’ (Cummings (2002), p. 63).
164 This introduction of members of the president’s family to top positions in the oil industry mirrored the
situation in Azerbaijan. Azeri President Heidar Aliyev, who brought SOCAR under his control in 1994, put
his son Illham Aliyev (currently serving President) in the position of the director of the Foreign Economic
Relations Division. In a section entitled ‘Tips on dealing with SOCAR’ the US Embassy in Baku listed the
most useful contacts for any US company interested in establishing Joint Ventures, partnerships. The
Embassy suggested that the first contact should be made with Valekh Aleskerov (Head of the Foreign
Investments Department), who would report the proposal to Illham Aliyev and Heidar Aliyev. Those two
had ‘the ultimate authority on all major contracts in Azerbaijan’ Source: US Embassy Baku, Azerbaijan
‘Who’s is Who in SOCAR’. http://www.usembassybaku.org/commerce/socar.htm (Accessed 1 June, 2004).
165 Interview with an oppositional journalist: Atyrau, 22 November 2004; see also: Murphy (2006), pp.
538–539.
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recruited sons and daughters of ex-communist apparatchiks to the top positions through
Kulibayev, primarily from Almaty. These recruits went to prestigious high schools and in
the late 1980s and studied at the Kazakh State University, Almaty Institute of Economy,
or other prominent institutions such as Moscow’s State University and Leningrad
University.166 At the time of independence, they were in their early 30s, with the Young
Communist League being the only network to which they were truly connected. They
gained their professional experience, however, in the private sector:167 Kanat
Bozumbayev (1969) became vice-president (economy) of KazTransOil; Berik Kaniyev
(1970) vice-president for refining, transportation and marketing KazakhOil; Saule
Mamyrbaeva (1969) president of finance KazTransOil; Erzhan Orynbasarov (1969)
director of the security KazakhOil; Abai Sadykov (1969) director of the debt
restructuring and analysis department KazakhOil; Marat Sapargaliyev (1970) director of
department KazakhOil; Askar Smankulov (1964) vice president KazTransOil; and Yerlan
Upushev (1969) vice-president of the marketing department KazTransOil168.
The recruitment of young professionals/clients to top managerial positions that
took place in the Kazakh oil industry was not unusual, and was part of a bigger trend
during the early years of independence. Whereas in the Soviet Union it was almost
unthinkable to see people below the age of 50 becoming part of the state elite, in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan this elite became much younger, with a substantial influx of an age
group which ranged from 30–40 years (Tulegulov 2000: 259; Cummings 2005: 59).
However, this new trend in the oil industry did not mean that those in their 50s could
simply be pushed aside and be replaced by Kulibayev’s group, since this would imply
open warfare with oil men. Instead, Nazarbayev rather skilfully facilitated the transition
of potential opponents to the private sector (generally private oil enterprises), politics,
local and state administration, and Kulibayev’s controlled KazakhOil – and as special
166 People affiliated with Kulibaev could be also found in all sorts of other top positions in the country:
Kiarat Kilembietow (Minister of Economics), Erbolat Dosajew (Minister of Health), Karim Masimow
(Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration), Mukhtar Ablyazov (Minister of Energy, Industry and
Trade). Source: Interview with executive director of a major oil project in Kazakhstan: Atyrau, 17
November 2004.
167 Ibid.
168 Sources: Interviews Kazakhstan Fall 2004; Kazakhstan State Directory, Astana June 1998; see also:
Cummings (2005), pp. 61–69.
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advisers to various foreign oil companies.169 They themselves would later on typically
say things like: ‘I was invited’ to hold a particular post in for instance, a joint venture.170
It is argued here that from Nazarbayev’s point of view, the most problematic
groups before and during the privatisation process were the oil men and high-ranking ex-
apparatchiks in western Kazakhstan. Not surprisingly, it was those individuals who, since
the mid-1990s, could be increasingly found working in various profitable companies and
involved in lucrative projects. Numerous examples illustrate this point: Zarip Zhukataev
was director of Embaneft, and in 1995 became director general of the Stepnoi Leopard
Canadian-Kazakh joint venture; Robert Berdyguzhin was president of Uzhneftegas, and
in 1997 became director general of Lukoil-Kazakhstan JV; Mendesh Salikhov was
president of Mangistaumunai, and in 1998 became president of the Neftegas insurance
company; Keltir Shanenov was president of Atyraumunaigas, and in 1997 became
president of CaspiyNeft, a private oil company; Alik Aydarbayev, vice president of
Yuzhneftegaz, in 1995 became director general of the Kumkol-LUKoil JV; Kuralbek
Kelzhanov held senior positions in the local communist party and in 1994 became
director general of American-Kazakh JV; Abenov Islam worked as a communist party
executive, and in 1995 rose to director general of the Kazakh–Cyprus company; Gaziz
Aldamzharov an ex-communist apparatchik, worked also on Tengiz and in 1996 became
director of Kazmalt, a Czech company; Amanzhol Kabdolov was the first vice-president
of Munaigas, and in 1997 was appointed head of the central oil and gas industry control
department; Saylau Zhylkaidarov, chief geologist of Uzen in 1996, became director
general of a British-Kazakh JV; his deputy director was Yermek Marabayev, who had
worked for the American company Drilcon. He also belongs to a major oil family in
Kazakhstan. 171
Characteristically for those companies, the Kazakh share in these business
ventures seems to have been very small. Thus, the Kazakh partner provided the necessary
contacts and political protection, whereas the know-how, equipment and so forth were
brought from aboard. Interestingly, in recent years Chinese companies – among others –
169 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty, 15 September 2004.
170 Interviews: Kazakhstan Fall 2000.
171 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, 2 ; Interviews: Kazakhstan Fall 2000.
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have attempted and successfully managed to take over some small oil extracting
companies from foreign interests, to the dismay of oil men in the oil rich areas.172
While the presidents and directors of key enterprises were helped with their
transitions to the private sector (or indeed, as in the case of the ex-Atyrau akim Sagat
Tugelbayev, to keep his company Anaco), mid-level ex-apparatchiks who had managed
to obtain a licence almost accidentally at the beginning of the 1990s were slowly
squeezed from their businesses. It has been maintained that since the second half of the
1990s, people close to the regime began displaying a growing interest in small oil
extracting companies. This forced most of the oil exploring companies into either
bankruptcy or into selling their assets and moving into other activities in the space of a
few years 173 with the help of the local bureaucrats. In the words of one director: ‘they
[high ranking bureaucrats] understood that their signature means money, making life
impossible for those without the right connections or unwilling to pay the necessary
bribes’.174 It was reported that in the second half of the 1990s, a typical mid-level oil
company had to pay one million dollars in bribes to their operate oil fields.175 In effect,
out of 15 small oil-extracting companies that were created in the beginning of the 1990s,
no more than three survived unchanged until 2004.176 Specialists working in the local oil
industry stated that the great bulk of the small oil extracting companies were taken over
by people from the centre of the country.177 It should be noted at this point that those
pushed out from their oil ventures came to haunt Nazarbayev’s regime towards the end of
the 1990s, when they joined forces with other groups in the oil-rich areas who did not
benefit from privatisation and lacked direct access to the foreign oil companies (discussed
at length in chapter 5).
Nazarbayev’s regime selected and rewarded its key clients in the region through
groups of intermediary brokers, most importantly the local akims.178 In Kazakhstan, on
the regional level virtually all power is in the hands of the akim (local governor/prefect),
who is directly appointed by the president, and in turn appoints local district
172 Interview with an executive director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 16 November 2004.
173 Interview with a financial director working for a local oil company: Atyrau, 18 November 2004.
174 Interview with a director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 8 November 2004.
175 Interview with a manager working for a foreign drilling company: Almaty, 8 September 2004.
176 Ibid.
177 Interview with an executive director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 16 November 2004.
178 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty, 15 September 2004.
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administrators. According to article 87 of the Constitution, the akim of each
administrative–territorial unit heads the local executive authorities and represents the
president and government of the republic. The akim is responsible for realising state
policy within the local territory, for coordinating the territorial divisions of the central
administration agencies, and for administering the executive bodies funded through the
local budget. Moreover, the akim is also responsible for economic and social
development in the regions (Makhmutova 2001: 113–114). In spring 1998, Nazarbayev
further consolidated his grip on power when he merged a number of regions, thereby
reducing their total number from 19 to 14.
Whereas a vertically integrated executive system had already been in place under
the previous 1993 constitution – i.e. akims directly appointed by the president – the
August 1995 constitution allowed the president to regain powers in the regions by
strengthening the position of the executive over other branches of the government. This
became manifest in the changing patterns of appointments of akims, which in a highly
centralised and personalised system is arguably one of the best indicators of the shifts that
take place in the balance of power.
As noted above, during the first years after independence, Nazarbayev heavily
relied on so-called home-grown governors. After all, these ex-first secretaries had the
necessary support within the regions, which Nazarbayev had to take under consideration
in the early days. However, they began displaying a level of independence from the
centre that was unacceptable to the president. In the post-1995 era, Nazarbayev began
appointing more and more ‘new man’ technocrats and former businessmen to the post of
akims, who would introduce the necessary reforms, but were politically too weak to
oppose him. As it turned out, this pattern did not last for a long time. In the late 1990s,
Nazarbayev began referring members of the national elite to the provinces – his trusted
‘lieutenants’ who owed him political or economic influence – rather than, for instance,
technocrats who in the long run could develop their own power bases in the regions and
become potentially politically threatening (Cummings 2000: 43). Trusted ‘lieutenants’
posed the least danger to the president; yet, the high degree of their rotation shows that
Nazarbayev tends to be very careful with them, too. On average, in the first decade of
independence, an akim would spend around 20 months in his post. Following that, he
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would either continue working for the government, become a parliamentarian, or a
private businessman (Schatz 2004: 104). It has been alleged that Nazarbayev tends to
appoint to the post of the akim only those ‘loyalists’ who have skeletons in the closet and
can be blackmailed because ‘KNB179 has something on them’.180
The new breed of akims are far from champions of the common good. In today’s
Kazakhstan, it appears to be a widely held consensus that their time in office is spent on
self-enrichment rather than promoting the interests of the regions in which they happen to
serve. In the words of Masanov:
The sole aim is self-enrichment. As soon as an akim is appointed he summons
the heads of the Committee for National Security and Police and instructs
them to insure order in the province; then he summons the akims of the various
districts under him and tells them they must bring him US$100,000 each every
year. How they earn that money is no concern to him. That workers are
unemployed, pensioners are half-starving, that’s there’s no water or electricity,
that’s also not his problem. (Masanov quote in George 2001: 50)
Moreover, the newly appointed akims do not seem to find it too problematic to gain
acceptance in the regions, since regional elites are by now accustomed to constant
changes at the top, so that there is no backlash from the people who did well under the
previous akims. Change is part of the system, a reality with which they have to live, and
this is something they accept.181
To sum up, due to the worsening economic situation, Nazarbayev’s regime
embarked on the most ambitious privatisation program for the oil and gas industry in the
post-Soviet space. The initial privatisation was carried out by PM Kazhegeldin, while the
Kazakh oil men were pushed aside. Despite criticism against the privatisation process,
Nazarbayev went ahead with his plans and in the process managed to bring the oil
industry solely under his own and his family’s control. Yet the Kazakh oil men, who had
been little involved in the process, had to be accommodated in other ways. Hence the
transition of key individuals in the oil sector (presidents, directors of state owned oil and
gas enterprises) was facilitated by Nazarbayev’s inner circle, and in the course of this
179 KNB (ex-KGB): the Committee for National Security is responsible for national security, intelligence,
and counterintelligence. The Chairman of the KNB reports directly to the President.
180 Panel discussion ‘Kazakhstan in Transition: 200 Years before Democracy,’ Central Eurasian Studies
Society, Fourth Annual Conference. Harvard University, 3 October 2003. Panellists: Martha B. Olcott,
Nurbulat Masanov, Zauresh Battalova, Dinissa Duvanova, and Rachid Nougmanov.
181 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty, 18 October 2004.
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transition, they automatically became his clients. Those oil men were watched over by
intermediates in the peripheries, most importantly the local akims and their deputies. In
the next section, it is shown that so far, these accommodated Kazakh oil men have proven
to be reliable supporters of the regime, and are ready to back it in times of political crisis.
4. The Kazakh oil industry after independence: the president’s company (1997–
2005)
The post-privatisation period was marked by a radical change in the regime’s attitude
towards future privatisation and foreign investors. The new government, headed by the
‘patriotic’ if not nationalistic Balgymbayev (Surucu 2002: 390), announced that it would
suspend the privatisation process in the oil sector and that the government would closely
scrutinise investors’ actions. A few years later, Balgymbayev summed up his mission in
the government as follows: ‘We were called upon to ensure the balance of power in
relations with foreign partners and to protect state interests.’182 At least in public, the U-
turn was supported by Nazarbayev, who at that time announced that the privatisation in
the oil and gas sector was concluded for the next two generations, and that enough deals
had already been signed. To use his own words: ‘For this generation and the next we
have completed all contracts (…) For the third generation of Kazakhs there’s still plenty
left … we have got to think about them as well’.183 Whereas the government’s tough new
line did not endure and was quickly reversed on the eve of the Russian financial crisis
and social unrest, it nevertheless had an important impact on the relationship between
different parties within the regime’s structure and on the further development of the oil
industry.
The nationalistic line of the new government created the space for the emergence
of a group of politically and economically influential actors – not previously affiliated
with the oil industry – that were determined to participate in the oil deals. They would
eventually orchestrate the downfall of Balgymbayev, whom they considered as the main
obstacle, by using his own nationalistic sword against him. However, in the process of
positioning themselves as serious players in the oil industry, they clashed with
182 ‘Nurlan Balgymbayev,’ Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine, No 4–5, 2001.
183 ‘Kazakhstan leaves rest oil and gas privatisation to next generations,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil
Connections, 3 (17), 15 June 1998.
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Nazarbayev’s family members, who were also keen on widening their influence in the oil
sector. During the infighting between these two parties, which also began affecting
Nazarbayev, his clients from the oil-rich peripheries firmly backed their patron.
Nazarbayev acknowledged their support through awarding key oil men with the highest
positions in yet another mutation of the NOC. Moreover, in recent years we can observe
the rise of new private oil companies in Kazakhstan, the main owners of which are
members of Nazarbayev’s family and Kazakh oil men. Thus, while Nazarbayev’s family
largely appropriated what was left in Kazakhstan in terms of oil, they did share the spoils
with the oil men. This in turn perpetuated the patron–clientelistic relationship which was
set in place in the mid-1990s.
4.1. The young oligarchs’ challenge
The immediate ‘victims’ of Balgymbayev’s government were workers of non-Kazakh
sub-contracting companies – primarily Turkish – who were simply accused of taking
away Kazakh jobs (discussed in chapter 4, section 2), and small companies that came to
the Kazakh market during Kazhegeldin’s rule. In 1996, for instance, 85 per cent of shares
in the Shymkent refinery were sold in a controversial deal to the little known Vitol (a
Dutch oil trading company).184 In 1997, Vitol was accused of tax evasion, and the
Kazakh authorities went so far as to arrest one of its bosses.185 Eventually, the company
was banned from Kazakhstan and its shares made their way to Kazkommertsbank (KKB)
and Central Asia Industrial Holding (CAIH). The fact that KKB and CAIH became the
owners of the Shymkent refinery heralded the arrival of a group of leading young
businessmen-turned-technocrats, in other words, oligarchs (some also call them Young
Turks – mladoturki),186 who had been excluded from the privatisation of the oil sector
under Kazhegeldin’s lead in government (Furman 2005: 225; Henderson 2000). By 1998,
people like Uraz Dzhandosov (First Deputy Prime-Minister and Chairman of the State
184 APS Review Downstream Trends, 19 August 2002.
185 Review Downstream Trends, 31 July 2000.
186 T.B. Umbetalieva, ‘Economical elite of Kazakhstan at the present stage,’
http://www.kisi.kz/English/Intpol/Umbetalieva_en.html (Accessed 16 September 2004); Nurbulat
Masanov, ‘Political elite of Kazakhstan: The changes of Kazakhstani political elite during the period of
sovereignty,’ Round Table: Political Elite of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2000.
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Investment Committee), Mukhtar Ablyazov (Minister of Power, Industry, and Trade),
Anvan Saidenov (Deputy finance minister and executive director of the SIC), Galymzhan
Zhakiyanov (Chairman of the Agency for Strategic Resources Control), and Sauat
Mynbayev (Minister of Finance) were co-opted by the regime and given top positions in
Kazakhstan (Cummings 2005: 122). Their new positions gave them enough political
clout to be able to demand stakes in the oil industry for themselves.187.
For instance, one prominent member of this group – Uraz Dzhandosov – created
an image of himself as a dedicated reformer in favour of selling oil and energy assets to
foreign companies. Moreover, he emphasised there would be no wholesale review of
privatisation: ‘We will seek to revise deals only if they are breaking the agreement or
breaking the law. We will sit down at the table with them [foreign companies] and
discuss it.’188 Thus, despite the fact that the oligarchs were clearly gaining their initial
footing in the oil sector (since some companies had been forced out of the Kazakh
market), Dzhandosov indicated that they, as opposed to Balgymbayev, were ready for
business. This sort of declaration was crucial and carried real weight, since Dzhandosov
took part in the exploration and production depositions with foreign oil companies.
However, before a group of businessmen-turned-politicians could position themselves as
a real alternative to Balgymbayev – in Kazhegeldin-like fashion – the Prime Minister was
yet again forced to step in as the champion of privatisation and foreign investors. Thus,
he unintentionally took the wind out of the oligarchs’ sails.
Between 1997 and 1998, a wave of social unrest swept through Kazakhstan
(discussed in chapter 4, section 1). Most traumatic for the population were the protests
staged by pensioners,189 who opposed a Chilean-style pension reform with private
individual cumulative accounts (Aslund 2003: 78; Gleason 2003: 51; Zhukov 2005: 403–
409). The protests reached a boiling point in 1997 when pensioners had not received any
money for almost a year, the arrears exceeding 36 billion tenge, and with no money in the
government’s coffers to pay them.190 The social problems were significantly magnified in
187 For their business connections see: Satpaev (1999), pp. 80–81; George (2002), pp. 34–37.
188 APS Review Downstream Trends, 31 July 2000.
189 Interviews, Kazakhstan Fall: 2004.
190 ‘Paying Pensions in Kazakhstan,’ The World Bank,
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the face of Russia’s financial crisis in August 1998 (Rutland 2001b: 173–187; Stiglitz
2002: 145–151), which produced rapid aftershocks for the Kazakh economy. It was
argued then that a strong incentive for another round of privatisations were falling oil
prices191 and the looming presidential elections (chapter 4, section 1.1). Sergei
Paramonov, the Almaty representative of Interconsulting stated: ‘The fact that
KazakhOil’s former president, Nurlan Balgymbayev, is today the prime minister of
Kazakhstan, and the company’s current vice president, Timur Kulibayev, is the son-in-
law of the country’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, means that Nazarbayev views
KazakhOil as a source of support to the national economy and, possibly, as a source of
financing for the next presidential elections.’192
In response to those mounting crises, the government in 1998 sold off
KazakhOil’s most promising asset,193 a 14.28 per cent stake in the Offshore Kazakhstan
International Operating Company (OKIOC194, now know as AgipKOC) for half-a-billon
dollars. The scale of the mistake committed by Kazakh decision makers in doing this
became visible only a few years later, when OKIOC announced the discovery of the
offshore Kashagan field – the largest oil find in the past 30 to 40 years, with oil and gas
reserves of over seven billion tons – which overnight catapulted Kazakhstan into the
super league of oil-rich countries195 (for a discussion of Kashagan deal and the events that
followed see chapter 6, section 2.2). Balgymbayev’s government did not stop here, and in
late 1999 announced plans to put up for sale KazakhOil’s 30 per cent interest in
Mangistaumunaigaz and 25.2 per cent interest in Aktobemunaigaz. This idea was
strongly criticised by ex-minister Piotr Svoik and the former Ambassador to China,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KAZAKHSTANEXTN/0,,conte
ntMDK:20212647~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:361869,00.html (Accessed 13 February
2005).
191 ‘Kazakhstan needs to sell state assets if oil prices continue,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 4
(2), 2 February 1999.
192 ‘Musclebound,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, June/July 1998.
193 In addition, in order to cushion the crisis, Kazakhstan borrowed heavily from international institutions.
By the end of the 1990s, they had become the third largest borrower among the former Soviet Republics,
having accepted 13 loans from the World Bank since independence, totalling almost $1 billion (Jafar
(2004), p. 207).
194 OKIOC was previously known as Kazakhstancaspishelf JSC.
195 Carola Hoyos, ‘$20bn Kazakh oil project faces two-year delay.’ Financial Times, 20 August 2003;
Yaroslav Razumov, ‘What does oil of Eastern Kashagan give to Kazakhstan and its people?’ Panorama, 14
June 2000.
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Murat Auezov, who were the leaders of Azamat (Democratic Party registered in 1999),
and who also demanded an investigation of past sell-offs in the Kazakh oil and gas
sector.196
The criticism voiced by the ‘opposition’ against Balgymbayev’s government was
just the tip of the iceberg. By 1999, the oil men’s government came under fire from every
possible fraction, such as the business community, the ex-Communist elite, and
parliament. Balgymbayev’s policies were made responsible for the bad performance of
the economy, which was now faring worse than it had under Kazhegeldin’s
administration.197 On top of that, he was also disliked for his heavy-handed style, a
character feature that was laid bare during budget debates.198 Balgymbayev resigned from
the post of Prime Minister on 1 October 1999 and went back to his old post or stronghold
as president of KazakhOil, which had been vacant since August 1999. Nurlan Kapparov
was moved to a position outside the NOC due to his opposition to the sale of a five per
cent Kazakh stake in TengizChevrOil, a sale which Balgymbayev had supported.199
The sale of the stake in TengizChevrOil caused a huge controversy, on which the
group of oligarchs was quickly to capitalise.200 Based on already raised resentment, they
argued that in the last two years, the value of the project had increased by 100 per cent;
hence ‘why give it away cheaply today if it could be given tomorrow at a higher
price?’201 At the same time, Balgymbayev stated that the main financial benefits from the
operation of the Tengiz field were not expected before 2015, and that it was worthwhile
to sell a stake in TCO now, in order to use the funds received for the development of
other sectors of the economy.202 The deal eventually went ahead, bringing the ownership
share of Chevron to 50 per cent. However, it backfired badly on Balgymbayev, since the
one-time supporter of Kazakh national interests was accused by the newcomers of
196 ‘Kazakhstan hopes oil stake sales will help revive privatisation drive,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil
Connections, 5 (16), 11 September 1999.
197 ‘In 1999, per capita GDP stood at $1,058 (the figure for 1990 was $1,741), while the total GDP volume
in 1998 barely reached 73 percent of the 1992 levels (Smirnov 2000: 164).
198 Komsomolskaya Pravda , 1 March 2002.
199 Diplomat Operation in Oil Diplomacy, 27 August 2001.
200 ITAR-TASS, 23 August 2000.
201 ‘TCO: The Most Intriguing Deal,’ Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine, No 3–4, 2000.
202 Ibid.
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serving the interests of the powerful foreign oil lobby.203 The main incentive for the
attack on ‘honorary oil industry worker’ was the highly anticipated redistribution of the
oil pie, which Balgimbayev openly opposed204 by simply stating that the further
‘privatisation of NOC KazakhOil is not profitable for the state’.205 Nazarbayev tacitly
backed the young technocrats’ assault on the ex-Prime Minister.206
The most straightforward explanation for his tacit support for them lies in the fact
that since Balgymbayev and Nazarbayev had worked together very closely during the
most controversial period in the post-independence era, Balgymbayev knew far too much
about various backdoor dealings207, including Kazakhgate (chapter 6, sections 1, 1.1).
Olcott stated that ‘Balgymbayev succeeded in making KazakhOil strong enough to be
viewed as a threat to Nazarbayev’ (2002: 158). Moreover, a semi-independent president
of the NOC was also intolerable from the standpoint of Nazarbayev’s family, which was
interested in getting involved in oil deals that Balgymbayev could potentially obstruct.208
By 2001, not only was Timur Kulibayev209 heavily drawn into the oil business, but also
Nazarbayev’s oldest daughter Dariga210 and her high ambitious husband Rakhat Aliev,211
who had interests in Mangistaumunaigaz (Peck 2004: 169).
With Balgimbayev considerably weakened, the two groups – namely the oligarchs
and Nazarbayev’s family – began positioning themselves for the struggle over influence
in the oil sector.212 The clash was accelerated by the ongoing conflict between the
oligarchs and Rakhat Aliev (the Deputy Head of the National Security Committee) over
203 Dosym Satpaev, ‘Kazakh Premier Under Threat,’
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200011_30_2_eng.txt (Accessed 20 September 2004).
204 Dosym Satpaev, ‘Bulldogs fight under a carpet: oil track,’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2001.
205 ‘Nurlan Balgimbayev: Privatisation of KazakhOil is Currently Unprofitable of the State,’ Petroleum
Magazine, November 2000.
206 Interview with the executive director of a major oil project in Kazakhstan: Atyrau, 17 November 2004.
207 Interfax-news, 19 February 2002.
208 Kanat Shaymerdenov, ‘The inevitable liberalisation of the domestic market for oil products,’ Panorama,
22 June 2001.
209 In 2002, Kulibayev expelled the Belgian company Traktebel from Kazakhstan and secured the transfer
of its business to the KazTransGaz company, which he controlled. This allowed him to step out of
Nazarbayev’s shadow and become a serious player in his own right.
210 For more about Dariga Nazarbayev see: Sergei Blagov, ‘Kazakhstan: Let’s talk about succession,’
www.atimes.com (Accessed 23 January 2004); Jeremy Druker, ‘Euroasia Media Forum: Central Asia’s
Masters of Spin,’ www.eurasianet.net (Accessed 24 April 2004).
211 Sergei Duvanov, ‘Rakhat Aliev – Crime Fighter,’ IWPR, 11 August 2000.
212 Interview with a high-ranking member of the opposition party, who worked in the presidential apparatus
throughout the 1990s: Almaty, 5 November 2004.
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business influence in other sectors of the economy such as sugar, banking and prior to
that, metallurgy. Nazarbayev made a reconciliatory gesture towards the oligarchs as he
shifted Aliev to the ambassadorial post in Austria – a move reminiscent of a Soviet style
‘honorary exile’.213 However, by then they saw Nazarbayev as a partial broker, one who
strongly favoured the interests of his family rather than balancing rival fractions. In the
oligarchs’ opinion, his system had become dysfunctional. As a response, they formed the
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) party in November 2001, which was hailed as
the first true base for the democratic movement in Central Asia.214 In reality, it strove to
normalise the relationship between business and the state, possibly in a corporatistic
fashion.215 However, the oligarchs failed to understand that the time of quasi-pluralism
was long over (chapter 3, section 1). Nazarbayev dealt with dissent in an
uncompromising manner. The DCK’s two most prominent members, Ablyazov and
Zhakyanov, were sent to prison216, prompting a split of the more ‘moderate’ wing of the
DCK, which was led by Dzhandosov and another wealthy businessman Bulat Abilov.
They moved to form the pro-business Ak Zhol (Bright Path)217 (for details see chapter 6,
section 1.2).
Throughout the DCK affair, Kazakh oil men stayed faithful to Nazarbayev despite
some attempts by the oligarchs to win them over,218 an act which should not be
underestimated. Aldar Kusainov219 argued that if the oil men were to throw their weight
behind the opposition, they would most likely tip the balance in their favour: ‘If Ak Zhol
or, more likely, the DCK decides to confront the authorities directly, one key
constituency that may prove a deciding factor is the growing number of small- and
213 Altai Jasulanov, ‘Austrian Exile for President's Son-in-Law,’ IWPR, 26 July, 2002.
214 Anthony Robinson, ‘A Kazakh Drama,’ Prospect, 81 (Dec 2002).
215 Dimitrii Furman argued that another major reason behind DCK was a need to create a political system
that would respect the rule of law as oligarchs and new bourgeoisie began to understand that ‘under the
conditions of an authoritarian system, their property was very weakly defended’ ((2005), p. 223).
216 They were convicted on corruption charges and were sent to six and seven years in prison, respectively.
Subsequently, Ablyazov was pardoned in mid-2003 as a reconciliatory gesture towards the DCK, whereas
Zhakyanov was only released in the beginning of 2006.
217 In 2005, a fraction led by Dzhandosov, split from Ak Zhol and formed Naghyz Ak Zhol (True Bright
Path) as a result of prolonged personal infighting.
218 Interview with a high-ranking member of the opposition party who worked in the presidential apparatus
throughout the 1990s: Almaty, 5 November 2004.
219 Pseudonym for a Kazakhstan-based commentator.
104
medium-sized business owners, many of whom are active in the country’s oil and gas
sector’.220
The oil men not only abstained from taking active part, but they were also the first
to take steps that would eventually culminate in the outlawing of the DCK. In 2003,
Atyrau’s authorities banned DCK operations in this oil-rich area for minor violations.221
By late 2004, there was no sign of either DCK or Ak Zhol in Atyrau city. It is argued
here that the oil men supported Nazarbayev because during and after the privatisation
process, he assured them of a smooth transition from state-run enterprises to the private
sector. In recent years, Nazarbayev has symbolically honoured his alliances by installing
representatives of the key oil families and people affiliated with old and new oil projects
at the top of the recently formed NOC KazMunaiGas, and by giving Kazakh oil men
preferential access to the new oil deals.
4.2. The NOC KazMunaiGas and Nazarbayev’s family
On 20 February 2002, Nazarbayev signed the decree222 on the establishment of the
Closed Joint Stock Company ‘National Company KazMunaiGas (KMG)’ through the
merger of the CJSC ‘National Oil and Gas Company KazakhOil’223 and the CJSC
‘National Company Transportation of Oil and Gas’224 (established in May 2001 through
the merger of state pipeline companies KazTransOil and KazTransGaz).225 Kazakh
authorities argued that the NOC KazMunaiGas was created to ensure a single state policy
220 Aldar Kusainov, ‘Kazakhstan’s Critical Choice,’ 13 January 2003
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav011303_pr.shtml (Accessed 29 April 2003).
221 Alexander Zakharov, ‘DCK Facing Oblivion,’ 17 October 2003
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200310_241_2_eng.txt (Accessed 24 February 2005).
222 Decree 811 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 20 February 2000, ‘On measures on further
securing the interests of the State in the oil and gas sector of the country’s economy’.
223 In 2001, KazakhOil accounted for about one-fifth of oil produced in Kazakhstan, while oil revenues
made up one-third of Kazakhstan’s budget; see also: Constantine Syroezhkin, ‘Politics before economy,’
Continent, 18 February 2001; Valerie Steshin, ‘KazakhOil magi blanket.’ Srednaya Aziya Bulletin, 4 June
2001.
224 In 2001, the Transportation of Oil and Gas was responsible for transporting up to 80 per cent of the oil
extracted in the country. Oil and Gas moreover accounted for half of Kazakhstan’s exports; For more see:
Andrey Zhdanov, ‘To be regaled by monster - this so is tasteful. The concentration of the transport of
Kazakh hydrocarbons in single hands have begun,’ Express-K, 8 May 2001
225 Kazakhstan News Bulletin Released weekly by the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1 (6), 27
February 2002; For details concerning the assets of KazakhOil and Transport of Oil and Gas before the
merger, see Appendix 4.
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in using the country’s chief mineral resources, and a single negotiating body. In theory,
the company should be capable of implementing more complex projects – in particular in
developing the Caspian Shelf – through unified management and organisation.226 The
commentators, on their part, suggested that the main rationale behind the creation of the
company was the desire of the Kazakh authorities to streamline relations between the
government and major companies, and to ensure greater involvement of the local
bourgeoisie in the oil project: ‘[t]he basic idea of the Kazakh elite, which is now coming
to power, is clear: foreigners should forget about being a “big brother” and should settle
for being junior partners’.227 Thus, it was announced that KazMunaiGas would have a
mandatory share of 50 per cent in all new oil and gas projects.
Liazzat Kiinov became president of the super-monopoly KazMunaiGas, with an
annual turnover of two billon dollars.228 He, like his predecessors (Yelemanov,
Cherdabayev, Balgymbayev) comes from western Kazakhstan. Kiinov studied at the
Kazakh Polytechnic Institute, held executive positions in the Communist Party, and after
independence was a deputy director general of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. In the
late 1990s, he headed Mangistaumunaigaz and subsequently was promoted to the position
of akim in the oil-rich Mangistau region.229 Makhambet Batyrbaev, who had participated
in the launch of the development project for the Tengiz field where he served as director
general of Tengizneftegaz in the beginning of the 1990s, was appointed as vice-president
of the KMG. Subsequently, he became vice-president of Munaigas and president of
Embamunaigaz. He belongs to a major oil family in Kazakhstan, as does Uzakbai
Karabalin, who first sat on the board of directors of the new company.230 Karabalin
studied in Moscow, worked for Emba, and at the beginning of the 1990s, held the
226 Azhar Kadrzhanova, ‘KazMunaiGas – New Oil and Gas Integrated Company,’ US & Foreign
Commercial Service and US Department of State, 19 April 2002; Ekspress-K, 6 Dec 03. Source: BBC
Monitoring 12 December 2003; Vlad Alpenshtok, ‘Decision of №456, or there and back,’ Vremia Po, 17
May 2001.
227 Sergei Gribov, ‘The Master Has Returned: Kazakh President reinstates KMG oil and gas super-
monopoly,’ http://www.rusenergy.com/eng/politics/a26022002.htm (Accessed 05 December 2004); see
also: ‘KazMunaiGas: Domestic Companies Will Get Priority Access to Licenses,’ Petroleum Magazine,
October 2002; ‘KazMunaiGas: On Guard of the Interests of the State,’ Petroleum Magazine, October 2003.
228 ‘An oil giant KazMunaiGas is established in Kazakhstan,’ Oil and Gas Kazakhstan Magazine, 1 (2002).
229 APS Review Downstream Trends, 26 August 2002.
230 In 2003, Karabalin replaced Kiinov as president of the company. He was characterised as a highly
professional oil man with moderate ambitions. Source: ‘New President of KazMunaiGas Appointed,’ Oil
and Gas Magazine, 1–2 (2003).
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function of deputy minister of the oil and gas industry. During the mid-1990s, he received
service training at Agip’s office in Italy and later on rose to become vice-president of
KazakhOil and eventually president of KazTransGaz. Another member of an oil family to
rise to a top position was Zhakyp Marabayev, who became director of investment
projects and joint ventures. Finally, Vladimir Miroshnikov was a top-official from the oil
rich regions, who in the 1990s became the first vice-president of Mangistaumunaigaz231.
The composition of top officials of the KMG demonstrates the firm alliances
between Nazarbayev and the Kazakh oil men. It is argued here that if Nazarbayev felt
threatened by Kazakh oil men and did not consider them his trusted clients, he would not:
a) create a highly centralised oil company that oil men could try to capture; and b)
appoint so many of them to executive positions. Having said that, the oil men were not
left to their own free reigns by Nazarbayev, who appointed Kulibayev232 to the position
of first vice-president of KMG. The latter brought to the company a number of his own
associates. For instance, Daniyar Berlibayev, the former first vice-president of
KazTransGaz was appointed to the post of managing director on corporate management,
and Kanatbek Safinov, (Kulibayev’s nephew), the ex-head of the board of directors of
KazakhOil, became director of legal security in KMG.233 It should be added that
Kulibayev’s high and very public position in the new company was not only that of a
watchman, but also that of a guardian of family interests in the new oil deals.234
As stated above, one of the intentions behind the creation of the new company
was to facilitate the access of the local elites to the oil business. The main benefactors of
this policy were members of Nazarbayev’s family and the Kazakh oil men. In 2003,
commentators began reporting on a new trend of home-grown Kazakh oil companies
buying up assets previously owned by foreign investors. In that same year, Nelson
Resources, a Canadian-based company registered in the Bermuda Islands, bought a 50
per cent stake in the North Buzachi oil field in the Mangistau region from China’s CNPC.
231 ‘The Phoenix Bird,’ Petroleum Magazine, April 2002; Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, 2;
Interviews Kazakhstan Fall, 2004.
232 A. Isaev, I. Sarsenov, ‘Crown prince and the black gold.’ Eurasia, 13 April 2001; Another rising star in
Kazakh oil sector has been Nazarbayev’s nephew Kairat Satybaldy. He has held various important
positions (Furman (2005), p. 219).
233 Petroleum Magazine, April 2002.
234 In October 2005, Kulibayev (at the age of 39) resigned as vice president of KazMunaiGaz without a
formal explanation. ‘Timur Kulibayev leaves KazMunaiGas,’ Kazakhstan Today, 22 October 2005.
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One year later, the company also purchased about 60 per cent of Chaparral Resources,
which in turn owned a 60 per cent controlling interest in the Karakuduk field that it was
developing together with KazMunaiGas. Finally, it was argued that Nelson Resources
would be awarded a number of licenses to develop sea blocks on which KazakhOil had
already conducted geological surveys.235 In August 2004, the market capitalisation of
Nelson Resources reached about $1 billion.236 According to commentators, the main
financial and political forces behind Nelson Resources were Timur Kulibayev and his
associates.237 Another example of Nazarbayev’s family involvement is Canargo Energy,
which is headed by Bulat Nazarbayev, the president’s brother. The company holds
licenses for the exploration of gas fields situated west of the Aral Sea.238 When it comes
to the oil men’s involvement, the most recent example is that of the US-based BMB
Holding, which owns several Kazakh oil deposits, together with interests in Azerbaijan.
The BMB board includes former Kazakh TengizChevrOil director Boris Cherdabayev
(brother of Ravil Cherdabayev)239.
These new domestic oil and gas companies are run by teams of specialists with
years of experience in the oil industry. One notable case in point is Nelson’s chairman
and chief executive Nick Zana, a long-serving Chevron executive, who was responsible
for increasing production and opening new export routes for TengizChevrOil (1995–
1997). He is also highly respected by the Kazakh oil men.240 Another example is the
former Total executive Aziz Ait-Said, who headed French major operations in the former
Soviet Union. Arguably, what has been happening in Kazakhstan in the last few years is
an attempt to build highly efficient and transparent oil companies that are able to attract
235 Sergei Grachev, ‘Kashagan Magic: Kazakhstan’s national capital claims major role in developing
Caspian Reserves,’ 16 February 2002 http://www.rusenergy.com/eng/caspian/a04022002.htm (Accessed
20 October 2004).
236 ‘Five Years of Success: Nelson Resources,’ Special Issue: Kazakhstan Oil and Gas, 2004.
237 Svetlana Voronina, ‘Commercial News Update-Kazakhstan,’ BISNIS Representative for Kazachstan, 30
October 2003.
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/0312KZ_Comm_Update.htm (Accessed 20 October 2004).
238 Nefte Compass, 6 August 2004.
239 http://www.bmbmunai.com (Accessed 3 October 2005); ‘BMB Munai: build up hydrocarbon reserves,’
Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine, 2 (2005).
240 Interviews Kazakhstan Autumn: 2004; see also: Vlad Alpenshtok, ‘Nick Zana in Access Industries or a
new task for the oil giant.’ Vremia Po, 4 June 2001.
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western investors.241 Those involved in the Kazakh oil sector follow the path of such
people as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former CEO of Yukos from 1995–2004, who after
bringing Yukos under his control attempted to turn the company around with the help of
western specialists. It could be argued that the formation of highly respectable companies
is either a way of legitimising the capital that Nazarbayev’s inner circle accumulated, or
of securing his family’s interests against unpredictable political developments.
To sum up, in the late 1990s, a group of young businessmen-turned-technocrats
(e.g. Dzhandosov, Ablyazov, Zhaiyanov) began demanding access to the oil sector. They
successfully sidelined Balgymbayev, whom they initially saw as the main obstacle.
However, in the process they clashed with members of Nazarbayev’s family (Rakhat
Aliev and Dariga Nazarbayev), with whom they were already engaged in a number of
struggles for influence in various sectors of the economy. Resulting from this, the
oligarchs went on to form their own political party (DCK) that directly threatened
Nazarbayev. The Kazakh oil men did not participate in these struggles against the
president and supported their patron. Nazarbayev symbolically rewarded them with high
positions in the new oil and gas company (e.g. Kiinov, Batyrbaev, Karabalin,
Marabayev), and paved the way for their participation in lucrative new oil deals (e,g.
Cherdabayev). By taking such steps, his regime managed to successfully reproduce this
existing patron–client relationship.
In conclusion, in the first years after independence, Nazarbayev attempted to
partly privatise the Kazakh oil industry with the help of the oil men. The relationship
between the regime and various branches of the oil-industry was structured in a
corporatistic fashion. However, the attempts in the centre and peripheries (as the example
of the Biedermann International explicitly demonstrated) to seize control over the oil
industry from Nazarbayev led him to abandon the idea of controlling the Kazakh oil
industry through corporatistic methods, and resulted in his gradual move to patron–
clientelistic techniques. This transition was greatly sped up during the privatisation
process of the oil industry. In addition, it was argued that in the centre of the country, the
actions of oil men and other important clients working in the oil industry are monitored
241 Mark Hollingsworth and David Leigh. ‘Ex-BAE chairman is recruited by Kazakhstan,’ Guardian, 4
December 2006.
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closely by the members of the Nazarbayev’s family, who have been introduced to the
highest posts in the oil industry; in the peripheries, they are monitored by the often-
rotated local governors.
110
Chapter 3: Strengthening the informal ties: the Kazakhization of the oil industry
In previous chapter, we argued that in the first years of independence, Nazarbayev’s
regime structured its relationship with various branches of the oil industry through
corporatist mechanisms. However, due to attempts at the centre and in the peripheries to
seize control over the oil industry from Nazarbayev, he was led to abandon the idea of
controlling the Kazakh oil industry through corporatist methods, which led to a gradual
move towards patron-client techniques. In this chapter, we argue that the introduction of
the patron–client ‘modus operandi’ was accompanied by the gradual Kazakhization of the
oil industry, which (intentionally and unintentionally) strengthened the informal ties
between Nazarbayev and his clients.
By the intentional strengthening of these informal ties through Kazakhization, we
understand a situation in which an oil industry-supporting company, say a construction or
assembling company, is only granted access to the oil industry because it is at least partly
owned by the regime’s client, who is also an ethnic Kazakh. That is to say, a company
run by the regime’s clients who are not ethnic Kazakhs would not be given oil industry
related contracts. By the unintentional strengthening of informal ties through
Kazakhization, we understand a situation in which the regime’s policies of staffing the
NOC with ethnic Kazakhs – a great majority of whom are not professional oil men – and
barring other non-Kazakh specialists from joining the company have elevated the status
of ethnic Kazakh oil men (the only professionals left in the company). It is argued in this
chapter that this unintentional rise is significant, since it allows the oil men to overcome
the feeling of inferiority that many of them have had towards Russian and other non-
Kazakh specialists. In effect, the oil men not only owe their patron Nazarbayev the high
positions they handed, but are also indebted to him for their special, privileged positions
in post-Soviet Kazakhstan that go beyond measurable benefits. Finally, in this chapter we
will discuss the negative effects that the Kazakhization per se of the NOC KazMunaiGas
is having on the Kazakh oil sector.
Leading on, in order to better understand the circumstances in which the
Kazakhization of the oil industry tool place, as well as to fully recognize its impact in the
following section, we will discuss the so-called northern autonomous movements and
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Russian–Kazakh relationships. Most importantly, this section explains why this
Kazakhization of the oil industry took place in the mid-1990s, and why Russian
authorities were willing to accept this policy without any major criticism, despite the fact
that it had direct impacted on their influence in Kazakhstan.
1. Containing mobilisation in the north and Russian–Kazakh relationships
On the eve of independence, Kazakhstan, like all other Central Asian republics, was left
with its share of colonial baggage, a weight that threatened the very existence of the
republic (Rakowska-Harmstone 1994: 23). It has been argued that as in the cases of
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, in Kazakhstan, an ethno-regional challenge, which has its roots
in the concentration of European/Slavic communities in the north and east of the country,
was the most likely source of political destabilisation (Melvin 2001: 173). According to
the last Soviet census, taken in 1989, ethnic Kazakhs constituted 39.7 per cent of the
population, while Russians, ethnic Slavs and other ‘Russians-speakers’ were 50.1 per
cent242 (Olcott 1997: 208). Kazakhstan owed this apparent imbalance, which in the Soviet
Union earned it a label of the ‘laboratory of the peoples’ friendship’, to its short modern
history,243 in the course of which its titular nationality was reduced to the minority
population (Schatz 2000: 75). Ethnic make-up, as a source of possible political friction,
was heightened by the fact that Kazakhstan, which encompasses an enormous territory of
2,717,300 sq km (1,049,155 sq mi, roughly five times the area of France), is divided
between two main ethnic groups: Kazakhs and Russians. Kazakhs occupy the south of the
country whereas Russians and other non-Kazakhs inhabit the northern parts of
Kazakhstan, which economically were (and still are) closely linked to Siberia, i.e.
southern Russia.
242 In the mid-1980s, in other Soviet Central Asia republics Slavs accounted for about 15 per cent of the
population (Lubin 1984: 6).
243 Key events were the extremely violent collectivisation during the Stalin’s years, which killed as many as
1.5 million Kazakhs and forced many more to immigrate to China; and the Virgin Lands campaign (1953–
65), which called for a rapid increase in the amount of sown land in western Siberia and Kazakhstan. A
new wave of non-Kazakh immigrants flooded the republic, and non-Kazakhs became the largest ethnic
group in the country.
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1.1. The northern autonomous movements’ emergence
Potential ethno-regional challenges gained a political face towards the end of the 1980s
with the formation of ethnic Russian-oriented groups and parties calling for greater
autonomy for the northern and eastern regions. To an extent, the push towards an
autonomous path owed much to one of Gorbachev’s key perestroika era policies – strong
centre and strong republics – which meant greater control of Alma-Ata; thus, inevitably
ethnic Kazakhs over decision making processes in the republic (Goodman 1994: 77–78).
Nazarbayev was also quick to capitalise on this new line, asking rhetorically at the 28th
Congress of the CPUS: ‘How can Kazakhstan help [in the restructuring of Soviet society]
if 90 per cent of its industry is controlled by agencies in Moscow?’ (Olcott 1995: 174).
Another important element was the formation of Kazakh nationalist groups, which had
their roots in the so-called December events of 1986244 that ‘gave rise to a strong sense of
the importance of political activism to promote the Kazakh national agenda’ (Gleason
1997: 88). Ethnic Kazakh based organisations ranged from nationalist groups such us
Zheltoksan (December) and Azat (Freedom), which wanted Kazakhstan to become a
mono-ethnic state, to Alash Orda, an extreme religious organisation that in the beginning
of the 1990s supported the idea of pan-Turkism and the creation of a Great Turkestan
state. In order to achieve their ends, they threatened to resort to terror (Janabel 1996: 16–
17; Khazanov 1995: 254).
The first real attempt at constructing an ethno-regional movement to guard the
alleged interests of the northern and eastern parts was made by descendants of the earliest
Russian settlers from the nineteenth century, who began to join an informal group, the
‘Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan’, which managed to gain seats in
local and city soviets in the five northern regions (Olcott 1997: 210). Yet another ethno-
regional political movement named Lad was established at the beginning of the 1990s on
the basis of the Russian cultural centres of the north and east, which also openly
244 On 16 December 1986, thousand to tens of thousands of predominantly young Kazakh students took to
the streets of Alma-Ata to voice their discontent with Moscow’s decision to appoint Muscovite Gennady
Kolbin, someone from outside the republic, to head the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) (Olcott
1990: 66). The protest, which was reported to be peaceful, was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a
riot, and Moscow decided to use the army to quell it at whatever price (1990: 66). Russian troops attacked
crowds with dogs and sharpened trench shovels. It is not known how many people died during those tragic
events. Estimates range from 200 to up 1,000 and maybe even more (Olcott 1997: 206).
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demanded a degree of local autonomy (Melvin 2001: 175). Those demands, when taken
to their logical conclusion, aimed at the virtual secession of the Russian-dominated areas.
It is important to keep in mind that those movements were indirectly encouraged by
voices in Russia. Most notably, in 1990 when Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the legendary
dissident and recipient of the Nobel Prize (1970), argued that ‘the future of Russia
depended on a re-centralization of the Slavic core, and thus on partition of Kazakhstan’,
his statement created tremendous resentment in Kazakhstan (Roy 2000: 191).
1.2. Nazarbayev’s response: a mixed political system and a pact with Russia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev’s response, to on the one hand,
Kazakh nationalists who now openly spoke about removing the ‘colonialists’ and, on the
other hand, to Russians speculating on the possibility of redrawing existing borders, was
the construction of a ‘mixed political system’ (Anderson 1997: 83; Chalidze 1992: 13–
14). The main premise of this new system, the legacy of which is still very strong in
Kazakhstan’s official political discourse, was the prospect of creating in the long-term a
democratic polity in which both communities would be able to peacefully co-exist, while
stressing the need for a strong executive power that would be able to contain immediate
threats from the extreme elements. Nazarbayev’s strategy added political weight in the
face of the regionally based instability that occurred in other parts of Central Asia, most
pronouncedly in Tajikistan, where the state disintegrated under the pressure of powerful
regional movements (Janabel 1994: 20; Dannreuther 1994: 25-31; Rubin 1998: 28-61).
The balance system that Nazarbayev began advocating at the beginning of
independence gave him a ticket to successfully outlaw both Kazakh and Russian radical
organisations by a presidential decree of June 1992, and to co-opt the moderate non-
Kazakh elements. First of all, obstacles that could potentially obstruct the participation of
the members of the former nomenklatura in the informal privatisation that took place in
the beginning of the 1990s were not put in place (Puzanov 1993: 32). Second, a number
of pseudo-political pro-presidential parties, such us SNEK, were created that ‘contained
many leading officials and enterprise directors from the north and east of the country’
(Melvin 2001: 174). Finally, an important element that minimised the reach of
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autonomous rhetoric among the Russian community was the extremely high level of
Sovietisation among ethnic Kazakhs. As one author wrote: ‘by the 1970s the Kazakhs
were arguably the most thoroughly Sovietised of all Soviet citizens – and the
overwhelming majority appeared to be proud of this’ (Akiner 1995: 51). Arguably,
Sovietisation, in other words Russification Bolshevik style, bridged (or rather did not
create a gap between) the two communities, at least in the first few years of
independence.
For its part, Russia, which at the beginning of the 1990s was gripped by an
economic crisis, looked now at Kazakhstan as ballast that it should rid itself off, leaving
the Russians living in Kazakhstan largely to fend for themselves.245 Ethnic Russians
featured in the Russian foreign relationship discourse as those left behind, either in the
midst of internal struggles within Russia (such as during dual citizenship debates during
the 1994 crisis), or when it felt that it needed to assert its stance towards the successor
states when confronted with competition from other states, most notably, the US and
Turkey (Bolukbasi 1998: 397). In relation to the latter point, in 1993 the Russian foreign
minister Andrei Kozyrev, in the face of what was seen to be a growing challenge from
new players in the region, did not hesitate to say that ‘there may be cases when the use of
direct military force will be needed to defend our compatriots aboard’, thus sending a
clear message to all the Central Asian countries to stay in line (Hunter 1996: 117). It
should be pointed out that the Russian’s assertive attitude, especially towards
Kazakhstan, was largely of a pre-emptive nature, since Nazarbayev never spoke about
cutting his ties with Russia – quite the contrary. The president of the new independent
Kazakhstan very quickly became the most ardent champion of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Kazakhstan has been a member since 1991, ever since it
emerged from the former USSR, reflecting a widespread perception of Kazakhstan’s
economic dependency on Russia. Nazarbayev argued that the new loose union with
Russia was crucial for the economic development of the Kazakh state (Hale 2005: 20).
Moreover, Nazarbayev from the very beginning ensured that Russian oil companies were
involved in lucrative oil246 and gas247 deals; Lukoil acquired a 20 per cent share in the
245 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 15 September 2004.
246 ‘Enter Russia,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, March 1995.
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Kazakh–Chevron deal to explore the Tengiz oil field, and he ensured that the proposed
new pipeline,248 critical from the Russian point of view, went through Russian territory
(Anderson 1997: 203). Over the years, Kazakhstan has paid dearly for its dependency on
this Russian pipeline system, as the Russian government would, for instance, set up low
transit quotas unfavourable from the Kazakh point of view.249
With regard to containing extreme ethnic Kazakh elements, Nazarbayev purged
from his inner circle those advocating radical ethnic policies,250 in addition to outlawing
them, as mentioned above at the beginning of the 1990s. Whereas those early bans and
purges on the surface looked like political manoeuvring aimed at maintaining the stability
of the multi-ethnic state (Bremmer and Welt 1996: 186), in reality their aim was to
reduce the direct political threat that extreme elements posed to Nazarbayev. Moreover,
Nazarbayev began implementing the policies of those that he only recently pushed aside.
He forcefully pursued with the Kazakhization of the country’s domestic political
apparatus and its economic sphere, which traditionally in the Soviet Union had been
under Russian and Slavic control. The most visible sign of new politics were the March
1994 parliamentary elections251 in the new parliament: ‘Russians found themselves
“represented” by a body which was only 21 percent Russian, and 58 percent Kazakh’
(Olcott 1997: 213).252 Similar processes took place all across the political and economic
spectrum and by the mid-1990s, a great part of the Russified elite that was earlier brought
into the regime’s orbit had been displaced and replaced by southerners (Melvin 2001:
176; Edmunds 1998: 464). In 1998, the four highest posts in the political system
(president, vice-president, prime minister and first deputy prime minister) were occupied
by Kazakhs (Odgaard and Simonsen 1999: 18). Kazakhization also began taking place at
a social and cultural level: ‘many old Soviet and Russian street names have been replaced
247 ‘Playing Hardball,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, October 1996.
248 ‘Life After Deuss,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, March 1996.
249 ‘Thorny Problems in Kazakh–Russian Economic Relations,’ Monitor, 5 (114), 14 June 1999.
250 Interview with a political expert: Almaty 7 September 2004.
251 The March parliamentary elections were widely criticised by the international observers for their
apparent improprieties. However, in Nazarbayev’s opinion, the elections were fully legitimate, even if there
were some ‘minor’ inconsistencies; he added: ‘You cannot expect Kazakhstan to traverse the road from
totalitarian Communist rule to a French-style democracy in just two years.’ Quoted in ‘Benevolent
Dictatorship,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1995, p. 44.
252 By 1998, Kazakhs comprised 80 per cent of the presidential apparatus, 64.4 per cent of central
government functionaries, and 69.7 per cent of the government (Hoffman Fall 2000: 248).
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by the names of Kazakh national heroes, and a new emphasis on a Kazakh historical
stance has emerged in the teaching of history in schools’ (Edmunds 1998: 463). At the
same time, Nazarbayev did not cease, especially during official visits to Russia, to stress
the importance of Russia’s people and its culture, effectively keeping a façade in place. In
his own words: ‘It is the Russian language that has given the Kazakhs access to the
heights of science and culture and to world literature. Kazakhs need the Russian language
just as they need their daily bread.’253
This change in Nazarbayev’s tactics can be explained through the mounting
economic crisis, which by 1994 had led to the climax in emigration of the non-titular
segment of society. The major catalyst of this economic crisis was the end of the special
economic relationships between Kazakhstan and Russia as Kazakhstan was forced to
leave the rouble zone in November 1993254 (Gleason 2003: 44). In the face of economic
destabilisation, Nazarbayev ended the process of ‘balance’ politics and chose to
consolidate his Kazakh political base. The presumed backlash of the northern elites was
minimised by the fact that much of the Russian industrial work force was actually leaving
Kazakhstan by 1994. It should be added that the first emigrants from Kazakhstan were
the representatives of the nomenklatura at the higher, republican, and regional echelons
(Kadyrzhanov 1999: 153). Emigration reached its peak in the mid-1990s. Official
statistics say that 481,000 people left Kazakhstan in 1994, with 309,600 following in
1995 and 229,400 in 1996 – i.e. a total of 1,846,466 people left Kazakhstan between 1991
and 1999 (Dave 2004: 453). According to the 1999 census, which has been accused of
social engineering (Dave 2004; Sinnott 2003), in the space of ten years the Russian
population had fallen to only 29.96 per cent of the total population; combined with other
Europeans, the total reached only 37.05 per cent of the population total (Sinnott 2003:
140).
While Kazakh official statistics leave much room for improvement, it is a broadly
accepted fact that an important section of the Russian community left Kazakhstan in the
mid-1990s, thereby minimising the threat of the northern autonomous movements that
253 ‘Nazarbaev in Moscow: Symbolic Concessions, Hard Bargaining,’ Monitor, 6 (121), 21 June 2000; (see
also Kolsto 1998: 56–58).
254 In 1994, inflation rose 1,945 per cent. Moreover, industrial production shrank by 25 per cent in 1994,
and Kazakhstan’s GDP in 1995 was 31 per cent below the 1991 level. Figures quoted in (Olcott 2002:
136).
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emerged at the beginning of the 1990s.255 However, it appears that President Nazarbayev
did not share this optimism. In an unprecedented move, Nazarbayev relocated the capital
of the country from the south (Almaty) to the centre of Kazakhstan (Astana), i.e. closer to
the north. It has been widely argued that the primary reason for this reallocation ‘was the
demographic predominance of ethnic Russians in the north and the possibility of
separatism’ (Schatz 2004: 76). Some have suggested that in the long run, Nazarbayev
hoped that the movement of capital would encourage ethnic Kazakhs to move to the
northern regions of the country, and hence inevitably change the regional ethnic balance
in favour of the Kazakhs (Wolfel 2002: 486).
Despite Nazarbayev’s Kazakhization policies, relationships between Russia and
Kazakhstan have been surprisingly good over the years, given the nature of some
statements by both sides in the early 1990s. In 2004, the Economist Intelligence Unit in
its annual report argued:
Kazakhstan’s main external ally and security guarantor is Russia. Despite some
early tensions over the treatment of the Russian minority in Kazakhstan,
relations are good and to an extent facilitated Kazakhstan’s decision to assist the
US in the counter-terrorism operations that followed the attacks on the US in
September 2001.256
Arguably, the main reason for the stable relationship is the fact that Nazarbayev has stuck
to the informal deal reached between Russia and Kazakhstan, by which Kazakhstan will
give Russia a share of its oil pie, whereas Russia will give Nazarbayev a free hand in
Kazakhstan’s domestic policies. For example, in November 2001, Kazakhstan and Russia
concluded a 10-year agreement on cooperation in the gas industry. The parties agreed to
achieve a good balance between the delivery and transit of the Russian and Kazakh gas,
and to unite efforts in the construction, reconstruction and maintenance of gas pipelines,
underground gas storehouses, and other associated facilities.257 In June 2002, both
countries signed yet another agreement, which further ensured a Russian near-monopoly
255 Interviews, Kazakhstan: Summer and Autumn 2004.
256 ‘Country Profile 2004: Kazakhstan,’ The Economist Intelligence Unit, London: 2004. p. 16.
257 ‘The Newest Oil History,’ Petroleum Magazine, October 2002.
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on the transit of oil from Kazakhstan for years to come.258 More recently, in 2005, both
countries signed a 55-year production-sharing agreement for the Kurmangazy oilfield in
the Caspian Sea, a deal worth 50 billion US dollars.259
At the same time, Russian politicians from time to time indicate to Kazakhstan’s
leadership that the issue of Russians living in Kazakhstan can always be politicised if
Kazakhstan were to ever deviate from the current line (Bukkvoll 2004: 642). For
instance, in 2003 Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that Kazakhstan and Russia
had ‘serious territorial problems’.260 In January 2005, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a nationalist
politician and deputy speaker in the Russian parliament's lower house, criticized the 2004
border delimitation agreement between the two countries, saying that ‘Kazakhstan had
never existed as a state’, and that by signing the border agreement Russia was giving
away its historic lands.261 Zhirinovsky was not alone in his outlook, and it was reported
that at least at the unofficial level, there is little certainty that the signing of the agreement
will put an end to territorial claims.262
The above discussion demonstrates that Nazarbayev skilfully managed to contain
the autonomous movements in the north of the country in the early years of independence
by creating a political system which allowed him to co-opt major players in the Russian
community. He only pushed with the Kazakhization of the country when the politically
threatening managerial strata began to leave Kazakhstan, and even more importantly,
after securing indirect support for his policies from Moscow. However, the tacit alliance
between Russia and Kazakhstan also re-created and strengthened Kazakhstan’s
dependency on Russia, which is demonstrated in Russia’s involvement in Kazakhstan’s
oil deals. Moreover, through not dealing with the issue of the north in a sensible fashion
but rather through grand manoeuvring, such as moving a capital from the south to the
258 Vladimir Socor, ‘Lock, Stock and Barrel: Moscow and Kazakh oil transit,’ Russia and Eurasia Review,
1 (3), 2 July, 2002.
259 Sergei Blagov, ‘Russia eyes stronger clout in Caspian Region,’ EuroasiaNet, 15 July 2005 (Accessed 14
August 2005) http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071505.shtml; Vladimir Socor,
‘Major Russian-Kazakhstan oil production-sharing agreement signed,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 (131), 7
July 2005.
260 Marat Yermukanov, ‘Russian-Kazakh Border Agreement Sparks Nationalist Reaction,’ Eurasia Daily
Monitor, 23 (19), 27 January 2005.
261 ‘Kazakhstan declares Russian nationalist lawmaker persona non grata,’ AP Worldstream, 10 February
2005.
262 Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 (19), 27 January 2005.
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centre of the country, Nazarbayev left the issue of the north unresolved and, arguably,
created room for tensions in the future. At the same time, the possibly of the north
separating from Kazakhstan made Kazakh elites extremely alarmed about any tensions in
the remote regions, including the oil-rich areas, effectively causing them to address these
in speedy manner (discussed in chapter 4 and 5).
In the following section, through the example of major erection and assembling
companies, we will discuss the way in which the regime’s clients gained a stake in the
companies that during privatisation had fallen into the hands of predominantly Soviet-era,
ethnic Russian directors. It will be shown that in the beginning of the 1990s, newly
privatised companies found themselves on the verge of collapse due to: a) the
disintegration of the building sector in Kazakhstan; and b) the policy of the Kazakh
government that gave outside building and construction companies free access to the
Kazakh market – something that the new owners failed to oppose. It will be argued that
their situation only changed in the mid-1990s with the arrival of the new minister of the
oil and gas industry, who began advocating the involvement of the major companies in
the oil sector (co-optation), on the condition that they sold part of their shares to the
regime’s clients (who happened to be ethnic Kazakhs).
2. The Kazakh oil-supporting industry
In chapter 2 (section 1), it was stated that during Soviet times, the Kazakhstan SSR did
not go through the full-scale energy development that Siberia did, and that in Kazakhstan
relatively few enterprises specialising in drilling and production operations were fully
established by 1991. In addition, this slow development of the republic’s oil industry was
accompanied by insufficient growth in the oil-related industries within the republic’s
borders, especially those that specialised in the production of oil and gas equipment.263
The lack of development of oil and gas machinery building plants in Kazakhstan – crucial
263 Interview with oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004; Interview with a general director of a local oil
company: Atyrau 12 November 2004; Interview with a manager of a foreign company that specializes in
oilfield systems: Almaty 22 October 2004.
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for steady, long-term development of the extractive sector – was due to decisions made at
the top levels in Moscow.264
Machinery building had been severely neglected by the top-level planners in the
Soviet Union since the Brezhnev era.265 This negative trend accelerated during the 1980s
when resources from the civilian machinery sector were channelled to the ministries
making military machinery; thus ‘the stagnation of the civilian machinery sector was due
above to the leaders’ own priorities’ (Gustafson 1989: 193). Instead of building new
plants, the Kazakh and (also the West Siberian Soviet) oil industry had to rely on the
existing infrastructure in Azerbaijan SSR, from where in the 1980s 70 per cent of Soviet
equipment for producing oil and gas equipment stemmed, together with that in the
Volga–Kama Basin, as well as increasingly on outside imports (1989: 189). Already by
the late 1970s, the existing plants in and around Baku – called the Glavseftemash266 – as
a result of lack of investment and poor maintenance, found themselves in a severe crisis,
leaving those in charge of oil and gas without much choice but to gradually import
sophisticated refinery equipment, oil-and-gas-field equipment, and pipes from Eastern
Europe (1989: 190). For instance, since 1981 had Romania had accounted for well over
half of the Soviet’s total field-related imports each year (1989: 199). Having said all of
that, the fact that Kazakhstan lacked major machinery building plants and had its oil
sector running with outside equipment does not mean that Kazakhstan SSR-based
enterprises did not in any way participate in the development of Kazakhstan’s oil, gas or
chemistry sector, and hence that Kazakhstan lacked any oil-supporting enterprises.
264 A machine-building complex of Kazakhstan in the structure of the former USSR was oriented to
producing soil processing and cattle-breeding machines. Source: ‘A Billion Market,’ Petroleum Magazine,
July 2000.
265 Most equipment for the oil and gas industries was manufactured by the Ministry of Chemical and
Petroleum Machine-building (Minkimmash). Drilling rigs were the responsibility of the Ministry of Heavy
and Transport Machine-building (Mintiazhmash), while most domestic pipes came from the Ministry of
Ferrous Metallurgy (Minchermet).
266 At its peak, Glavseftemash employed 20,000 workers.
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2.1. During and after the Soviet Union
As early as 1965, Moscow had established the Kazakh Ministry of Special Construction
Works,267 which was responsible for building large industrial facilities such as the
refineries in Pavlodar, Shymkent and Atyrau, the brass works in Balkhash and
Zhezkazgan, the lead, titanium and magnesium works in Shymkent and Ust-Kamengorsk,
and the phosphor plants in Zhambyl and Shymkent.268 Moreover, in the 1980s,
enterprises that were a part of the ministry carried out works on Tengiz, Kumkol and
Karachagank along with enterprises from Russia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.269 The
involvement of Kazakhstan-based companies in the oil and gas sector gathered speed in
the second half of the 1980s with the collapse of the chemistry sector. Thus, an enterprise
that had previously been involved in building chemical plants became responsible for
building and maintaining a pipeline system as well as gas stations across the republic.270
The initial development of major construction and building enterprises in the
Kazakhstan SSR derived directly from the so-called equalization policy271 (Rodgers
1974; Liebowitz 1987; Ozornoy 1991), which aimed at equalising the levels of economic
development and the living standards of the country’s diverse nationalities and regions.272
Whereas the success of the equalization policy, which dated back to the Stalinist’s period,
was highly questionable, Kazakhstan (and especially the north of the republic) has been
cited among its main beneficiaries (Capisani 2000: 24–47). In other parts of Central Asia
which were supposed to be showcases to the outside world – predominantly to Middle
Eastern audiences – of a successful marriage between Islam and Socialism,273 the
equalisation policy failed to bring about the same changes as it did in the north of
267 The enterprises comprising the ministry were created over a period of twenty years. The earliest was set
up in the mid-1950s, the latest in mid-1970s.
268 Interview with a director of a major steel constructing company: Almaty 21 October 2004; Michail
Braznikov, ‘Who and how is developing Kazakh oil and gas sector. The growth of foreing construction
companies or one more argument for the the local conetent policy,’ Continient, 22 September 2001.
269 Interview with a general manager of a major construction company: Almaty 20 October 2004.
270 Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004; Interview with a director of KazMunaiGas’ major subsidiary: Almaty 28
October 2004
271 ‘AO Imstalkon – 50 years. Life-long constructions. Interview with Director General Vladimir
Kananykhin,’ Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 3 March 2006.
272 The heyday of the equalisation policy fell on the pre-war, early post-war years and a period between
1955–1965 (Khrushchev’s era).
273 This is the so-called Central Asian model of development.
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Kazakhstan (Olcott 1982: 488; Anderson 1997: 48–50; Kandiyoti 2002b: 287). Despite
the rhetoric on the part of the Soviet leaders about industrialisation, ‘agriculture remained
at the heart of Moscow’s vision for the fourth southern republic’ (Anderson 1997: 39).274
Yet, the apparent gap between Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics was
a superficial one, since the increased industrialisation in Kazakhstan had few effects on
the employment pattern of the Kazakh population (Olcott 1987: 236). In Kazakhstan, as
in other Central Asian republics during the Soviet Union, ‘[i]ndustrial management and
skilled labour were primarily comprised of Russians and other Slavs, while members of
the titular nationality largely remained in rural areas engaged in unskilled agriculture
labour’ (Luong 2002: 68).275 In Kazakhstan, this pattern began as early as in the 1920s
and 1930s, and remained largely unchanged for the decades that followed. In 1959, for
instance, 53 per cent of industrial specialists in Kazakhstan were Russians while only 24
per cent were Kazakhs, and in 1965, a report of government awards for ‘good work’
showed that awards went overwhelmingly to non-Kazakhs (Peck 2004: 54–55). It was
stated that the Kazakh Ministry of Special Construction followed the established pattern
and was also run by Russian specialists as well as Ukrainians and Belarusians.276 The
overwhelming dominance of Russians in the ministry was reinforced by the fact that the
ministry fell under the realm of the prestigious industrial sector, which meant that it was
under Moscow’s direct control (Melvin 2001: 173). The situation only began to change in
274 For instance in the mid-1980s, around 65 per cent of cultivated land in Uzbekistan was devoted to cotton
production. Thus Uzbekistan was described as ‘monoculture economy’. The situation was similar in
Turkmenistan, and to a lesser degree in Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, which produces only a small amount of
cotton, it was the industry of the republic that linked it with the ‘cotton production complex’, as it mainly
produced goods such as fertilizers and agricultural machinery (Gleason 1991b: 342–343, see also Stringer
2003: 149–152). It should be added that twenty years later, the situation seemed to remain unchanged. In
2005, ICG stated: ‘Cotton dominated the exports of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, a
monoculture with profound political, economic and social consequences. (…) [L]ack of political openness,
failure to reform economies, large-scale poverty and social deprivation – have their roots in the cotton
economy’. Quoted in ‘The Cure of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture,’ International Crises
Group, 28 February 2005.
275 On the basis of this situation, during the 1980s observers concluded that the Slavs comprised a
privileged elite in Soviet Central Asia. However, Lubin in Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia
(1984) argued that the situation in which Central Asians found themselves was not solely due to Moscow’s
imperial policies, but was also based on sound economic reasons. Central Asians, according to the author,
preferred to work outside the socialized sector because these offered much better prospects for higher
incomes earned as unofficial employment for scarce services, or as the result of parallel actives on
unofficial markets.
276 Interview with a special advisor to the president of a major construction company: Almaty 20 October
2004.
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the mid-1970s when the ranks of the lower levels specialists were filled with graduates of
the Kazakhstan-based academies in Karaganda, Pavlodar, Rudny and Ust-Kamengorsk.
Young Kazakh specialists were mainly recruited from demobilised military personnel and
the Communist Union of Kazakhstan’s Youth.277
In the early 1990s, the ministry went through the process of the so-called state-by-
state privatisation (Appendix 5a), which occurs ‘when public officials, using their formal
powers, privatised those sections of the state for which they are themselves responsible’
(Krishtanovskaya and White 38: 1999). Others named this process political capitalism
(Staniszkis 1992), and it is most likely to happen when privatisation relies on the free
distribution of shares to citizens (vouchers privatisation) as opposed to direct sale of
assets on public tenders. During voucher privatisations, shares are distributed to a large
number of adult citizens without putting in place any mechanisms of control:
Under such a situation, it is more likely that over time individuals will emerge
who are able to use their networks with government officials in state-owned
banks and other government institutions to receive capital. This will enable them
to establish one or more investment funds to purchase these vouchers, thereby
gaining control of large amount of property. (King 2001: 516)
In the case of a single enterprise or a group of enterprises, the winners are most likely to
be incumbent managers who, thanks to their knowledge, access to financial instruments
and political connections, are able to appropriate sufficient numbers of shares only to
emerge ‘as modern corporate executives, freed of the restraints of command economy,
who may now allocate to themselves vastly increased pay and benefits’ (Walder 2003:
903).
In 1991–1992, the enterprises that made up the Kazakh Ministry of Special
Construction Works were reorganised into stock-holding companies. Their stocks were
issued to those employees who had worked in any given enterprise for more than five
years. Once the stocks were issued, the enterprises became independent of the ministry.
The entire operation of transforming the ministry into a stock-holding company took
place at a time when no adequate legislation and no legal framework were in place. The
people directly responsible for the privatisation process were directors of the enterprises
that comprised the ministry. Thus, rather unsurprisingly, they turned out to be the main
277 Interview with a director of a major steel constructing company: Almaty 21 October 2004.
124
beneficiaries. Through various intermediaries, they bought shares from employees who
were willing to sell them almost immediately. Another group that gained from the
privatisation process were the managers and engineers.278 It should be kept in mind that
the ex-directors of the ministry were able to carry on the privatisation process in a speedy
manner, since they fell into the category of the so-called influential Russians, a group that
the Nazarbayev tried to keep on his side in the first years of independence279 (section 1 of
this chapter). Thus, the main rationale behind the ministry’s privatisation was to maintain
the status quo under the new conditions.
The old structures were also upheld by the new owners. Whereas fifteen
companies that emerged form the process of privatisation became independent entities,
they were, however, linked to one another. For example, company A bought five to eight
per cent of the company B, and vice-versa. This reciprocal cross-ownership has been
reinforced through various interlockings of the Boards of Directors and Supervisory
Boards of the biggest companies in the group.280 Hence, the ministry might have ceased
to exist in an official form, but those who took over attempted to sustain it. In the new
environment, this was increasingly difficult to achieve, however. In the first years after
gaining independence, the construction-building and assembling companies that used to
be part of the ministry – as most of the other enterprises with a similar profile in
Kazakhstan – found themselves on the verge of collapse. Two factors played a role in
this: a) the building and construction sector in the republic came to a virtual standstill;281
and b) the oil, gas sector overnight became off-limits to the major Kazakh companies.
With reference to the latter point, firstly the companies that conducted works on
major projects in the 1980s were unable to compete with the major sub-contractors that
began arriving in Kazakhstan with foreign oil companies. The main problems included
278 Interview with a special advisor to the president of a major construction company: Almaty 20 October
2004; Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004; Interview with a director of a major steel constructing company: Almaty
21 October 2004.
279 Duisenbekov Daulet; Tholen Jochen and Ken Roberts, ‘Post-Soviet Management: Evidence from
Kazakhstan,’ Working Paper, INTAS, July 2002; Douglas Bartley and Michael Minor, ‘Pitfalls in
privatisation in Kazakhstan,’, Business Forum, Winter-Spring 1994.
280 Interview with a special advisor to the president of a major construction company: Almaty 20 October
2004; Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004; Interview with a director of a major steel constructing company: Almaty
21 October 2004.
281 Interview with a general director of major construction company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
125
lack of funds282, lack of experience and insufficient technology283. Secondly, the Kazakh
government did not show much interest in promoting Kazakh enterprises, which the
bosses of the newly privatised companies were expecting the government to do.284 This
lack of interest on the part of the authorities in promoting major local companies was
motivated by their sole concern with attracting as many international companies as
possible to Kazakhstan by giving them and their sub-contractors far-reaching provisions,
even if it meant leaving behind Kazakh companies285 (chapter 5, section 1.1).
The apparent indifference of the Kazakh government meant that the oil–
supporting industry, as well as enterprises that could potentially work in the oil and gas
sectors, were left to their own devices. It was stated that in the first few years after 1991,
major companies survived mainly due to the renovation works of the enterprises in whose
building or construction works they had been involved in previous years, including oil
enterprises such as Yuzneftegaz and Uzenmunaigaz.286 In addition, the new owners of,
for instance, assembling companies simply began selling technical devices at low prices,
together with production bases, systems etcetera.287 Hence, what took place was a classic
case of asset stripping by the bosses of the newly privatised companies, who were eager
to reap the benefits.
The silent policy of keeping Kazakh companies away from the oil sector, or not
directly encouraging their direct participation, was formalised in the 1995 Subsoil law
(chapter 2, section 3.1). The Subsoil Law and Petroleum Law stated that an operator
(foreign oil company) was obliged to use: a) ‘materials and equipment produced in
Kazakhstan, provided they were competitive in terms of ecological, technical, pricing,
delivery and operational considerations; and b) and the services of Kazakhstan businesses
to the extent that they were competitive in terms of price, effectiveness and quality
282 Interview with ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
283 Interview with a journalist specialising in oil: Almaty 1 November 2004
284 Interview with an ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
285 Ulbosyn Kozhantaeva, ‘National features of the international contracts,’ Delowaia Nedelia, 7 April
2006.
286 Interview with a special advisor to the president of a major construction company: Almaty 20 October
2004; Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
287 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 3 March 2006.
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[italics mine].’288 The law, formulated in such a way, gave foreign oil companies a free
hand in picking up the companies they wanted to co-operate with in the oil-rich regions.
Moreover, the law allowed companies to avoid working with the Kazakh companies if
they so preferred. For instance, Kazakh equipment could be easily called into question on
the basis of its low technical and ecological standards. By the same token, the services
provided by Kazakh businesses could be considered as less effective than those of a
western company, because local companies did not work within the ISO standard
recognized worldwide.
Thus a contractor, as Petroleum magazine put it: ‘could use foreign products or
services and employ foreign citizens claiming that domestic products and services and are
not competitive in prices, quality or in other terms’.289 This point was common currency
to such an extent that the 1998 Investment Climate Statement produced by the staff of the
US Embassy in Almaty openly said that: ‘investors usually are not required to purchase
from local sources.’290 Such far-reaching provisions for foreign investors were due to the
apparently vital role that foreign interests played in drafting the 1995 law: ‘It is well
known that the preparation of the 1995 Petroleum Law involved not only the best
Kazakhstan lawyers but also major Western petroleum companies and lawyers: their
professional advice contributed a lot to the methodology of the lawmaking. As a result,
when enacted, the Law received a high appraisal of the investors for its quality’
(Chentsova 2003: 10).
On the domestic front, the ‘winners’ of the new structural set-up in which the
centre became the only partner of the oil companies were the groups which had direct or
indirect access to the apex of power, thanks to their links to members of the national elite
including high-ranking directors of the Ministry of the Oil and Gas industry. Those links
allowed individuals close to the regime to guarantee protection to the various non-Kazakh
service companies that tried to win predominantly the construction contracts
commissioned by the foreign oil companies. Thus, whereas the oil company could work
288 Abai Shaikenov and Anthony Cioni, ‘Changes in Kazakhstan’s Local Content Rules For Oil Operators’,
Investors’ Voice. American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan.
http://amcham.kz/article.php?article_id=155 (Accessed 18 June 2005).
289 ‘Will the new fields appear in Kazakhstan?’ Petroleum Magazine, November 2001.
290 ‘Kazakhstan: 1998 Investment Climate Statement,’ US Embassy Almaty, Business Information Services
for the Newly Independent States, 30 June 98. http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/980630kz.htm
(Accessed 12 June 2005).
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with whomsoever it wanted, a sub-contractor that it employed nevertheless needed to be
shielded against the central bureaucracy, tax police and so forth. The ‘umbrella’ which
protected those non-Kazakh companies was provided by the people from the centre.291
Arguably, Nazarbayev favoured empowering groups from the centre, i.e. those close to
him, since it was they who constituted his hardcore power base.
It should be added at this point that foreign oil companies on their part favoured
non-Kazakh companies for a very simple reason, namely, that they had worked with
many of them before. Hence, if foreign oil companies could, they would in most
instances favour their close collaborators over local companies. As Paul Domjan put it in
a World Bank paper:
International oil companies (IOCs) prefer to deal with their global suppliers for
a number of well justified reasons (including the fact that they do not have the
infrastructure to deal with small suppliers in many countries). For cost-savings
reason, they are reluctant to break these supplier relationships in order to
source locally in each country where they operate (…) forming ties with global
suppliers is one way in which many Turkish firms have themselves become
global suppliers. In Kazakhstan, for example, Enka, one of Turkey’s largest
construction companies, has formed an alliance with Bechtel, a key global
supplier to ChevronTexaco, to supply the TengizChevrOil project.292
A similar scenario unfolded in other major projects. In Karachaganak, for instance, the
main supplier was an Athens-based contractor company.
2.2. Nurlan Balgymbayev and Kazakhization
The introduction of the 1995 Subsoil law, which went directly against the interests of the
Kazakh companies, showed the extent to which Russian directors and presidents – who
were once viewed as a serious threat to the new regime and indeed to the unity of the
Kazakh state – became demobilised. It was asserted that the main reason for this state of
apathy was the fact that Russians and other Slavs, by the mid-1990s, had begun leaving
291 Interview with a high-ranking member of the opposition party who worked in the presidential apparatus
throughout the 1990s: Almaty 5 November 2004; Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 29 October 2004.
292 Paul Domjan, ‘The Supplier Development in the Oil and Gas Sector of Kazakhstan,’ Background Paper
No. 5. April 2004, p.5.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKAZAKHSTAN/Resources/Backgroundpaper5_SupplierDevelopm
ent_April2004.pdf (Accessed 4 September 2005)
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Kazakhstan293 (see section 1 of this chapter). This, in turn, undermined the bargaining
power of the Russian strongmen (directors of large enterprises, the nomenklatura), vis-à-
vis an increasingly assertive regime.294 The outbursts of discontent were short-lived and
rather sporadic and did not make any substantial headway. For instance, in January 1995,
the top managers of Almaty-based commercial enterprises published a declaration calling
for a referendum on land ownership and other important issues, such as the status of the
Russian language and the republic’s relationship with Russia. In response, some
conservative-minded media reacted with a hostile campaign against the ‘traitors to the
Nation and the Motherland’.295 In light of those events, it is highly ironic that Nurlan
Balgymbayev, who was characterised by many as a Kazakh nationalist (chapter 2, section
4), became the main advocate of the still predominantly Russian owned-oil-supporting
industry.
In chapter 2 (section 3.2), it was argued that in the mid-1990s, Nazarbayev
appointed Balgymbayev to the post of the Minister of the Oil and Gas industry in order to
create an atmosphere in which those at the centre and in the peripheries that were hostile
towards the privatisation of the Kazakhstan oil industry felt that their views were being
taken under consideration. On his part, Balgymbayev proposed the development of the
Kazakh oil sector with the use of the existing enterprises, and initially strongly opposed
the privatisation of the oil sector that was advocated by then Prime Minister Akezhan
Kazhegeldin. Whereas Balgymbayev’s vision was clearly abandoned in favour of the
Kazhegeldin-backed sell-out of the oil industry, it however opened a window of
opportunity for those enterprises that for four years had been starved of any major state
contracts.
Balgymbayev began lobbying the major companies because he saw them as
crucial for the healthy development of the Kazakh oil industry.296 He argued for the
involvement of local companies in the construction works in Almaty and Astana, which
would allow them to rebuild their strength and prepare them for cooperation with foreign
293 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 15 September 2004.
294 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 18 October 2004.
295 ‘Benevolent Dictatorship,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1995.
296 Interview with a executive director of a major oil project in Kazakhstan: Atyrau 17 November 2004;
Interview with a high ranking member of the opposition party: Almaty 5 November 2004; Interview with a
vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas sector: Almaty 19
October 2004.
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companies (see also chapter 5, section 1.2).297 Given the close relationship between
Balgymbayev and Nazarbayev, we can assume that major companies were brought back
into the orbit with the president’s consent; in other words they became the regime’s
clients. It was suggested that the main incentive for Nazarbayev to aid the companies was
the fact that they employed thousands of people, who in some instances had not been paid
for months. This in turn was seen as a potential source of social unrest.298
At the same time, facilitating the access of the companies/new clients to state
contracts was not value free. According to some interviewees, the co-operation between
the regime and companies could only go ahead because the owners agreed to sell parts of
their shares or an entire branch of a company to the people with links to the regime
(ethnic Kazakhs).299 In some instances, the new partners – who after some time would
become presidents of their companies – were ex-oil men that had worked with
Balgymbayev throughout the 1970s and 1980s.300 The Russian bosses, on their part, were
left without much choice but to go ahead with the new rule, which simply said: ‘if you do
not look Kazakh today you will not become a senior player’.301 As a result of those
reshuffles, the issue of the ownership and structure of the companies was only finally
settled in 1999. Nevertheless, we do not argue that the Russian directors were completely
pushed aside: at worst they became junior partners, but their interests were still taken into
consideration.302 For instance, in late 2004, several children of ex-directors still held
important positions in major companies.303
In the years to come, construction, building and assembling companies – the
regime’s new clients – enjoyed exceptional access to the apex of power, which reached
its climax at the time when Balgymbayev held the post of president of the NOC
297 Interview with a director of a major steel constructing company: Almaty 21 October 2004 .
298 Interview with an ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
299 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 18 October 2004; Interview with a vice-president of a major
sub-contracting company that specialises in oil and gas sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
300 Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004; Interview with a high ranking foreign specialist working on major
projects in Kazakhstan since mid 1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
301 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since the mid-
1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
302 Interview with a person close to the Kazakh business community: Almaty 14 September 2004.
303 Interview with a business development manager working for a major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004.
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Kazakhoil, and later when he became Prime Minister (Appendix 5b). In the words of one
director: ‘in Kazakhstan the most difficult task is to get to those at the top but once you
achieve that Kazakhstan is a fairly stable environment to work in’.304 This preferential
treatment of the companies that used to be part of the ministry was an object of much
envy and criticism by those who were not part of the structure.305 However, privileged
access had its price: companies were required to pay massive bribes to the web of
officials, and in particular to the top-level managers in the NOC, who were in charge of
awarding building and construction contracts 306 (this issue is discussed in the second part
of this chapter). It should be kept in mind that the companies did not have much choice
but to pay the necessary the bribes, since there were no alternatives open to them. In the
second half of the 1990s, all major construction and assembling enterprises were still
barred from working with foreign oil companies.
The involvement of Kazakh companies on major construction projects,307 and the
growing Kazakhization of those companies,308 did not mean that Kazakh companies
would be given automatic access to foreign oil projects. Arguably, whereas the Kazakh
regime was keen on facilitating the access of its clients to various branches of the oil
industry and the oil supporting industry, it did not want to create a situation in which the
companies would grew overly independent on the regime’s patrimonial networks. In
other words, Nazarbayev wanted to keep his clients happy, but also close to himself. In
line with the 1995 Subsoil law, the main reason cited over and over again for the lack of
access of the Kazakh construction companies to the foreign projects was the ISO
standard.309 The situation of the major companies would eventually change around 2000–
304 Interview with a director of a foreign oil trading company: Almaty 20 September 2004.
305 Interview with a marketing manager of a major company that specializes in producing equipment for the
oil and gas industry: Almaty 22 September 2004.
306 Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
307 The Companies that used to be part of the Kazakh Ministry of Erection and Special Construction Works
since the mid-1990s were involved in all major construction projects in Kazakhstan, ranging from the
Almaty International Airport to the somewhat bizarre symbol of new Kazakhstan, the 97m high ‘Astana-
Baiterek’ monument.
308 For instance, in the case of a major construction company such as Kazkhimmontazh, the president and
two first vice-presidents of the company are ethnic Kazakhs, and the two other vice-presidents are,
respectively, a Ukrainian and a Russian.
309 Interview with an area manager of one the world-wide major drilling companies: Almaty 4 October
2004; Interview with business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
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2001 onwards, when the regime began amending the 1995 Subsoil law. The key catalyst
for this adjustment was discontent among various interests groups in the oil-rich areas,
whose interests had been omitted during the privatisation process (chapter 2, section
3.3.), and who were further excluded from participating in the oil industry due to the far-
reaching provisions that were written into the 1995 Subsoil Law (discussed at length in
chapter 5).
To sum up, in the first years of independence, major Kazakhstan-based
construction and assembling companies were privatised by Soviet-era directors, who in
most cases were ethnic Russians. In the following years, those companies, starved of both
state and oil industry related contracts, were forced to take on ethnic Kazakh partners that
had the regime’s backing as a precondition for obtaining new contracts. This operation on
the part of the regime demonstrated that those who functioned within oil or oil-related
industries had to be both the regime’s clients and ethnic Kazakhs, and that Russians and
other Slavs on their own would not be able to successfully carry on with their businesses,
even if they were co-opted by the regime. This, in turn, reinforced Nazarbayev’s position
as a defender of ethnic Kazakh interests. At the same time, the regime was keen on
limiting companies that either had new partners or became entirely owned by the
regime’s clients to the contracts that were out of its reach, namely, the foreign oil
companies.
3. The Kazakh NOC
In chapter 2 (section 4.2), it was argued that the main rationale behind the creation of the
NOC KazMunaiGas (KMG) was a desire on behalf of the Kazakh authorities to establish
a vertically integrated structure which would act as a vehicle for greater control of foreign
oil companies, and in addition would strive to uphold the interests of the Kazakhstan-
based oil companies in future oil deals. The importance assigned to the NOC in
defending and promoting national interests placed it – at least on a symbolic level –
among the most important institutions in the country, together with the Ministry of
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004; Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major
projects in Kazakhstan since the mid-1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
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Foreign Affairs or the KNB. In turn, this implied that the NOC, just as any other
institution of national significance, would be run by ethnic Kazakhs – something not
unprecedented.
The Kazakhization of the top levels of the NOC KazMunaiGas was already well
underway in the company’s previous incarnations – for instance, under Kulibayev’s
group that came to control KazakhOil in the late 1990s, or indeed during Balgymbayev’s
reign (chapter 2, section 3.3). However, we argue that with the creation of KazMunaiGas,
the process of Kazakhization took on a new dynamic. As my research shows, ethnic
Kazakhs in KazMunaiGas not only hold key positions in the company (president, vice-
presidents, departmental directors), but have been also appointed to managerial positions
and those of lesser importance. Moreover, in recent years non-ethnic Kazakh specialists
have been barred from joining or rejoining the NOC. We argue that the latter point plays
a key role in reinforcing the relationship between the oil men and Nazarbayev, as it
unintentionally underscored the oil men’s position. In a company overwhelmingly run by
ethnic Kazakhs, they evidently constitute the group of greatest importance. What is more,
the tacit policy of not rehiring Russians and other Slavs – in most instances – allows the
oil men and other ethnic Kazakh specialists to overcome the feelings of inferiority that
many of them have had towards non-Kazakh specialists.
Leading on, this section also argues that the Kazakhization of the oil sector gave
Nazarbayev the opportunity to co-opt those elements (we will call them young
professionals) that were seeking access to the oil sector (petrodollars) but did not have
either a link to the oil families or lacked a professional education. Moreover, we will
demonstrate that whereas co-optation served the regime’s short-term aims, the
introduction of predominantly rent-seeking-oriented outsiders to the NOC KazMunaiGas
deepened the corruption in company.
3.1. Kazakhization
As argued in chapter 2 (section 4.2), Nazarbayev in 2002 staffed key positions (president,
vice-presidents, board of directors) in the newly formed KazMunaiGas with his loyal oil
men (Appendix 5c), a move that was aimed at sealing the alliances between the regime
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and the oil men. It was stated that their first act in office was to appoint their fellow oil
men – mainly from the oil-rich provinces310 to the positions of deputies, departmental
directors and directors of the company’s numerous sub-subsidiaries (more than fifty in
total).311 During my fieldwork, I interviewed four KazMunaiGas directors who were all
appointed between 2002 and 2003. All of them were ethnic Kazakhs – approximately
fifty years old – from the Atyrau, Mangistau region, and all worked in the oil industry all
their lives. They typically started at the bottom and, over a period of thirty years or so,
worked their way up to fairly high positions in the oil enterprises. Their appointment to
high posts in the NOC was for all of them the ultimate honour (Appendix 5d).312
Another group of professional oil men that had been appointed to high posts in the
company came from the southern regions (Atyrau, Zhambyl) and the north (Pavlodar) of
the country. Thus, whereas those specialists do not originate in the west of Kazakhstan,
they nevertheless can be classified as oil men, since they had worked in the oil industry
all of their lives and are part of this somewhat specific group. For instance, Kairgeldy
Kabyldin (Pavoldar region), who since 2002 holds the post of Managing Director,
Transport Infrastructure and Service Projects, worked for Transmission Oil Pipeline,
Pavoldar from the late 1970s onwards, and later on in the Ministry of Energy and Fuel
Resources and KazTransOil; Galiusat Keshubayev (Pavoldar region) was appointed to
the post of Managing Director Technological Development in 2004. He was educated at
the Institute of Oil and Gas (Ukraine), and has worked in the Kazakh oil industry since
the beginning of the 1990s.313
The appointment of the oil men, especially those from the west of the country,
across the top levels (president, vice-president) and lower levels (directors) of the
company has been seen by some interviewees as evidence that the NOC KazMunaiGas
310 Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
311 The most important subsidiaries for the company’s work are the following: KMG Exploration &
Production, KazTransOil (oil transportation), KazTransGas (gas transportation), Atyrau refinery (oil
refining), Kazmortransflot (shipping by tankers), Atyrau International Airport, Eurasia-Air Helicopter
Company, KazTransCom Telecommunications Company. Source: http://www.kmg.kz (Accessed 2
September 2006).
312 Interview with director of KazMunaiGas’ subsidiary: Astana 11 December 2004; Interview with
KazMunaiGas’ director: Astana 6 December 2004; Interview with a KazMunaiGas’ director: Almaty 6
October, 2004; Interview with a director of KazMunaiGas’ subsidiary: Almaty 4 November 2004.
313 http://www.kmg.kz (Accessed 2 September 2006).
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has been captured by the younger zhus.314 They argued that the top-level officials brought
with them to the company their clients/directors, and that the directors did the same: they
brought with them members of their extended families as well as people that they were
affiliated to, for instance, colleagues, friends etc. In the opinion of two of the
interviewees, the fact that a person from the west of Kazakhstan surrounds themselves
with people that belong to his/her ‘clan’ is hardly a surprise, since this area of the country
is seen as one of the most traditional ones, and where tribal and family affiliations have
been particularly strong.315 An interviewee from the Atyrau region went further than that
and suggested that a person from the region who goes to work in Astana is obliged to find
a position for his compatriots.316 At the same time, a few of other interviewees were
quick to point out that whereas the west of the country is a stronghold of traditionalism,
in other parts of Kazakhstan such as Almaty, the importance of family ties has been
considerably weakening.317 According to them, ‘clan’ affiliations played a crucial role
across Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, in the years that
followed, ability and professionalism became increasingly important – especially in the
private companies. As one manager pointed out, ‘people who are serious about making
money try to separate business from the family’.318
Given the fact that the KazMunaiGas is a state-run institution and that the
directors who joined the high ranks in the company had spent their lives in the western
regions, one cannot rule out the possibility that they – or at least some of them –
‘brought’ to Astana their nephews, cousins, friends etc. However, the notion that the
younger zhus captured the KMG seems to overstate the power of clans in the company.
Most importantly, it does not explain why in various managerial and lower positions in
314 Interview with a high representative of a governmental agency: Astana 8 December 2004; Interview
with an oppositional journalist: Almaty 27 October 2004.
315 Interview with a person close to the Kazakh business community: Almaty 14 September 2004; Interview
with a high-ranking member of the opposition party: Almaty 5 November 2004.
316 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
317 Interview with a marketing manager of a company that specializes in supplying equipment to the oil and
gas industry: Almaty 28 September 2004; Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 18 October 2004;
Interview with an executive director of a foreign company that specializes in delivering technical
equipment to oil industry: Atyrau 15 November 2004; Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-
contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
318 Interview with a marketing manager of a company that specializes in supplying equipment to the oil and
gas industry: Almaty 28 September 2004.
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KazMunaiGas, we find people that do not have either ties to the oil-rich regions or have
no experience of working in the oil industry, a point to which we will turn next.
Numerous interviewees stated that the reorganization of the Kazakh oil industry
was accompanied by the unimpeded influx of young – i.e. of age thirty years old or so –
professionals who did not have any previous experience of working in the oil sector.319
The official explanation given by one of the NOC KazMunaiGas’s directors was that
these young lawyers, economists, accountants were recruited into the company with the
aim of turning KMG into a Western style NOC; the most desirable outcome being
Norway’s Statoil.320 While transforming KazMunaiGas into an efficient and transparent
NOC is undoubtedly a good idea, a number of Kazakh and Western interviewees proved
to be rather sceptical of the whole undertaking, including young ethnic Kazakh
professionals that joined the company after it was restructured in 2002.
In their view, the majority of new managers that were appointed to important
positions in the company could be characterized as ‘political’ appointees that found their
way to the NOC thanks to their connections or influential relatives’.321 For the young
managers, the main incentive for getting into KazMunaiGas has been the prestige
associated with the oil business and the opportunities that it affords.322 For instance,
working in KazMunaiGas is seen as useful stop in one’s career or a source of enrichment:
‘It is only in the last few years that oil and gas became fashionable because this is where
the money is.’323 While not all the managers were hired solely on the basis of their
connections, in most instances this was true. Some interviewees who work closely with
KazMunaiGas on a day-to-day basis argued that one of the most positive developments in
recent years has been the arrival of a group of professionals in their late thirties and early
319 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 18 October 2004; Interview with local specialist working for
the foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004; Interview with general manager working for a foreign
building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004; Interview with director of KazMunaiGas’
subsidiary: Astana 11 December 2004; Interview with the director of the Engineering Companies Union of
the Republic of Kazakhstan: Almaty 13 October 2004; Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 13
October 2004.
320 Interview with KazMunaiGas’ director: Astana 6 December 2004; see also: Isabel Gorst,
‘KazMunaiGas: Oil producer sets its sights high,’ Financial Times, 15 December 2004.
321 Interview with a general director of a foreign small drilling company: Almaty 10 September 2004;
Interview with a director of a medium sized subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004;
Interview with the business development manager working for a major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004.
322 Interview with a technical director working for a local oil company: Atyrau 22 November 2004.
323 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004.
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forties that have the necessary experience and skills. These people – mostly ethnic
Kazakhs – worked in the private sector throughout the 1990s, and in some instances
owned private companies.324
It was stated that the occupation of the top ranks of the NOC (president, directors
and managers) by ethnic Kazakhs is a reflection of a wider trend within the company.
According to one director who is, it is important to stress, a non-Kazakh, the reshuffle
that accompanies the transition from KazakhOil to KazMunaiGas served as an excuse for
‘purifying’ the company.325 Whereas such statements can be easily qualified as biased,
other interviewees complained at length about the bureaucratic nature of KazMunaiGas –
including a KMG’s director326 – and on occasions added that NOC is an ethnic Kazakh
institution from top to the bottom.327 According to a more sober and balanced account,
ethnic Russians and other Slavs can be still found working in KMG, but they constitute a
minority. The numbers of non-ethnic Kazakhs in the NOC is between five to ten per
cent.328 It should be stressed that this number stands in sharp contrast to the situation in
the 1990s, when Slavs held a number of bureaucratic positions and dominated the
technical departments of the Minister of the Oil and Gas industry or the NOC
Munaigas.329
3.2. Unintended outcomes
It is a fact that the Kazakhization of the NOC took place. However, the present situation
should not be seen solely as an outcome of a well orchestrated tacit strategy but also – if
not primarily – as result of a long-term process that accompanied the development of the
Kazakh oil industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance, the fact that the
Kazakh government had wanted to turn the NOC into a modern capitalist enterprise
324 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004;
Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004.
325 Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in the oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
326 Interview with a KazMunaiGas director (Exploration and Production): Almaty 6 October 2004.
327 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004; Interview
with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau 12 November 2004.
328 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004;
Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004.
329 Interview with a general director of a foreign small drilling company: Almaty 10 September 2004.
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implied that Soviet era bureaucrats would be either forced into retirement or pushed to
lower positions, if not laid off.330 It was only ‘natural’ that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, the
young managers – allegedly accustomed to capitalism – have been recruited from among
ethnic Kazakhs rather than non-Kazakhs. Arguably, the same pattern repeated itself with
the lower-level employees of KazMunaiGas. In the case of the non-Kazakh specialists,
the situation is even more complicated. We argue that Russians and other Slavs were not
pushed from the NOC in order to ‘purify’ the company, but rather had been leaving state
run oil industries throughout the 1990s for jobs in other sectors which at the time seemed
more promising. Initially, only few found positions in private oil companies, whether
local or foreign. Hence, the de-Russification of the technical ranks initially took place
independently of the regime’s Kazakhization strategy.
As stated in the previous section, at the beginning of the 1990s the Kazakh
government’s number one objective was to attract as many foreign oil companies as
possible, which were seen as crucial for the development of the Kazakh oil sector. This
trend had negative effects on the oil supporting industries as well as on the oil industry
itself. For instance, geological research was brought to a standstill. Specialists employed
in the institutes across Kazakhstan were left without much choice but to go and seek
employment outside their professions.331 In the most extreme cases, they worked in the
local bazaars or turned taxi drivers.332 The same situation occurred in the case of oil
drilling specialists: ‘In the beginning of the 1990s, the government said that now we are
going to work on the fields that were discovered in the past and that for the years to come
there will not be any drilling in Kazakhstan. What were we supposed to do?’333
In other instances, the specialists working in a design institute found themselves
out of work because the bosses of the institutes drove them into bankruptcy. In the
beginning of the 1990s, a director of an institute would establish a private business, the
nominal owner of which was a relative or a friend. The director would then use the
institute’s space, equipment, as well as workforce to work on projects that he had
330 Ibid.
331 For instance, in the mid-1990s the staff strength of a major design institute in Atyrau was reduced from
400 to 250. Source: Interview with vice-director of a design institute: Atyrau 25 November 2004.
332 Interview with a technical director of a company which specializes in supplying high-tech technology to
the oil and gas sector: Almaty 27 September 2004; Interview with a director working for a major foreign
sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004.
333 Interview with a geologist working for an oil exploration company: 5 October 2004.
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managed to obtain for his company. Moreover, as starting capital, a director diverted
institute funds as short-term loans to his company: loans that the director’s company
never repaid. In a short while such institutes, stripped of their assets, found themselves on
the verge of collapse and the staff was simply laid off.334
It was stated that the situation for geologists, designers, and drilling specialists
began to improve from 2001–2002 onwards. The single most important contributing
factor was the buoyant world oil prices in the early 2000s that led to the creation (and in
some instances revitalization) of various mid-sized companies335 that were keen on
gaining access to the oil industry336 (discussed further in the next section). One of the
major problems that the new companies faced was a lack of trained specialists with
sufficient experience who would be able to supervise complex projects; hence people
who for a great part of the 1990s were out of a job become eagerly-sought assets almost
overnight. A technical director stated that about 80 per cent of his colleagues that used to
work with him in a design institute now worked for private companies.337 The position of
the specialists was further strengthened when it emerged that throughout the 1990s,
Kazakhstan not only failed to educate a new generation of professionals,338 but the ones
that it actually did educate needed thorough retraining.339 Consequently a number of
interviewees spoke about a lost decade or ten-year gap.340
334 Interview with a director of company that specializes in designing and building gas stations: Almaty 29
September 2004; Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty
11 October 2004.
335 ‘Ai-Dan Ltd. To the Single Aim,’ Petroleum Magazine May 2000, ‘Kazneftegasmash: A Reliable
Partner of Oilmen,’ Petroleum Magazine, October 2004.
336 Another important factor contributing to the speed development of the oil supporting companies was the
local content policy (chapter 5).
337 Interview with a technical director of a company which specializes in supplying high-tech technology to
the oil and gas sector: Almaty 27 September 2004.
338 In Kazakhstan, as in all others post-Soviet, socialist countries, law and economics become the most
popular degrees, whereas the technical universities, the former bastions of education, were deserted. See
also: Daulet Duisenbekov; Jochen Tholen and Ken Roberts, July 2002.
339 The education of future engineers became one of the government’s priorities at around 2000–2001. For
more see: ‘Education According to the 21st Century,’ Petroleum Magazine, October, 2002; ‘Centre for
Education and Science,’ Petroleum Magazine, May 2000.
340 Interview with a deputy director of a designing institute: Almaty 23 September 2004; Interview with a
commercial director of a designing institute: Almaty 23 September 2004; Interview with an area manager
of one the world wide major drilling companies: Almaty 04 October 2004; Interview with a director of a
medium-sized subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004; Interview with a general director of a
local oil company: Atyrau 12 November 2004; Interview with general manager working for a foreign
building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004.
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The aforementioned KazMunaiGas directors, in a similar fashion to other
interviewees, spoke during the interviews about the issue of specialists in Kazakhstan;
however, with two major differences. Whereas for companies aiming to get into the oil
industry, the most urgent problem was to find and employ as many Soviet-era specialists
as possible – irrespective of their ethnicity341 – the directors instead placed a stress on
training the younger generation – that is to say, ethnic Kazakhs. Moreover, according to
them, there were enough top-level specialists from the Soviet era working in
KazMunaiGas already – a view not shared by a number of other interviewees342 – and
they could cope with workloads without any major problems.343 This statement indirectly
implies that KMG is not interested in hiring non–Kazakh specialists. Given the secrecy of
KMG, it is virtually impossible to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that this is the
case; however, some evidence supports this claim. One of the interviewees – an ethnic
Russian whose life history does not divert from that of other KMG directors – was told
that he could not be employed by KMG because he did not speak English;344 needless to
say, none of the other KMG directors spoke English either.
In addition, two specialists that worked for foreign companies spoke about
situations in which, during meetings with KMG concerning technical matters, the
company was represented by a manager (ethnic Kazakh) who was accompanied by a
group of specialists that was employed from outside of the NOC. The group of specialists
– predominantly made up of ethnic Russians (however, not exclusively) – were people
who actually knew ‘what they were taking about’, whereas the manager played the role
of a guardian. According to both interviewees, a situation in which KMG sub-contracts
341 Interview with a deputy director of a designing institute: Almaty 23 September 2004; Interview with a
commercial director of a designing institute: Almaty 23 September 2004; Interview with a director of an
engineering and designing company: Almaty 27 September 2004; Interview with a vice-president of a
company that specializes in geographical services: Almaty 28 September 2004.
342 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004;
Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004;
Interview with a regional manager of one of a major foreign sub-contracting company: Atyrau 10
November 2004.
343 Interviews with KazMunaiGas’ directors: Astana 11 December 2004; Astana 6 December 2004; Almaty
6 October 2004; Almaty 4 November 2004.
344 Interview with a geologist working for an oil exploration company: 5 October 2004.
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specialists from outside of the KMG (non-Kazakh) rather than employing them on a
permanent basis was self-explanatory345.
The policy of not hiring or rehiring Russian and other non-Kazakh era specialists
to work in KMG is perfectly in line with the Kazakhization of the NOC, and as such is
not in any way surprising. However, what is special about this situation is the fact that
people who do not get hired are not just ordinary Russians and other Slavs, but those who
used to directly or indirectly run industries or head institutes; in other words, they had
been in the first row. In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, the axis turned one hundred eighty
degrees, and those who used to be in a second row and those in the oil-rich peripheries in
the third row are now in the first one. The special place that the directors and others like
them (real experts) hold in a new company is further highlighted by the fact that the new
young professionals – ‘political appointees’ – are not engineers by training, but rather
lawyers and economists who do not know anything about the oil sector. During the
interviews, the directors spoke rather dismissively about these young professionals, who
only do a bureaucratic job and who have never seen an oilfield in their lives.346 It is
argued here that the special position that the oil men – the regime’s clients – held in the
NOC reinforces their bond with the regime, and especially with Nazarbayev. While there
is no tangible evidence to even suggest that not employing non-Kazakh specialists was
the regime’s official policy in order to please its clients, it is certainly the result.
The repercussions of this unintentional outcome – which came about as a result of
the Kazakhization of the oil industry – can be only fully understood and appreciated if we
take under consideration the importance that working in the top levels of the state-owned
enterprises had in the Soviet Union. The clout that it once had not only included better
housing conditions and access to goods that were outside the reach of an average person,
but crucially meant immeasurable prestige and respect within one’s community –
something that ethnic Kazakhs were overwhelmingly denied and arguably had been
longing for. Hence, it is not surprising that during the interviews, the directors were very
keen on stressing the special place that the NOC plays in building new independent
345 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004;
Interview with business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004.
346 Interviews with KazMunaiGas’ directors: Astana 11 December 2004; Astana 6 December 2004; Almaty
6 October 2004; Almaty 4 November 2004.
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Kazakhstan, for which – as one of them put it – ‘my ancestors fought with sword and
fire’.347
As a result of this, Nazarbayev, from the point of view of the oil men and other
ethnic Kazakh specialists, is not just a patron who assures their well being, but is also
someone who ended decades of living in the shadows of Russians and other non-
Kazakhs.348 Arguably, this puts Nazarbayev on an equal footing with Dinmukhamed
Kunaev (chapter 1, section 2), who ruled the Kazakhstan SRR from 1964 until 1986, and
who is held responsible for actively promoting the Kazakh ethnic elite to the key posts
across the republic. It was stated that thanks to Kunaev, by the 1980s the Kazakhstan
SSR had developed ‘a genuine Kazakh infrastructure, in which Kazakhs held many of the
important jobs, especially in party politics, the republic’s government, and agriculture
and in the cultural networks and educational systems’ (Olcott 1997: 205). Arguably, then,
Nazarbayev is – not always intentionally – finishing what Kunaev began during the
Soviet years.
3.3. Paying the price
The NOC KazMunaiGas has been an effective mechanism in the regime’s hands insofar
as it allows the regime to co-opt to the sphere’s important players. This has been the case
for insiders (oil men) as well as outsiders (young professionals). While for the oil men
working in the NOC has been above everything else a matter of pride, they as young
professionals also joined the company on the premise that they would be able to gain
financially. In chapter 2 (section 4.2) it was argued that top levels of KazMunaiGas
(president, vice-presidents, board of directors) were given access to the oil business deals
in which Nazarbayev’s family played a leading role. In this section, we will discuss the
ways in which deputies, departmental directors and directors of the company’s sub-
subsidiaries, as well as managers, went about enriching themselves with the regime’s
unquestionable support (Appendix 6).349
347 Interview with a KazMunaiGas director: Almaty 6 October 2004.
348 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 15 September 2004; Interview with a foreign diplomat:
Almaty 15 September 2004.
349 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004.
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In section 1.2 of this chapter, it was argued that the major Kazakhstan-based
construction and building companies were granted access to the oil industry because they
acceded to the regime’s request and took on ethnic Kazakh partners. That, however, did
not mean that the companies would be spared from paying extra ‘tax’: far from it. A top-
level official working for one of the companies stated that a company that wins a
KazMunaiGas tender – similar situations occurred in the case of KazakhOil – has to pay
a bribe which equals ten per cent of a contract’s total value. In the situation when a
company is awarded a contract and defaults on a payment, the deal is cancelled – under a
petty excuse – and a short while thereafter, a new tender is set up. The money obtained is
then divided between directors and managers of the KazMunaiGas subsidiary with which
the company is supposed to co-operate on a project. The next level involves
KazMunaiGas’s top-level officials, and in the case of the biggest deals the most sizable
share goes ‘to the most important person in the country’.350 In some instances, the role of
the intermediate/broker between different parties involved is played by a manager who in
the past, for example, worked for a construction company and is now employed by
KazMunaiGas.351
According to interviewees who own or work for mid-sized companies – which
specialize in supplying fire equipment among other things – the precedent of setting up
tenders is not in any way unique to major companies and applies across the board. In
their experience, as many as ninety-five per cent of tenders have been either set up or
won by people with whom managers in charge of tenders are acquainted.352 On most
occasions, tenders have been organised in such a way that on average only one company
in ten would meet all the conditions. As in the case of major companies, managers
responsible for tenders get a sizable percentage of a contract – sometimes as much as
twenty per cent.353 It is important to keep in mind that the lower-level managers have
350 Interview with a vice-president of a major sub-contracting company that specialises in oil and gas
sector: Almaty 19 October 2004.
351 Interview with a special advisor to the president of a major construction company: Almaty 20 October
2004.
352 Interview with a marketing manager of a company that specializes in supplying equipment to the oil and
gas industry: Almaty 28 September 2004; Interview with a marketing director of a company that specializes
in supplying equipment to the oil and gas industry: Almaty 24 September 2004; Interview with a director of
company that specialises in designing and building gas stations: Almaty 29 September 2004; Interview
with local sub-contractor: Almaty 29 October 2004.
353 Ibid.
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been particularly prone to rent-seeking, even when it comes to smaller deals, since due to
the rotation dynamic in the KazMunaiGas they do not know for how long they will stay
in their positions.354
Another way of enriching oneself and one’s colleagues is to go ‘shopping’
immediately after becoming a manager, as demonstrated by a high-ranking director of
one of the KazMunaiGas’s numerous subsidiaries. Thus, a director might try to purchase
new computers for the offices, safety equipment, alarms and so on, and grossly inflate the
actual costs of these goods in which the subsidiary is interested. The difference between
the estimated costs and real costs would then split between a supplier and the managers
and directors involved. Needless to say, the supplier is a trusted person – for example a
member of the manager’s immediate family.355 In some instances, the real benefits of
working for the NOC evaporate once a director actually stops working for the company
and moves to a private business.
Due to their contacts in the NOC and the government, top-level ex-directors are a
valuable acquisition for both local as well as foreign companies, to which we can now
turn. A foreign company that enters the Kazakh market and is interested in either oil
exploration or in selling equipment worth million of dollars has to forge links with the
local elite. However, for that to happen, the company needs to employ a local player who
is going to lobby for its interests.356 During my fieldwork, I came across one Western
company which did exactly that. The company in question has been on the Kazakh
market for a greater part of the 1990s, and in recent years has decided to step up its
activities. In effect, a manager of the company, who also has been working in the Kazakh
market for a number of years and has a good understanding of the local dynamics,
‘invited’ to the company an ex-KazMunaiGas director. His role has been to facilitate
access to the KazMunaiGas contracts, a task that he has carried out successfully, as the
company has obtained the contracts that it was aiming at. The payoff to the ex-
KazMunaiGas director as well as his colleagues in the NOC (and the government
officials, most likely) has been taking place on the level of a foreign company’s
354 Interview with an executive director of a foreign company that specializes in delivering technical
equipment to oil industry: Atyrau 15 November 2004.
355 Interview with local sub-contractor: Almaty 29 October 2004.
356 Interview with oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004.
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subsidiary – which the Western company and the ex-director jointly created – through
which the equipment is sold to the NOC KazMunaiGas.357
The corruption in KazMunaiGas has had an extremely negative effect on the
development of the various oil industry-supporting companies that came to the market in
2000–2001. Those companies, which are predominantly owned by middle-aged ethnic
Kazakhs – who in most instances have not had any experience of working in the oil
industry before – tried to get their initial footing in the oil sector by getting hold of
KazMunaiGas contracts358. During my fieldwork, I interviewed two companies that fitted
the above description. Both companies were created in the beginning of the 2000s on the
basis of either a Soviet era institute or on the basis of Soviet era enterprises that were
privatised at the beginning of the 1990s (and by the end of the decade went bankrupt). At
the core of these two companies are Soviet specialists that are in charge of the technical
departments, most of whom have been there for six years or longer.
In the case of both companies – due to their apparent contacts with the
KazMunaiGas managers – they managed to obtain their first contracts with the NOC.359
While ‘winning’ those tenders was a positive development from the perspective of the
companies, the interviewees however complained directly and indirectly about the
corruption and lack of transparency of KazMunaiGas. What seemed to particularly annoy
the interviewees were the constant demands on the part of the KazMunaiGas managers to
give them some extra money, even though the necessary bribes had presumably already
been paid, well in advance.360 This constant harassment by the KazMunaiGas officials
inevitably hampered the development of the companies in question, as they had to keep
allocating a substantial part of their profits to the KazMunaiGas people. In the long run,
this will either drive those companies from the oil sector altogether or lead to their
closure, as the companies will not be able to deal with this ever-growing demand for
bribes.
357 Interview with a manager of a foreign company that specializes in the oilfield systems: Almaty 22
October 2004.
358 Interview with general manager working for a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11
October 2004.
359 Interview with president of a small building company: Almaty 7 September 2004.
360 Interview with a deputy director of a designing institute: Almaty 23 September 2004; Interview with a
commercial director of a designing institute: Almaty 23 September 2004; Interview with a director of an
engineering and designing company: Almaty 27 September 2004.
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In conclusion, in chapter 2 it was argued that at the beginning of the 1990s, the
most serious threat to Nazarbayev’s hegemonic position in the oil industry came from oil
men in the centre as well as the peripheries of the country. Nazarbayev managed to
successfully minimize this threat through firstly, privatising the oil industry and secondly,
by turning the oil men into his clients. In this chapter, we have discussed how the bond
between Nazarbayev and his clients has been deepened (ethnic Kazakhs are the only ones
that have access to the oil deals) and reinforced (the oil men are the only specialists left in
the NOC). Such upholding of the ties between the regime and the oil men means that they
have been allowed to enrich themselves, even where it has led to a negative effect on the
oil industry.
In the next two chapters, we will move away from the issue of oil men and
concentrate on the larger population and interest groups in the oil-rich regions who did
not gain from the privatisation of the oil industry as the oil men did, and in the case of the
interest groups were further cut off from the oil industry related contracts. In chapters 4
and 5, we will discuss the way in which the regime went about addressing the challenges
that emerged in the oil-rich areas, mainly focusing here on the Atyrau region. The
strategy here differs significantly from the way in which Nazarbayev’s regime dealt with
the threats posed by the major players in the Kazakh oil industry. The most important
difference between the two is the heavy involvement of the external actors (foreign oil
companies) in addressing the problem of the interest groups in the oil-rich areas such as
Atyrau. As a result of this, we argue that in the Atyrau region, the regime structured the
relationships with interest groups via the involvement of foreign oil companies, which
thus became an indispensable part of the equation.
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Chapter 4: Controlling the oil-rich regions: the genesis of the co-operation between the
regime and foreign oil companies
In this chapter and in the following one, we will focus on the second type of problem that
oil has been creating for Nazarbayev’s regime – dissatisfaction in the oil-rich areas.
Chapter 1 (section 1.2) demonstrated how resources can motivate secession movements
in the resource-rich regions, manipulated by dissatisfied interest groups, which on
occasion led to violent uprisings and effectively prolonged civil wars. Scholars who deal
with problems of the resource-rich areas argue that for a violent situation to emerge, at
least a few requirements from a long list have to be fulfilled: first, the resource-rich
region is located far away from the centre; second, the resources are extracted by
‘outsiders’ who are perceived to extract ‘local’ resources without sharing the wealth;
third, a highly centralised nature of procedures for economic decision-making; fourth,
lack of economical diversification in the resource-rich regions; fifth, widespread poverty;
sixth, a local population which is displaced by the extractive industry or suffers from its
environmental costs; and finally, the resource-rich region is inhabited by an ethnic
minority (Le Billon 2001; Robinson 1998).
Whereas in Kazakhstan a number of criteria from the above list are fulfilled, a
radical movement which would seek some sort of autonomy for the oil-rich parts did not
emerge – in fact, not even a moderate one that would attempt to represent the interests of
the disadvantaged. Thus, it can be assumed that the regime was able to satisfy local
public and interest groups which did not seek to capitalise on the problems that emerged
in the oil-rich regions. In order to understand how Nazarbayev’s regime managed to
achieve this, in this and the next chapter, we will attempt to uncover the complicated
dynamics that developed between regime, oil-rich regions and foreign oil companies at
the end of the 1990s.
This chapter seeks to understand the genesis of the involvement of foreign oil
companies. In order to understand how this involvement came about, this chapter
proposes to analyse the initial problem that the regime encountered in the Atyrau region,
namely the dissatisfaction of the local population with the lack of economic development.
The blame for this situation was placed directly on Nazarbayev and the central
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government, who were accused of taking away from the region its due share of oil
revenues. It is argued here that the regime dealt with the discontent among the local
population by shifting the burden of responsibility for the lack of economic development
from itself to the foreign oil companies with their tacit acceptance; this, in turn, spelt the
beginning of the co-operation between the regime and foreign oil companies in
addressing the problems in the oil-rich areas. In the next chapter, we will demonstrate
how disadvantaged local interest groups attempted to build on the regime’s initial
response as they began demanding a greater share of the oil spoils for themselves. The
Nazarbayev’s regime reply to this growing dissatisfaction was the deepening of its co-
operation with the foreign oil companies.
Furthermore, in order to demonstrate that the initial co-operation between two
parties was not accidental, we will demonstrate in this chapter how this co-operation also
played itself out in addressing the problem of the local labour in the oil-rich regions.
Finally, in this and the following chapters, we will argue that the Kazakh regime
responded to the crises in the oil-rich regions in an extremely speedy fashion – and
became willing to enter into co-operation with the foreign oil companies – due to the
existence of the threat in the northern part of the country at the beginning of the 1990s
(chapter 3, section 1). This threat made the regime extremely attuned to any signs of
crises in the remote regions of Kazakhstan, particularly the oil-rich areas.
1. The oil-rich regions and foreign oil companies
In chapter 2 (section 3.2.), we discussed how during Prime Minister’s Akezhan
Kazhegeldin’s time in office (1995–97), Kazakhstan went through a process of ‘mass
privatisation’. The most controversial was the third stage in the so-called case-by-case
privatisation, during which the country’s largest and most valuable major factories, mines
and assets were privatised. From March to May 1997 alone, the government sold off the
bulk of its shares in oil and gas enterprises to numerous foreign companies. Nazarbayev
tried to silence the critics of his actions by painting a picture of a glorious future ahead.
For example, in February 1997 he argued that Kazakhstan would receive some US$76
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billion from the Tengiz deal alone (quoted in Luong 83: 2000b).361 However, in the midst
of the economic crisis, which was further aggravated by Russia’s 1998 crisis and a severe
drop in the oil prices on the international markets, the gap between future gains and
reality on the ground proved to be too wide.362
In the years 1997–98, a wave of strikes and protest actions swept through
Kazakhstan. The two main groups that took to the streets were pensioners (discussed in
chapter 2, section 4.1), and workers whose wages had not been paid for months,
sometimes for periods as long as one year or even longer.363 Fifteen hundred workers at
the Achisay Polymetal Plant in Kentau, Southern Kazakhstan, in October 1997,
demanded the payment of ten-months’ wage arrears, totalling 100 million tenge –
US$1.35 million.364 The epicentre of the protests was Karaganda Oblast, where 13,000
miners became unemployed as mines in the region were closed.365 It was reported that
most of the industrial facilities that had seen labour unrest had been sold or ceded in part
to nominally foreign companies.366 Foreign companies were not only accused of paying
overdue wages too slowly, but also of a failure to invest in facilities, as they had agreed
to do when the industrial plants were sold. For instance, the offshore-registered Global
Minerals Reserves Company that bought Shubarkol coal mine in Karaganda region had
agreed to invest the equivalent of US$5 million in the facilities each year. But in 1997, it
spent less than $1 million on the facility’s infrastructure367.
The situation in the oil-rich regions largely followed a pattern that was emerging
all across Kazakhstan. Foreign oil and gas companies which bought oil and gas
enterprises that had been already operating for some time were accused of laying off the
local workforces. Instead, they brought in new staffs from abroad, which were said to be
better suited to operating the equipment, which was allegedly brought from abroad.
361 ‘Divergent views on Kazakhstan’s Economic Performance,’ Monitor, 4 (10), 16 January 1998, p.
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?search=1&volume_id=21&issue_id=1221&article_id=
12148 (Accessed 13 June 2005).
362 Hugh Pope, ‘Kazakhstan Weathers Worst of Turmoil,’ The Wall Street Journal, 8 January 1999.
363 Seventy workers of Shahan Autoenterprise in Karaganda were not paid their wages for 36 months
(Human Rights, January 2000).
364 Kazakh commercial TV, 24 October 1997. Quoted in ‘Kazakhstan’s Most Politicized Labour Unrest
Continues,’ Monitor, 3, 205 (3 November 1997).
365 ‘Kazakh miners demonstrate,’ RFE/RL Newsline, 1 (54), 17 June 1997.




Equipment was brought over, however, only in a few instances, and most of the time
companies were using old Soviet equipment.368 The site of most serious unrest was in the
Aktyubinsk region. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which in 1997
bought 60 per cent of the shares in Aktobemunaigas (AMG), was accused of having a
particularly negative impact on the local population. Three years after acquisition, the
CNPC was still refusing to repay overdue wages or fulfilling the social obligations
specified in the contract. The company argued that it was told by the Chinese government
to operate on a strictly for-profit basis, and that the original Chinese investments
contracted in the takeover deal were deemed to have covered wage arrears and other
debts, ecological rehabilitation and other social costs as well as personnel training, all on
top of investments in production.369 Resentment towards the CNPC was translated into a
protest when, in 1999, AMG Chinese managers laid off 2000 Kazakh workers under the
banner of restructuring. During the protest, workers demanded their jobs back or financial
compensation from CNPC. It was also reported that during the protests, the issue of
social obligations was brought up on number of occasions370 (for further discussion
concerning Chinese involvement see chapter 6, section 2.3). Similar resentment to the
Aktyubinsk situation was mounted in the Kyzylorda region, where the Canadian
company Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd371 (which in 1996 bought the regional oil producer
Yuzhneftegas, the most important enterprise in the region, see also chapter 2, section
3.2), in the space of four years, reduced staff from over 5,100 to 1,900 (for further
discussion of this, see chapter 5, section 1.2).
1.1. Early elections and discontent in the Atyrau region
Nazarbayev’s response to the growing social and industrial unrest across Kazakhstan’s
major industrial centres was to call elections 18 months early. It is widely agreed that
early elections were calculated at catching Nazarbayev’s political opponents off guard,
368 Interview with oil expert: Almaty, 2 November 2004.
369 Robert M. Cutler, ‘How Shah-Deniz is changing the equation – Part 2,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil
Connections, 5 (14), 7 August 2000. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnc03266.htm (Accessed 15
September 2004).
370 Interview with oil expert: Almaty, 17 September 2004.
371 Renamed PetroKazakhstan in 2003.
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giving them little time to organise.372 The strategy paid off, and in the January 1999
elections, which were widely criticised for somewhat unexpected heavy-handedness,
Nazarbayev ‘won’ 78.3 per cent of the vote.373 At the same time, in 1999 the presumption
that Nazarbayev would easily win a fair contest was quite common.374 It was speculated
that he would take as much as 60 per cent of the vote375 in a free contest. This meant that
on average, Nazarbayev got at least 20 per cent more than his presumed actual support.
However, this support for Nazarbayev was not evenly spread out across Kazakhstan - far
from it.
Nazarbayev got the least votes in three regions: in Atyrau and Mangistau, two of
the centres of Kazakhstan’s oil industry, and in Zhambly (George 2001: 50). In the
Atyrau region, which is home to Kazakhstan’s two biggest oil projects Tengiz and
Kashagan376, Nazarbayev (according to the official statistics) received only 50 per cent of
the vote. However, some claim that 50 per cent was a heavily inflated figure, and that in
reality Nazarbayev got only 25 per cent of the vote.377 The blame for such a disastrous
performance was put directly on Nazarbayev and the central government, amid
accusations that they were taking away from the region its due share of oil revenues378
and in turn hampering the economic development of the region. The allocation of oil
revenues was perceived as unjust for two reasons. Firstly, the oil bonuses that oil
companies paid to the Atyrau region were not allocated to the region directly, but instead
to the centre of the country. Secondly, the system of financial centralisation in
Kazakhstan meant that central authorities collected all taxes, which were then distributed
amongst the regions of Kazakhstan. In such a system, oil-rich regions are bound to get
less from the centre than the amount which they contribute to the national budget, since
372 Carlotta Gati, ‘Kazakhstan: Leader certain to win one-horse race,’ Financial Times, 9 January 1999.
373 Reuters, 11 January 1999.
374 Nazarbayev’s closest opponent in the elections was Gani Kasymov, the ex-general and chief of the State
Custom Committee and a former presidential adviser.
375 ‘Report on Kazakhstan’s Presidential Elections,’ Helsinki Commission, 10 January 1999.
376 In 2003, 44% of oil and over 50% of natural gas of the Republic’s total volume were produced in the
territory of the Atyrau oblast (quoted in Petroleum Magazine, April 2003), whereas oil enterprises
constituted 95.6% of regional GDP (quoted in BISNIS Report, 31 May 2004).
377 Interview with an oppositional journalist: Atyrau 22 November 2004; Interview with member of the Ak
Zhol party: Almaty 5 November 2005.
378 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
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the greater bulk of the money will be spent on those parts of the country in the south and
in the centre which are oil-poor.
With regard to the first cause of complaint, it is speculated that the Atyrau region
annually receives from Chevron 30 to 60 million US dollars in bonuses.379 Whereas no
one claims that Chevron does not pay this money, it is argued that a very small
percentage of the bonuses, if any, has stayed in Atyrau, and that the money has gone
instead to the state’s budget.380 It is widely claimed that bonuses were allocated later on
to the development of Astana; in 1998, official figures said that US$2 billion was spent
on the building of the new capital (quoted in George 2001: 18). However, it was also
rumoured that the money was not spent on the new capital, but was simply seized by
Nazarbayev and his inner circles,381 which politically was much more damaging (chapter
6, section 1.1). According to foreign diplomats, one-third to one-half of the over US$1
billion in privatisation bonuses from foreign companies to the government of Kazakhstan
has disappeared.382 An observer in Atyrau argued that the question of bonuses was the
single most important issue around which oppositional groups close to ex-Prime Minister
Akezhan Kazhegeldin (see chapter 2, sections 3.1, 3.2) organised their anti-Nazarbayev
campaign during the 1999 presidential elections. The message of the campaign, which
was largely conducted on the grass-roots levels, was simple and loud ‘you are living in
poverty because all the money is going into the president’s pockets’.383
With regard to the second cause for complaint, Kazakhstan, like most developing
countries, has a fairly decentralised system of expenditure, but the central government
collects all taxes, which are shared with lower level governments (Stein 1999). Collection
of taxes in Kazakhstan is carried out by various governmental organisations, which
submit all collected taxes to the central authorities. Decisions concerning how funds are
to be allocated are then made at the central level in accordance with the idea of central
379 Interview with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau 12 November 2004.
380 Interview with an executive director of a local oil company: Atyrau, 16 November 2004.
381 R.M. Auty, ‘Reforming Resource-Abundant Transition Economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’, IMF
Working Papers, 9913. Paper Presented to the DSA Annual Conference, University of Bath (September
1999), pp.7–8.
382 Steve Levine, ‘Caspian Logic: Democracy? Sure, Sure. Now Buy Our Oil,’ New York Times, 3 January
1999.
383 Interview with an oppositional journalist: Atyrau 22 November 2004; Dmitriy Maslov, ‘Kazakhstan’s
big oil: myth or reality,’ Continent, 1-14 September 1999; Akezhan Kazhegeldin, ‘Big problems of big oil,’
Eurasia, 10 March 2001.
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redistribution. The inevitable ‘losers’ of such a structural arrangement are the richer
regions of the country, which subsidise the development of poorer parts of Kazakhstan
(Makhmutova 2001: 437–138).
Atyrau and Mangystau oblasts, and the city of Almaty, have faced the
maximum absolute reduction of the development opportunities as a result of
state budget redistribution, and Astana, Kyzylorda, Taldykorgan and Torgai
oblasts – the maximum absolute increase. (Human Development Report:
Kazakhstan (UNDP, 1998), p.8 quoted in Cummings 2000: 22)
Moreover, local authorities have no independent taxation powers and no source for
independent revenue generation other than local service fees, which themselves are
subject to central approval (Gleason 58: 2003).
On the local level, the direct blame for relocating bonuses to the centre was laid
on the akim Ravil Cherdabayev.384 Ravil Cherdabayev, as already mentioned in chapter 2
(section 2.1), was appointed as akim of Atyrau region in 1994. Judging from the posts
that he had held prior to 1994 – director of TengizChevrOil JV (1992–93); Minister of
Oil and Gas Industry (1993–94)385 – and his close connections to other major oil families
in Atyrau and Mangistau, it seems that Cherdabayev served as an intermediate between
Nazarbayev and the oil companies. However, Cherdabayev, a home-grown akim and ex-
apparatchik,386 and thus a sort of regional leader who at the beginning of the 1990s had
rebelled against Nazarbayev’s economic reforms, was also among those politically and
economically powerful akims who since 1996 had lobbied for tax-raising powers that
would allow them to ensure speedier development of their regions.387 This challenged the
whole notion of financial centralisation, an idea unsurprisingly favoured by Nazarbayev.
It is not entirely clear if Cherdabayev’s motives were to wrestle more power from the
centre for his own benefit,388 or simply to genuinely promote the development of the
region. In any case, such attempts politicised the issue of unequal distribution between
384 Ibid.
385 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, Astana: Azholdas & Company Publishing House. (1999), p.
543.
386 He worked in executive positions in the Communist Party (1992–93).
387 ‘President says "NO" to regional autonomy,’ Monitor, 4 (128), 6 July 1998; Other powerful akims were
Galymzhan Zhakiyanov (Pavlodar region), Mazhit Esenbayev (Karaganda region), Vladimir Gartman
(Akmola region); quoted in ‘Regional Rules,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, May 1998.
388 In chapter 2 (sections 2.1; 2.2.) I discussed how, during the second half of the 1990s, Atyrau’s families
attempted to gain control over the oil industry in Kazakhstan by attempting to seize control of the NOC.
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Atyrau and other regions, and this was also reflected in the election results.389 As one
director in Atyrau put it, ‘our region makes up 30 per cent of the budget. We are feeding
one-third of Kazakhstan, that is not right’390. For example, in accordance with the Law on
State Budget for the year 2003, the Atyrau oblast transferred over US$20 billion to the
republican budget,391 effectively becoming one of the largest donors to this budget.392
The scale of the discontent among the local population that the elections results
revealed was magnified by the fact that the Atyrau region is mainly populated by ethnic
Kazakhs. In 2000, Kazakhs made up 79.5 per cent of the population in the region; the
other major ethnic group was the Russians, constituting 15 per cent.393 Moreover, the
Atyrau region is one of the least Sovietised western provinces, where ‘many cultural
practices remain largely unchanged from the prerevolutionary period’ (Olcott 1987:
251). Thus, the people that were voting against Nazarbayev in the 1999 elections were
those that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan were supposed to be a bedrock of the new state, and
Nazarbayev’s hardcore support base. In addition, from the perspective of the regime, any
sign of dissatisfaction in the Atyrau region was problematic, since the town of Atyrau,
the capital of the region, is over 2,600 kilometres west of Almaty, i.e. the centre of the
country.394
1.2. The regime’s response: shifting the responsibility
The main source of discontent in the Atyrau region was Nazarbayev’s regime rather than
the foreign oil companies. They had been the main targets of protests in other resource-
rich provinces such as Aktyubinsk and Kyzrloda. In the Atyrau region, Tengiz, the major
oil enterprise, had already gone through a phase of restructuring – a process not without
its problems395 – initiated by the American oil company Chevron in 1993. By 1999, this
so-called ‘first phase’ of restructuring was largely over. In September 1999, Kazakh
389 Interview with a journalist working for a local newspaper: Atyrau 23 November 2004.
390 Interview with a director of a medium-sized subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
391 ‘The “Big” Oil of Atyrau: Hopes and Reality,’ Petroleum Magazine, April 2003.
392 ‘Black Gold of Atyrau,’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
393 ‘Kazakhstan’s Regions,’ Eastern Research Group, Research & Analytical Papers, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (London, May 2000), p. 17.
394 Ibid.
395 ‘Workers Unite,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1996.
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citizens held – at least on paper – 71 per cent of TengizChevrOil staff positions,
compared with 55 per cent in 1993. Investment in employee training had risen from
approximately US$1.8 million in 1994 to approximately US$6.2 million in 1998.396
Moreover, workers at Tengiz are said to be well fed and are given proper safety clothing,
and ‘should hence consider themselves lucky’.397 In the cases of the other oil enterprises
that were sold off to foreign interests in the second half of the 1990s, the process of
restructuring had just begun, and attention, arguably, was focused on the oil companies
rather than on the regime. This is not to say, however, that the local population in Atyrau
did not feel any grievances towards foreign oil companies; they did, but their
dissatisfaction in the Atyrau region with oil companies was of a secondary importance.
At the end of the 1990s, one main source of resentment towards foreigners was
the legendarily disproportionate wages for local and foreign specialists. In the late 1990s
an English, American or Italian specialist working for Tengiz was allegedly earning
between 15,000 to 20,000 American dollars monthly, whereas Kazakh specialists earned
no more than 1000 dollars for the same work. In Aktyubinsk, Chinese specialists working
for the Chinese National Petroleum Co. earned 8,000 dollars monthly compared to the
800 dollars398 paid to a Kazakh specialist. In 2001, the central authorities argued that
foreign specialists working on the Karachagank project on an average earned US$14,500
dollars monthly, whereas the average monthly pay of a Kazakh specialist was 1200
dollars.399 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to judge to what extent the claims
concerning the disproportion in wages are founded or unfounded. Yet, the mythical status
that they assumed in the public imagination undoubtedly had an impact on the way in
which the foreign oil companies and Nazarbayev, who after all had invited them to
Kazakhstan, were seen by the local population.
Specific service companies that came with foreign oil companies at the beginning
of the 1990s were received with a similar amount of suspicion and discontent. The fact
396 Figures quoted in ‘Oil Development in the Caspian: A critical investigation of California oil companies
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,’ by Pamela Sumner Coffey. California Global Corporate Accountability
Project, (Berkley, Fall 1999); see also Peck 2004: 156.
397 Interview with a journalist working for a local newspaper: Atyrau 23 November 2004; Interview with a
director of a small supplying company: Atyrau 17 November 2004.
398 Interviews with oppositional and pro-government journalists Atyrau 22—23 November 2004; Rysty
Alibekova, ‘Oil producers reach new heights.’ Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 31 May 2001
399 ‘Karachagank Import Substitution Program,’ Oil and Gas Kazakhstan Magazine, 1–2, 2001.
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that foreign companies were bringing their own cooks, food and security people was
widely perceived as a real affront to Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people.400 According to
one estimate, by late 2004 Chevron was bringing about 60 per cent of its foodstuffs from
aboard, whereas the rest was purchased locally – primarily vegetables, bread and the
like.401
To sum up, in the oil-rich Atyrau region, the blame for the lack of economic
development was put on Nazarbayev and his local representative Ravil Cherdabayev,
which significantly increased the political risks from the perspective of the regime. Given
the distance of the Atyrau region from the centre, this dissatisfaction could potentially
translate into protests, and in the long run even into autonomous movements and perhaps
secession. In the following pages, we will argue that the regime’s response to the growing
dissatisfaction in the Atyrau region was to shift back the burden of responsibility for the
lack of economic development from the government to the foreign oil companies, thereby
effectively containing the growing dissatisfaction.
The foreign oil companies were a perfect scapegoat for the regime, since they are
an external force or ‘outsiders’. Naturally, the regime is responsible for selling various oil
enterprises to them, but it can always cast itself as an innocent ‘victim’ that did not know
that these oil companies will, for instance, severely reduce employment at an
enterprise.402 It should be added that the Kazakh government was not alone in its
thinking, and that this sort of ‘victim’ rhetoric was in fact used all across the post-
Socialist block, especially at the beginning of the 1990s.
What is unique in the Kazakh case is the extent to which the foreign oil
companies in the Atyrau region aided the government in shifting the responsibility to
them by not actively protesting against the regime’s actions; this was because stability in
the Atyrau region (in which foreign oil companies are after all investing billions of
dollars) is also in their interest. I base this claim on a number of interviews in Almaty and
Atyrau (2004) with people working for the foreign oil companies in the capacities of
director and regional manager, who openly admitted that they were closely co-operating
400 Interview with a director of a small machinery plant: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
401 Interview with a marketing manager of a major company that specialises in remote sites services:
Almaty 2 December 2004.
402 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004.
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with the representatives of Nazarbayev’s regime on the local level. A justification given
for such co-operation was that a situation in Kazakhstan was not abnormal from their
point of view, and that they had encountered similar scenarios before in other parts of the
world – notably Africa and the Middle East. The line of reasoning of those directors and
managers seems to be that it is all part of working in a difficult environment.
1.3. Imangali Tasmagambetov and pacts with foreign oil companies
Nazarbayev’s response to the election results in three regions where he received the least
votes in the 1999 elections, rather predictably, was swift. The akims of the Mangistau
region (Nikolai Bayev), the Zhambly region (Sarybai Kalmyrzayev) and the Atyrau
region (Ravil Cherdabayev), were all dismissed within weeks after the elections.
Imangali Tasmagambetov became the new akim of the Atyrau region in February 1999.
He stayed in his post until 15 December 2000, and played a vital role in appeasing the
dissatisfied population in the Atyrau region by shifting the responsibility for the lack of
economic development from the regime to the foreign oil companies. In order to
understand his impact better, we will first trace his career up to his appointment as
Atyrau’s akim, and then his subsequent role in the political life of post-Soviet
Kazakhstan. Our brief analysis will most importantly demonstrate the close proximity of
Tasmagambetov to Nazarbayev, which in turn lead to the assumption that the strategy of
‘shifting the responsibility’ came directly from the apex of power.
Imangali Nurgaliyevich Tasmagambetov comes from the Atyrau region,403 where
he began his political career in the mid-1980s with his appointment as first secretary of
the Guryevsky city committee for LKSMK (Lenin Communist Union of Kazakhstan’s
Youth), i.e. the Komsomol. Interestingly enough, just before him, the post of first
secretary of Guryevsky city committee of the CP was occupied by the aforementioned
Ravil Cherdabayev, who at that time was Tasmagambetov’s patron.404 In the late 1980s,
Tasmagambetov became a Politburo member, a member of the Central Committee of the
CP of Kazakhstan, and deputy of the 12th Supreme Soviet. From the beginning of the
403 Atyrau until 1992 was called Guryevsky.
404 ‘Imangali Nurgaliyevich Tasmagambetov,’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
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1990s, he closely co-operated with Nazarbayev; first as a chairman of the republican state
committee for youth affairs, and later on as a presidential adviser. In the mid-1990s,
Tasmagambetov became deputy prime minister, subsequently education and culture
minister, and finally deputy head of the presidential administration. One year before his
appointment as Atyrau’s akim, Tasmagambetov served as a chief assistant to the
president,405 which meant that he undoubtedly was one of Nazarbayev’s closest
associates and hence one of the president’s trusted ‘lieutenants’ who received akim
appointments in the late 1990s.
The fact that further illustrates that Tasmagambetov was a trusted enforcer of the
president’s will was his appointment to the post of Prime Minister in January 2002.
During his time in office, he became most famous for disclosing information about a
secret fund established by the authorities, which later snowballed into a scandal which
came to be known as ‘Kazakhgate’ (chapter 6, section 1.1), and for taking on himself the
initial wave of attacks around this scandal.406 The intimate relationship between
Nazarbayev and Tasmagambetov was said to be so close that he was tipped as the most
likely next president of Kazakhstan.407 In 2002, he famously revealed: ‘I would never
have become the Tasmagambetov I am today, if it has not been for the President (…)
That’s why, I am a product of Nazarbayev’.408 In 2003, the KazRating national agency
listed him as the second most important man in Kazakhstan.409
This brief analysis illustrates that Tasmagambetov had all the attributes to address
the crisis in the Atyrau region. He was a local person with good connections to the
regional oil families and ex-Communist party people. Moreover, from Nazarbayev’s
point of view Tasmagambetov could be trusted with implementing new strategies without
risking that his ‘lieutenant’ would abuse the trust placed in him; he would not use his
time in the region to construct his own patronage networks or power bases, as seemed to
the case with the previous akim Cherdabayev. It was reported that shortly after
405 http://www.rferl.org/specials/kazakhelections/bios/tasmag.asp (Accessed 10 May 2004).
406 Aldar Kusainov, ‘Kazakhstani prime minister admits to existence of secret government fund,’
EurasiaNet, 5 April 2002. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040502a.shtml
(Accessed 25 May 2005).
407 ‘Kazakh opposition sees premier as obvious successor to president’. Eurasia web site, 14 February
2002. Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 28 February 2002.
408 Marea Beat, ‘Central Asian tiger in turmoil,’ Turkish Daily News, 19 February 2002.
409 Karavan, 2 May 2005, p.5. Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 20 June 2003.
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Tasmagambetov’s arrival in the Atyrau region, during a series of meetings with the
representatives of the local administration he ordered the regional departments to tighten
control over investor activities; ‘his reason was the need to increase benefits for the
province from the presence of foreign oil operators’.410 It is alleged that the new akim
made similar remarks during sessions of the local maslikhats, which resonated very well
with the local population: ‘he is a person that was not afraid to take unusual decisions’.411
Yet, on another occasion, he spoke about the challenge facing Kazakhstan to secure a
well-coordinated working relationship between the local government and the operating
joint stock companies.412
Tasmagambetov’s time in office was marked by a set of spectacular actions, all of
which had only one aim: to demonstrate to the local population that the government was
not neglecting them. In the spring of 1999, the regional division of the natural resources
halted operations on six Tengiz wells on the grounds that they violated existing
regulations of oil recovery. The operation was resumed after TengizChevrOil (TCO) JV
agreed to contribute US$4 million for the improvement of quality of life in the province.
In a similar case in late summer 1999, local authorities in the Atyrau region blocked the
drilling of the first exploratory well at Kashagan under the excuse that Agip KCO
Consortium413 did not have the necessary permits. Operations were resumed once the
Consortium agreed to build a huge sporting complex in Atyrau free of charge.414
Moreover, in 1999 Agip KCO founded a project for gasification of the central part of
Atyrau, modern building construction and installation of heating systems and water
supplies. In the health sector, the Consortium funded the supply of modern medical
equipment in the rural areas throughout the Atyrau region.415 Finally, at the beginning of
the 2000s, the Agip KCO Consortium transferred its office from Almaty to Atyrau. It was
410 Gribov Sergei, ‘Xenophobic Hard Liners Gain Inside-Support from Kazakh Government,’
RusEnergy.com, 4 Febuary 2002. http://www.rusenergy.com/eng/caspian/a04022002.htm (Accessed 25
May 2004).
411 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
412 Marea Beat, Turkish Daily News, 19 February 2002.
413 Agip KCO Consortium subsequently was renamed the Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating
Company (OKIOC).
414 Sergei Gribov, RusEnergy.com, 4 Febuary 2002.
415‘Obligations strengthened by deeds,’ Petroleum Magazine, September 2002.
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suggested at that time that the main reason for transferring the company’s head office to
Atyrau was the tough stance by Tasmagambetov, who declared in September 1999
the management of the OKIOC, whose activity is giving rise to controversy
amongst the public due to fears of an accident on the Sunkar drilling platform,
should be based where it carries out the work, and not in the southern
capital.416
Moreover, foreign oil companies were also made to build new roads, and to renovate the
main bridge in Atyrau city as well as the local mosque and the Orthodox Church.
According to one account, Tasmagambetov would visit a church or go to the area where a
local road was in very poor state and ask the local officials to do something about it: ‘get
money from the oil companies’.417 Notably, it was not only the biggest foreign companies
that were obliged to contribute to local development, but less significant companies were
also ‘persuaded’ to open a school or provide English classes.418 Since the Atyrau region
is Kazakhstan’s second smallest in terms of population – roughly half a million people
were living there in 2000 – information about good deeds of the new akim spread quickly
and strengthened the impact of Tasmagambetov’s actions.
The biggest publicity stunt was the ‘100th Year Celebration of Kazakhstani Oil’ in
September 1999, which aimed at demonstrating how high on the national agenda the
Atyrau region ranked. In the words of then Prime Minister Nurlan Balgymbayev: ‘I
believe Atyrau is the third capital of Kazakhstan – the oil capital. Astana is the
administrative capital, Almaty the commercial capital, and Atyrau the oil capital’.419 The
celebrations emphasised the fact that the region’s first oil development dated back to
1911, and that even the Nobel brothers had visited the region. Thus, Atyrau by definition
became something grander, linking Kazakhstan to the great history of world oil. It should
be added that the celebration was sponsored by various foreign oil companies, which
spent around U $2–$3 million dollars each on this ‘project’.420
416 Interfax, 24 January 2000.
417 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
418 Interview with a marketing manager of a major company that specialises in remote sites services:
Almaty 2 December 2004.
419 Quoted in Eastern Research Group, Research & Analytical Papers (2000), p. 17.
420 Interview with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau 12 November 2004.
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Threats of halting projects and intimidating oil companies, especially small
ones,421 were not new in Kazakhstan. Tasmagambetov’s ‘approach’, however, was truly
novel and seemed unprecedented when it came to the magnitude of the players that he
was now taking on. No one living in Atyrau, or indeed in the other oil-rich areas, had
employed this tactic before. Most importantly however, the strategy worked:
Tasmagambetov introduced rules for the oil companies operating in Atyrau –
if you are living here then you should treat it like a home and help Kazakh
people. You see oil companies do not want to do anything for Atyrau.
Everything they did in the city was through forced sponsoring. Now, if they
are not willing to build something for us then they will have problems with the
local authorities.422
The opinion cited above is not unusual in Atyrau, and most of the local business people,
journalists and experts that I talked to, agreed that things began to change significantly
after Tasmagambetov came to Atyrau. It indicates that during his short time in office,
perceptions began to shift. Nazarbayev’s regime became the solution to the local
population’s problems rather than the problem, which it had been seen as during the
1999 elections. The real problem now was ‘the foreign oil companies that did not care
about the Kazakh people’. It is argued that in subsequent years, the new akims, Serikbek
Daukeyev and Aslan Musin, carried on with Tasmagambetov’s approach,423 which
further strengthened the shift of the perceived problematic entity from the regime to the
companies in the public imagination. The ultimate effect of such actions is that in the
Atyrau region, foreign oil companies began taking over some of the functions that are
normally performed by the state.424
Naturally, not everyone was completely dazzled with Tasmagambetov. One
director, commenting on what happened in 1999, rather soberly pointed out: ‘something
needed to be done in Atyrau and they [Nazarbayev and his inner circle] gave him such an
421 ‘Paying the Piper,’ Russian Petroleum Investor, August 1996; ‘British oilman facing “ruin and
bankruptcy” after Kazakh fine,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 3 (13), 24 April 1998.
422 Interview with a director of a medium-sized subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
423 For instance, in 2004 Kazakh authorities in a highly publicized case temporarily impounded an oilrig
belonging to U.S.-based Parker Drilling because of the company's failure to pay customs duties. Source:
‘Kazakhstan Impounds U.S. Oil Rig,’ Moscow Times, 9 July 2004.
424 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 12 October 2004.
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opportunity, but it was just a drop’.425 In 2001, local officials were estimating that they
needed around US$350 for their long-term plans.426 Those that claimed to be
representatives of the opposition in the Atyrau region were unsurprisingly much more
sceptical, since the only ‘lasting effect on the 100th Celebration are painted facades in the
center of the town’.427 This point is supported by the 2004 UNDP report, which estimated
that in Kazakhstan the highest urban poverty was in the Atyrau region, while the highest
rural poverty was registered in yet another oil-rich region, Mangystau.428 This downturn
began in the mid-1990s, and it has so far proved to be irreversible. For example, in 2001
nearly one-third of the population had a per capita income below the sustenance level,
which was lower than in 1997, when the share of the poor in the total population was 43
per cent.429
The foreign oil companies, on their part, were willing to go along with the
regime’s strategy for various reasons. Firstly, the regime’s demands from the perspective
of the oil companies did not appear to be extraordinary, since they largely consisted of
fulfilling social obligations as stated in the contracts. John Morrow, a director general of
Karachaganak Petroleum Operating, argued that in 2002 his Consortium would allocate
US$2.9 million to social projects in the Western Kazakhstan and Atyrau regions, which
in the majority were ‘obligatory projects to be carried out under the final production
sharing agreement’.430 In some instances, however, such spending on social projects
exceeded contract obligations. In 2002, the new akim of the Atyrau region, Serikbek
Daukeyev, pointed out that TCO allocates about US$8 million annually to develop social
programmes. He admitted that these funds were above and beyond what TCO had
stipulated in its contract.431 A similar situation seemed to occur in the neighbouring
Mangistau region, where the akim Bolat Palymbetov stated in his interview that ‘many
425 Interview with a executive director of a local oil company: Atyrau 16 November 2004.
426 David Stern, ‘Rude awakening for sleepy oil town,’ FT.com site, 21 August 2001.
427 Interview with oppositional journalist: Atyrau 22 November 2004.
428‘Kazakhstan: Poverty persists despite impressive economic growth,’ IRIN (Ankara, 13 May 2004).
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=41037&SelectRegion=Central_Asia&SelectCountry=KAZA
KHSTN
(Accessed 5 July 2005).
429 ITAR/TASS (4 April 2001).
430 ‘Karachagank Project: Advanced Equipment Plus High Technologies,’ Petroleum Magazine, December
2002.
431 ‘Akim Seikbek Daukeev: “Oil Enterprises are Vital for Us,” Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
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companies fulfil their obligations and even exceed them’.432 At first glance, those
increases suggest that oil companies in some instances bent under Tasmagambetov’s
pressure. In reality the situation was arguably somewhat different, for reasons that we
will discuss in the second part.
Foreign oil companies were willing to exceed their contract obligations, which
effectively meant taking most of the blame for the lack of economic development, since
from their perspective, stabilisation in the oil regions in which they invest billon of
dollars is the most important factor. In other words, it is also in their interests to minimise
the political risks that authoritarian regimes face. It appears that oil companies are
extremely sensitive to any sign of instability, mainly due to their experiences in other
parts of the world where political friction, in the most extreme cases, has led to violent
conflicts and had negative effects on oil exploration and recovery, as for instance, in
Chad in the late 1970s.433 One director stated that in his opinion Kazakhstan is a friendly
place, much better than Nigeria or Turkmenistan.434
Moreover, the way in which Nazarbayev’s regime went about addressing
problems that mounted in the Atyrau region, by casting itself as a defender of the
people’s interests vis-à-vis the foreign oil companies, was a familiar scenario to the
representatives of the companies in Kazakhstan, and something that they were willing to
accept.435 Whereas Tasmagambetov, and later on other akims, posed as uncompromising
figures in public, during private meetings with representatives of the oil companies they
were much more ‘reasonable’. One director stated that local authorities were not forcing
them to do anything, but rather asking the company to sponsor various events such as the
festivities commemorating the end of the Great Patriotic War;436 other activities included
giving financial support to pensioners, mothers with many children, and orphans.437 The
432 ‘Mangistau Creates a New Petrochemical Complex,’ Petroleum Magazine, October 2002.
433 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since the mid-
1990s: Almaty, 21 October 2004; Interview with a high ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company:
Almaty 6 October 2004.
434 Interview with general manager of a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
435 Interview with a regional manager of a major foreign sub-contracting company: Atyrau 10 November
2004.
436 Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
437 ‘Black Gold of Atyrau,’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
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same goes for the move of the headquarters of the oil companies from Almaty to Atyrau,
which, as was shown, appears to have been one of Tasmagambetov’s major victories
during his short time in office. Hence, the oil companies, rather than being forced to
move their headquarters to Atyrau, were requested to do so. What is more, they viewed
this request, however costly, to be perfectly reasonable.438
Moreover, at the end of the 1990s, foreign oil companies could be rather certain
that the regime would go only so far in its demands, which made companies more willing
to accept them. Towards the end of the first decade of independence, Kazakhstan’s
economy was in a deep economic crisis,439 and the companies knew that the regime had
tried to do everything to attract foreign investors rather than to antagonise them.
Certainly, the government spoke loudly about scrutinising foreign investors, as when
Prime Minister Nurlan Balgimbayev on one occasion said: ‘We are looking into how
foreign investors carry out their obligations under the contracts’.440 However, it did not
indicate that it wanted to, for instance, reverse privatisation in the oil or indeed any other
sectors. Quite to the contrary, President Nazarbayev seemed to reassure foreign investors
that the rules of the game were not going to change: ‘Private companies will carry on as
they were – there will be no change in the course (of privatisation)’.441 Finally, it is
important to keep in mind that foreign oil companies are not willing to be passive
scapegoats to the Nazarbayev’s regime forever, and that in the long run they could well
use their social projects to their own advantage. This is a point which was, ironically,
made by the aforementioned akim Palymbetov: ‘Many companies are serious in making
their reputation; that’s why they render social assistance irrespective of their contract
obligations. It is the community opinion that is important to them.’442
438 Ibid.
439 Additionally, prices of oil in 1999 had fallen to almost 10 US dollars per barrel.
440 ‘Kazakhstan evaluating privatisations,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 3 (20), 24 April 1998.
441 ‘Kazakh privatisation wants to prevent mistakes made elsewhere,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil
Connections, 3 (20), 24 August 1998.
442 Petroleum Magazine, October 2002.
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2. Continuing playing the blame game: the case of local labour
As it was stated in section 1.2 above, in the oil regions such as Aktyubinsk and Kyzrloda,
the main source of discontent at the end of the 1990s was not so much in Nazarbayev’s
regime, as was clearly the case in Atyrau, but rather the foreign oil companies that laid
off local staff and even worse, began replacing them with foreign workers and specialists.
The Nazarbayev’s regime’s response to these problems, which potentially could
transform themselves into protests against the regime,443 was to introduce new measures
– active promotion of the local labour – which allowed it to yet again cast itself as a
defender of the local population vis-à-vis outside companies.444 The main targets of the
regime’s attack, however, were not foreign oil companies per se and the predominantly
Western specialists working for them, but rather workers of medium-sized sub-
contracting companies, for instance, from Turkey and other non-Western countries,
which were being sub-contracted by the foreign oil companies.445 The blame for the
decrease in employment was put on those companies, primarily because people working
for them were not highly skilled workforces and could be replaced by Kazakh citizens
without much danger of hampering the oil projects,446 which would be the case if
Nazarbayev’s regime tried to replace Western specialists with local people.447 The
architect of this strategy was Nursultan Balgymbayev,448 whose extremely close contacts
with the major oil companies (chapter 2, section 3.2) would suggest that this shifting of
the blame towards non-Western sub-contracting companies happened, at least to some
extent, with the tacit approval of the foreign oil companies. After all, it was also in the
foreign oil companies’ interests to shift the responsibility for the unemployment in the
oil-rich areas from themselves to third parties.
Having said all of that, we do not try to suggest that solely non-Kazakh companies
were targeted by the Kazakh officials to employ more Kazakh citizens; far from it. Major
443 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004.
444 Country Commercial Guide Kazakhstan, Fiscal Year 2004, July 2003, p.7. www.bisnis.doc.gov
(Accessed 23 January 2004.)
445 Interview with oil expert: Almaty 17 September 2004.
446 Interview with general manager of a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
447 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
448 Ibid.
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foreign oil companies and their sub-contractors were also under pressure to employ
Kazakh citizens; however, in their case, there were only certain citizens involved. A
director of a major sub-contracting company argued that every time his company would
start a new project, open a new office and the like, it would inevitably find itself under
pressure from the local authorities in the oil-rich regions to employ their cousins, sons,
daughters, brothers-in-law and so on. He said that the mechanism was very simple: ‘You
come to the their office and you want something to be done and they say no problem just
here it is my brother-in-law could you help him out?’449 As a result of this, every tenth
person that the company employed was due to the pressure from the local authorities. The
General director of a small extracting company spoke about a similar experience; in his
own words:
There is a pressure to employ relatives of those that work in local bureaucracy,
especially the ones that carry out some sort of inspection, for example, health
inspectors. They would ask me would you not give a job to my son or some
other relative. That happens all the time. The only way to deal with this sort of
pressures is to give up to their demands and employee a relative. But then I am
extra strict with such person and after a while they themselves quit. They know
that they do not have any qualifications and that they were employed because of
those pressures and they quit.450
In the case of the non-Western sub-contracting companies, the pressures coming from the
authorities were of a much more severe and far-reaching nature.
2.1. Non-western sub-contracting companies
At the beginning of 1997, the Kazakh government began talking about the need to boost
local employment by limiting the issuance of work permits to foreigners. Those debates
quickly found their reflection in the Law on Employment of the Population (1998). Under
the new law, the government limited the number of work permits available to foreigners
449 Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
450 Interview with a general director of a foreign drilling company: Almaty 10 September 2004.
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based on their areas of specialisation and geographic regions of origin.451 In 1998, the US
Embassy stated that: ‘Keeping out cheap, foreign labour that could potentially add to
Kazakhstan’s already significant number of unemployed was the original intention of the
law’.452 In August 2000, the government went one step further, and for the first time fixed
a quota for the foreign workforce,453 which until then had not been limited. According to
the Resolution, the quota for foreigner workforce imports in 2000 was fixed in the
amount of 7,000 persons, broken down into 5,025 in the sphere of engineering and 1,635
in the finance and economics fields.454 It is argued here that the prime target of those new
measures were the workers of sub-contracting companies all across oil-rich areas
including the Atyrau region, which had seen a considerable influx of non-Western sub-
contracting companies (chapter 5, sections 1.1, 1.2).
Thus in late 2000, shortly after the introduction of the quota system, the
Prosecutor’s Office in the Atyrau region brought to light a number of cases in which
foreign companies operating in the oil sector had breached Kazakh law by bringing in
foreign workers and specialists in those professions where they could be provided by
local labour. The Prosecutor of the Atyrau region, Mukhtar Zhorgenbayev, pointed out
that many of these companies were contractors of the TengizChevrOil joint venture.455 A
good example of a TengizChevrOil’s sub-contractor which was subsequently accused of
breaking the law is the Turkish Fintraco-TEPE construction company, which at the
beginning of the decade was in charge of building the ultra-modern administrative
headquarters for TengizChevrOil in the centre of Atyrau city. In November 2001, the
National Security Committee for the Atyrau region stated that during a routine check,
they had discovered that 91 employees of Fintraco-TEPE did not have permits to work in
Kazakhstan.456 Those 91 workers, together with 57 others who were also accused of
451 ‘2005 Investment Climate Statement – Kazakhstan,’ The Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/42065.htm (Accessed 21 August 2005).
452 ‘Kazakhstan: 1998 Investment Climate Statement’ US Embassy Almaty, Business Information Services
for the Newly Independent States, 30 June 1998. http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/980630kz.htm
(Accessed 12 June 2005).
453 Resolution 1219 ‘On fixing quota for employment of foreign citizens hired by the employers outside
Kazakhstan for the year 2000, and by profession groups.’
454 ‘Employment of Foreign Workforce in Kazakhstan: What changed with the introduction of quota for
2000,’ Petroleum Magazine, November 2000.
455 Khabar Television, 24 November 2000, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 24 November 2000.
456 Interfax, 13 November 2001.
167
lacking the necessary papers, were deported to Turkey in December 2001.457 It should be
pointed out that oil companies themselves, at least on some occasions, appeared to try to
bar such incidents from happening. For example, in April 2001, TengizChevrOil laid off
44 Ukrainian citizens who were also thought not to have the necessary documents.458
The co-operation between the regime and foreign oil companies on the issue of
local labour was reflected in the figures released by the foreign oil companies. When oil
companies issue data about the involvement of local labour, they should only include
people directly working for them. However in Kazakhstan, foreign oil companies actually
included non-Western subcontractors, which in turn allowed them to present a picture of
a considerable shift.459 For instance, in the Kyzrloda region, by 2002 over 1,700 local
staff were working at the oil-producing enterprises, and together with the servicing
companies this figure reached more than 5,000 employees.460 A director of one non-
Western company that worked in the Kyzrloda region – at the time when the data quoted
above were issued – stated that his company employed 1,000 people, of which Kazakhs
made up 80 per cent. Kazakh workers were mostly employed on a short-term contract
basis, and once their contracts were concluded they were dismissed. It should be added
that when the company came to Kazakhstan for the first time, it brought its own
workers.461 In 2001, it was also reported that on the Karachagank Project (Western
Kazakhstan) there were 12,000 people, of which only 3,278 were foreign specialists462.
Whereas in reality the increase in local labour working for the oil companies was
perhaps not as staggering as the numbers might suggest, it seemed to be enough to
convince people that the government cared for them. Those who lived and worked in the
Atyrau region and were very sceptical of the foreign companies admitted that the change
was real, and that more local people had begun working for the sub-contracting
companies after the measures were introduced.463 According to the official statistics, the
457 Khabar Television, 5 December 2001, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 5 December 2001.
458 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 3 April 2001.
459 Interview with a high representative of a governmental agency: Astana 8 December 2004.
460 ‘Serikbai Nurgisayes: The Subsoil Users Form the Basis of the Oblast’s Economy,’ Petroleum
Magazine, December 2002.
461 Interview with general manager of a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
462 ‘Karachaganak Import Substitution Program,’ Oil and Gas Kazakhstan Magazine, 1–2, 2001.
463 Interview with a specialist working for the local Oil Trade Union: Atyrau, 19 November 2004; Interview
with a journalist working for a local newspaper: Atyrau 23 November 2004.
168
level of officially registered unemployment in the region was 4.5 per cent in 2001, as
compared 7.3 per cent in 1999.464
In subsequent years, attacks on non-Western sub-contracting companies did not
die out, but rather seemed to become part of the daily life in the oil-rich regions.465 For
instance, in early 2005 in the Atyrau region, local authorities discovered 45 Turkish
citizens working illegally for a construction company which conducted work for
TengizChevrOil.466 Later on in the month, authorities accused 40 Indian citizens working
for an Indian construction company Punj Lloyd Kazakhstan, which is also a
TengizChevrOil sub-contractor, of lacking the necessary business visas.467 In March of
the same year, yet another group of 37 Turkish employees working for a Turkish sub-
contracting company were declared illegal.468 To some extent, non-Western sub-
contracting companies, at least in recent years, have made the attacks on local authorities
on them much easier due to their apparent mistreatment of the local labour.469 It was
reported that non-Western sub-contracting companies that actually hire a certain amount
of local labour often violate labour laws, do not provide social benefits, and have much
worse working conditions than Western companies. As one journalist put it: ‘social
benefits in the European company are on the European level, whereas in the Indian and
Pakistani companies they are on Indian or Pakistani level’.470 However, the most
problematic issue is the one of equal pay: non-Western sub-contracting companies refuse
to pay the same wage to local and outside workers. For instance, a Turkish, Indian, or
Chinese worker can earn per month as much as US $800, whereas Kazakh worker for the
same job will get only US $200.471
The issue of unequal pay was the main reason behind a strike of the Kazakh
workers in the village of Shanyrak in Atyrau Region, where 370 local workers employed
464 ‘Akim Serikbek Daukeev: Oil Enterprises are Vital for US,’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
465 In recent years Turkish companies were not only accused of favouring Turkish citizens over local labour
in Kazakhstan but also in neighbouring Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan: ‘Turkmen Riled by Turkish Firms’
Hiring Policies,’ IWRP, RCA No. 391, 28 June 2005; Simon Ostrovsky, ‘1,000 strike at US oil firm in
Azerbaijan,’ AFP, 22 November 2005.
466Kazakh Television first channel, 19 January 2005. Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 21 January 2005.
467 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 9 February 2005.
468 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 3 March 2005.
469 Interview with a specialist working for the local Oil Trade Union: Atyrau 19 November 2004.
470 Interview with a journalist: Almaty 29 October 2004.
471 Ibid.
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by the Indian company refused to work, arguing that Indian workers earned more than
they did and that the company did not provide them with the proper technical
equipment.472 In some instances, the discrepancies in wages even led to violent clashes
between two parties. One of the most vivid examples of tensions running high between
Kazakh and outside workers was a clash between the Kazakh and Turkish employees of
the Turkish construction company GATE Inssat, which was taking part in the
reconstruction of the Atyrau refinery. In April 2005, Kazakh workers accused Turkish
managers of mistreatment, and this dispute turned into a scuffle involving about 500
people, some of whom were armed with metal rods and bricks.473 The scuffle was
followed by an inspection of the local authority, which resulted in the deportation of
some of the Turkish workers.
2.2. A new approach?
So far we have argued that the main targets of the local authorities in the oil-rich regions
have been non-Western sub-contracting companies, not foreign oil companies or Western
sub-contractors and the like. That, however, began to change a few years after fixed
quotas were introduced for the first time. The growing confidence on the part of the
Kazakh authorities – which was brought about by the increase in oil prices, an influx of
various sub-contracting companies, (chapter 5, section 2.3; chapter 6, section 2.1), and
commitment of the foreign oil companies to Kazakhstan474 – resulted in spillovers of the
regime’s strategy from exclusively non-Western sub-contractors to Western sub-
contractors broadly understood, with one significant difference. In the case of non-
Western sub-contractors, the idea was to get as many Kazakh citizens working in
effectively low-skilled jobs. With regard to Western sub-contractors, however, the
government not only wants them to employ local labour, but also to train Kazakh citizens
472 Kazakhstan Television first channel, 26 October 2004. Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 26 October
2004.
473 Bagila Bukharbayeva, ‘Kazakh oil workers clash with Turkish supervisors over alleged mistreatment,’
AP Worldstream, 12 April 2005.
474 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since mid
1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
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so that they will obtain new skills, and in the long run will be able to replace Westerners
and others altogether.475
At the same time as the Kazakh authorities have increased their demands towards
Western sub-contractors, they have also steadily begun relaxing the fixed quota system,
which foreigners see as a major obstacle and complain about, at central as well as local
authority levels.476 In 2004, Kazakhstan allowed twice as many foreigners to work in the
country than in 2000, and the total number had risen to 16,500. A foreign diplomat
asserted that these strategies – on the one hand, the growing pressure on Western sub-
contractors, and on the other hand, the changes in the government’s policy – have been
elements of a carrot-and-stick approach that allows Nazarbayev’s regime simultaneously
to portray itself as the champion of the foreign investors and also uphold its image as a
defender of local labour.477 This admittedly clever strategy, however, yet again places
responsibility on the outsiders, whose own goal is not to train Kazakh workers but, to put
it crudely, to make money. Hence, the result is a rather mixed one.
A project manager working in the Kyzylorda region stated that in the last two
years, members of the local administration had been often visiting his firm, invoking the
government’s new guidelines, openly demanding of him that he employ Kazakh citizens,
and on occasions even suggesting in a straightforward fashion to install some of
themselves or their relatives, into managerial positions. These demands, however, have
proven difficult to realise, since it was pointed out that the representatives of the local
administration lacked the necessary work skills. Disputes ended in a sort of
‘compromise’, with the project manager agreeing to employ few workers and to pay them
relatively high wages while referring them to low skilled jobs. The project manager
pointed out that he favoured such settlements since it cost him less time and money than
to train local workers from scratch.478 Another area manager of a foreign sub-contracting
company, one that mainly operates in the the Aktyubinsk and Mangistau regions and
specialises in drilling, argued that in principle his company did not have any problem
with employing local labour, since they were after all cheaper than non-Kazakh labour.
475 Interview with a foreign diplomat: Almaty 12 October 2004.
476 Interview with an area manager of one of the world’s wide major drilling companies: Almaty 4 October
2004.
477 Ibid.
478 Interview with a project manager of a medium size drilling company: Almaty 8 September 2004.
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What constituted a problem, however, for the company was the low qualifications of the
local labour or their unfamiliarity with Western equipment. Moreover, those who on
paper seemed to be qualified for the job were not always so in reality:
All the people that come to me they have the right papers. They all come with
their book in which it will say that they are qualified labour. For example lets
take an assistant driller. The definition of the assistant driller in a Kazakh, Soviet
industry is entirely different from the definition of the assistance driller in a
Western oil business. An assistance driller on the North Sea, in the Far East can
actually work as an assistant to the driller in the event that the driller is taken ill
or has to go to the bathroom or something like that. The definition of the
assistance driller here is someone that helps the driller and that can be anyone of
the rig floor. But we do not have that, we define what a person is supposed to do.
In our system an assistant to the driller is defined as assistant to the driller, a
floor man is defined as floor man. Well you can say that it is a play on
terminology but everyone that you ask here will tell you “Yes of course I am an
assistant to the driller.479
Whereas the issue of who is a qualified driller in Kazakhstan and who is not should be
left to those that are authorities on the subject, from the political point of view one thing
is certain: the regime, in order to maintain its position as a defender of Kazakh interests,
has to come across as constantly putting the pressure on foreigners. This strategy can
easily work in relation to soft targets such as non-Western sub-contracting companies,
but will require the considerable agreement of foreign oil companies if it is to be
effective, as in the case of shifting the responsibility in the Atyrau region (section 1.3).
However, since the latter approach demands active pacting with oil companies, which are
difficult partners (discussed further in chapter 5, section 2.2), the regime will most likely
look for additional soft targets to address the issue of unemployment in the oil-rich
regions.480 For instance, in 2004 Atyrau’s local authorities argued that in recent years as
many as 33,000 Uzbek citizens had arrived in the region, most of whom were in
Kazakhstan illegally.481 Those Uzbek citizens were accused of destabilising the local
labour market, i.e. of taking jobs from the locals. It was suggested that whereas in Atyrau
the local workforce earned between 20,000 and 25,000 tenge per month [130–160 US
479 Interview with an area manager of one the worldwide major drilling companies: Almaty 4 October
2004.
480 Kazakhstan Television first channel, 20 January 2004. Source: BBC Monitoring Service 21 January
2004.
481 Quoted in Vremya, 8 January 2004, p. 2.
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dollars], Uzbek citizens were willing to work for two or three time less – between 12,000
and 15,000 tenge [77–97 dollars], thus depressing the local labour market.482
In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the development of
the co-operation between Nazarbayev’s regime and foreign oil companies that allowed
the regime to address the problems which mounted in the oil-rich areas during the late
1990s. In the following chapter, we will see that the dissatisfaction of the local population
was exploited by certain interest groups, which began demanding a greater share of the
oil spoils that in their opinion, in a highly centralised system, were going solely to the
people closest to the president. We will also see that the regime, in response to those
demands, further strengthened its co-operation with the foreign oil companies, which in
turn allowed it to successfully contain growing discontent.
482 Khabar Television, 1 Feb 2003. Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 1 February 2003; It was also reported
that behind such a large influx of outside labour are organised criminal gangs from the south of Kazakhstan
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, 31 August 2005).
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Chapter 5: The balancing act: the case of local content policy
In chapters 2 and 3, it was argued that the regime, in order to keep the NOC and major
engineering companies under its control, primarily used two mechanisms: clientelism and
Kazakhization. In this chapter, we argue that in the case of the local groups in the oil-rich
regions, the picture becomes somewhat more complicated as the equation of the oil
industry–regime is broadened by an additional actor: the foreign oil companies. The
involvement of outside actors in controlling oil-rich areas in Kazakhstan is not unique. In
chapter 4, we argued that the regime, in co-operation with foreign oil companies,
managed to ‘address’ grievances among the local population.
In this chapter, firstly, we will discuss the situation of the so-called local interest
groups in the oil-rich regions whose interests were largely omitted during the
privatisation phase. In addition, in the post-privatisation period, local interests – such as
major companies in Almaty (chapter 3, section 2.1) – were denied access to foreign oil
companies’ contracts due to far-reaching provisions written into the Subsoil law. Thus,
tensions between the regime and local interests developed as a result of the regime’s
actions. In the following pages, we will argue that discontent in the oil-rich areas (the
1999 Presidential elections discussed in chapter 4, section 1.1) allowed those interest
groups to voice their dissatisfaction with the position in which they found themselves.
We will further demonstrate that the dissatisfaction of the local interest groups with the
lack of sufficient business opportunities for themselves was one of the major reasons for
the introduction of the local content policy, which was partially aimed at appeasing local
interest groups. We will argue that another important motive for applying the local
content policy by 1999 was the pressure coming from major engineering companies in
Almaty and the north of the country (chapter 3, section 2.2).
Secondly, we will discuss the entire host of problems that the regime encountered
once it tried to implement the local content policy. Those problems stem from the fact
that in the second half of the 1990s, the Kazakh government gave foreign oil companies
far reaching provisions that were written into the oil contracts it signed with them, which
in turn made the introduction of the local content extremely problematic. The clash of
interests between companies and the regime led to a tug-of-war which was resolved
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through a compromise similar to the one discussed in chapter 4 (section 1.3.): foreign oil
companies were willing to give some concessions to the regime, and in turn the regime
let foreign oil companies carry on with their business in a largely unchanged fashion. We
will call this compromise a rapprochement process.
Thirdly, we will discuss the rise of local companies in the oil-rich regions since
the local content policy was introduced, along with the problems that they and other
small and medium-sized companies in Kazakhstan usually encounter. Next, we will argue
that Nazarbayev’s regime structured its relationship with local companies through
indirect co-operation with the foreign oil companies and their major sub-contractors. By
indirect co-operation, we understand a situation in which the regime, rather than
controlling local companies directly, has instead chosen to control them through
intermediates, namely the foreign oil companies and their sub-contractors. Thus,
departments of the foreign oil companies responsible for selecting local companies
employ people close to the regime structures. This has a direct impact on the decision-
making process that determines which local company the foreign oil company is going to
employ and which not. Moreover, we will demonstrate that foreign oil companies that
forged alliances of convenience with local authorities also tend to listen to their
suggestions about which local companies foreigners should co-operate with. We will
argue that the roots of the co-operation between the regime and the foreign oil companies
follow in a straightforward line from the rapprochement process.
1. Local interest groups and their discontents
The centralisation of power in the mid-1990s (chapter 2, sections 3.1 and 3.3) denied
regional leaders in the oil-rich regions ‘a sphere of influence to which they believed they
were entitled – [playing a substantial role in determining] the terms of privatisation and
foreign investment’ (Luong 2000a: 7). In real terms, this development meant that all the
major decisions concerning foreign investment were going to be made on a central level,
and that regional leaders in effect would have little influence over the future dealings of
foreign oil companies in their respective regions. It should be mentioned that in this
centralised system, decisions concerning the course of the Kazakh oil sector were made
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in very close co-operation with the foreign oil companies, since the regime was desperate
to attract further investments and was willing to give oil companies far-reaching
concessions in order to do so (chapter 3, section 2.1).
The post-1995 structural arrangement, in which local leaders were isolated from
the decision making process further down the local network ladder, initially spelled out
no (or very little) access to the oil money for various local interest groups (clients) (who
depended on the regional leaders (patrons) to pave the way to the ‘corridors’ of
petrodollars).483 The local interest groups – at least in the Atyrau region on which we will
primarily focus in this chapter – at the end of the 1990s were made up of various cross-
cutting networks that consisted of local businessman (mostly ex-directors of medium size
state owned enterprises), senior bureaucrats, ex-apparatchiks (including their children and
relatives) as well as criminal elements.484 This reliance of the local interest groups on
regional leaders should not be underestimated. Luong (2002) argued that Soviet policies
and institutions in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics
created structural incentives for elites and masses alike to shift the locus of their
identities from tribe and Islam to region, and to personally invest in regional
rather than national political identities by simultaneously fostering interregional
political and economic competition at the republican level and creating an
intricate system of patronage networks at the regional level. (p.62) [Within this
system…] the chief executive in a given territory, the obkom first secretary
became the prime dispenser of political and economic resources at the regional
and local level, and skilfully used this position to build loyalty and support
throughout his oblast. (p. 67)
In the case of the Kazakh oil-rich regions, the monopoly of the centre on the relationships
with the oil companies, and the sparse involvement of the regional leaders, meant that the
leaders would not be able to influence the process of allocating small service,
construction and supply contracts by the oil companies or their major sub-contractors.485
It should be kept in mind that the oil industry related contracts were highly desired, since
483 The regional leaders such as Atyrau’s akim, Cherdabayev, and other key oil families established their
own networks with foreign oil companies that were discussed in chapters 2 (section 3.3) and 3 (section
3.3). However, it should be said that during my fieldwork, I did not find any substantial evidence that the
alliance between Cherdabayev, his brothers and oil companies ensured access of the local interests groups
to oil or oil connected ventures in any meaningful way.
484 Interviews Kazakhstan: Autumn 2004.
485 Interview with business development manager working for a major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004.
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they meant that locals would have a stable income for a considerable amount of time in
what was and still is a highly unstable business environment.486
1.1. Local interest groups in the oil-rich regions: the case of the Atyrau region
Due to the shift from the peripheries to the centre in the late 1990s, local officials, ex-
apparatchiks and emerging businesspeople in the Atyrau region had seen little if any of
the petrodollars about which President Nazarbayev spoke in his speeches by the end of
1990s, and the chances for any economic improvements seemed slim. Firstly, the most
lucrative venture in the oil-rich areas was for the oil exploration of the small oil fields
that were discovered during the Soviet era, and in some instances partly exploited;
however, these were taken over from the locals by various people with close ties to the
officials in Almaty or Astana (chapter 2, section 3.3). Secondly, most of the small- and
medium-sized service contracts that foreign oil companies granted in the late 1990s
overwhelmingly went to what Kazakhs call third world companies. In the 1990s, those
‘third world companies’ were, in most cases, Turkish in origin. Moreover, the regime
tacitly supported such arrangements, through not openly criticising the lack of
opportunities for local business. In some instances in the mid-1990s, ‘third world
companies’ or non-Western sub-contractors secured the protection of people close to
Nazarbayev by bribing them. However, apart from bribes, the conditions structurally set
up by the far-reaching provisions in the Subsoil law of 1995 were the main reasons why
non-Kazakh companies were allowed to enter the Kazakh market (chapter 3, section 2.1).
In the Atyrau region, the first small- and medium-sized service firms began
emerging in the years 1995–1996. The intention behind the creation of many of those
firms was to obtain small service contracts – especially in the area of drilling – from the
foreign oil companies’ major sub-contractors.487 However, this proved rather difficult.
The foreign oil companies and their subcontractors argued that those newly created
companies had at their disposal only outdated equipment, and suffered from the lack of
new technologies. Another major problem was the shortage of qualified specialists able
486 Interview with a director of a small machinery plant: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
487 Interview with a executive director of a local oil company: Atyrau 16 November 2004.
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to work in the oil industry. One commentator put it down to the fact that many Russians,
who allegedly had the necessary expertise, had left the Atyrau region in the mid-1990s.488
Some of those who were involved in major projects, such as Tengiz in the second half of
the 1980s, strongly disagreed with the oil companies’ point of view. One director pointed
out that Tengiz was built with the participation of companies from all across the Soviet
Union, and that in the initial stages Americans as well as their sub-contractors were using
actual equipment from Soviet times.489 Hence, in his view, the foreign oil companies
were applying double standards – on the one hand working on Soviet equipment while on
the other discriminating against it. Another example that he quoted was the Pavlodar
refinery, which was built – almost exclusively – by Kazakh companies in the 1980s. At
its peak, 8,000 people worked on the site of the project, and ‘it does not seem that they’ve
done such a bad job’.490
The view quoted above, however worth keeping in mind, seems to be held only by
a minority who tend to speak with unhidden nostalgia about Soviet industry. In chapter 3
(section 2.1), it was demonstrated that the majority of directors that I talked to, who were
working in the 1980s on projects such as Tengiz and Pavlodar, openly admitted that the
equipment they were using was largely inadequate, especially when confronted with the
demands of Western companies. Moreover, in Atyrau, businesspeople that happened to
work with local service companies in the mid-1990s stated that those early attempts at
setting up firms that specialised in such activities as drilling were largely a failure.491
Thus, the lack of co-operation between small-sized service companies and foreign oil
companies in the mid-1990s was put down to the reasons presented by the oil companies,
and did not seem to produce any substantial grievances among local interest groups. In
other words, it was poor technical capability rather than a lack of connections that
disqualified those small-sized service companies.
At the same time, ex-apparatchiks, local businessman (and most likely criminal
elements) were not willing to reconcile this so easily with the fact that the great bulk of
the construction works, especially those commissioned by the foreign oil companies,
488 Interview with journalist specialising in oil: Almaty 1 November 2004.
489 Interview with a general director of a major construction company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
490 Ibid.
491 Interview with a financial director working for a local oil company: Atyrau 18 November 2004.
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were not going to Atyrau’s companies but to non-Kazakh ones, of which the
overwhelming majority came from Turkey. Those companies were sub-contracted by
Bechtel to build virtually everything in the case of Tengiz, as well as later on during the
Kashagan project492 (chapter 3, section 2.1). The discontent of local interest groups
originated from observing the way in which these non-Kazakh companies were working.
It should be recognised that at the beginning of the nineties, any outside companies were
assumed to be superior to Kazakh ones in every respect: ‘but then you see how they work
and you understand that they are not doing it any better than you would do it. People see
these things’.493
It was stated that the people responsible for this situation were those in the centre
of the country, who granted access to the Kazakh market to foreign firms without paying
any attention to regional interests.494 As one director put it:
In principle people in Atyrau are very tolerant. But why to bring companies
from the third world countries if Kazakh companies can do the same for less
money (…) The way how it happened was that he [Turkish, Indian, Pakistani
businessman] came to Kazakhstan with a suitcase full of money which he gave
to two, three people that make all the important decisions. They did it because
they knew that in a few years time they will leave Kazakhstan with ten
suitcases. They [non-Kazakh companies] had very good personal contacts with
many important people in Astana495.
It should be added that at the end of the 1990s, this view was shared by other
businesspeople who felt that their construction, transport, assembling and service
companies scattered all around Kazakhstan were losing contracts to non-Western sub-
contracting companies.496 Some of them also argued that the investments made in Atyrau
and other oil-rich regions were not real investments in the first place: ‘let’s say a
company comes to Kazakhstan and they declare that they will invest US$100; however,
492 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since the mid-
1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
493 Interview with the chief accountant working for a major foreign oil company: Atyrau 23 November
2004.
494 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
495 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
496 Interview with an oil expert: Almaty 17 September 2004.
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out of this $100 as much as $90 will be taken by the non-Kazakh companies who will
buy foreign equipment and employ foreign labour’.497
Others fiercely complained about companies from outside of Kazakhstan, which
only specialised in supplying foreign oil companies and their subcontractors: ‘after all it
is not so difficult to call a British or German company that produces, for instance, spare
parts, to sign a contract with them and bring that stuff over to Kazakhstan’.498 Arguably,
it was supplying companies that most of the local notables had their eyes fixed on, since
this sort of activity does not require a big investment, but promises quick and lucrative
returns, provided that foreign oil companies or their subcontractors are willing to enter
into long-term contracts.
1.2. Discontent
Ironically, it was Nazarbayev and those close to him who allowed the criticism of this
situation, in which outsiders were favoured over locals, to become openly pronounced
through their decision to send Tasmagambetov to the Atyrau region to implement the
‘shifting the responsibility strategy’ in 1999 (see chapter 4, section 1.3). Recall that the
premise behind this shifting of the responsibility was that the oil companies did not do
enough for the oil-rich regions, which inevitably implied that the regime was admitting
that the mistakes had been made during the privatisation process. By the end of the
1990s, the view that regional interests were ignored during privatisation became
acceptable to such extent that it was openly pronounced by various officials, including
those who were directly appointed by Nazarbayev to the regions. For example, the akim
of the Kyzrloda region, Serikbai Nurgisaye, stated:
I believe that during privatization the interests of regions were not taken into
account at all. For instance, in the privatization contract on JSC Yuzhneftegas
our interest was recognized by one point, i.e., that the investor would allocate
$10 m. to complete the construction of hospital. The contracts’ provisions do not
497 Interview with a director of a small machinery plant: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
498 Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 29 October 2004.
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contain obligations to make payments for social and economic development of
the region, or deductions to municipal facilities.499
To some extent, such open criticism of the government’s actions could arguably take
place since the regime’s shifting the responsibility strategy created room for it; but it also
simultaneously took the sting out of those criticisms. After all, shifting the responsibility
was all about the centre finally caring for the welfare of the oil-rich regions at the
expense of the foreign oil companies (with their tacit agreement, as we have seen).
Having said all of that, statements as the one made by Kyzylorda’s akim
nevertheless reflected the mounting dissatisfaction of the local interest groups. The oil
experts500 and people working for the national agency501 that I interviewed argued that
the growing criticism of the regime’s action in the oil-rich regions – which pronounced
itself so vividly during the 1999 presidential elections – gave those groups a perfect
opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction against the centralised post-1995 system that
favoured those with close ties to the centre rather than the peripheries. Hence, this was a
system in which local groups were the inevitable losers. Moreover, the regime’s actions,
which were aimed at appeasing dissatisfaction among ordinary people in the oil-rich
regions, were not sufficient from the local interest groups’ point of view. Whereas these
interest groups, as it was said in chapter 4 (section 1.3), saw this shifting the
responsibility strategy to be a positive development, they argued that it nevertheless did
not create sufficient business opportunities for them.502
This boldness on the part of local interest groups, to a very large extent, can be
assigned to Tasmagambetov’s actions in lifting the barriers separating locals from the
foreign oil companies, which now became tangible.503 Moreover, Tasmagambetov in
some ways showed the way in which money can be made when foreign oil companies are
pushed by the political heavyweights. According to an opposition journalist, the public
works that were carried out for the 100th anniversary – at the expense of the foreign oil
499 ‘Serikbai Nurgisayev: "Our Aim is to Get into the Top Three Oil Producing Regions in the Country," ’
Petroleum, May 2000.
500 Interview with an oil expert: Almaty 2 November 2004; Interview with oil expert: Almaty 17 September
2004.
501 Interview with a high representative of a governmental agency: Astana 8 December 2004.
502 Ibid.; At the end of the 1999, in the Atyrau region there were 55 joint ventures and 158 foreign
companies. (numbers quoted in) Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, 4 October 1999.
503 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
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companies – were done by companies connected to Tasmagambetov, which considerably
inflated the costs they incurred. For instance, the renovation of the bridge in the city-
centre were reported to cost 3.5 million dollars, whereas in reality the costs did not
surpass even half of the sum. Moreover, the renovation of the small Orthodox Church
alone supposedly amounted to 3 million dollars, when in Atyrau (taking under
consideration labour costs) one could build at least one new church for the same amount
of money. Finally, the cost of laying asphalt on six streets was around 42 times higher
than it should have been.504
The steadily growing discontent among local interest groups in the oil-rich
regions with the existing arrangements can be demonstrated through the example of the
Kyzylorda region, where local interest groups began aggressively targeting the Canadian
company Hurricane Hydrocarbons. Thus, they took the initiative in their own hands
despite the state policy which said that the centre had a monopoly on all dealings with
the foreign oil companies. As it was noted in chapters 2 (section 3.2) and 4 (section 1),
in 1996 Hurricane Hydrocarbons acquired Yuzhneftegas, which had begun developing
the Kumkol oil fields in 1989. However, it should be recognised that when Hurricane
took over Yuzhneftegas, it not only became the owner of the fields, but also acquired a
wide range of supporting operations including
a road building company, a farm covering some 2,500 square miles (6,400
square kilometres) with 25,000 sheep, 450 camels, and a number of cattle (…),
a transportation company responsible, among other things, for transporting
employees from Kyzl Orda to Kumkol, a trading company to sell items receive
as payment in barter transactions, 11 gasoline stations, and a construction
company to build facilities at the field as well as housing in Kyzl Orda. (Peck
2004: 159)
One of the first changes that Hurricane made in 1996 was to remove ‘autonomy from all
individual division managers and centralise all purchase and sales decisions’ (Peck 2004:
160). This rearrangement in the structure of the company inevitably led to the removal of
the Soviet bosses from the company, which in turn upset the networks that had been
developing since the beginning of the 1990s.505 In response to that, ex-directors and local
504 Interview with oppositional journalist: Atyrau 22 November 2004.
505 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004.
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officials attempted to wrestle from Hurricane some of the assets over which they used to
have control. Thanks to their connections with the local police and officials from the
akim’s office etc., the ex-directors were able to constantly harass Hurricane and take over
the transport division and the road construction units,506: ‘it was impossible for them to
put up with the pressure’.507 Their next demand was for Hurricane to sub-contract what
used to be its transport division, which now became a private transport company. It
should be added that the new owners of the transport company substantially increased the
costs of transport services when compared to what they had cost Hurricane before it was
forced to sell the transport unit.508 It was also reported that the transport company was
the first case of wrestling from Hurricane various assets; in subsequent years other units
also shared the fate of the transport company.509
The dissatisfaction expressed by the local interest groups took on a new
dimension once they were joined by the major construction and engineering companies
based primarily in Almaty and the north of Kazakhstan (chapter 3, sections 2.1 and 2.2).
It was reported that the main pressure came from the ‘Association of Equipment and
Service Providers for Oil and Gas Industry’, which consists of about 25 companies.510
The members of the association argued that they had every right to greater co-operation
with foreign oil companies, since by 1999–2000, most of them had managed to obtain
ISO certificates, which were seen as a sort of passport enabling the engineering
companies to work with the foreign companies. Moreover, in the second half of the
1990s, some of those companies had already managed to obtain substantial contracts
from the foreign oil companies’ subcontractors with the help of people close to the
President.511 During the duration of those contracts, the directors and managers of the
companies had the time to observe and adjust their companies to a Western way of
working. Moreover, they began to see space for themselves in a growing Kazakh oil
506 Ibid.




510 Interview with oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004; Interview with a local specialist working for the
foreign embassy: Almaty 27 September 2004.
511 Interview with vice-director of NOC KazMunaiGas subsidiary: Atyrau 25 November 2004.
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sector.512 The companies that obtained those contracts were predominantly those that
used to be a part of the industrial–military sector in the Soviet Union.513 What those
companies demanded foremost from the government now was some sort of coherent
strategy that would aim at promoting local companies.514
The criticism voiced by local interest groups, and later on also groups from the
centre, gained additional weight with the change at the apex of power, namely the arrival
of the team (chapter 3, section 2.2.) which – at least in terms of rhetoric – strongly
supported Kazakh national interests. In Balgymbayev own words:
The state should always think about its own production and resource base and
domestic operators, who can give reasonable odds in a competition with
foreign operators. The domestic operators should be given access to new
technologies in organisation of production and management; in other words, to
learn to work effectively like the leading foreign companies.515
Balgymbayev’s government spelled bad news for the non-Kazakh companies, whose
authorities were now willing to replace Kazakh companies;516 as one director put it when
referring to the late 1990s: ‘we squeezed Turks from the Kazakh market’.517 In chapter 4
(section 2.1), it was demonstrated that the Nazarbayev’s regime did not feel in any way
obliged to protect the interests of the non-Kazakh companies or to campaign strongly for
replacing foreign workers with Kazakhs when the issue of employment became a serious
matter. However, the end of the support from the people close to the apex of power for
the non-Kazakh companies did not mean that now foreign oil companies and their major
subcontractors would automatically begin employing Kazakh companies. For that to
happen, foreign oil companies would have to give up the far-reaching concessions that
512 Interview with a director of a major engineering company: Almaty 22 September 2004.
513 Ibid.
514 Interview with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau 12 November 2004.
515 ‘Nurlan Balgymbayev: Privatisation of KazakhOil is Currently Unprofitable for the State,’ Petroleum
Magazine, November 2000.
516 Interview with person close to Kazakh business community: Almaty 14 September 2004.
517 Interview with a director of a medium-sized subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004. This
statement is somewhat overoptimistic, as in late 2004 in Astana Turkish flags waved on every major
construction site. That can be explained by the fact that Turkish companies that were still in Kazakhstan
signed their contracts in the mid-1990s. Thus, they would remain in Kazakhstan until their contracts were
concluded. See also chapter 4 (section 2.1).
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the Kazakh government had made to them in the mid-1990s, which initially they were not
willing to do.
To sum up, in this section we have discussed the basis for the discontent among
local interest groups that erupted at the end of the 1990s. This discontent, as has just been
demonstrated, was treated seriously by the regime once these groups were joined by the
major engineering companies from other parts of the country. The response of the regime
in the shape of its local content policy will be the focus of the next section. This will
further advance our argument that the grievances of the local interest groups were seen by
the regime as potentially dangerous.
2. Nazarbayev’s response: enforcing local content policy and rapprochement
In order to fully understand nature of the regime’s response to the mounting
dissatisfaction in the oil-rich regions, we have to focus on the boundaries that the regime
had to manoeuvre within; in effect, we have to understand what the regime could do and
what it could not in order to address the issue of the interest groups. By the boundaries
that conditioned Nazarbayev’s regime actions, we mean the legal framework – made up
of two key elements: a) the Subsoil Law; and b) provisions in the oil contract – that were
developed by Tereshchenko’s and Kazhegeldin’s governments throughout the 1990s with
Nazarbayev’s unquestionable approval. We will demonstrate that the regime, due to
constraints written in the oil contracts, very early on accepted the fact that it can exert
only a certain amount of pressure on the foreign oil companies and began a process of
rapprochement with the companies. The process of rapprochement, in its fundamental
nature, was a logical continuation of the pact that Tasmagambetov had made with the
foreign oil companies during his short reign as an akim of an Atyrau region.
2.1. Enforcing local content policy
So far, it has been argued that since the centralisation of power in 1995, groups from the
centre (due to their proximity to the president and the national oil company) were able to
secure access for predominantly non-Kazakh sub-contracting companies to the Kazakh
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market, in turn creating dissatisfaction among locals (Section 1.1; see also chapter 3,
section 2.1). The line of argument of the local interest groups seemed to be that if they
enjoyed a similar kind of protection, they would benefit more equally from the presence
of the foreign oil companies in the regions. However, whereas by 1999–2000 the regime
was willing to shift its support from non-Kazakh to local companies, a new obstacle
emerged, namely the issue of concessions that the regime gave to the foreign oil
companies. This included granting them the sole right to decide with whom they wanted
to work.
The first major sign that the government had begun addressing the issue of the
local interest groups – and hence, that it was viewing discontent among those groups to
be serious – came in September 1999 with a number of amendments to the Subsoil Law
(chapter 3, section 2.1). The 1999 amendments most importantly gave the state a greater
role in the process of allocation of the sub-contracting contracts by the foreign oil
companies. This revised Subsoil law, similarly to the 1995 version, required subsoil users
to use equipment, materials, and products manufactured in Kazakhstan, and the services
of Kazakh enterprises. Moreover, amendments also said that foreign services could only
be used when the required services did not exist within the Republic of Kazakhstan;
further, it stressed that this could only happen when the authorised state body had granted
prior permission.518 This point was further reinforced in the Resolution of the Republic of
Kazakhstan from 31 July 2001, which specified that ‘in the absence of this or that
equipment, material, service or qualified labour force on the domestic market, subsoil
users can use services of foreign organizations only after approval of authorised state
bodies’.519 In order to underscore its commitment to the new measure, in early 2000 the
Kazakh government announced that it had set up a special commission to monitor the
activity of foreign companies investing in the oil industry.520 Moreover, at the beginning
of 2001, implementation of the local content policy was listed by Nazarbayev as a third
518 Marla Valdez, Almas Zhaiylgan, ‘A Legal Overview of Mining in Kazakhstan,’ May 2002,
http://www.dentonwildesapte.com/assets/L/LegalOverviewMiningKazakhstan_May02.pdf (Accessed 15
September 2004); Marla Valdez, ‘Commentary on Amendments to Petroleum Law in Kazakhstan,’ 3 April
1999. http://www.dentonwildesapte.com/PDF/Commentary_PetrLawInKazakh_Apr1999.pdf (Accessed 23
February 2004).
519 Petroleum Magazine, November 2001.
520 ‘Kazakhstan sets up commission to monitor oil companies’ activities,’ Alexander’s Gas and Oil
Connections, 5 (7), 27 April 2000.
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priority task for the government in the upcoming year, while the development of small
business and entrepreneurship was in fourth position.521
In addition to introducing crucial changes in the legal framework, the regime
initiated a series of high profile actions aimed at promoting the vital interests of the
Kazakh local companies in the oil-rich regions. Those actions were carried out in spirit:
‘we [the authorities] knew that the problem of sub-contractors did exist, however, we
were preoccupied with much more important issues such as sky rocketing unemployment.
Now we will pay more attention to the problem of local content’.522 Thus, in 2001 the
Kazakh authorities organised a conference in Atyrau city entitled ‘Western Kazakhstan
Local Content and Infrastructural Development’ which was designed to ‘bring together
representatives of Kazakhstan enterprises and foreign oil industry investors to learn of
each other’s capabilities and requirements, in line with the Kazakhstan Government’s
programme’.523 One year later, yet another exhibition took place, with a special focus on
the construction ‘North Caspian Infrastructure Development Exhibition’.524 In addition,
Balgymbayev on numerous occasions toured Kazakhstan and met with representatives of
various major construction and machine-building companies.525 Finally, and most
importantly, the government: a) carried out so-called amnesties so that Kazakhs ‘would
invest money into their country’;526 and b) in 2002, for the first time, Kazakh authorities
tried to come to grips with the most important issue, namely, that of international
standards (especially ISO 9000 and ISO 14000), whose implementation was activated
after an adoption of the government resolution, ‘On Republican Programme: Quality’ as
of 2 May 2002.
521 ‘Seven Tasks of the Government,’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2001.
522 Interview with journalist specialising in oil: Almaty 1 November 2004.
523 ‘Atyrau hosts major import substitution conference’, Kazakhstan News Bulleting Released weekly by the
Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, 2 (10), 3 May 2001.
524 Marina Kuanysheva, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 2 April 2002.
Exhibitions in other oil-rich regions followed. For example, in June 2002 National Import Substitution
Conference took place in Aktau, Mangystau region.
http://www.kazpravda.kz/archive/02_04_2002/e_e.html#e_e5 (Accessed 27 May 2005).
525 ‘KazakhOil Develops Co-operation with Domestic companies,’ Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine,
No 1-2, 2001.
526 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since mid
1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004; In 2001, some 200 million US dollars were transferred from the shadow
economy to the legal one. About 1,000 people were affected by the campaign. (Quoted in) ITAR/TASS, 13
July 2001; See also: Kazat Berentaev, ‘Legalising the illegal,’ Vremia Po, 25 May 2001.
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The government’s actions were followed by sporadic attacks by officials on the
foreign oil companies. For example, in 2001 Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev
expressed his dissatisfaction with the low level of involvement of Kazakh companies in
sub-contracted work at the Karachaganak oil and gas condensate deposit. The share of
these companies, in Tokayev’s opinion, should have increased from 21 per cent to 40 per
cent. He also demanded the establishment of a joint commission for the management of
the Karachagank project, which had to include four Kazakh government representatives
and four representatives from Karachagank Integral Company (KIO).527 Tokayev’s
demands concerning the percentage of the local companies employed by foreigners was a
considerable shift in the position of the Kazakh government. Only in 2000, the vice-
president of NOC KazakhOil, Zhakyp Marabayev, had said that ‘the Kazakhs companies
will be granted access to this major project without any priorities or preferences, but on
the conditions that they will fully meet Western standards’.528 A quota system was not
even on the agenda. This substantial radicalisation, conveyed in the comments of the top
officials who now not only demanded greater involvement of the state but also argued for
a quota system, signalled a major shift that took place in Kazakhstan, reaching its peak in
2002.
In 2002, the aforementioned Imangaly Tasmagambetov (chapter 4, section 1.3),
speaking in his capacity as Prime Minister, openly called for the renegotiation of
contracts as well as advocating the exertion of control over the foreign oil companies’
procurement practices. He argued that they should at least source 25 per cent of their
content locally. Moreover, the tender process should be overlooked by the representatives
of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, who would also have the power to
approve the terms and results of tenders (Tsalik 2003: 133). Tasmagambetov remarks
were reflected in the decree adopted in June 2002, ‘Rules for the Procurement of Goods,
Works and Service When Carrying out Petroleum Operations’. In essence, the decree
further reinforced the 1999 amendments to the Subsoil law, as it established mandatory
procedures for procurement by a contractor when carrying out petroleum operations:
‘project operators will organise the tenders and define the suitable provider, and Kazakh
527 Interfax, 3 April 2001; Altynay Mukhambedyarova, ‘Kazakhstan presses the oil companies.’ Navigator,
14 February 2001.
528 ITAR-TASS, 10 November 2000.
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government agencies will endorse or annul the contract’.529 The measure concerning the
fact that a ministry should monitor the performance of concluded contracts was
reinforced in yet another resolution passed in November 2002.530
The changes introduced by the Kazakh government between 1999 and 2002
created widespread anger among western investors, who saw the increasing government
control over their operations as an infringement of their right to free entrepreneurial
activity (Chentsova 2003). Some argued that the new regulations contained a number of
provisions contradicting the Constitution, Civil Code and other Kazakh laws.531 The
foreign oil companies went so far as to mobilize the support of their own home
governments for the abrogation of the new rules. In mid-2002, the ambassadors of the
USA, Canada and several European nations sent a joint letter to the Kazakh government
asking it to cancel the new measures it had introduced.532 The US companies were
particularly unhappy with the changes in the legislations, since as early as 1994 they had
received special provisions in the U.S.–Kazakhstan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT),
which explicitly states in Article II Paragraph 5, ‘neither party shall impose performance
requirements…which specify that goods be purchased locally…’533. Protests on behalf of
the foreign governments, especially the US one, gained added significance in the light of
the fact that in the 1990s, two senior officials, Condoleezza Rica and Dick Cheney, had
worked for the companies which were now coming under attack in Kazakhstan.534
Despite these protests, the Kazakh government did not revoke its controversial measures,
and even tried to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the foreign oil companies and their
subcontractors. In 2002, Nurlybek Imanbyave, the Minister for Industry and Trade,
advanced further the ‘cause’ of promoting Kazakh companies through setting up a
529 Sergei Gavrichev, ‘Kazakhstan Rulez: Private companies in Kazakhstan will have to choose contractor
with Government consent,’ RusEnergy, October 2002.
530 ‘Resolution 1204 of the Government of Kazakhstan of 14 November 2002. On measures strengthening
the state support of domestic manufactures’, Petroleum Magazine, 2002 December.
531 Zhumageldy Yelubayev, ‘The hierarchy of legal acts or once again about the omnipotence of
departmental instructions.’ Petroleum Magazine, December 2003.
532 Sergei Gavrichev , op. cit., October 2002.
533 Judith Robinson, ‘1999 Amendments to Law on Petroleum,’ BISNIS International Trade Specialist,
January 2000.
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/000112kzlg.htm (Accessed 3 May 2004).
534 Nicholas Lemann, ‘Profiles: Without Doubt. Has Condoleezza Rica changed George W. Bush or has he
changed her?’ The New Yorker, 7 October 2002; Jane Mayer, ‘Contract Sport. What did the Vice-President
do for Halliburton?’ The New Yorker, 9 February 2004; for more about Halliburton and Dick Cheney, see
Briody 2004: 191––239.
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Contract Agency devoted to the issue of the participation of domestic manufacturers in
Kazakh oil and gas projects535 (see also section 2.3).
At first glance, it appears that the magnitude of the regime’s attacks on foreign oil
companies was disproportionate. After all, the Kazakh government had changed the 1995
Subsoil law and the foreign companies, however unhappy they might be with the new
situation, could not do anything about it apart from protesting. Chapter 4 (section 1.3)
showed that representatives of the regime and foreign oil companies were perfectly
capable of reaching agreements without the need for disputes turning into open warfare.
It is argued here that the regime was so aggressive in its attack because whereas it could
change the Subsoil Law and play a greater part in monitoring the process of selecting the
companies, it however could not directly force foreign oil companies into working with a
designated percentage of the local companies. For this to happen, the issues of quotas
would have to be raised in the oil contracts themselves, which had hitherto not been the
case.536
In chapter 1 (section 1.1), it was argued that provisions concerning local content
are a standard clause, which by the mid-1990s were automatically written into any PSA
or JV contract. In most of the cases, requirements to use local content do not exceed 40
per cent, but in some cases such as Russia, Western investors operating under PSAs have
to buy 70 per cent of essential equipment and machines from local producers.537 The
provisions made in the contracts are essential, since once the deal is done it is virtually
impossible for the host country to go back and renegotiate the contracts without taking
drastic steps such as the re-nationalisation of the oil sector. The director of a major sub-
535 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 16 May 2003.
536 An alternative explanation to the one put forward here, was provided by Sergei Gavrichev, who in 2002
argued that the Kazakh government was so aggressive in enforcing local content policy because in the last
two years (2000-2001) foreign companies had substantially decreased their payments to the central budget.
The companies argued that the payments decreased because of low world oil prices. However, Prime
Minister Tasmagambetov seemed to believe that low prices were just a pretext for tax evasion. Thus, he
decided to apply non-standard methods of increasing the influx of petrodollars (RusEnergy, October 2002).
Whereas I do not argue that this decrease of the budgetary payments was one of the additional reasons for
the aggressive behaviour of the Kazakh government, I suggest that it was not the only one, and in fact most
likely not the most important when viewed from the perspective of the local interest groups and large
engineering companies. Moreover, in my opinion the Kazakh government attempted to address the issue of
budgetary payments by starting its discussion with Chevron (chapter 6, section 2.1) and not through the
local content policy.
537 ‘A Note on Production Sharing in Russia,’ United Nations Survey: Economic Survey of Europe. 3, 1998.
http://www.unece.org/ead/pub/surv_993.htm (Accessed 4 June 2004).
190
contracting company noted that oil contracts include the so-called grandfather clauses
‘which protect the contract from any subsequent change in the legislation, otherwise the
government changes next month and they can change your PSA agreement’.538 A high-
ranking person working for one of the major projects in Kazakhstan argued along the
same lines: ‘this PSA was signed in 1997 and changes in laws do not really affect us. We
are protected against changes in the law. We are sort of untouchable’.539
Moreover, oil contracts in most cases are kept secret – they are not disclosed to
third parties – especially those sections that deal with the issue of taxes, royalties,
bonuses and the like. The Kazakh regime also chose to follow the path of secrecy, and to
date has not disclosed any information about either JV or PSAs that it concluded with
foreign oil companies throughout the 1990s, including any provisions concerning local
content. Whereas all paragraphs regarding local content are kept secret, Kazakh
businesspeople in Almaty and Atyrau are deeply convinced that each contract has a
clause that deals with the issue of local content. Yet, they ‘naturally’ could not provide
any detail, since contracts are not disclosed to the public.540
However, we assert that provisions concerning local content were not made in
those contracts themselves, and that the regime’s attacks – discussed in this section –
stem from that very fact. By that, we mean that a regime aware of the lack of necessary
conditions attempted to force foreign oil companies into working with local companies
by changing the Subsoil law and attacking foreign oil companies. Nevertheless, foreign
oil companies do not have to co-operate with local companies even after the Subsoil Law
has been substantially revisited, since they are protected by oil contracts that effectively
override all national laws. I base this claim on the number of interviews that I conducted
with a Kazakh journalist,541 a high representative of a government agency,542 a foreign
diplomat,543 an ex-director of a foreign oil company,544 and a well-informed foreign
538 Interview with an area manager of one the world wide major drilling companies: Almaty 4 October
2004.
539 Interview with the chief accountant working for a major foreign oil company: Atyrau 23 November
2004.
540 Interviews with various Kazakh businessman: Kazakhstan, Fall 2004.
541 Interview with journalist specialising in oil: Almaty 1 November 2004.
542 Interview with a high representative of a governmental agency: Astana 8 December 2004.
543 Interview with foreign diplomat: Almaty 27 September 2004.
544 Interview with ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
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specialist.545 During the interviews, all five noted546 that in the oil contracts there was no
provision concerning local content, a fact that the government was desperate not to make
public.547 Moreover, a manager working for a major oil company in the world, one which
works in Kazakhstan under the PSA agreement, openly stated that even after the Subsoil
Law had been amended, the company did not feel any pressure to employee local
companies.548 Hence, if a foreign oil company chooses to work with the local company, it
does so because it suits the company and not because it is obliged to do so.
The claim concerning the lack of necessary provisions was also expressed in an
article written in 2003 by two oil lawyers, Chentsova and Brainina, in which they argued
that the great majority of contracts negotiated and concluded prior to September 1999
‘expressly stipulate that the Contractor has a right to free purchase of work, services and
goods, including from foreign manufacturers’ (2003: 20). Domjan argued along the same
lines: ‘local companies do not know what opportunities a particular PSA affords them,
nor whether there are any special provisions for the oil company meeting their
requirements that might help local companies access the oil company’s value chain’.549
Having said all of that, a contract manager working for a major sub-contracting company
in the Atyrau region, during my interview with him, affirmed that in the contract of the
company for which he works, there is a clause which specifies how many local
companies they should co-operate with. However, rather peculiarly – after numerous
requests – he refused to give me even a rough estimate what this number might be.550
One of the interviewees, who himself was involved in drawing one of the major
contracts, emphasised during our interview that the Kazakh side is directly responsible
545 Interview with high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since mid
1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
546 Four of those interviewed claimed that they had read two or even three major oil contracts in their
entirety (Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan). Two interviewees, in order to prove that they were telling the
truth, went so far as to show me a copy of an oil contract that they had in their office.
547 During the privatisation process of Mangistaumnaigaz (chapter 2, section 3.2), Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a
deputy in the Kazakh parliament, argued that the workforce was against privatisation because nowhere in
the contracts was it written that foreign investors should continue with social programmes. Source: Reuters
Newswire, 3 February 1997.
548 Interview with a manager working in the contracting and procurement department of one of the major
oil companies in the world: Almaty 14 September 2004.
549 Paul Domjan, ‘The Supplier Development in the Oil and Gas Sector of Kazakhstan,’ Background Paper
No. 5. April 2004, p. 5.
550 Interview with a contract manager of a major foreign subcontracting company: Atyrau 16 November
2004.
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for a lack of necessary provisions: ‘They did not want local companies to be involved
into the North Caspian initially. The government did not. They did not trust them, they
did not trust anybody.’551 Another person working in a high position for a major foreign
oil company asserted that ‘between 1991 and 1997 no one could be bothered with local
content because government was busy with other things and the country was half
ruined’.552
2.2. Escalation
It was stated that around 2000–2001, the regime was unable to force foreign oil
companies into working with the particular percentage of local companies that Tokayev
and Tasmagambetov had spoken about, and it turned its attention to the very sub-
contractors that in previous years had helped it to access the Kazakh market. That was
done through the introduction of all sorts of taxes that drove up the costs of foreign sub-
contractors operating in Kazakhstan, thereby increasing the costs of the foreign oil
companies. By doing so, the regime hoped that foreign oil companies would begin sub-
contracting the cheaper Kazakh companies. In the words of one director:
They [Kazakh government] cannot play with actual wording and advantages,
privileges included in the PSA, JV. But what they can do is to introduce new
laws and new legislations that will have a knock effect on that PSA. So they
cannot change the PSA but they can make it more expensive for the operator to
work through changing the law that affect the subcontractor who works for the
operator. In principle they do not mess with the PSA at all. The sub-contractor in
his contract with the operator will have what they call escalation clause which
allows him then to go to the operator and say that the legislation has changed,
which means that I am paying more for my fuel, for the property tax and
therefore I have to increase my rate to you for the fact that it cost me now more
to do my business. So physically they did not change the PSA but it now costs
operators more money to do the actual work.553
551 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since the mid-
1990s: Almaty 21 October 2004.
552 Interview with chief accountant working for a major foreign oil company: Atyrau 23 November 2004.
553 Interview with an area manager of one the worldwide major drilling companies: Almaty 4 October
2004.
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Besides introducing new laws, the regime also began to closely scrutinise the non-
Kazakh subcontractors, as another example demonstrates:
Taxation is very complicated in this country. So if I am a tax authority and you
are a foreign company, I will come to you and I will begin checking you and I
can very quickly find a large number of violations. I can easily make you a law
breaker. How, because of the way in which I interpret certain articles of the
tax code, code which is complicated enough. And then I will make you to pay
penalties, fines, for example, half a million dollars - what would you do ?554
One accountant, who works for a foreign company, argued that it is apparent to him that
tax inspectors agree with their superiors in advance which areas they are going to
investigate and eventually fine a company for – on one occasion, for as much as US
$200,000. He said that when such a situation occurs, it is better to settle matters with a
tax inspector immediately. i.e. to bribe them before it is pursued any further, since it is
impossible for a non-Kazakh company to win a dispute in a Kazakh court. Interestingly,
it is not non-Kazakh citizens that are ‘settling’ these disputes but ethnic Kazakhs who
work for the company: ‘Kazakhs are the ones who give money to the officials’.555
From the above examples, it would appear that the regime is powerless to
introduce changes into the oil contracts and to force foreign oil companies into working
with a particular percentage of local companies, but has nonetheless found a way of
disadvantaging non-Kazakh sub-contractors. However, these half-measures could never
bring far-reaching changes to the way in which foreign oil companies operate; the key
after all is the oil contract. Thus, the regime could eliminate some of the smaller non-
Western sub-contracting companies, but not the most important players, especially the
ones from the West.556 Moreover, the replacement of even smaller sub-contracting
companies was being obstructed by the authorities on the local level.
The authorities, who were given a free hand in their dealings with the non-Kazakh
companies, rather than trying to push them from the Kazakh market instead preferred to
establish relationships with many of those companies, some of which indeed looked very
554 Interview with local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
555 Interview with an accountant working for a medium-sized drilling company: Almaty 10 September
2004.
556 Interview with a business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004.
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lucrative. For instance, an oil worker working for a mid-sized company admitted that his
company paid local authorities a sum of 10,000 dollars every year. When, on one
occasion, the company was late with a payment, local inspectors stormed the company
and sealed their equipment. The company was allowed to resume its work once the
payment was made. He said that the same held for other companies, which are constantly
harassed by the local officials who either demand cash payments upfront (up to $1,000 at
a time) or presents such as refrigerators or washing machines. He finished by saying:
‘They are restless in their demands. There is always something that they want from us’.557
2.3. Rapprochement in the times of ‘crises’
The regime, unable to push oil companies any further on the issue of local content and
facing opposition from the local authorities, began looking for ways of settling its dispute
with the foreign oil companies when it was still at its height (2001–2002). As an ex-
general director of a major foreign oil company summed it up: ‘at the end of the day the
government cares more about investors’ money that goes to the central budget than the
local content policy’.558 The foreign companies, on their part, were hardly interested in
battling the Kazakh government, and made some concessions which allowed the regime
to save face. This was in itself important for Nazarbayev, since the government was seen
by interest groups in the regions as finally doing the right thing: ‘a lot of good, hard work
was done by the Kazakh government at the end of the 1990s’.559
The regime, in turn, had to contain itself with the low degree of business
opportunities that foreign oil companies offered to the local companies. Moreover, the
government has been willing to not openly criticise the inflated statistics issued by the
foreign oil companies about the involvement of the local companies. Even more, the
government has been consciously obstructing the work of its own agency that was set up
to monitor those very statistics. This rapprochement between foreign oil companies and
Nazarbayev’s regime, in essence, is a logical culmination of the deal that
557 Interview with an oil worker working for a foreign medium-sized drilling company: Almaty 8
September 2004.
558 Interview with an ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
559 Interview with a general director of a major local constructing company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
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Tasmagambetov and foreign companies made during his time in office (chapter 4). The
foreign oil companies were willing to partly accept the regime’s demands to take greater
responsibility for the social and economic development of the oil-rich regions, while the
regime on its part largely left the companies to carry on with their business as usual.
In 2001, Nazarbayev, during his speech at the conference in the Atyrau region
aimed at the executives of the foreign oil companies, proposed a way out of the crises in
which the two parties found themselves in these words:
I have called on and I am once again calling on all investors operating in
Kazakhstan to fully help Kazakh enterprises, otherwise why have we invited
you here [Kazakhstan]? As soon as you face problems with [oil] transportation
and quotas and as soon as you need to tackle some issues you run to the
government and I step in and help. And I have the right to expect you all to be
attentive to the requests of the Kazakh head of state. I ask that we should not
use any sanctions against each other because there is no need to do so. You are
like Kazakhs to us. You have come here to develop the Kazakh economy and
to make profits – we understand this.560
Whereas on their part foreign oil companies were not willing to give up on the provisions
that the Kazakh government had made in their contracts, they nevertheless began
showing signs of being ‘attentive to the request of the Kazakh head of state’.
As early as 2000, the Atyrau association, Prikaspiyburneft [Caspian oil drilling]
won a tender to drill wells at the Tengiz oil field; the value of the contract was estimated
at 869,500 dollars. It should be added that Prikaspiyburneft was the first Kazakh
company to be involved in drilling deep wells at Tengiz.561 In the same year,
TengizChevrOil began organising seminars for Kazakh suppliers which aimed at briefing
locals on the requirements placed by foreign companies for goods and equipment.562
During the seminars, local companies were told how to fill application forms and what
the exact tender procedures were.563 Those seminars were received very well by the
locals in the Atyrau region, who for the first time began seeing the direct benefits of local
560 Kazakh Television first channel 30 October 2001. Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 31 October 2001.
561 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 1 September 2000.
562 ‘Import Substitution Program: Challenges and Dilemmas,’ Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine, No 5-
6, 2002.
563 Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
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content policy.564 Moreover, in 2001, Flour, the main sub-contractor of the TCO,
commissioned a high-profile project at the prestigious Kazakhstan Institute of
Management, Economic, and Strategic Research (KIMEP). It was named the ‘Oil and
Gas Local Content’, and aimed at seeking and analysing companies with which TCO
could potentially co-operate. During the project, the institute collected data for about 400
companies.565 The Operator also set up various special projects such as the Small
Business Development (SBD) scheme, which since 2001 has focused on ‘small
businesses that could provide goods and services to TCO’.566 The TCO’s rapprochement
with the local companies, however widely welcomed at the time, was modest – at least on
paper – when compared to other consortia in oil-rich regions.
For instance, OKIOC Business Development Manager Murat Mukashev
announced that in 2001 alone, OKIOC intended to sign contracts with Kazakh companies
to the tune of US $33–35 million567. The OKIOC also claimed that already in the year
2000, contracts with domestic companies totalled US $17.7 million568. In 2002, the
Karachagank Integrated Organisation (KIO) announced that by the end of the
development phase of the Karachagank project, the total value of contracts that would
have been placed with Kazakh companies was estimated at a staggering US $1.3
billion.569 By 2003, TCO considerably caught up with KIO and OKIOC; in that year the
consortium claimed that it exceeded its 39 per cent local content goal, reaching 42 per
cent. This represented a sum of US$564 million spent with Kazakh suppliers, up from
$415 million in 2002.570
564 Interview with a director of a small supplying company: Atyrau 17 November 2004.
565 Interview with an oil expert: Almaty 2 November 2004
566 ‘Developing Small Business in Kazakhstan,’ ChevronTexaco 2002 CR Report.
http://www.chevron.com/cr_report/2002/economic_issues/procurement/kazakhstan_small_business.asp
(Accessed 24 May 2005).
567 Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine, No 3, 2001.
568 ‘OKIOC plans to nearly double import substitution investment in 2001’, Kazakhstan News Bulleting
Released weekly by the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, 2 (10), 3 May
2001.
569‘KIO spends $1.3 billion to boost national industrial production’, Press Release: Karachagank
Petroleum Operating B.V. 18 June 2002. http://www.kpo.kz/cgi-bin/index.cgi/13?id=86 (Accessed 7
February 2005)
570 ‘Local Content,’ ChevronTexaco 2003 CR Report.
http://www.chevron.com/cr_report/2003/local_content.asp (Accessed 2 November 2005). According to the
same report, in 2003 Chevron spent, on local suppliers, in Angola $177 million, Indonesia $650 million,
Thailand $120 million, and in Venezuela $120 million.
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This alleged increase in the co-operation between local companies and foreign oil
companies was also reflected in the data issued by some branches of the government. In
2001, according to the Ministry of Economy, the government of Kazakhstan anticipated
that no less than US $340 millions worth of contracts would be fulfilled in the framework
of its local content policy, a growth of 9 per cent over the 1999 results.571 In the same
year, an akim of the Atyrau region argued that TCO placed more than 700 orders totalling
US$281.2 million with 449 different Kazakh companies for the purchase of goods and
services, which was considered to be a ‘sign of progress in implementing the import
substitution program’.572 In 2002, Nazarbayev, during his visit to the Atyrau region,
praised the local content policy programme and its impact on the region: ‘The creation of
conditions and the state’s constant care about this region are producing good results (…)
That is why I hope that all people – nor only the people of Atyrau, but also people of the
region – will feel an improvement in their lives through opening small and medium-sized
businesses’.573
However, not everyone has been so optimistic about the co-operation between
local companies and foreign oil companies. Arguably, one of the main problems with the
statistics that have been issued by foreign oil companies – and which are reproduced by
the Kazakh government – is the way in which foreign oil companies actually calculate
what local content is and what it is not. A high representative of a government agency
argued that whereas he understood by local content a share of the contract that was
served by the local company, from the perspective of the foreign oil companies the local
content included all their expenditures made in Kazakhstan, in another words ‘every
single cent that they spend here’.574 Thus, local content includes salaries that companies
pay to the local staff, sponsorship or bonuses (including social spending), electricity
payments, payments to the national budget, penalty payments, oil purchases locally and
so on. This, in turn, puts in a different light the numbers released by the foreign oil
companies. For example, in 2004 Karachagank Integrated Operation reported that 43 per
cent of the works done were carried out by local companies; however, representatives of
571 ‘Government’s import substitution program bears fruits’, Kazakhstan News Bulleting Released weekly
by the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, 2 (12), 10 May 2001.
572 ‘Akim Serikbek Daukeev: Oil Enterprises are Vital for US’, Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
573 Khabar Television, 18 December 2002. Source: BBC Monitoring Service 12 December 2002.
574 Interview with a high representative of a governmental agency: Astana 8 December 2004.
198
the governmental agency argued that it was 21 per cent at best. In the case of Agip, KCO
the gap is even wider: AGIP said that it was 44 per cent, and according to the
representative it was around 15 per cent.575 Moreover, the statistics issued by the foreign
oil companies also include all the work that is carried out by branches of the foreign sub-
contracting companies, which are registered in Kazakhstan as Kazakh companies. Those
companies are seen by the Kazakh businessmen as a major obstacle to the co-operation
between themselves and foreign oil companies.
As early as 2000, the director of the gas industry department of the Energy and
Mineral Resources Ministry, Musabek Isabaev, argued that KIO, in its calculations of
local content, ‘took into account subcontractor works executed by Kazakhstani branches
of foreign organisation (…) 23 Kazakhstani companies were selected on the tender last
year and 5 of them turned out to be branches of foreign companies’.576 Thus, companies
which on paper were Kazakh in reality were part of a bigger foreign entity. One year
later, Sagat Tugelbayev, who was an akim of the Atyrau region in the years 1992–1994577
said: ‘Foreign subsurface users operating in Kazakhstan still employ operator firms that
import everything, goods and small-scale services. It is silly to say that the republic’s oil
industry receives huge foreign investments as these amounts go aboard as payments for
imported equipment and services’.578
These remarks, made by Isabaev and Tugelbayev at the beginning of the second
decade of independence, were still relevant in 2004579. It was argued that many foreign
sub-contracting companies that came under pressure in the second decade of
independence changed the names of their companies and registered them as Kazakh
companies; as one director put it: ‘and everybody knows that it is the case, but the
government is not doing anything about it; they closed their eyes and pretend that nothing
is happening’.580 Turkish construction companies, which were heavily targeted from the
575 Ibid.
576 Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan Magazine, No 3, 2001.
577 Petroleum Encyclopaedia of Kazakhstan, Azholdas & Company Publishing House, Astana: 1999. p.
495.
578 ‘Import Substitution and Infrastructure Development in Western Kazakhstan,’ Oil and Gas of
Kazakhstan Magazine, No 3, 2001.
579 ‘It is difficult for the Kazakh subcontracting companies to take part in the TengizChevrOil tenders.’
Kazakstanrevenuewatch, 15 January 2004.
580 Interview with a general director of major construction company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
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end of the 1990s onwards were among the first ones that became ‘Kazakh’.581 However,
they were not singular in that respect, and many others followed suit. During my
interviews, I came across a few Western supplying companies from Holland, Germany,
Switzerland, USA – that have been in Kazakhstan for no more than five years – that
turned out to be branches of major foreign companies that were registered in Kazakhstan
as ‘Kazakh’ companies. Ironically, the executive director of one of those companies,
which specialises in delivering electric and heating equipment, stated that his company
filled the gap in the market that was left by the Turkish company that was pressured to
leave Kazakhstan.582 Thus, whereas the Kazakh government was initially pressing outside
sub-contractors to leave Kazakhstan in order to create space for Kazakh companies, this
room, instead of being filled by a Kazakh company or Kazakh and non-Kazakh JV, was
simply replaced by another non-Kazakh company. However, on paper this non-Kazakh
company still counts as a major Kazakh sub-contractor.
The apparent disinterest on the part of the authorities in the statistics issued by the
foreign oil companies is best demonstrated using the example of the Contract Agency,
which was set up to monitor those very statistics. Additionally, the agency was also
supposed to gather information about local companies and ideally to create a database
which could be then used by the foreign oil companies interested in working with local
companies.
The Contract Agency was set up in 2002 under the Ministry of Industry and Trade
as one of its departments. The idea was that the Ministry, which on a monthly basis
receives reports from foreign oil companies concerning participation of local companies
in their oil contracts, would pass them to the agency. For instance, in 2002, the akim of
the Kyzylorda region stated that monthly monitoring was being conducted by his office
as well as by the Ministry of Industry and Trade.583 However, the Ministry was unwilling
to display that information, arguing that all matters concerning oil and gas are handled by
the Ministry of Oil and Gas and the NOC KazMunaiGas. KazMunaiGas, which as shown
in chapter 3 receives monthly reports from all Kazakh companies working directly or
581 Interview with ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
582 Interview: Atyrau 15 November 2004.
583 ‘Serikbai Nurgisayev: the subsoil users form the basis of the oblast economy,’ Petroleum Magazine,
December 2002.
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indirectly in the oil sector. It was not inclined to co-operate on its own part, since the
agency was outside its structure. In order to smoothen the co-operation, a decision was
taken in 2003 that the agency should come under joint supervision of the Ministry and
KMG. However, joint jurisdiction seems to be only a cosmetic makeover, since the
agency still reports having problems with obtaining sufficient information from the
Ministry or KMG.
All of this leads to a situation in which representatives of the agency themselves
are not sure how many local companies are working in the oil and gas sector, or can work
in this sector. The National Statistics Agency estimated that in 2004, around 200,000
local companies in Kazakhstan were able to work with oil companies and their
subcontractors. Out of these 200,000 companies, between 3 per cent to 4 per cent, i.e.
about 6000, were allegedly working directly or indirectly with the oil or gas companies.
The representatives of the agency themselves are not as optimistic as the official
statistics, since they frankly do not know how many companies are out there. Those
working for the agency can only be 100 per cent certain whether the company is able to
work with foreign oil companies or is actually working with a foreign entity if they visit
and assess the situation themselves. As a result, representatives of the agency have visited
168 local companies in all the regions of the country within last two years. However,
until December 2004, they had only found 43 signed contracts with local companies that
met all the necessary standards.
In addition to the challenges of getting sufficient information on the condition of
the local companies and their participation in oil projects, the agency also encountered
more prosaic problems. For example, for one-and-a-half year years, it did not have its
own office or access to computers. Moreover, the web page of the agency, which was
meant to be a key tool used in promoting local companies, was still under construction
three years after its creation. Consequently, the time of those working in the agency is
mostly spent on travelling all around Kazakhstan and giving 25-minute-long
presentations about the agency and what it wants to do in the future. In the last two years,
representatives of the agency, according to their own estimates, gave a staggering 818
presentations. This amounts on average to at least one presentation every day since it
came into existence. The reason for the underperformance of the agency can be found
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within the agency. The Contract Agency is staffed with young graduates from US
Universities, particularly Austin, Texas, who come from oil families and for whom work
in the agency is just a short stop in their careers.584
To sum up, in this section we discussed the situation in which Nazarbayev’s
regime found itself at the end of the 1990s. On one hand, there was growing pressure
from the oil-rich regions to create more space for co-operation between local interests
and foreign oil companies; on the other hand, there was reluctance on the part of the
foreign oil companies to co-operate. This resistance originated in the far-reaching
provisions that the regime granted to foreign oil companies in the oil contracts. It was
demonstrated that the regime tried to push foreign oil companies into co-operation with
local interests through introducing measures aimed at either increasing the costs of the
foreign sub-contracting companies operating in the country, or by pushing them out of
the Kazakh market altogether. However, these ad hoc actions could not enforce the
changes that the regime had hoped for, since the ultimate decision as to which foreign oil
companies want to co-operate with is in the companies’ hands. Finally, we argued that
the regime, aware of this fact, began a process of rapprochement with foreign oil
companies, which allowed it to save its face. This rapprochement process, in its spirit,
was a continuation of a deal that Tasmagambetov reached with the companies during his
time as Atyrau’s akim.
3. Co-operating with foreign oil companies
In this section, we will demonstrate that the introduction of the local content policy, as
well as the business opportunities that came about in the rapprochement period, led to the
growth of the local companies, which now wanted to explore whatever opportunities
there were. However, we argue that the regime could not allow for the co-operation
between foreign oil companies and local companies to go unchecked, as it could lead to
the development of an entire host of networks that would be outside the regime’s control.
In order to avoid this scenario, Nazarbayev’s regime began indirectly co-operating with
584 Interviews with a high representative of a governmental agency: Almaty 8 October 2004 and Astana 8
December 2004; See also: Kalymbet Beysenkulov, ‘Kazakh gambit. The Kazakh government deliberately
uses information which does not correspond to reality,’ Fergana. ru, 3 May 2001.
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the foreign oil companies on one crucial matter: that of which local companies foreign oil
companies should work with and which ones to leave aside.
This indirect approach, in its essence, is a logical continuation of the way in
which Nazarbayev’s regime had already dealt with grievances among the local
population in the oil-rich areas. Thus rather than deal straightforwardly with the local
population or local companies, it preferred to shift the burden of responsibility from itself
to the foreign oil companies, making them the targets of any future criticism for the lack
of economic development or the creation of sufficient business opportunities. In doing so,
Nazarbayev can maintain a role of an arbiter rather than that of a party directly involved
in any of the issues. The willingness of the foreign oil companies to yet again go along
with Nazarbayev’s regime should be seen as an extension of the rapprochement process
(section 2.3.) – an additional concession that foreign oil companies gave to the regime for
the possibility of carrying on with their business in a largely unchanged fashion.
3.1. Local companies
From 1999 onwards, the people that constituted local interest groups which, from the
mid-1990s, had lobbied for greater involvement of the Kazakh companies began setting
up their own companies, which they now hoped that foreign oil companies would sub-
contract. It was stated that very few local sub-contracting companies existed prior to 1999
and 2000; however, since the government began enforcing local content policy, they
‘sprang up like mushrooms after rain’.585 Thus, whereas in 2001 the US embassy in its
annual report spoke about no more than six companies with which foreign oil companies
could co-operate,586 by 2003 (according to the statistics issued by the foreign oil
companies), more than 150 local companies from the Atyrau region alone took part in the
seminars organised by the oil companies.587 This speedy development of the local
companies was greatly helped by the increase in oil prices since 2000 onwards, which
encouraged many to set up same sort of company and try their luck in the oil industry
585 Interview with local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
586‘Kazakhstan: Oil and Gas Equipment,’ BISNIS Representative in Kazakhstan, September 2001.
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/010917kazoilgas.htm (Accessed 29 February 2005).
587 Interview with oil expert: Almaty 17 September 2004.
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supporting sectors.588 Also, since 2001—2002, the creation of the local companies in the
regions was encouraged by the local akims589 – on direct orders from Astana590 – who
hoped that ‘oil and gas would give an impulse to local businesses and productions’591 and
eventually lead to the increase of the tax revenues in their respective regions.592
However, as we will see, the most important reason behind the akims’ support for the
local companies was self-enrichment more than anything else.
It was reported that local companies in the oil-rich regions were formed by two
distinguishable groups, which in some ways is a testimony to the changes that had
occurred in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. The first group is made up of the ex-apparatchiks
and ex-directors who created their companies on the basis of existing enterprises, which
in the Soviet Union were part of the big conglomerates.593 In the case of this group –
rather unsurprisingly – most important are the connections that have their roots in the
communist area.594 The second group is made of ‘young entrepreneurs’ – people in their
30s who had some prior experience in various business ventures, for instance, those
dealing in used cars.595 In this case, the most important are: a) family connections; and b)
all sort of friendships that were formed in the school or at the university.596
Local companies in the oil-rich regions mainly specialise in construction work,
building roads, transport and supplying basic services such as catering.597 The range of
capabilities and competences of those companies varies a great deal. It was reported that
588 Interview with a general director of a local oil company: Atyrau 12 November 2004; Interview with a
general director of a foreign drilling company: Almaty 10 September 2004.
589 Interview with the chief accountant working for a major foreign oil company: Atyrau 23 November
2004
590 Nazarbayev, considerably weakened by the Kazakhgate scandal (chapter 6, section 1.1), needed to paint
himself as the champion of the local companies.
591 Petroleum Magazine, May 2000.
592 Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004; Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 29 October 2004.
593 Interview with a general manager working for a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11
October 2004.
594 Interview with business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004; Interview with a general director of a foreign small drilling
company: Almaty 10 September 2004.
595 Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
596 Ibid.
597 Interview with a regional manager of one of a major foreign sub-contracting company: Atyrau 10
November 2004; Interview with an oil engineer working for the foreign company in Kyzylorda region:
Almaty 8 September 2004.
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some of the companies, despite the fact that they work using old Soviet equipment and
within Soviet standards, deliver quality work and on time.598 Moreover, they also try to
invest in new equipment. For instance, the local transport company in the Kyzylorda
region, which in the past had only old trucks at their disposal, in recent years has invested
into a whole fleet of new German trucks and is now by far the most competitive company
of this sort in the whole region.599 At the same time, there is a whole range of companies
that aim only at making a quick profit. Those are mainly companies that are interested in
supplying foreign oil companies or their sub-contractors with basic goods. If they fail to
obtain a contract, they mostly disappear from the market in an instant.600 In late 2004, on
one estimate there were more than 100 companies in the Atyrau region that solely
specialised in supplying the foreign oil companies.601
The creation of these local companies has been a far from smooth process. The
local companies in the oil-rich regions, despite the local content policy, have been
confronted with similar obstacles in conducting business as all the other small- and
medium-sized companies (SMEs) in Kazakhstan.602 First of all, banks in Kazakhstan
usually do not provide any financing for business start-ups, regardless of which industry
sector the proposed venture is supposed to operate in. That is mainly due to the fact that
companies or people involved do not have any credit history.603 Moreover, the vast
majority of SME representatives find it extremely difficult to prepare acceptable business
plans conforming to the standards established by the banking sector. For instance, banks
are said to demand too many guarantees from their clients.604 Many other companies are
unwilling to approach banks, because the books and tax declarations of their companies
do not meet the established requirements and cannot be adequately evaluated by credit
598 Interview with general manager working for a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11
October 2004.
599 Interview with an oil engineer working for the foreign company in Kyzylorda region: Almaty 8
September 2004.
600 Interview with a manager of a foreign company that specializes in the oilfield systems: Almaty 22
October 2004.
601 Interview with a director of a small supplying company: Atyrau 17 November 2004.
602 For additional overview see: ‘Kazakhstan social protection concept (KAZ/99/004),’ Kazakhstan UN
Report.
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dwpp/download/kazakhstan/kazreport.pdf (Accessed 2 November
2005) pp. 58–62.
603 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004.
604 Interview with a director of a local oil company: Atyrau 8 November 2004.
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officers.605 However, the most important problem for the SMEs is that banks offer
business development loans at 18–24 per cent interest rates for a six- to 24-month period,
which local companies cannot afford.606 In addition, the special privileged loans granted
by the local governments go to people close to the local bureaucracy, ‘in order to get this
privilege loan you need to know somebody, you have to be supported, lobby by
somebody’.607 As a result of this of lack of access, for bank credits or special loans, local
companies are forced to raise money through extended family networks: ‘people borrow
money from one another this is how they get the capital, it is a common practice here’.608
As one western specialist put it, ‘Kazakhstan is a village it is one of the biggest villages
that you can imagine’.609
Secondly, the process of obtaining the necessary licences takes from two to six
months. Most of the licences have to be renewed every year, requiring a necessary fee,
which for a small construction company adds up to 1000 dollars. It also requires the
stacking up of all the necessary documents that need to be stamped by the authorised
bureaucrats. For some companies, obtaining a licence is such a time-consuming process
that they actually employ a special person who deals with all necessary paperwork
involved.610 Naturally, these overly bureaucratised procedures leave much room for error,
and in turn place the licensing bodies in a privileged position. Hence, it is a common
practice to bribe bureaucrats, who expect to receive payments every time the licence is
being issued or renewed. Another way of speeding up the process of obtaining a licence
is to find a relative in the local administration who can help to lobby for company
interests so that the process of obtaining a licence will take two weeks rather than five
months.611 Also problematic is the lack of technical centres, i.e. specialised institutes that
can issue the necessary certificates for obtaining licences.612
605 Interview with person close to Kazakh business community: Almaty 14 September 2004.
606 Interviews with various Kazakh companies: Kazakhstan, Autumn 2004.
607 Interview with local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
608 Ibid.
609 Interview with a high-ranking foreign specialist working on major projects in Kazakhstan since mid
1990: Almaty 21 October 2004.
610 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004.
611 Interview with a local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
612 Interview with a director of a small machinery plant: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
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Thirdly, the way in which licensing authorities are abusing their powers is not an
exception to the rule in Kazakhstan. Government officials often demand bribes from
SME owners. This procedure is especially widespread among tax and customs officers,
and regional administrations and local fire departments. In the vast majority of cases,
officials interpret the law in whatever way they please. Officials also deny the
opportunity to the entrepreneurs or their staffs to familiarise themselves with the internal
instructions and rules defining the scope of responsibilities, rights and obligations of the
various government agencies and services. One of the reasons for this is that the officers
themselves are not familiar with those rules.613 Thus, what companies normally try to do
it is to establish ‘good relationships’ with, for instance, the tax police, and to avoid any
conflicting situations.614 Finally, another major problem for SMEs is changing the legal
framework, which often creates a sense of lack of stability crucial for any business to
function normally.615 Moreover, there are also contradictions within existing legislations;
as one director put it: ‘on the first page legislation can say one thing and on the tenth page
quite something different. Sometimes I think to myself that legislations are written in
such a way so that a person will make a mistake’.616
3.2. Local companies and foreign oil companies
Despite these obstacles, an increase in the numbers of local companies in the oil-rich
regions did happen. Moreover, notwithstanding the initial resistance from the foreign oil
companies, some co-operation between local companies and foreign companies, however
limited, has also been taking place. This co-operation has become part of everyday life in
the oil-rich regions. In 2004 and 2005, the US, Canadian and UK embassies, in their
reports for prospective investors, did not omit to mention that in recent years the Kazakh
government had been pursuing the development of local oil and gas support services that
should be taken under consideration when conducting business in Kazakhstan. At the
613 Interview with a person close to Kazakh business community: Almaty 14 September 2004.
614 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004.
615 Ibid.
616 Interview with a director of a small machinery plant: Atyrau 11 November 2004
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same time, the local content policy was not presented as a major obstacle617 to taking up a
business venture in the oil-rich regions.618 It could be argued that Nazarbayev’s regime
successfully manoeuvred between foreign oil companies and local companies, and in the
final analysis managed to keep both parties – at least partially – satisfied.
Having said all this, the increase in the number of local companies and their
apparent co-operation with foreign oil companies is highly problematic when assessed
from the regime’s perspective. When the regime leaves the co-operation between local
companies and foreign oil companies uncontrolled, this situation can lead to the
development of an entire system of patronage networks that would bypass the regime – a
situation that poses a direct political threat to the regime’s authoritarian rule. Arguably,
that is why Nazarbayev did not include local content quotas in the oil contracts
themselves, and instead was willing to extend to foreign oil companies’ the far-reaching
provisions they contain. The uncontrolled co-operation between locals and foreigners
became especially unwelcome at the beginning of the second decade of independence,
when parts of the business elite split from the regime and went to build their own political
party DCK, Ak Zhol (discussed in chapter 6, section 1.2). Thus, for the first time those
armed with money had created a direct threat for the regime.
By the introduction of the local content policy, Nazarbayev’s regime made sure
that it would have a say in the process of selecting Kazakh companies that could co-
operate with foreign oil companies. In section 2.1, it was demonstrated that during the
early days of local content, the Kazakh government began demanding the creation of
joint commissions made up of representatives of the Kazakh government and the foreign
oil companies. The Kazakh government got its way, and the Joint Management
617 On occasion, even quite on the contrary. In 2003, the representative of the US embassy in Kazakhstan
wrote: ‘Plenty of opportunities exist for U.S. companies producing oil and gas field equipment and
machinery such as drilling and wellhead equipment, valves, pumps, motors, compressors. Good prospects
also exist for U.S. small- and medium-size firms offering downstream engineering and such services as
fabrication, welding, engineering services.’ Azhar Kadrzhanova, ‘2nd North Caspian Regional Oil and Gas
Exhibition,’ BISNIS 15––17April 2003.
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/030417NCaspianOilGas.htm (Accessed 27 May 2005).
618 Svetlana Voronina, ‘Atyrau Regional Reports,’ BISNIS Representative, Astana, Kazakhstan. 31 May
2004; Arthur Iralin. ‘The Caspian’s black gold. Kazakhstan taps into massive oil and gas deposits,’ The
Trade Sections at the Canadian Embassy in Kazakhstan. 24 March 2004; Jafferi Shozey. ‘Steppe Forward.
The British Embassy’s Commercial Newsletter,’ The Trade and Investment, British Embassy, Almaty.
January 2005, Issue No. 4.
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Committee (JMC) for the Karachagank project was established.619 In addition, other
bodies were created on the state level. Most important is the Authorised State Agency
(ASA), whose key authorities are: control over procurement of commodities, works and
services; and approval of terms and results of tenders. The state bodies that have a direct
say in the selection process have been accused of corruption and favouritism (Tsalik 133:
2003), and of being used by bureaucrats to satisfy their private interests.620 The regime, in
addition to setting up bodies that would scrutinise the process of selecting local
companies, has also displayed considerable interest in certain key institutions – namely
departments of the foreign oil companies that have been on the frontline of selecting local
companies.
In 2002, Atyrau’s akim Daukeyev (chapter 2, section 2) praised foreign oil
companies for creating departments for working with local suppliers and studying the
local market for goods and services.621 These departments are directly responsible for
choosing local companies as partners, which in the next phase are managed by the
foreign oil companies’ major sub-contractors. However, in some instances it is a sub-
contractor and not the foreign oil company that is directly responsible for the selection
process. That depends on the arrangement between the two parties. Those working either
for the foreign oil companies or their major sub-contractors assert that in principle, the
way they go about selecting local companies does not differ in any sense from the
process the company uses in any other area of the world; it is a mechanistic process from
their point of view. The most important criteria are: competitiveness, ability to do work
on time, and high standards and safety.622 Naturally, the selection procedure is not easy,
and one contract manager himself admitted that the application ‘can be the size of
Tolstoy’s War and Peace’, which can produce substantial problems for a small local
619 On the Kazakh side, the state’s authorised representatives were the Vice-Minister of Energy and Mineral
Resources Uzakbai Karabalin, the West Kazakhstan akim Krymbek Kusherbaev, KazTransOil First Vice
President Erlan Upushev and KazTransGaz Vice President Bulat Nazarov. Source: Oil and Gas Kazakhstan
Magazine, No 1-2, 2001.
620 RusEnergy, October 2002.
621 Petroleum Magazine, February 2002.
622 Interview with a manager working in the contracting and procurement department of one of the major
oil companies in the world: Almaty 14 September 2004; Interview with a contract manager of a major
foreign subcontracting company: Atyrau 16 November 2004; Interview with a regional manager of one of a
major foreign sub-contracting company: Atyrau 10 November 2004; Interview with a director working for
a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October 2004.
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company.623 This transparent process of selecting local companies takes on a new
dimension once we look at who actually works in the departments that conduct
selections, as well as their own rationales for selecting one company rather than another.
The departments that specialise in selecting local companies predominantly
employ ethnic Kazakhs in their mid-30s who are usually the children of important
officials in the oil-rich regions, and in the case of Atyrau and Mangistau also include
members of the oil families.624 One interviewee stated that locals without any doubt exert
a great influence over the selection process, and that ‘foreign companies have to listen to
their recommendations’.625 At the same time, an expert who often comes into close
contact with the managers of the various foreign oil companies stated that companies
themselves dislike this situation in which a third party interferes in the selection process,
which they find very frustrating. However, there is not much that they can do about it: ‘if
they want to do business they have to employ these people’.626 During my field-work, I
interviewed a couple of employees of the departments in question. They stated that
whereas issues such as international standards and the track record of a local company are
important for the selection process, it is equally important who recommends a company
and whether they know the people that run it. One of the interviewees openly and proudly
admitted that he looks at the landscape of the local companies through family lenses:
‘When I have a choice of employing your company or the company of this man [ethnic
Kazakh], it is normal that I will employ his company because I know his father, his
father’s father and so on […] Clans and family names are very important here’.627
The situation in which foreign oil companies delegate considerable powers to
their local employees (who select companies according to a specific key) is, according to
one commentator, a tragic development. Foreign oil companies, which are supposed to be
agents of modern, new ways of doing business for their own convenience, follow the
623 Interview with a contract manager of a major foreign subcontracting company: Atyrau 16 November
2004.
624 Interview with a local specialist working for a foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
625 Interview with a director of a local oil company: Atyrau 08 November 2004.
626 Interview with a local specialist working for a foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
627 Interview with a business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004; interview with another business development manager working for
the same subcontracting company: 14 October 2004.
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‘local rules of the game’.628 At the same time, the idea of locals playing an important role
in foreign consortia is not new. In chapter 2 (section 2.1), we saw how foreign oil
companies at the beginning of the 1990s employed or sponsored various ‘big men’ of the
Kazakh oil industry. In return, these companies were largely given a free hand to conduct
their business in the way that suited them, at least until the second decade of the 1990s. In
addition it was established in the previous section that local companies are but a very
small part of these projects, and that foreign oil companies can simply afford to employ
companies that are being recommended even if this means incurring losses. The example
of companies backed up by the local administration demonstrates this point vividly.
The regional administration, which at the end of the 1990s was given a green light
to exercise greater pressure on foreign oil companies, became an ever more important
force with which the foreign oil companies had to establish a ‘working’ relationship.629
This liaison, in something that can be broadly understood as the post-Tasmagambetov
era, expressed itself in contracts that companies directly or indirectly connected to local
authorities were able to secure. As one oil journalist put it: ‘Few years ago,
TengizChevrOil would not work with a small local company that provides services of
very poor quality. But nowadays, many companies are owned by influential people. Oil
companies have to work with those companies’.630
Those working in foreign oil companies, or their sub-contractors, stated that the
promotion of the companies favoured by the local authorities takes place under the cover
of their lobbying the interests of the companies from an oil-rich region.631 Hence, a high
official approaches a foreign oil company and makes a case for local companies, which in
itself is seen as unsurprising and comprehensible.632 After all, it is the job of any local
authority to lobby the interests of local companies. However, after that he/she points to a
specific group of companies that are widely known to be either owned by local
628 Interview with local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
629 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004;
Interview with oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004.
630 Interview with oil journalist: Almaty 29 October 2004.
631 Interview with an oil engineer working for the foreign company in Kyzylorda region: Almaty 8
September 2004.
632 Interview with a director working for a major foreign sub-contracting company: Almaty 11 October
2004.
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authorities’ members’ relatives, friends, or people closely associated with them.633
According to some interviewees, companies supported by the local authorities are easily
recognised since they, as opposed to most of the others companies of the same profile, do
not have any problems with local authorities – and most importantly they can easily
obtain all the necessary documentations, including licences.634
The companies favoured by the authorities are relatively small in size and
primarily specialise in basic construction works; they employ only few people and work
directly with the foreign oil companies.635 Moreover, these companies tend to keep a very
low profile: ‘they do not want to be too visible’.636 It was also asserted that a
characteristic of the companies owned by local authorities is their apparent lack of
professionalism.637 This is due to the fact that these ‘construction’ companies are (most of
the time), created for the purpose of a particular project, and tend to disappear from the
market once the contract expires.638 As one technical director put it
many companies in Atyrau only come to actual existence once they win a
tender for, for example, some building works. What happens next is that this
company very quickly employ various specialists such as designers,
mechanics, ecologists, building engineers etc. Those quickly created
companies most of the time cease to exist once a project is completed.639
However, this does not necessarily mean that the work was actually completed. One
director pointed to numerous situations in which a foreign oil company employed a small
construction company, but very little or no actual work was done on the site. Even more
interestingly, a few months later the same people managed to win yet another tender, and
the familiar procedure was repeated all over again: ‘oil companies know that they have to
633 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004.
634 Interview with business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14/10/04; Interview with oil expert: Almaty 17 September 2004.
635 Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004.
636 Ibid.
637 Interview with a general manager working for a foreign building sub-contracting company: Almaty 11
October 2004.
638 Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004.
639 Interview with a technical director of a small designing and building company: Atyrau 8 November
2004.
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employ those companies; for them it is part of their costs, and as long as the oil prices are
high they do not find it problematic’.640
This apparent failure by the local company, which is supported by the local
authorities to do any proper work, seems to be very common – especially when it comes
to works that are being paid for from the regional budget. For instance, in Atyrau in late
2004, the local drama theatre was being renovated for a third time: ‘The theatre is not
being used at all, but for the third time the budget is paying for the renovation. Every
time they have different contractors, and no one is being punished for not finishing the
work. Do you think that if I tender for this project I would win it, no! If I had someone in
the administration then it would happen’.641 The enrichment of the local authorities is
meaningfully reflected in their high standards of living. Whereas a local official working
for a regional administration earns on average only about US$200 per month, the family
of a top official can live in a three-storeyed house worth one hundred thousand dollars or
even more.642
Another example of the co-operation between foreign oil companies and local
authorities is a mid-sized company that primarily specialises in supplying building
materials to TengizChevron, and which is owned by an ex-tax police officer. The link
between the two parties becomes somewhat apparent, since throughout the greater part of
the 1990s, the owner of the company worked in the section of the tax police which
scrutinised TengizChevron. A privileged relationship of a company with TengizChevron
is reflected in the fact that whereas in order to obtain a contract normally a company has
to go through lengthy tender procedures, the company under discussion is on TCO’s
special lists of contractors. In reality, this means that a company gets a list of products in
advance that the TCO needs, as well as a set price for their supply. Its only competitors
are other local companies on the TCO’s list. The owner of the company also tried to
participate in tenders of other major companies such as KazMunaiGas and AGIP;
however, without much success. According to him ‘procedures are far too complicated
and there is too much of paperwork involved’.643 The latter point demonstrates that the
640 Interview with a director of a local oil company: Atyrau 8 November 2004.
641 Interview with local specialist working for the foreign embassy: Atyrau 10 November 2004.
642 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 11 October 2004.
643 Interview with a director of a small supplying company: Atyrau 17 November 2004.
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company would most likely not be able to survive on the market without its special
arrangement with TengizChevron.
The situation looks somewhat different in the case of regional akims and their
deputies who are parachuted – to use Cummings’ term (2000) – from, for instance,
Almaty to the oil-rich regions. These akims, who on an average spend less than two years
in a post (chapter 2, section 3.3), have to focus on big projects that guarantee quick
returns. In order to achieve this aim, the akims’ deputies set up front companies –
registered in an ordinary fiat – that secure a relatively big contract from foreign oil
companies. After that, such a ‘company’ simply sub-contracts engineering and
construction companies from others parts of Kazakhstan to carry out all the necessary
works.644 On some occasions, the akims’ front companies went so far as to sub-contract
foreign construction companies.645 As one (admittedly very frustrated) director put it:
Atyrau is a very competitive place and I just could not understand from where
this company came from, it is like it fell from the sky. The company won three
tenders on the road, I investigated for quite some time who the people are
behind this company and it turned out that the owners of the company are
three deputies of the local akim. They created a company, won tenders and
now they are in the process of delegating work to different companies. It is a
50-50 percent split arrangement.646
Local companies that are not connected to the regional office or local notables
find doing business in the oil-rich areas extremely difficult: ‘those companies are left on
their own without any help either from the government or akims who do not take any
interest in them. Programmes indeed are in place, but they are not working as local
companies would like them to (…) akims are not interested in helping local companies
but rather what those companies can do for the social sphere’.647 There are numerous
examples of akims not fulfilling their obligations towards local companies, but quite to
the contrary taking advantage of them. For example, the local regional office forces local
companies in Atyrau to remove the garbage from designated parts of the city without
644 Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 29 October 2004.
645 Interview with a business development manager working for major foreign subcontracting company in
Kazakhstan: Almaty 14 October 2004; Interview with a marketing manager of a major company that
specialises in remote sites services: Almaty 2 December 2004.
646 Interview with a general director of major construction company: Atyrau 11 November 2004.
647 Interview with an oil journalist: Almaty 28 October 2004.
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payment, while the funds that are allocated for that purpose go to the officials’ own
pockets.648 Work done for the city depends on the size of the company. Thus, one of the
biggest construction companies in Atyrau, with no apparent ties to the akim’s office, in
2004 had to build a small bridge and 60 kilometres of road outside Atyrau for free. If the
company refused to do as it was asked, it would be plagued with harassment from
different local agencies ‘and it is not a problem they will always find something, this is
the Soviet way of thinking. They still have lots of power and they use it in the old Soviet
way. They can say to me you are not a local patriot. You have to help’.649
In conclusion, in this chapter we discussed the roots of the discontent among local
interests groups in the oil-rich areas of Kazakhstan, and the way in which Nazarbayev’s
regime chose to address this problem through an attempt to introduce a local content
policy. Furthermore, we demonstrated that far-reaching provisions in the oil contracts
made the full-scale introduction of the local content policy highly problematic. The
regime, in the face of the opposition coming from the foreign oil companies, allowed
them to carry on with their business in a largely unchanged fashion, while the foreign oil
companies on their part were willing to begin co-operating with a limited percentage of
local companies. Moreover, we showed that the deal reached between the regime and
foreign oil companies had a direct effect on the way in which Nazarbayev’s regime
controls local companies, and how that process has been unfolding in the last few years.
648 Interview with a director of a medium size subcontracting company: Atyrau 15 November 2004.
649 Interview with a general director of major construction company: Atyrau 11 November 2004
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Chapter 6: Beyond the 1990s: quasi-formal relationships and consolidation
In the first decade of independence, the ruling regime in post-Soviet Kazakhstan proved
to be highly resilient in the face of the threats posed by the oil industry broadly
understood. As demonstrated in chapter 2, Nazarbayev, once confronted with the direct
challenge to his grip on the NOC, was quick to substitute the ill-serving corporatist
technique with the patron–client instrument which, as discussed in chapter 3, was further
strengthened in the process of the Kazakhization of the oil industry. Moreover, as shown
in chapters 4 and 5, in order to address the growing sense of crises in the oil-rich regions,
besides using patron-client patterns on the local level the regime also entered into a tacit
agreement with foreign oil companies. As a result, by the early 2000s the mechanisms
used by Nazarbayev’s regime to control the oil industry could be characterised as being
highly personalised, with informal networks strongly favoured over formal institutions.
In the first part of this chapter, we argue that Nazarbayev’s regime, which
throughout the 1990s and beyond had been thriving on patrimonial networks, began
showing signs of moving away from established patterns in the first half of 2000s. In
2003 the Kazakh regime, in response to the Kazakhgate scandal and the rise of a pro-
business opposition, attempted to co-opt small- and medium-sized businesses across
Kazakhstan. Whereas the government’s initial actions failed to yield desirable results –
and did not bring about any serious political consequences for the regime – it did not
cease its pro-business politics, but persistently put forward new policies that favoured
business interests. We argue that this determination on the part of the regime is a real
attempt at gradually moving away from a situation in which patrimonial networks
dominate the Kazakh polity, including the earlier regime–oil industry relationships, to
one in which quasi-formal mechanisms – controlled by the regime – become primary
regulators. The new type of relationship stems from a need to accommodate the ever-
growing Kazakh middle-classes, which are supposed to become the backbone of the
ruling regime, replacing the powerful and unpredictable financial/industrial groups that
were favoured before 2002. Thus, the regime pushes for a more coherent relationship
between small- and medium-sized businesses and the state in order to assure its long-term
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stability. At the same time, not all mechanisms of control are likely to alter as
significantly.
In the second part of this chapter, we will discuss a number of disputes that the
Kazakh state entered into since 2002 onwards with foreign oil companies, which
potentially could have far-reaching repercussions on the regime–companies’ tacit alliance
in the oil-rich areas (chapter 4 and 5). Yet we argue that while disputes over Tengiz and
Kashagan in themselves were a major development, they are unlikely to profoundly
affect the co-operation between the two parties in the Atyrau region, since it is in their
mutual interest to maintain the status quo. Thus, what we can expect to see is the oil
companies serving intermittently as scapegoats for the regime’s unpopular policies on the
one hand, and on the other, the implementation of the local content policy in its current
form for a considerable time. The situation can change significantly, however: for
instance, consider the Kyzylorda region, where a Chinese company purchased the
Kumkol oil field, which was previously owned by the Canadian company
PetroKazakhstan. As the existing record of the Chinese oil company’s activities in
Kazakhstan demonstrates, they are much more forceful in introducing their own labour,
and most importantly, their own sub-contracting companies. This in turn can have
negative consequences for the regime’s relationship with the Kyzylorda region.
1. Kazakhgate
In late 1998, the Kazakh authorities charged the ex-Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin
with money laundering and tax evasion (chapter 2, section 3.2). The charges against the
ex-PM, which in themselves were not unfounded, were largely seen as being of political
nature, with the aim of eliminating him and his Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan
from Kazakh political life. The main reason for this political assassination was
Kazhegeldin’s proven ability to transform himself in a relatively short time into the most
serious opponent to Nazarbayev in the presidential elections that were scheduled for the
beginning of 1999 (chapter 4, section 1.1). Subsequently, Kazhegeldin left Kazakhstan
and was banned from standing in the elections. Whereas Nazarbayev’s short term
political aims were achieved, the ex-PM, due to his vast knowledge about the inner
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workings of the ruling regime, still posed a danger and could potentially seriously
undermine Nazarbayev’s stand on both the domestic and the international scenes. In
order to fully discredit Kazhegeldin, the Kazakh authorities began another investigation
into his alleged secret accounts outside Kazakhstan.650
1.1. Crisis and their containment
In April 1999, Kazakh officials contacted the authorities in Belgium and Switzerland,
where Kazhegeldin apparently had his financial holdings. The investigation took an
unexpected turn when the Swiss investigators discovered ‘a pattern of suspicious
transactions involving American and European oil companies’ dealings with
Kazakhstan’.651 These took place between May 1997 and September 1998, i.e. at the time
of the rapid sell-out of the oil enterprises which brought the Kazakh oil sector under the
control of Nazarbayev and the then-head of NOC KazakhOil, Nurlan Balgymbayev
(chapter 2, section 3.2). The investigators alleged that more than US$1 billion dollars
from ExxonMobil, Amoco Kazakhstan Petroleum (BP Amoco), and Philips Petroleum
were channelled through escrow accounts, shell companies and foundations located in
Switzerland, the British Islands and Lichtenstein to accounts held by Kazakh officials
including Nazarbayev, Balgymbayev, Kazhegeldin and their families.652 It quickly
emerged that the key part in this elaborate scheme was played by American lawyer James
H. Giffen, who was directly responsible for funnelling money from these oil companies
to the secret accounts of the abovementioned Kazakh officials.
James H. Giffen’s involvement in Kazakhstan dates back to the late 1980s, when
he was initially involved in Chevron-Soviet government negotiations concerning field
studies in the west of Kazakhstan653 (see chapter 2, section 2.1). Whereas his role in the
signing of the final deal between Kazakhstan and Chevron over a stake in the Tengiz oil
650 Interview with an oppositional journalist: Atyrau 22 November 2004; see also: Vremya Novostei, 2 April
2003; Daniiar Ashimbaev, ‘Oligarchy and democracy,’ Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 14 November 2003.
651 David Johnston ‘Kazakh Mastermind, or New Ugly American?’ New York Times, 17 December 2000.
652 Larry Chin ‘Part 2: Big Oil, the United States and corruption in Kazakhstan’ OnLine Journal, 16 May
2002; David McKeeby ‘Crude Business: Corruption and Caspian Oil’ Caspian Energy Update, 31 August
2000.
653 In the 1980s Giffen led the American Trade Consortium, an organization created to promote regional
trade and investment.
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field (1992) is not exactly clear, it was reported that Chevron agreed to pay Giffen
personally US$0.75 for every barrel produced, for his early role in the deal.654 Giffen’s
involvement in Kazakhstan became more apparent in the 1990s, when he became a
special counselor to Nazarbayev. It was stated that Giffen was responsible for
establishing contacts between Washington’s establishment and the Kazakh president. For
instance, he was allegedly in charge of organising Nazarbayev’s first presidential visit to
Washington in May 1992, when he met with President George Bush, and of acquainting
Nazarbayev with Al Gore, who later on chaired a U.S.-Kazakhstan joint commission.655
He could be most aptly described as a gatekeeper between Nazarbayev and the foreign oil
companies in business and political circles; as Robert Baer, a former CIA officer put it:
‘James Giffen was Mr Kazakhstan. If you wanted an oil concession in Kazakhstan, you
went to Giffen’.656
Giffen’s role in the money transfers was brought to light by the US Justice
Department, which in 2000 began investigating him for possible violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribery of foreign officials. The US investigation
initially focused on Mobil’s purchase of a 25 per cent stake in the Tengiz field in 1996
for about $1 billion. Giffen earned a US$51m ‘success fee’ for brokering the deal, and
allegedly stuffed more than $20m of this sum into the Kazakhs’ Swiss bank accounts.657
Subsequently, in 2003 he was charged with funnelling more than $78m in unlawful
payments between 1995 and 2000 into these accounts from deals that included Amoco,
Mobil, Texaco and Phillips.658 On his part, Giffen denied that he had violated any US law
since he had only acted at the direction of senior Kazakh officials.659
The unravelling scandal, which was now being widely reported by the
international press, caught Kazakh officials by surprise, as their actions demonstrated. In
654 Joshua Chaffin and David Stern, ‘Kazakhstan’s gatekeeper become a legal liability,’ Financial Times,
15 April 2003.
655 Michael Dobbs, David Ottaway and Sharon LaFraniere, ‘American at Center of Kazakh Oil Probe,’
Washington Post, 25 September 2000.
656 Joshua Chaffin, ‘US businessman charged over Kazakh oil deal,’ FT.com site, 2 April 2003.
657 Joshua Chaffin and David Stern,‘Mobil falls under eye of Kazakh probe,’ Financial Times, 8 April
2003.
658 Joshua Chaffin, ‘ExMobil executive charged over kickbacks,’ FT.com site, 3 April 2003; for more
details see ‘Kazakhstan bribery scandal investigation biggest ever undertaken,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil
Connections, 30 April 2003.
659 For more about corruption and the oil industries see: Tomas Catan and Joshua Chaffin, ‘Bribery has
long been used to land international contracts,’ Financial Times, 8 May 2003.
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the early stages of the investigation, the Swiss authorities froze several of the bank
accounts believed to be available for the benefit of Nazarbayev and Balgymbayev. In
September 2000, Nazarbayev, on a visit in the United States, appealed directly to the then
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to unfreeze the funds, reportedly repeating his
embarrassing request during a series of consecutive meetings with her.660 Kazakh
officials also later attempted to lobby the Bush administration, which they saw as being
well-disposed towards oil-rich countries and in a position to appreciate Kazakhstan’s
strategic position after 9/11, once the investigation by the US court got underway.
According to the Financial Times, in late 2001 Kazakh officials made an aggressive
effort to target Vice President Dick Cheney by appealing to him in person to shut down
the ongoing criminal investigation. The Kazakhs also attempted to apply pressure on him
through the construction company Halliburton, of which he used to be the CEO.
Moreover, the Kazakh authorities also held meetings with Richard Armitage, Colin
Powell’s State Department deputy, concerning the Giffen case.661 Yet, whereas
accusations related to the scandal caused a substantial embarrassment to Nazarbayev and
some top officials in the US, it was the attention that the case received in Kazakhstan that
proved a real source of concern for the regime.662
To start with, the allegations – which were not entirely new in Kazakhstan –
related to missing royalties from oil deals663 that did not reach the Treasury. The rumours
first began to circulate on the eve of 1999 elections;664 as a US consultant who worked in
the country at the time put it: ‘It was beginning to smell. The word was around that
maybe there were secret accounts in Switzerland’.665 The direct impact of those early
charges – on which Kazhegeldin’s loyalists tried to capitalise politically in the absence of
their leader – was manifested in Nazarbayev’s poor performance during the elections in
the Atyrau and Mangistau regions (chapter 4, section 1.1). However, it was the joint
investigation conducted by Swiss-American authorities concerning secret accounts that
finally gave substantial weight to the accusations. In mid-2000, media outlets supported
660 New York Times, 17 December 2000.
661 Joshua Chaffin ‘The Kazakh connection,’ FT.com site, 25 June 2003.
662 ‘Nazarbayev cornered,’ Economist Intelligence Unit - ViewsWire, Number: 301, 2003.
663 The main source of concern was the so-called social component of the oil deals, a percentage that meant
to be spent on social issues (like schools and hospitals).
664 A. Guliaev, ‘A new scandal. Chevron’s payment,’ Izvestiia, 26 October 1999.
665 FT.com site, 25 June 2003.
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by Akezhan Kazhegeldin and Mukhtar Abliazov, who would later become the co-founder
of DWK (chapter 2, section 4.1), began to publish claims that high-level government
officials had received kickbacks from foreign oil companies. The claims voiced in the
media were verified by a former Geneva prosecutor, Bernard Bertossa, who in an
interview with the Soldat newspaper (May 2000) confirmed that Switzerland had frozen
the bank accounts of not only the Kazakh president but also two former prime
ministers,666 and that the nature of these accounts was highly dubious.
The regime’s response to the scandal-related publications was decisive. The
editor-in-chief of Soldat, Emurat Bapi, was sentenced in 2001 to one year in prison for
‘insulting the dignity and honour of the president’.667 Moreover, in September 2000 the
newspaper’s journalist Lira Baysetova, who wrote about the secret accounts, lost an eye
after being beaten up by unidentified thugs.668 In addition, the newspaper Vremia Po that
had also run articles concerning the case – now widely know as Kazakhgate – was forced
to stop its publications in 2001 when the state-owned printer refused to produce the
paper.669 This heavy-handed approach670 calculated at achieving short-term gains, in
other words silencing the press, was accompanied with the installation of a special ‘crisis
group’ within the regime structure. Its main task was to develop a more sensitive strategy
for dealing with Kazakhgate. The pivotal role was played by Bulat Utemuratov, a
Nazarbayev loyalist and an ex-ambassador to Switzerland and the UN.671 The group drew
up a two-tier plan, which stated that Nazarbayev and his daughter Dinara672 should admit
666 Kazhegeldin admitted being the beneficiary of $6 million shortly before leaving office but he claimed
that he returned the money to the Kazakh government accounts from which it originated. Source: AFX, 17
July 2001.
667 A criminal offense under Article 318 of the criminal code.
668 It was also alleged that the death of Baysetova’s daughter in police custody, three weeks after the article
concerning officials’ accounts was published, was not accidental. Source: Swissinfo, 10 July 2002.
669 A Human Rights Watch Report, http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kazakhstan0404/3.htm (Accessed 26
October 2004), Dimitry Chirkin, Pravda.Ru, 4 April 2002.
670 The regime’s prosecution against independent journalists that wrote about Kazakhgate, however, did not
stop at this. In 2002, Kazakh officials infamously accused Sergie Duvanov, who had published articles
concerning the secret accounts, of raping a 14-year-old girl. It was widely assumed at that time that the
charges against Duvanov were fabricated. For more see: ‘Prominent opposition journalist convicted in
Kazakhstan on rape charges,’ EurasiaNet, 28 January 2003.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav012803.shtml (Accessed 5 December
2004).
671 ‘Kazakhgate under way,’ Eurasia-Internet, 5 June 2002.
672 Dinara is married to Timur Kulibayev, the ex-vice president of KazMunaiGas (see also chapter 2
sections 3.3; 4.1; 4.2).
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the existence of bank accounts in their names, while at the same time categorically stating
that the accounts were opened without Nazarbayev’s knowledge by Giffen and
Balgymbayev. It should be then suggested that by doing so, those two ‘partners in crime’
hoped to convince foreign oil companies that they were acting on Nazarbayev’s orders.673
The need for such elaborate explanations was deemed necessary in the face of the
political opposition which, though weakened by the arrest and conviction of its two
prominent faces Ablazov and Zhakyanov (chapter 2, section 4.1), was hoping to regain
momentum hot on the heels of Kazakhgate. The scandal created a perfect opportunity and
pointedly demonstrated the corrupt nature of the regime and its careless attitude towards
the well being of its citizens. After all, top officials had gone as far as stealing money that
was supposed to be spent on social projects.674 Assylbeck Kozhametov, a member of the
DCK Political Council, said:
Nazarbayev had lost the "moral right" to govern Kazakhstan. This has to do with
’Kazakhgate’ and the political prisoners [Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov], as well as
the fact that the country has some of the highest [economic] indicators in the
region, but it does not share [the wealth] with its population,’ (…) ‘Only between
3 percent and 5 percent of the total population, and probably major international
investors, have access to the country’s wealth, while the majority of the
population lives in poverty.675
As a result, Utemuratov’s plan – with substantial modifications – was finally put into
action on 4 April 2002, when the then Prime Minister Imangali Tasmagambetov (chapter
4, section 1.3.) disclosed to members of parliament that the authorities had used revenues
from the Tengiz oil field to establish a secret fund holding US$1.4 billion. The fund was
presented as having been vital for the survival of Kazakhstan in 1997 and 1998, when
Nazarbayev made a decision to withdraw, on two separate occasions, $480 and $400
million dollars in order to pay off pension arrears, thereby alleviating social tensions and
covering the budget deficits stemming from the collapse of the Russian rouble.676
Tasmagambetov also admitted the possible existence of foreign accounts (totalling more
673 Eurasia-Internet, 5 June 2002.
674 Interview with a top adviser to the major oppositional party: Almaty 29 November 2004
675 Quoted in: Justin Burke, ‘Kazakhstani opposition movement prepares to renew battle with Nazarbayev,’
EurasiaNet, 17 October 2002. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101702.shtml
(Access 15 October 2003).
676 ‘Kazakhstan’s national bank justifies creation of secret oil fund,’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections,
24 April 2002.
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than $100 million) in Nazarbayev’s name, but denied that the president had a role in
opening them. Finally, the authorities dropped the idea of using Balgymbayev as a
scapegoat and instead blamed Kazhegeldin for all wrongdoing.677
Tasmagambetov’s address to parliament created as many problems as it resolved
from the regime’s perspective. On the one hand, putting forward its own version of the
Kazakhgate scandal gave authorities a breathing space, as they could now argue that the
investigation by the US-Swiss officials was just a big misunderstanding rather than
having to relentlessly deny the existence of any accounts.678 On the other hand, the very
fact that the powers that be had admitted the existence of secret accounts was to an extent
self-incriminating, and as such politically damaging. Nazarbayev’s response to the
looming crisis, which was only growing with the 2004 parliamentary elections
approaching, was to reinforce his domestic position and to appropriate – at least on paper
– the opposition’s proposals for further political and economical reforms.679
1.2. The impact of Kazakhgate: the case of small and medium businesses
The regime went on a full offensive in 2003. Nazarbayev’s annual state-of-the-nation
address680 on April 4 was interpreted by local commentators as a direct response to the
677 Aldar Kusainov, ‘Kazakhstani prime minister admits to existence of secret government fund,’
EurasiaNet, 5 April 2002. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040502a.shtml
(Accessed 25 May 2005); see also Delovaia nedelia, 5 April 2002.
678 For instance, this sort of argument was used by Alexander Pavlov, a deputy chairmen of pro-presidential
Otan (Fatherland) party, during televised debates between political parties that took place before
parliamentary elections in 2004. Kazakh Television first channel, 27 Aug 2004. Source: BBC Monitoring
Service, 27 August 2004.
679 For oppositions platform see: Speech of cochairman of the AK ZHOL Democratic Party of Kazakhstan
Bolat Abilov at the III Congress of the Party.
Source: http://www.akzhol.kz/eng/publications/publ_080104_3.htm (Accessed 25 August 2006)
680 In his speech, Nazarbayev indicated that a large government budget surplus, created mainly by the
country’s vast wealth in natural resources, would help the state expand its infrastructure, investment, and
job creation programs in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. He also declared major increases in
pensions, wages and social payments, including a 20 per cent average pension increase, 32 per cent
minimum wage increase, and 50 per cent increase in public sector salaries. Moreover, the president spoke
about the need for a more transparent and open electoral system, and also advocated that more rights and
powers should be given to political parties. Khabar Television, 4 April 2003. Source: BBC Monitoring
Service, 4 April 2003.
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Kazakhgate scandal.681 One of the main points in the speech was the creation of a
favourable development climate for Kazakh businesses. During his address, Nazarbayev
made the case for carrying out a substantial corporate tax cut in the upcoming year, and
also announced new tax cuts for VAT as well as social and individual income taxes. VAT
was to be cut from 16 to 15 per cent; the social tax on companies would be reduced
regressively to from 20 to 7 per cent, and the highest personal income tax rates were to be
cut by 10 per cent. Moreover, he revealed that the Kazakh government would set up an
investment fund and innovation fund as the driving forces for a competitive economy.
Finally, he called for a greater partnership between the state and the private sector.
It was stated that businesses came under the special interest realm of the regime
during Kazakhgate, because it was among their entrepreneurs that the knowledge about
the scandal and awareness of its implications was most widespread.682 In turn, this fact
could be easily used by Ak Zhol, the moderate wing of the opposition,683 which strove to
organise small- and medium-sized businesses against the regime.684 Whereas Ak Zhol
was often described as being relatively temperate in outlook, with its focus being
economic reforms, it was however suggested that the president was not certain of the
party’s collaboration in the 2004 elections,685 and that the relationship between the two
was in fact far from comfortable. For instance, on the eve of the Ablazov and Zhakyanov
trials, Bulat Abilov, the co-chairman of Ak Zhol, criticized the authorities for trying to
appropriate businesses across Kazakhstan. In particular, he focused his attention on the
681 Ibragim Alibekov, ‘Nazarbayev embraces reforms, seeks to undermine support for political opposition
in Kazakhstan,’ EurasiaNet, 8 April 2003.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040803_pr.shtml (Accessed 9 April 2003).
682 Interview with a high-ranking member of the opposition party who worked in the presidential apparatus
throughout the 1990s: Almaty 5 November 2004.
683 Kazakhgate was widely used by other political parties as well. For instance, in mid-2003, three
influential parliamentarians – Communist Party leader Serikbolsyn Abdildin, Vlasislav Kosarev, and Tolen
Tokhtasynov – wrote a letter to Nazarbayev, calling on him to reveal the names of the high-level Kazakh
functionaries allegedly involved in the bribery scandal known as ‘Kazakhgate,’ because the affair was
damaging the image of the country at home and abroad. The letter was read to a joint session of parliament.
Source: ‘Kazakh Parliament Calls for openness on Kazakhgate,’ Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 July
2003.
684 By 2002, Ak Zhol had as many as 65,000 members. Moreover, by 2003 there were 490,000 small- and
medium-sized businesses in Kazakhstan. Sources: Novoye Pokoleniye 15 November 2002 and Interfax-
Kazakhstan 31 October 2003; see also Aldar Kusainov, ‘Opposition in Kazakhstan press campaign to dilute
president’s authority.’ EurasiaNet, 19 March 2002.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav031902.shtml (Accessed 4 November 2004).
685 Aldar Kusainov, ‘Kazakhstan opposition party showing new stridency’ EurasiaNet, 13 November 2003.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111303a.shtml (Accessed 20 November 2003).
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law-enforcement bodies, which in his opinion were unashamedly taking away small
businesses from entrepreneurs.686 On his part, Nazarbayev famously stated that while
Kazakhstan needed large- and medium-sized businesses for pulling the country’s
economy forward, the business community ‘should not interfere either directly or
indirectly, through their people, in power, in taking political decisions’.687
The state-of-the-nation speech was not a one-off event, but rather the beginning of
a process which aimed at co-opting Ak Zhol’s potential power base into the regime’s
structures, thus diminishing Kazakhgate’s potential impact.688 The first signs of this
policy had begun to surface already in 2002.689 In August of that year, Nazarbayev stated
that ensuring the development of small- and medium-sized business was among the
government’s top seven priorities.690 Furthermore, in September, Tasmagambetov,
speaking at the Kazakhstan business forum in Astana, assured the attending businessmen
that the country’s government was paying close attention to the development of
businesses, and that the middle class was the basis of Kazakhstan’s stability. Moreover he
called for a constructive dialogue to produce specific ways to support small- and
medium-sized businesses.691 Still, it was only in 2003 that the government’s campaign
fully took off, with declarations slowly giving ground to more concrete proposals.
One of the government’s flagship initiatives was aimed at the state institutions
themselves, which were criticized for putting pressure on private businesses and
entrepreneurs. The government accused its own officers – of the financial police, interior
affairs, custom service agencies, local executive bodies, the Agriculture Ministry’s
territorial bodies, and those of the State Agency for the Management of Land Resources –
of arbitrariness in their dealing with the private sector, and called for a radical change to
their ‘monitoring’ of business and private property transactions.692 On his part,
Nazarbayev famously remarked that ‘private property is a holy cow, not a milky cow’.693
686 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 27 July 2002; see also Kazmonitor.kz , 14 November 2003.
687 Khabar Television, 30 Mar 2002, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 2 March 2002.
688 See also: Marat Yermukanov, ‘Nazarbayev hijacks oppositions plans for electing governors,’ Eurasia
Daily Monitor, 1 (147), 15 December 2004.
689 RFE/RL, 28 February 2002.
690 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 7 August 2002.
691 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 18 September 2002.
692 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 18 April 2003.
693 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 31 October 2003.
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The government was also very keen to show that its new policies were yielding desirable
results. In mid-April 2003, it was reported that the number of checks on economic entities
by controlling bodies in the first quarter fell by 40 per cent compared with the same
period in 2002, and that various measures were taken against 467 officials who were
accused of needlessly interfering in business activities.694 The next targets were the
private banks, which were criticized for charging high interest rates on loans (20–22 per
cent) when inflation stood at 6 per cent; Nazarbayev went so far as to call it a
‘conspiracy’. Moreover, he threatened banks with detailed inspections to check their tax
payments, which in his opinion were nothing short of ‘ridiculous’.695
Leading on, further proposals for reinvigorating private businesses were presented
in late 2003, when Nazarbayev condemned the robust system of technical regulations,
rules, and differing standards in the sphere of manufacturing and trade, which in his view
had became ‘a gold mine’ for bribe takers. What was needed, he suggested, was a
specific constitution for business and trade.696 Moreover, the Kazakh president
disapproved of the number of registration procedures, which had became unacceptably
unwieldy; in his own words: ‘Ministries and governors have virtually started establishing
prices for their services and for the services of their state-run enterprises. The
antimonopoly committee used to establish prices for these services before’.697 In effect,
Prime Minister Daiyal Akhmetov was publicly told by the president to reduce the number
of licenses and permits required to run businesses.698
The bosses of the small- and medium-sized businesses were also strongly
encouraged by the regime to actively participate in resolving the private sector’s
problems in the future. In Nazarbayev’s view, the Chamber of Trade and Industry (CTI)
needed to become a connecting link between government and business. Nazarbayev, who
was himself impressed by the CTI’s activities in Austria and Germany, spoke about the
urgent necessity to adopt appropriate laws that would provide the chamber with much-
needed authority.699 The calls for rapprochement between businesses and authorities were
694 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 16 April 2003.
695 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 31 October 2003.
696 Ibid.
697 Khabar Television, 31 October 2003, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 31 October 2003.
698 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 31 October 2003.
699 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 31 Octber 2003.
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again repeated in 2004 and 2005 by Akhmetov, as well as by Nazarbayev, in whose
opinion the co-operation between the two parties should not be treated with suspicion.
After all, this was how business was being conducted in any developed state,700 he
argued. Moreover, in 2004 Nazarbayev proposed to reorganize the Council of
Entrepreneurs into the Council of Business Circles of Kazakhstan, and assigned it
authority over the consultative and advisory body.701
The impact of the government’s initiatives on the day-to-day business activities of
Kazakh entrepreneurs was mixed at best. In Atyrau in late 2004 (as shown in chapter 5,
section 3.1), the problems that the authorities had pledged to address since 2003 were still
very much in place, and the effect of the reforms was nowhere to be seen. The situation
was somewhat different in Almaty, where some interviewees admitted that visits from the
tax police had become rarer in the last year or so, and that the various investment funds
established by the state were a providing a chance for developing their businesses in the
future.702 The discrepancy between Atyrau and Almaty has most likely to do with the fact
that the bureaucrats in the centre, out of fear that action would be taken against them,
were more inclined to implement at least some of the government’s policies. Authorities
in the remote regions however, took a rather relaxed approach to the directives coming
out of Astana. At the same time, most of the interviewees in Almaty, Atyrau and Astana
were equally sceptical about joining any private or state-created associations, which they
considered as yet another mechanism of control.703 As Raimbek Batalov, the chairman of
the eleventh forum of Kazakh businessmen noted, ‘some laws that have been adopted
recently which are really vital for the economy in fact play into hands of bureaucrats’.704
Although the economic reforms that Nazarbayev and his inner circle had tried to
initiate in 2003 failed to make any headway, and despite the fact that knowledge of the
Kazakhgate scandal705 was growing, oppositional parties failed to make use of these
700 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 4 May 2004; Interfax-Kazakhstan, 5 September 2005.
701 Dosym Satpayev, ‘The political elite is preparing for presidential elections,’ Petroleum Magazine,
October 2005.
702 Interview with a marketing manager of a company that specializes in supplying equipment to the oil and
gas industry: Almaty 28 September 2004; Interview with a marketing director of a company that specializes
in supplying equipment to the oil and gas industry: Almaty 24 September 2004; Interview with local sub-
contractor: Almaty 29 October 2004.
703 Interviews: Kazakhstan Fall 2004.
704 Quoted in: http://www.continent.kz/eng/2003/21/2e.html (Accessed 22 August 2006).
705 Interview with a top adviser to the major oppositional party: Almaty 29 November 2004.
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issues in the run-up to the 19 September 2004 parliamentary elections. Instead of
focusing on Kazakhgate per se, Ak Zhol and DCK spoke about the widespread corruption
in the country in general terms. A few months later, Kazhegeldin, in an interview for
Respublika, criticized the opposition openly for their rather ‘timid’ attitude towards
Kazakhgate.706 Moreover, Ak Zhol departed from its strictly pro-business line one month
before the elections and focused on the growing inequality in the Kazakh society, which
they proposed to address in a truly populist fashion. Ak Zhol’s leaders stated that if they
were to win the elections and form a new government, they would start from 2005
onwards ‘transferring into each citizen’s bank account three quarters of the revenue it
earns from taxes on the extraction of mineral resources’.707
The fact that neither of the parties spoke more openly about Kazakhgate derived
from a miscalculation on the part of the oppositional forces that the scandal sooner or
later would catch up with Nazarbayev anyway.708 As Piotr Svoik from DCK expressed it,
somewhat inappropriately, for Nazarbayev, Kazakhgate ‘is like AIDS: it doesn’t kill you
right away, but you can’t live with it’.709 The fact that Ak Zhol’s leaders chose to
abandon their key constituency, namely the business lobby, and tried to appeal to a wider
audience was primarily motivated by the necessity to widen the party’s political base.
After all, small- and mid-sized business votes alone would hardly put Ak Zhol in power,
even if the elections happened to be free and fair – which they were not.710 Yet, one
cannot completely rule out the possibility that Ak Zhol’s leaders could not rely on
business support prior to 2003. Whereas the government’s actions failed to yield
desirable results, the small- and medium-sized businesses were now being wooed by
other pro-presidential forces such as the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK)711 and
706 http://kazhegeldin.addr.com/2004en/engl_27_12_04.html (Accessed 6 December 2006).
707 Quoted in: AP Worldstream, 19 August 2004; see also: http://www.continent.kz/eng/2004/19/2e.htm
(Accessed 25 August 2006).
708 This despite the fact that Kazakhgate was widely seen as an issue that offered the opposition their best
chance of wrestling parliamentary control from pro-Nazarbayev forces. See for example: Ibragim Alibekov,
‘Kazakgate fires up Kazakhstan’s election campaign.’ EurasiaNet 20 May 2004.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav052004.shtml (Accessed 10 July 2004).
709 Quoted in: Wall Street Journal, 16 September 2004.
710 ‘PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 19 September and 3 October 2004.’
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/12/3990_en.pdf (Accessed 29 January 2005);
711 On the eve of the elections DPK chairman, Maksut Narikbayev argued that: ‘the government and the
former parliament had not paid enough attention to developing small- and medium-size business (…)
numerous regulatory acts and inspections from the state agencies were preventing the development of small
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most importantly the Asar Party (All Together),712 which was headed by the Kazakh
president’s daughter Dariga Nazarbayev (chapter 2, section 4.1). As a result, the so-called
centre ground became very crowded.
To sum up, the efforts on the part of Kazakh top officials to appeal to small- and
medium- sized businesses was motivated by their concern about the potential impact that
Kazakhgate might have. In September 2004, it turned out that regardless of the poor
implementation of the regime’s policies, the opposition not only not used Kazakhgate,
but also turned away from businesses and looked for a new source of support within the
electorate. Thus it was a win–win situation for Nazarbayev’s regime.
In the next section, it will be shown that despite the relatively comfortable
situation the regime found itself in, it did not cease in its efforts to co-opt Kazakh
businessmen. We argue in this chapter that what seemed to be a short-term
rapprochement with Kazakhstan’s growing middle class was in fact a part of a bigger
strategy which as aimed at moving from patrimonial-based relationships towards quasi-
formal ones in order to guarantee long-term stability for the regime.
1.3. Enduring change or mirage?
In the months following the 2004 elections, Nazarbayev’s regime did not cease in its
efforts to appeal to Kazakh businessmen, but rather tried in ever more assertive fashion to
portray itself as their defender. Yet, some of those early steps were heavy on populist
rhetoric and thin on substance. For instance, in November during the joint session of the
Majlis and Senate, Nazarbayev stated that 80 per cent of the Kazakh economy was
controlled by ten ‘mega-holding companies’, which by definition stifled competitiveness.
Since they brought about a negative effect on the development of a wide range of
businesses in the country, Nazarbayev suggested that the secondary functions of major
and medium-sized business.’ Kazakh Television first channel, 20 August 2004, Source: BBC Monitoring
Service, 20 August 2004.
712 Altynbek Sarsenbayev, the co-chairman of the Ak Zhol party and former media minister and envoy to
Russia, argued before the 2004 elections that the main reason for creating Asar was to draw away potential
Ak Zhol voters and to facilitate a further split within the Kazakh elite. Respublika Assandi Times, 5 March
2004, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 22 March 2004.
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industrial holdings should be transferred to small- and medium-sized businesses.713 In
other words, he advocated demonopolization. A few days after Nazarbayev’s speech, his
advisor Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, in his own speech, made the same point in a much
more forcible manner: ‘Oligarchs hate competition and they represent the main obstacle
in developing small and medium-sized businesses’.714 The condemnation of the owners
of the industrial holdings was widely seen by local observers as little more than an attack
on the opposition.715 Ak Zhol, which had failed to make any political gains during the
elections campaign,716 was being further undercut by a series of personal attacks.
Yet, Nazarbayev’s and Yertysbayev’s addresses showed that small- and medium-
sized businesses were still very much on the agenda and it was intended that they should
become one of the corner-stones of the Kazakh regime in the future. This point was fully
pronounced by Nazarbayev in 2005 during a joint parliament session:
The success of our economic and, particularly political programs depends on
strengthening a layer of [private] owners, and I tell you about this all the time.
They represent the middle class that is currently being formed. This is precisely
what states with developed democracy have and this is precisely why those states
are stable irrespective of replacement of the elite. This is why I always deal with
the development of small and medium businesses in the country and support them.
We have done a lot together but this is only the start.717
Subsequently, the Kazakh government, in line with Nazarbayev’s recommendations,
began drafting and implementing a number of laws, the main aim of which was the
protection of small and medium-sized business. Firstly, the government began drafting a
law that would lower to a minimum the number of reports that needed to be filed by
small- and medium-sized business.718 Secondly, Nazarbayev signed a decree on
strengthening measures to fight corruption and improve discipline within government
agencies. At the time of the implementation of the decree, the government also spoke
about the need for greater transparency in procurement, the reduction of government
713 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 3 November 2004.
714 Khabar Television, 7 November 2004, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 7 November 2004.
715 Interviews: Kazakhstan Fall 2004.
716 The final elections results were: Otan (42), Ak Zhol (1), Asar (4), Agrarian and Industrial Union of
Workers Block (11), Democratic Party (1). Source: http://www.kazelection2004.org/theresults.htm
717 Kazakh Television first channel, 1 September 2005, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 1 September
2005.
718 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 17 November 2004.
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interference in business activities, and the introduction of trial by jury.719 Thirdly, the
government drafted laws on issuing all types of licenses and permissions which were
accompanied by the creation of the Fund for Developing Small and Medium-Sized
Businesses, which assumed the functions of a financial supermarket to provide private
businesses with a full range of services (the initial budget of the fund was 22.7 million
dollars).720 Fourthly, Nazarbayev stated that state bodies should serve businesses and not
vice versa, and that the development of businesses must be one of the important criteria
for assessing state bodies’ activities, particularly those of local state bodies.721 Fifthly, the
Kazakh regime took the lead in establishing a business body that would serve as a forum
for dialogue between the state and the country’s entrepreneurs.
In March 2005, with active approval from the presidential administration, a group
of businessmen created Atameken, the Nationwide Union of businessmen and employers
of Kazakhstan.722 The executive director of the union, Serik Akhmetov, had previously
served as head of the state inspection department in the presidential administration.723
Shortly after the Atameken creation, it emerged that one of the main functions of the
union was to bring under its umbrella various Kazakh business associations – around 200
in total724 (for a list of major associations and unions in Kazakhstan, see Appendix 7).
The promised reward for joining the union was the acquisition of favourable treatment
from the authorities. Nazarbayev set an example of this during his visits in 2005 to the
Pavlodar and Zhambly regions, where he met with representatives of the regional
branches of Atameken, who were described as the representatives of local business
community.725 As a result, as many as eleven major business associations entered the
union two months after its formation.726 The bosses of the union invested much time in
crafting policies that would demonstrate to its potential members that they were not
merely followers of the government’s line, while stressing that the union was a body that
719 RFE/RL Newsline, 9 (72), Part I, 18 April 2005.
720 Kazakh Khabar TV, 26 April 05, Source: BBC Monitoring Service, 26 April 2005.
721 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 28 October 2005.
722 Marat Yermukanov, ‘NAZARBAYEV LINES UP HIS MEN AHEAD OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN.’
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 (150), 2 August 2005.
723 Kazinform, 1 April 2004.
724 Source: http://www.kazpravda.kz/print.php?chapter=1140523171.
725 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 25 May 2005; Interfax-Kazakhstan, 9 August 2005.
726 Kazachstan Today, 6 June 2005.
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would make constructive comments for the long-term development of the Kazakh
economy. One of Atameken’s early initiatives was that of coming out in favour of
introducing elected judges in the republic.727
The main motivation behind the creation of Atameken, however, was a desire on
the part of the regime to establish a sort of quasi-institutionalized control over the
country’s entrepreneurs. The Kazakh government, which since 2004 had put forward a
number of proposals that aimed at reassuring businessmen that the state was on their side,
now demanded their co-operation. It should be said here that such an approach towards
business was not entirely new in Kazakhstan, and had been already tried in the oil
industry at the beginning of the 2000s.
In chapter 3 (section 1.2), we discussed some of the major Kazakh subcontracting
companies, which Nazarbayev’s regime in the late 1990s brought under its control by
giving them preferential treatment in winning tenders set up by the NOC KazakhOil. It
was argued that the regime established control over those major subcontracting
companies because they were in the hands of ex-nomenklatura, whose political support
Nazarbayev had preventively maintained throughout the 1990s. In the 1990s there was
little, if any real danger that those subcontracting companies would break away from their
dependent relationship with the regime. In order to become independent, they would have
to have find alternative sources of contracts. Through the 1990s, in Kazakhstan there was
only one such alternative, namely the foreign oil companies. However, there was little
chance for co-operation between these oil companies and local sub-contractors, since
none of the companies had the ISO certificates that would act as a pass for working with
foreign oil companies.
At the beginning of the second decade of independence, the situation began to
change considerably. First of all, all major sub-companies acquired ISO certificates,728 as
well as number of other Western standards. Secondly, due to contracts with NOC and
other, less important contracts, mainly with their Uzbek, Turkmen and Kyrgyz
counterparts, companies gained considerable financial strength, which in turn allowed
727 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 11 May 2005.
728 By 2005 in Kazakhstan, over 250 companies had implemented the ISO 9000 management quality
system. ‘Kazakhstan’s companies implement ISO 9000’ http://www.infomrm/kz, 3 March 2005.
232
them to raise their technological standards.729 The local content program (chapter 5,
section 2.1), which aims at promoting local companies, was the final piece of a puzzle
that opened the doors to co-operation between foreign oil companies and these
subcontractors.
Whereas the regime did not block the development of co-operation between
international oil companies and the major local subcontractors, it also did not actively
support it.730 Obstructing the co-operation could lead to open friction between the regime
and major local construction and engineering companies, and hence potentially become a
source of problems for the regime. Thus, rather than interfering in the developing
relationships, the regime created a new structure through which it could monitor the
relationship between the two parties. In 2001, the ‘Engineering Companies Union of the
Republic of Kazakhstan’ was created. A key function of this Union has been to help
Western companies that want to bring their investments and technology to Kazakhstan to
adjust to Kazakh (meaning old Soviet) standards. The idea is that the process of adjusting
to Kazakh standards will encourage co-operation between Western companies and major
local sub-contractors that are part of the Union. Co-operation with the Union is
compulsory for Western engineering companies, since they are also obliged to pay for the
Union’s services. Major Almaty companies too, on their part, pay an annual fee for the
privilege of being part of the Union.731
From the outside, the Union looks like a rent-seeking body which aims at the
indirect taxation of Western and local companies working in the oil and gas sector, and
without doubt this is partly its role. However, it is important to recognize that besides
collecting money from the companies, the Union also closely co-operates with the
Ministry of Oil and Gas, which reviews the process of adjusting foreign companies to
Kazakh standards based on the reports sent to it by the Union.732 The Ministry closely
monitors those procedures, and in some instances even helps in negotiations between
729 ‘The Renaissance of Domestic Oil and Gas Automation,’ Petroleum Magazine, November 2001; Olga
Steblova, ‘The sector is alive,’ Gazeta.kz, 19 January 2006.
730 Interviews with number of major engineering and construction companies: Almaty, Fall 2004.




Kazakh and international companies.733 While none of the major engineering or
construction companies that I interviewed said that membership in the Engineering
Companies Union was compulsory, all them are part of the organization. Moreover,
interviewees admitted that their companies did not benefit in anyway from being part of
it. When asked why they did not revoke their memberships, that answer was ‘it would not
be an appropriate thing to do’.734
Significantly, the President of the Engineering Companies Union is Kadry
Karkabatovich Baikenov. At the beginning of the 1990s, Baikenov was the Minister of
Energy and Fuel Resources, and as Deputy Prime Minister he was officially responsible
for negotiations with Western investors.735 In late 2004, besides being president of the
Union, Baikenov was also chairman in the Board of Confederation of Employers of
Kazakhstan, as well as president of the Investconsulting Company. It is argued here, that
the fact that Baikenov is head of the Union is not accidental – it indicates that the Union’s
real function goes well beyond promoting Kazakhstan’s major companies, and it actually
aims at monitoring their activities. One interviewee who closely observes the
developments in Kazakh business stated that the Engineering Companies Union is a
prototype of a business association (about which Nazarbayev has talked for some time
but has been slow at implementing).736
The organisation, which assembles together a particular group of companies and
is headed by the ex-high ranking official, bears resemblances to the business associations
that have been emerging in recent decades in China (chapter 1, section 5). Margaret
Pearson (1997) has argued that the ruling regime in the post-Mao China, in order to
control the activities of the business community, which has gained a relative level of the
autonomy from the state, set up associations that are controlled by retired officials from
relevant ministries in order to monitor them. Moreover, in Kazakhstan as in the Chinese
case, companies that are particularly scrutinised by the regime are those that work with
foreign, outside companies.
733 Interview with ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
734 Interviews with number of major engineering and construction companies: Almaty, Fall 2004.
735 Oil Daily, 15 April 1992; In 1994 Ravil Cherdabayev took over from Baikenov as the Minister of
Energy (see chapter 2, section 2.1).
736 Interview with person close to Kazakh business community: Almaty 14 September 2004.
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The actions on the part of the regime described in the above section are early
attempts at bringing Kazakh businesses under the regime’s control through the use of
quasi-formal mechanisms. In order to achieve its aim, the regime uses the ‘stick and
carrot’ approach, with the stick outweighing the carrot. If quasi-formal institutions such
as Atameken and the Engineering Companies Union were to develop into more equal
partnerships, the regime would have to give up some of its powers, which is unlikely to
happen. Hence what is expected to happen in the long run – given that the regime is
committed to staying on its current course – is the growing coercion of different
economic groupings into various quasi-formal institutions that will be controlled through
regime-appointed intermediaries.
This scenario is most likely to unfold in the oil business, where the ever growing
group of entrepreneurs working directly or indirectly in the oil sector will become
Nazarbayev’s greatest asset, but also a source of major problems. Another important
instrument of control of the oil business – at least in the oil-rich areas – will be the
developing alliance between the regime and foreign oil companies, which despite all the
odds, is likely to endure for a considerable length of time. We will discuss this issue in
following sections.
2. Kazakhstan versus foreign oil companies
In chapters 4 and 5, it was argued that in the years 1998—2001, the tacit alliances
between the Kazakh regime and foreign oil companies allowed the regime firstly to
defuse crises in the Atyrau region, and secondly to co-opt and control various local
interest groups. The partnership was viewed by both parties as beneficial, since the
concessions they had to make in order to bring relative stability to the oil-rich regions
were rather minor. In other words, the gains outweighed the costs. The collaboration
between the companies and the regime, however, became somewhat questionable after
2002. This happened when the Kazakh regime decided to enter into a number of disputes
with foreign oil companies aimed at renegotiating some parts of the contracts that were
signed in the 1990s.
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In the following section, we will argue that while some of the actions of the
Kazakh regime challenged the status quo, they did not, however, affect the existing
cooperation between the regime and the companies in the Atyrau region per se. We base
this claim on the fact that while the companies and the regime had their differences, the
issues on which both parties collaborated in the oil-rich regions – such as the social
sphere, local labour and local content policy – did not enter into the realm of discussion.
In our view, this is the case because the Kazakh ruling regime is relatively satisfied – at
least as far as the Atyrau region goes – with the arrangements that it reached with foreign
oil companies in the late 1990s. After all, at least in the public’s perception the
companies had appeared to bow to the regime’s pressure as it painted itself as the
defender of local people. The foreign oil companies, as much as they were dissatisfied
with the regime’s actions, had little interest in undermining the existing tacit alliance,
since it guaranteed stability in the key oil-rich areas.
In order to demonstrate this point, we will refer to the debates that took place in
the globalisation literature in the 1990s in the following sub-section. Also, we will
discuss the Kyzylorda region, where the Kazakh regime set out to outmanoeuvre
PetroKazakhstan from Kazakhstan all together. The social component, local labour and
the environment were the issues that the local notables used actively to mobilise the local
population against PetroKazakhstan.
Moreover, in this section we argue that the relationship in the oil-rich areas
between the regime and foreign oil companies is heavily dependent on the origins of the
foreign oil companies involved. While most western companies, which have a great deal
of experience in operating in oil-rich countries, know when one has to give into the host
country’s demands regarding local labour or local content, the Chinese oil companies –
which have only recently entered the global arena – are much more aggressive in their
actions. Consequently, they do not pay sufficient attention to upholding the delicate
balance in the oil-rich areas in which they operate. This in turn can create substantial
problems for the ruling regime, especially in the south of Kazakhstan.
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2.1. Tengiz
Since 1998/9 onwards, Kazakh top officials, above all Balgymbayev and
Tasmagambetov, made a number of statements to communicate to foreign investors and
the Kazakh people that although the country’s oil industry was now in foreign hands, the
Kazakh state was still the ‘boss’ (chapters 2, 4 and 5). While on a few occasions this
tough-talking was followed by actions, these were not intended at changing the rules of
the game between the Kazakh state and foreign oil companies that had been established
in the years 1992–1998. A telling example was the case of the local content policy
(chapter 5). The fact that both of those ultra-patriotic ex-Prime Ministers were actively
involved in working out common positions with foreign oil companies on such issues as
the social sphere or the involvement of local labour meant that in real terms their rhetoric
– most of the time – amounted to little more than hot air (chapter 4). The situation began
to change only in late 2001 when Nazarbayev, during the session of the Kazakhstan’s
Foreign Investors Council, explicitly stated that ‘the balance between the interests of the
state and business’ should be observed.737 What set Nazarbayev’s statement apart from
the previous ones was the fact that the president himself, and not just one of his loyal
henchmen, was speaking about establishing a new order. Secondly, the environment had
become transformed due to rapidly changing oil prices on the international market. In
2000, oil prices jumped from 10 to 30 US dollars per barrel, naturally giving Kazakh
officials a kind of leverage that they previously did not have738. It should be added that in
the following years, the oil prices have continued on this upwards trend, breaking
through the ‘magic’ threshold of 50 dollars per barrel in 2005.
Initially, Nazarbayev’s main concern was the privileges that foreign oil
companies had been granted earlier, primarily the reduction– over a period of 10 years –
of VAT and social taxes from 20 per cent to 16 per cent, and from 26 per cent to 21 per
737 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 15 December 2001.
738 In April 2001, TengizChevrOil released the results of additional research on the Tengiz field, which said
that the field’s total reserves are about 2.7bn tonnes of oil, while only three years earlier the JV had claimed
that the field’s oil reserves were estimated at 1.2bn tonnes. The figure of 2.7bn tonnes of oil allowed Tengiz
to be considered one the world’s major land fields, and this inevitably strengthened the Kazakh position
even further.
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cent, respectively.739 These low taxes were designed to attract foreign oil companies to
Kazakhstan at a time when the prices of oil were hovering at around 9 to 15 dollars a
barrel – that is, when oil extraction seemed hardly profitable from the companies’ point
of view. As the price of oil grew, the Kazakh government wanted oil companies to
increase their royalties and relevant taxes to match their greater profits.740 While many
foreign companies, under growing pressure from the authorities,741 quietly renegotiated
their contracts and returned some of their more generous incentives, it quickly became
apparent that the tax issue was a prelude to a longer struggle rather than being an end in
itself.742 As one of the specialists from the Cambridge Association of Energy Research
put it: ‘There is a feeling that Kazakhstan is pushing and pressuring foreign investors in
order to let them know how much pressure they can put on them’.743
Firstly, KazTransOil, which had monopoly control over oil exports and was
headed by Kulibayev in October 2001, increased its pipeline tariffs by 50 per cent.744
Secondly, in the companies’ opinion, the new draft of the investment law compromised
the so-called ‘contract stability’. The sticking points were the international arbitration
bodies to which investors could take their disputes with the Kazakh government if they
chose to do so under the previous law, which dated back to 1994. According to the new
739 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 15 December 2001.
740 It was argued at that time that one of the main reasons behind Nazarbayev’s decision to open the issue of
taxes and other incentives – from which foreign investors allegedly earned almost as much as from their
basic activities – was political pressure from the oppositional group DCK, for which the issue of inadequate
tax payments by foreign investors became central to its political platform. Hence, the argument goes that
Nazarbayev was pushed by his political opponents into opening the thus far closed issue of oil contracts,
rather than willingly entering the dispute with the companies that he himself had attracted to Kazakhstan
only few years earlier. Sources: Dosym Satpayev, ‘Will the New Government Introduce the New Rules of
Game?’ Petroleum Magazine, February 2002; Erbergen Salykov, ‘Government RK protects the petroleum
magnates from the Kazakh nation,’ Zonakz.net, 24 November 2003; Sabrina Tavernise and Christopher
Pala, ‘Energy-rich Kazakhstan is suffering growing pains,’ The New York Times, 4 January 2003.
741 For instance, in addition to Nazarbayev’s demands, the Almaty Tax Committee accused foreign oil
companies of ‘tax-dodging’. Officials argued that a significant amount of Kazakh oil was supplied to false
firms registered in the Caribbean islands. These firms then resold the oil to real customers at higher prices.
Such machinations yielded large profits, since duty was not imposed on trade operation under Caribbean
laws. Source: BBC Monitoring Service 10 April 2002; see also S. Smirnov, ‘Kazakhstan’s Oil Mirage.’ Oil
and Gas Vertical, no. 11, 2000.
742 Michael Lelyveld. ‘Bitter feelings failed $3bn Kazakh oil deal’. Asia Times, 23 November 2002; For
details, see ‘Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Tax Guide.’ Ernst&Young Tax Services, 2002 Edition.
743 Alexander Zakharov. ‘Authorities pressure foreign investors.’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 16
December 2002.
744 Andrew Apostolou, ‘Kazakhstan’s New Oil Policy Places New Burdens on Foreign Firms,’ EuroasiaNet, 2
December 2001. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav021201.shtml (Accessed 30
June 2003).
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draft, the disputes could be transferred outside the country’s courts only with the consent
of ‘the state body’.745 Thirdly, and most importantly, there was a disagreement between
the Kazakh government – represented in the dispute by KazMunaiGas – and
ChevronTexaco over funding the expansion of TengizChevrOil’s activities.746
ChevronTexaco insisted that the project be funded from oil revenues, as stipulated in the
original contract (Peck 2004: 158), while Kazakh officials insisted that the company
should rather borrow money from financial institutions. This, in turn, would allow
Kazakhstan to preserve its share of the revenues – as much as $200 million.747 In
addition, local officials in Atyrau accused the consortium of violations in storing sulphur
– a by-product of the oil production748 – and threatened the TCO with a fine of up to $70
million, clearly in order to exercise further pressure on the company. We will return to
this case later in this section.
The standoff between ChevronTexaco and Kazakhstan led to the temporary
suspension of a $3 billion venture in November 2002, which took oil industry insiders
and commentators by surprise.749 The quarrel between the two, despite efforts on the
Kazakh side to end the dispute as soon as possible,750 lasted until late January 2003.
While the details of the horse-trading behind the scenes are unknown, it seems that the
Kazakh government emerged as the winner. The TengizChevrOil agreed to pay $810
million in additional tax payments through 2005, and also consented to helping
KazMunaiGas in financing its 20 per cent share of expansion costs.751 Moreover,
ChevronTexaco’s representatives revoked their statements about a worsening investment
environment in Kazakhstan and proclaimed that the agreement was ‘a positive statement
745 Michael Lelyveld, ‘International Compromise Sought on Investment Law,’ 18 November 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/11/18112002161501.asp
746 TengizChevrOil second generation and sour gas injection projects (SGP/SGI) were designed to raise
Tengiz output from 260,000 to 480,000 oil barrels per day by 2005. Source: Dmitoriy Solovyev,
‘TengizChevrOil announces its expansion in Kazakhstan,’ Vremia Po, 26 June 2001.
747 (Quoted in) FT.com site, 4 December 2002.
748 The TCO alleged that sulphur was a product and stacked the substance in blocks near the Tengiz
oilfields since 1993. Local officials argued, though, that sulphur constituted waste and therefore required
permission for storage.
749 Michael Lelyveld, ‘Huge Oil Venture Abruptly Suspends Expansion,’
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/11/18112002161501.asp, 18 November 2002.
750 Michael Lelyveld, ‘Oil Project Remains Murky,’
Murky.’http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/12/11122002184031.asp, 11 December 2002.
751 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 30 January 2003.
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about Kazakh investment climate’.752 In many ways, the Tengiz affair looked like a
classic example of power shift in the relationships between TNCs and the host country, as
described by globalisation theorists.
These theorists allege that developing countries, in order to attract FDI, are
willing to make far-reaching provisions to outside firms. In other words, TNCs can
initially extract maximum concessions from the economies in which they are considering
investing (Tarzi 1995: 154; Lairson and Skidmore 1997: 317). For the most radical
theorists – notably those working within the dependency school – the moment of entering
into a long-term contracts is, so to speak, the beginning of the end for the host country
(Sklar 1979: 531), since from that point on the TNCs will do everything to stop the state
from achieving genuine autonomous development. Thus the TNCs, for example
prevent local firms and entrepreneurs from participating in the most dynamic
sector of the economy; they appropriate local capital rather than bringing in a
new capital from the outside; they increase income inequalities in the host
country, and they use inappropriate capital-intensive technologies that contribute
to unemployment. (Cohn 2000: 287)
Yet other studies suggest that the positions of the host states do not indefinitely have to
be as gloomy as dependency theorists seem to suggest. They argue that while in early
stages of investment the host states are indeed in a much weaker position, ‘once the
investment is actually in place, bargaining power shifts towards the host economy’
(Gilpin 2000: 147). This is most likely to happen when FDI is concentrated in resource
extraction, as the case of the OPEC countries demonstrates (Balaam and Veseth 2001:
371; Noreng 2002: 54; Hinnebusch 2003: 38). Thus, once the investment has been ‘sunk’
and the project becomes profitable, ‘foreign firms may be exposed to the threat of
nationalization, or more likely, the renegotiation of the original terms of the investments’
(Tarzi 1995: 159).
Having said all of that, this model has a one major drawback, as ‘it ignores the
constraints posed by the host country’s domestic politics [which] may hinder host
countries in their efforts to exploit the bargaining advantages once gained from the
752 (Quoted in) Financial Post, 28 January 2003.
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relative demand for its resources’ (1995: 159). The biggest problem is the political elite,
which often lacks the political will to do so, because companies use their considerable
resources to win favours through bribery and corruption. For instance in the Middle East,
despite nationalistic pressure from beneath and expanding bargaining powers, the vast
majority of local elites continued to accept that the activities of the companies should be
tolerated unchanged, at least until the end of the 1960s (Turner 1978: 89). We argue that
a similar situation developed in Kazakhstan.
Thus, while the model cited above – as put forward by moderate globalisation
theorists – is a good explanation of the debate between the Kazakh government and the
foreign oil companies, it does not present us with the full political outcome. Instead, it
focuses solely on: a) the conflict between two parties; and b) host governments’ gains,
but omits the fact that despite all the tensions between the foreign companies and
Kazakhstan, at least some of the groups within the regime structure were interested in
upholding friendly relationships with the foreign companies – including full co-operation
in the oil-rich regions.
To begin with, the drive to strengthen investment laws in favour of Kazakhstan
was strongly contested at the apex of power. For instance, Foreign Minister
Kasymzhomart Tokayev was against the revision of contracts with foreign investors,
arguing that if the Kazakh side had any claims against foreign companies, it could use
mechanisms such as conducting consultations and negotiations with the companies. He
also pointed out that foreign investment companies had not refused to hold talks with the
government on amending contracts previously;753 hence there was no need for the radical
changes that some parliamentarians proposed.754 Nazarbayev, on his part, told the
parliament that Kazakhstan would not revise existing oil-production-sharing contracts
with foreign investors, but would change its tax policy on new oil projects.755 Moreover,
just a few months before the Kazakhstan–Chevron dispute reached its breaking point, the
head of the Kazakh state awarded the ChevronTexaco chairman David O’Reilly with a
753 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 24 June 2002.
754 The new law of Kazakhstan ‘On Investments’ was finally adopted on 8 January 2003. While the new
investment law was not welcomed by the foreign oil companies with fanfare, it gave them what they
wanted, however, since the law did not provide for retroactively altering relations based on existing
agreements. Source: Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2 November 2003; For details see: ‘Definition of investments in
subsoil use Contracts,’ Petroleum Magazine, December 2004.
755 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2 September 2003.
241
high government award, the Order of Kurmet, for ‘great contributions to developing
Kazakhstan’s economy’. He held talks with members of the board of directors of
ChevronTexaco, telling them in person about the possibilities of conducting continued
business in Kazakhstan.756 However, the most telling example of the good relationships
between the Kazakh elite and foreign companies – in the midst of the heated atmosphere
– was the conclusion of the environmental debate initiated by an Atyrau court.
The case concerning sulphur storage was primarily aimed at ChevronTexaco,
which Kazakh officials tried to pressure into giving in to their demands. The Kazakh
authorities chose also to concentrate on this particular problem in order to get the local
population, which for a long time had suspected the consortium of polluting the
environment, on the regime’s side.757 Hence, Nazarbayev’s regime yet again became the
defender of Atyrau’s interests and tried to capitalise on them. For instance, Energy
Minister Vladimir Shkolnik, when speaking at the Caspian Ecology 2003 international
environmental conference, said that the tightening of environmental rules for the
companies working in the Caspian Sea area was one of the key topics on which Kazakh
government would be focusing.758 In addition, the environment was used as a platform
for co-opting various regional groups. For instance in early 2003, the local branches of
the pro-presidential as well as oppositional parties formed an association which submitted
a number of appeals against burying waste sulphur in the region.759 Despite these anti-
Chevron declarations and campaigns, the outcome was somewhat puzzling.
Chevron was indeed fined, but not for illegal sulphur storage. Rather, it was fined
for excessive wastewater discharges and other discharges into the atmosphere, and was
ordered to pay barely more than one million US dollars in fines, instead of $70 million as
previously assumed.760 Moreover, in the spirit of previous agreements between
Kazakhstan and the companies – as discussed in chapter 4 – in 2002 Chevron initiated a
long-term umbrella program called ‘We Share the Planet Earth: ‘[t]he program includes
756 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 15 April 2002. One should add that in 2002, US exports to Kazakhstan exceeded
$600 million. The large total for U.S. exports mostly consisted of Boeing aircraft and satellite defense
equipment. Source: ‘Doing Business in Kazakhstan,’
http://www.buyusa.gov/kazakhstan/en/doing_business_kazakhstan.html
757 Interviews: Atyrau 2004.
758 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 11 November 2003.
759 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 19 February 2003.
760 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 17 November 2003.
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developing and implementing a nationwide environmental curriculum in the primary and
secondary schools, an annual ecology art contest, a nationwide contest of scientific-
practical projects of high school students and volunteer environmental actions’.761 Thus,
Chevron was let off the hook by the Kazakh authorities after it made some minor
concessions (see also Zhukov 2005: 395–396). Arguably, the status quo had been re-
established.
The Chevron affair was a major turning point in the Kazakh regime and foreign
oil companies’ relationship. The regime, by pressing oil companies into giving in to its
demands, crossed the boundaries that hitherto had been uncontested. As oil expert
Richard Orange put it:
Times have changed since the innocent early 1990s when the Caspian state doled
out contracts to big international majors on terms that many locals now argue
were far too generous. Now, with little chance of foreign investors walking away
from some of the world’s largest undeveloped oil fields, Kazakhstan, led by
authoritarian president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is throwing its weight around.762
At the same time, the mutual dependency between Chevron and the Kazakh officials and
their common interests – especially in the oil-rich areas which are pivotal for both –
meant that neither of the two had any interest in changing the existing situation. Thus,
neither social issues, nor local labour, nor the local content policy entered into the realm
of the discussion. Quite the opposite: once the debate was concluded, both parties happily
returned to the pre-established patterns. This involved the regime’s fiercely attacking the
company and winning the support of the local people, while the company made a public
show of eventually bowing to the regime’s pressures and making a necessary but
insubstantial contribution to the area. These points are substantiated further when we








On 28 June 2002, after a two-year appraisal programme undertaken by the contracting
companies of the North Caspian Sea Production Sharing Agreement763 (now known as
Agip-KOC), the Kashagan oil field was declared commercial. While the Kashagan field
had been hailed as the greatest discovery of the last few decades – with preliminary
estimates putting producible reserves at 7-9 billion barrels764 – from the outset, it had all
the trappings of an engineering nightmare.765 It was estimated that the companies would
have to invest $29 billion over the next 15 years in order to eventually bring the field’s
output up to 1.2m barrels per day.766 Due to the technical difficulties and the need for
massive investments in the future,767 British Gas decided to sell an 8.33 per cent interest
in the consortium to the Chinese company CNOOC North Caspian Sea, a subsidiary of
CNOOC, for US$615m768. A few days later, the remaining 8.33 per cent were sold for
another $615m to the Sincopec Group, China’s number two oil producer.769 This deal
was openly embraced by Nazarbayev during a meeting with Chinese officials, who
visited Astana to make a formal announcement. Simultaneously, the management of
KazMuniGas announced that it was also contemplating the possible admittance of
Chinese oil companies to major projects in Kazakhstan.770
The deal, however, did not go through: it was blocked by others members of the
consortium, who chose to exercise their right to pre-empt the sale and to buy the BG
share and divide it among themselves. The leading opponent of the Chinese involvement
was Royal Dutch Shell, which in turn was threatened with the suspension of its projects
763 Companies involved: Eni (16.67 per cent), ExxonMobil (16.67 percent), BG (16.67 per cent), Inpex
(8.33 percent), Phillips (8.33 per cent), Shell (16.67 percent), and TotalFinaElf (16.67 per cent).
764 Two years later Kashagan’s reserves were estimated at 13bn barrels; See also: Alexander Constantinov
and Rashid Dyusembaev, ‘How much oil we do not know, but the strategy is ready,’ Vremia Po, 10 August
2001
765 David Buchan. ‘Are the oil giants out of their depth?’ FT.com site, 13 July 2001; See also: Ulbolsyn
Kozhantaeva, ‘The prospects of the gas sector,’ Delovaia Nedelia, 8 March 2001.
766 In late 2000, Kazakhstan produced 500,000-600,000 barrels a day. Source: Financial Times, 11
December 2000.
767 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004; In
addition, analysts argued that the company had become over-exposed to Kazakhstan, with its investments
there at one point accounting for up to 30 per cent of its net asset value. Source: FT.com site, 11 March
2003.
768 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 7 March 2003.
769 Jeo Leahy. ‘Sinopec buys into Caspian project.’ FT.com site, 11 March 2003.
770 ‘China is not yet admitted to Kashagan.’ Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan 3, 2003.
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in China.771 One interviewee, who has been working on the Kashagan project, stated that
the reasons for blocking the Chinese bids were: a) the fact that Chinese companies had
been seen as extremely difficult partners to work with and that none of the Western
companies involved liked to have them on board; and b) that the Kashagan PSA was
probably the most complicated oil deal ever concluded due to the number of companies
involved, which made the running of the project extremely complicated. Hence: less
partners, fewer problems.772 Alternatively, and much more soundly, it was argued that the
most important reasons for keeping Chinese companies away from the project were
geopolitical concerns, and more specifically the possible routes of transportation of the
Kashagan oil. While Western companies – especially US ones – favoured the BTC
direction,773 it was thought that the Chinese companies would push for a West
Kazakhstan-West China pipeline.774
Leading on, it was because of the pipeline issue that the Kazakh government –
which strongly supported the Chinese option – decided to step in and announce that it
now wanted the Kashagan stake for itself.775 This in turn sparked a battle of epic
dimensions, since the foreign companies were not keen on having KazMunaiGas as a
partner either. As one specialist pointed out at the time, ‘the prospect of the Kazakh
government as an equal partner in such an expensive and complex project is not an
appealing one’.776 Secondly, the Kazakh government stated that it would not pay the full
$1.23 billion that had been agreed upon with the other partners in the project, which was
not met with much sympathy by British Gas.777 Thirdly and most importantly, the foreign
oil companies could block the Kazakh bid and there was little that the Kazakh
government could do about it. The problem was the lack of any legal grounds for the
771 Lina Saigol. ‘Battle lines drawn for Caspian oil.’ Financial Times, 8 May 2003.
772 Interview with a high-ranking specialist of a major foreign oil company: Almaty 6 October 2004; see
also Christopher Pala. ‘Kazakhstan Turns on Oil Majors.’ The Moscow Times, 29 June 2004.
773 ‘Kashagan oil field can grow into legend.’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections. 2 April 2001;
Ulbolsyn Kozhantaeva, ‘On the oil crossroads,’ Delovaia Nedelia, 18 May 2001.
774 Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan 3, 2003; In May 2004, Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to build
an $840 million pipeline that would funnel up to 70 million tons per year from the Caspian Sea to China;
See also: Bakhytzhan Mukushev, ‘Kazakhstan’s oil fate and directions its takes,’ Navigator, 27 February
2001.
775 Interview with the president of a major Kazakh newspaper: Astana 8 December 2004.
776 ‘Kazakhstan makes hostile bid to oil majors.’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 21 July 2004.
777 Neft Compass, 8 July 2004.
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Kazakh bid, since the Kashagan PSA did not give Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas the same
pre-emptive right to buy stakes as it did to the member of the consortium.778
In response to those problems, the Kazakh government cited an article in the
constitution which declares that the subsoil is ‘the exclusive property’ of the state, and
hence the asset first and foremost of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In the opinion of the
Kazakh government, this gave them a pre-emptive right to buy the stake. Secondly, the
Kazakh authorities began a hostile campaign against British Gas and other members of
the consortium in order to pressure them into giving in to their demands. But at no time
did they try to mobilize the local population in the oil-rich areas or the wider Kazakh
society by referring to social issues or to the local content policy.
In June 2004, a Kazakh customs official impounded an oilrig that belonged to
Parker Drilling Company, a US Agip KCO contractor, for the alleged non-payment of
some US$6 million in customs duties, and also imposed a fine of $1.7 million for
breaking customs regulations.779 Also, in June, British Gas was accused by the Kazakh
financial watchdog of helping to ‘smuggle’ up to $2.7 billion worth of gas condensate to
Russia from the Karachagank field, in which BG had been involved since 1992.780 The
Kazakh Agency for Combating Economic and Corruption Crime stated that the damage
inflicted on the state was to the tune of $5.4 million.781 It is important to mention that
these accusations against foreign oil companies arrived hot on the heels of another
dispute concerning the Kashagan field, which was only resolved in February 2004. The
Agip KCO, which initially had agreed to start commercial production in 2005, announced
in late 2003 that the production would not start until 2007–2008. This in turn meant that
the consortium would have to pay a fine, which Kazakh officials were quick to jack up to
hundreds of millions of dollars.782 While the dispute was somewhat separated from the
778 Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 18 August 2004.
779 Ibragim Alibekov. ‘Kazakhstan asserts state interests in Kashagan oil field.’ EurasiaNet, 7 September
2004.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav070904.shtml (Accessed 9 September
2004).
780 Neft Compass, 22 July 2004.
781 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 19 May 2004.
782 The exact payment made by the AGIP consortium has not been so far disclosed to the public. However,
some speculated that Agip KOC offered to pay a bonus of $100 m as compensation for the delay. Source:
‘Kazakhstan strikes deal with consortium on Kashagan oil field.’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections. 25
March 2004.
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whole issue of who had a pre-emptive right to buy the stake, it added considerably to the
worsening situation.783
The dispute concerning the Kashagan field climaxed in late 2004, when
Kazakhstan’s parliament unanimously approved a bill giving the government priority in
buying stakes in energy projects that were put up for sale in the country. Simultaneously,
the Kazakh financial police filed new charges against British Gas for unpaid taxes from
2000 and 2003.784 Parallel to those changes in legislation and the attack on the
companies, the Kazakh Oil Minister, Vladimir Shkolnik, began speaking about finding ‘a
mutually beneficial’ solution that would satisfy both the Kazakh government and the
foreign oil companies.785 One of these steps on the part of the Kazakh government was
KazMunaiGas’s declaration suggesting that the company was interested in buying only
half of the British Gas stake of 8.33 per cent for the market price of $615 millions.786
Moreover, during the 12th meeting of the Council of Foreign Investors, Nazarbayev
stressed again that Kazakhstan was determined to improve the investment climate rather
than the other way around.787 Finally, Shkolnik countered the view widely held by
Kazakhs and foreigners alike,788 concerning the re-selling of a block of shares to the
Chinese companies, that ‘Kazakhstan is not going to re-sell anything to anyone’.789
It appears that Shkolnik’s assurance about the non-Chinese involvement
constituted a turning point in the dispute. With the passing of the new law, it became
apparent that the Kazakh government was determined to participate in the deal, and
would stop at nothing to achieve its goal.790 In addition, with the presidential elections in
sight for Nazarbayev and his inner circle, Kashagan increasingly became more of a
domestic political issue than an economic one.791 In such a situation, the Kazakh
783 Interview with ex-general director of a major foreign oil company in Kazakhstan: Almaty 27 October
2004.
784 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 6 October 2004.
785 Bagila Bukharbayeva. ‘Kazakh government optimistic on its bid to get stake in international oil
consortium.’ AP Worldstream, 5 October 2004.
786 RFE/RL Newsline 9 (85), Part I, 5 May 2005.
787 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 10 December 2004; see also ‘Kazakhstan ready to discuss taxes with oil majors.’
Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections. 29 June 2004.
788 Interviews Almaty: Fall 2004.
789 ‘Kazakhstan bid for Kashagan natural deposit.’ Time of Central Asia, 2 October 2004.
790 It is important to keep in mind that the new legislation did not affected the contracts concluded in the
1990s since – as it was already pointed out in the Chapter Five – those contracts are above Kazakh law.
791 Interview with a president of a major Kazakh newspaper: Astana 8 December 2004.
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authorities’ pledge concerning Chinese companies became crucial from the perspective of
the foreign oil companies, as it established the boundaries within which the agreement
could be reached. The fact that KazMunaiGas wanted to acquire only half of the stake
was acceptable to the foreign oil companies, but not ideal. Arguably due to those factors,
the dispute over the Kashagan stake was finally resolved on 5 May 2005.
In the course of the Kashagan dispute – as in the case of the Tengiz affair – the
Kazakh authorities, which used every other trick in the book to push foreign oil
companies to play according to the new rules of the game, did not speak of either social
issues or the local content policy. As the case of PetroKazakhstan, discussed in the
following sub-section, shows, this tactic could have easily mobilized the local population
against the companies and strengthened the Kazakh authorities’ position in those
negotiations. Hence, we argue the Kashagan dispute again forcibly demonstrates the
degree to which the tacit co-operation between the companies and the regime has become
entrenched in the oil-rich regions, and underlines its importance from the perspective of
Nazarbayev’s regime.
Furthermore, the extent to which the regime is keen on relying on co-operation
with the outside companies in the oil-rich areas in order to maintain the social and
political peace is confirmed by the example of Chinese oil companies. We argue that the
Chinese companies, which were not interested in assisting the Kazakh regime to the same
extent as Western oil companies, became the targets of attacks by various officials. That
is to say, that the regime tried to pressure the Chinese into the same sort of tacit alliance
that it enjoyed with the US and European companies. The need for this alliance became
ever more important in 2005 when China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) bought
the third biggest oil field in Kazakhstan, Kumkol.
2.3. PetroKazakhstan and CNPC
The disputes between the Kazakh regime and foreign oil companies that we have so far
discussed in two previous sub-sections, were aimed primarily at changing the existing
rules of the game. Moreover, from the outset of those debates it was clear that the Kazakh
regime – even if tried to buy a stake in the oil consortium – was not aiming at
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outmanoeuvring those companies from the country altogether. The situation was different
in the case of PetroKazakhstan, against which Kazakh authorities launched an extremely
hostile wave of attacks from 2003 until 2005 even by Kazakh standards – the principal
objective of which was to chase the company out of Kazakhstan.792
In late 2003, the Anti-Monopoly Agency fined PetroKazakhstan US$97 million
for a number of alleged violations, such as hiking the prices of fuel oil.793 The sum came
on top of outstanding penalties over unpaid taxes, royalties and unjustified revenues that
totalled $100 million. In addition, the Kazakh Agency for Regulation of Natural
Monopolies fined the company $6.3 million, and shortly thereafter, another $31 million
for the alleged overpricing of the refined petroleum products that it sold in Kazakhstan794.
In 2004, the Kazakh financial police launched a criminal case against the managers of
seven companies affiliated with PetroKazakhstan for monopolistic activities and for
limiting competition.795 In 2005, the Kazakh authorities went one step further and issued
warrants against the president and chief financial officer for violating Kazakhstan’s
antimonopoly legislation.796
The attacks on the company by central and local authorities were accompanied by
demonstrations staged in Kyzylorda and Shymkent, which were managed by Asar and the
youth movement Vybor molodykh (the Choice of the Young). The demonstrators focused
on all the issues that were not raised in previous debates, i.e. social contributions, local
labour and local content. For instance, according to Makhmut Izembetov, the acting
secretary of Asar’s Kyzylorda branch: ‘PetroKazakhstan Company exploits the local
population, paying people meagre wages. They do not allocate money for developing
business or infrastructure in the region, they damage the environment, and all this
792 The Hurricane deal, next to TengizChevrOil, was the most controversial oil contract that the Kazakh
authorities signed with a foreign oil company in the 1990s. The project ran into many problems over the
years (Peck 158–165: 2004), primarily because this relatively small company was an easier target than the
major oil companies. Now, with the huge increase in oil prices and the growing confidence on the part of
the Kazakh officials, the regime set to oust the company once and for all. Source: ‘Kazakhstan’s economy:
The pushy partner.’ Alexandre’s Gas and Oil Connections, 10 November 2005; Isabel Gorst. ‘China takes a
great leap forward into its neighbor’s oil business.’ Financial Times, 23 August 2005; Keith Bradsher.
‘Chinese Company to buy Kazakhstan oil Interests for $4 billion.’ New York Times, 22 August 2005.
793 Neft Compass, 25 July 2004.
794 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 4 October 2003; Financial Post, 4 November 2003.
795 Interfax-Kazakhstan 27 October 2004.
796 RFE/RL Newsline 9 (63), 5 April 2005.
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compels the population to appeal to People’s Control’.797 Finally, in July 2005, an Astana
court fined the company yet another $54 million for violating tax legislations.798
PetroKazakhstan gave in to Kazakh pressure in August 2005, when it decided to
sell its enterprise to the Chinese company CNPC for a staggering $4.18 bn, making it the
most expensive oil acquisition ever in Central Asia. It was a widely held view then that
CNPC could not have bought PetroKazakhstan without the blessings of the Kazakh
government.799 The latter, it is argued here, was inclined to open up access to the Kazakh
market, especially since the Chinese bid for the British Gas stake in the Kashagan oil
field had failed so spectacularly. Furthermore, it was argued that CNPC involvement was
only logical, since in 2004 KazMunaiGas and CNPC had teamed up to build the 1,000km
pipeline from Kumkol to Urumchi in northwest China.800 All this took place in the
background of the visit in July 2005 of Chinese President, Hu Jintao, to Kazakhstan,
during which he signed an agreement with Nazarbayev to develop a ‘strategic
partnership’.801 In the long run, the Chinese involvement has turned to be a mixed
blessing for the Kazakh regime, especially when it comes to social and political peace in
Kyzylorda. We make this claim on the existing records of the Chinese-Kazakh
relationships in other oil-rich regions.
The involvement of Chinese companies in Kazakhstan dates back to 1997, when
CNPC acquired a 60.3% state in state-run Aktyubinskmunaigas (chapter 2, section 3.2).
From the very beginning, the relationship between CNPC and the local population was
one of the most problematic ones in Kazakhstan. For instance, in April 1999 the company
infamously fired 2,000 employees, and despite pledges on the part of the Chinese
managers to rehire workers at a later date they never in fact did so (chapter 4). The
relationships worsened further in early 2000, when employees of Aktyubinskmunaigas
797 Marat Yermukanov, ‘Kazakhstan’s establishment and oligarchs on collision course.’ Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 2 (45), 7 March 2005.
798 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 13 July 2005.
799 Ian Austen, ‘From Canadian Bankruptcy to the Riches of Kazakhstan.’ New York Times, 23 August
2005.
800 RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 9, No. 159, 23 August 2005; Bruce Pannier, ‘Kazakhstan/China: Oil Deal Marks
Beijing’s 1st Foreign Energy Takeover.’ RFE/RL, 23 August 2005.
801 The two governments are also partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a six-nation security
group led by Beijing and Moscow that is meant to combat Islamic extremis in Central Asia. Source:
Associated Press, 22 August 2005; Yuri Kirinitsiyanov, ‘Water and oil – new realities in the Kazakh-
Chinese relationships’ Business in Russia, 20 Febuary 2001.
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publicly called for the CNPC contract to be cancelled (Peck 2004: 170–171). By 2003-
04, there was little evidence that the situation had improved in any way; quite on the
contrary.
It was reported that CNPC business executives largely employed Chinese
specialists brought in from China, ignoring their commitment to train and hire the local
workforce. The excuses for not employing local workers were the alleged lack of
qualified oil specialists in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the few who actually were employed
by the Chinese company complained that they were paid only half the salary received by
Chinese workers.802 The ‘cruelty’ of the Chinese bosses – in the public imagination –
reached its climax when rumours circulated that some of them went as far as demanding
from the Kazakh workers that they sing Chinese songs.803 Another major problem from
the Kazakh regime’s perspective – and a much more serious one – was created by the
Chinese sub-contracting companies, around 40 in total – that had been working for
CNPC–Aktyubinskmunaigas. Those companies not only employed solely Chinese labour,
but also successfully blocked the access of the Kazakh sub-contracting companies to
Aktyubinskmunaigas contracts.804
Leading on, Chinese companies were also not willing to dissolve the tense
atmosphere that their actions created. Except for organizing a few charitable campaigns
and giving a few handouts to the poor, the CNPC was a rather uncooperative partner805
compared to Western foreign oil companies, as demonstrated in chapter 4 and 5. This led
to an inevitably negative assessment of the Kazakh regime amongst the local populations
where these companies operated, which caused in turn a great deal of frustration within
the regime on the national as well as local levels. In response, in mid-2004 Astana
pressurized the CNPC and demanded that it cut the number of Chinese personnel by 40
per cent that year, repatriating them to China. Also, the government urged the company
to train local workers for high-qualified jobs to replace them.806 On the local level, the
managers of a number of Chinese companies were accused of inflicting economic
802 Marat Yermukanov, ‘Kazakhs fear Chinese creeping expansion.’ Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 June
2004.
803 Interviews with various oil specialists: Almaty Fall 2004.
804 Ibid.
805 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 June 2004.
806 Marat Yermukanov, ‘A thorny road to Sino-Kazakh partnership.’ China Brief, Volume 4 (14), 8 July
2004.
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damage on Kazakhstan. The CNPC–Aktyubinskmunaigas managers were charged with
economic crimes to the tune of US$21.5m, and of evading customs taxes and duties.
Moreover, two of CNPC’s sub-contracting companies were accused of illegal business
activities and a failure to pay customs duties for equipment brought from China.807
More research is needed to investigate the impact that the Kazakh regime’s ad
hoc policies have had on the relationships between CNPC–Aktyubinskmunaigas and the
local authorities. However, judging from the information available by 2005, there was
little evidence to suggest that Chinese companies were willing to change their behaviour.
For instance, rumours circulated that CNPC intended to hire 10,000 Chinese workers to
construct the Atasu–Alashankou oil pipeline, while the Kazakh local population had
been given to believe that the pipeline would create hundreds of jobs in western and
southern Kazakhstan and effectively help to alleviate long-standing social problems.808
In conclusion, during the first part of 2000s, the ruling regime in Kazakhstan
began showing signs of moving away from its established methods of regime
maintenance; in other words it moved from purely patron–client based systems to a
quasi-formal ‘modus operandi’. As the prime motivation behind this particular
modification lies the attempt to build a more coherent type of relationship with Kazakh
society in order to prolong the reign of the Kazakh president. The new mechanisms also
increase the chances of a smooth transition from Nazarbayev to his successor, assuming
that the president chooses to hand over power voluntarily. The absence of any change in
the relationship between the Western oil companies and the Kazakh regime in the oil-rich
areas – despite major disagreements between the two – shows the extent to which those
companies have become an integral part of Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan. Foreign oil
companies that came to the country at the beginning of the 1990s not only revolutionized
the Kazakh oil industry, but also left their imprint on the Kazakh state (oil laws) and the
regime’s behaviour (taking for granted bribery in dealings with foreign investors). It is
argued here that these strong ties between the two are not likely to be cut as long as
807 Interfax-Kazakhstan, 8 December 2004.
808 Marat Yermukanov, ‘Sino-Kazakh pipeline project has demographic, as well as economic dimensions.’
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 (75), 18 April 2005; Stephen Blank, ‘China’s difficult search for Central Asian
energy.’ China Brief, 12 December 2005.
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The main purpose of this study was to explore the techniques that the Kazakh regime –
headed by the authoritarian ruler Nursultan Nazarbayev – used to maintain itself in power
from 1991 until 2005. This thesis has endeavoured to uncover the range of the regime’s
methods by analysing the ways in which it went about controlling the oil industry, an
industry with which the political and economical future of Kazakhstan is inseparably
intertwined. The empirical section of this study has investigated the interplay between the
regime and the actors located in and around two cores: the NOC and the oil-rich areas.
This thesis has focused in particular on instances when the other players involved with
the oil industry directly or indirectly attempted to challenge the regime’s authority in
those two centres, either because of their greed or grievances. It was argued that it is in
these moments of crisis that the regime’s maintenance techniques are most visible, and
even more importantly, likely to be replaced by new methods. In order to account for the
techniques that the Kazakh ruling regime applied when structuring its relationships with
the oil industry, this thesis shifted the emphasis from zhuz-horde, tribe and clan-based
approaches to Kazakh politics: it sought instead to unravel the relationship through the
prism of formal (corporatism) and informal (patron–client) mechanisms of control.
1. The Kazakh regime–oil industry relationship
This thesis has argued that in order to establish and uphold its control over the oil
industry, the Kazakh regime used formal, informal and quasi-formal regime maintenance
techniques, and also entered into a tacit agreement with foreign oil companies. The
formal mechanisms of control were used in the first years of independence, and were
largely a logical continuation of the way in which the oil industry had been governed in
the Soviet Union. Yet, these formal types of relations proved unsustainable, due to the
challenges from inside of the oil industry, which was headed by professional oil men. The
conflict between the Kazakh president and the oil men led to a restructuring of the
existing relationships. From the mid-1990s on, the regime began the slow process of
moving from formal to informal techniques.
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The use of the patron-client relationships as a main mechanism of control
throughout the 1990s and beyond did not come as a surprise. In the Soviet Union patron-
client links were crucial to obtaining anything from a refrigerator, furniture or food
products without queuing for hours if not days, to getting a good job and advancing one’s
career in the work place or in the Communist party. Patron-client relationships were a
part of the daily life into which all the key players were socialised into. Hence,
patrimonialism per se has constituted for the Kazakh regime – as it indeed still does for
so many other post-Soviet regimes - a sort of safety net which it can always rely on in
times of uncertainty or political crises. Over the years, an important element in
strengthening these old/new informal relationships was the gradual Kazakhization of the
oil industry, which intentionally and unintentionally reinforced a bond between the
regime and its clients. Furthermore, Nazarbayev’s regime preferred to use patron-client
techniques because of their dyadic character as opposed to a relationship based on
kinship, in other words, regional sub-clans or more appropriately in the Kazakh case,
extended oil families.
Whereas throughout the 1990s and beyond Nazarbayev recognised that interests
of particularly important oil families had to be taken under consideration in his dealings
with the oil industry, he did not overemphasise this fact or indeed did not attempt to form
open alliances with the key families. Even if such options were initially on the table they
were scrapped rather quickly in the beginning of the 1990s after one of the more
important families began positioning itself strategically in anticipation of a future
privatisation of the oil sector which they planed to hijack. As a result, kinship began to be
seen as a threat to Nazarbayev’s hegemony over the oil industry, rather than an asset or
advantage. Excluding Kazakh indigenous oil men from the privatisation process was
made possible largely due to the internal split between different fractions especially in the
Atyrau region. If it had not been for this infighting, oil families would have had a much
better chance at capturing the oil industry in the mid-1990s. Eventually, Nazarbayev went
to award important oil men with various high level positions (including key posts in the
NOC) but kept them at an arms length from the decision making process and preferred to
deal with them as his clients. For instance, it was not accidental that the Kazakh president
pushed with the restructuring of the oil industry with the help of the Prime Minister who
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did not have any experience of working in the oil sector and chose to control the oil
industry vis-à-vis his son in law and his clients. Even so, this thesis did not conclude that
in the years to come the importance of the oil families in the Kazakh oil industry was
completely diminished.
The relatives of key oil men who in recent years have been appointed to mid-
level positions in the NOC ‘brought’ with them to Astana members of their own extended
families, but not in such great numbers as was generally predicted in Kazakhstan. Oil
families have played an important role - at least in the Atyrau region - in selecting local
companies with which foreign oil companies could work with. There is little doubt that
the entry of the oil families took place with Nazarbayev’s and his inner circle’s
knowledge. By allowing the relatives of important oil families to enter into the NOC and
to play a role in selecting local sub-contractors, the regime tried to demonstrate that the
interests of the representatives of the oil-rich regions are still being taken under
consideration. At the same time, thanks to frequent reshuffles and rotations the managers
and directors who heavily rely on family ties have been successfully prevented from
using their connections in any way that could seriously threaten the regime’s grip over
the oil industry. In other words, they have not been allowed to stay in their positions for
long enough to develop networks based on kinship and patrimonialism that would allow
their patrons/relatives to grow substantially in strength. Finally, the presence of people
from the oil rich regions - particularly in the case of the NOC - have been
counterbalanced by the presence of other actors, for instance, ‘political’ appointees in
whose interests it is to weaken the influence of the oil families in order to strengthen their
own position.
Leading on, this thesis argued that the first half of the 2000s to some degree
signalled a return to the previously abandoned types of formal techniques. It was argued
that in Kazakhstan, as in the case of other authoritarian regimes, the new attempts at
recreating a formal type of relationship have been initiated by the propertied elites intent
upon preserving their hegemonic authority and their rights against oppositional forces
(Haynes 1988: 136). The process of creating a formal type of relationship in post-Soviet
Kazakhstan was greatly accelerated once the oppositional forces (which until early 2000s
played a marginal role in the country’s political life) were joined by all powerful
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oligarchs who now openly challenged the regime and President Nazarbayev himself. The
key group which the regime aimed to accommodate through the development of the
formal relationships was the ever-growing Kazakh middle-class which the oligarchs
initially hoped to win over on their side. Thus, if the young oligarchs had not defected
from the regime, Nazarbayev and his inner circle would not have been as eager as it
became to structure new type of relationships. Furthermore, the restoration of the formal
types of relationships was facilitated and accelerated by the rise in oil prices since the
beginning of the 2000s. Hence, the Kazakh regime not only used these massive oil
windfalls to merely conserve the status quo, but also seemed to seize the emerging
opportunities to restructure its relationships with the oil industry and the wider business
community.
The corporatist logic has a very long tradition in Kazakhstan and Central Asia per
se, since it was one of the key pillars of the Bolshevik/Leninist state. However, the
present day endeavours arguably have their source in East Asian and Chinese regimes –
both with strong corporatist leanings – which are reputed to be amongst the inspirations,
if not models, for the Kazakh regime. That is to say, the Kazakh regime first used the
Asian example of Singapore, and the Malaysian style of ‘enlightened (benevolent)
authoritarianism’, to legitimise its rule. In fact, in recent years it has begun increasingly
to see itself as a part of the Asian, rather than the Eurasian ‘world’, and has started to pay
closer attention to their regime maintenance techniques.809
It is worth noting that the formal type of relationships that began emerging in
Kazakhstan since 2003 does not amount to a fully-fledged corporatism but rather a quasi-
corporatism. The post-Soviet Kazakh brand of corporatism lags behind its authoritarian
counterparts across time and space in two important respects. Firstly the level of
institutionalisation is relatively low and secondly the associations put in place by the
Kazakh state (which attempts to maintain a dominant position in structuring of social
relationships) do not have any input into the decision making process. However, some
aspects of state led corporatism - as understood by Latin American or Asian scholars can
emerge in the foreseeable future.
809 Fiona Hill, ‘Whither Kazakhstan ? (Part I),’
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/hillf/20051031_kazakhstan.pdf, pp. 4––5 (Accessed November 20
2006).
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A low level of institutionalisation stems from the fact that the process of
structuring relationships with the country’s business community (in particular the broadly
understood oil industry) has been put into motion very recently. Given the developments
of the last few years, one can expect a considerable increase in the level of
institutionalisation. Amongst the most important events are, a) the active involvement of
the Kazakh president in constructing a new type of relationship, b) a number of new laws
which aimed at actively promoting formal type of relationships, c) the creation of some
high profile bodies such as Atameken (the Nationwide Union of business and employers
of Kazakhstan) which aims at incorporating existing business associations which are
scattered all over the country. The question concerning the involvement of the members
of the business associations in the decision-making process is however more complicated.
On the one hand, as this thesis argued, there were no signs as of 2005 that the regime is
actively interested in businesses’ input into decision-making processes. On the other
hand, given the dynamic movement of the members of the members of the business elite
into governmental- and political posts and of high-ranking bureaucrats into business
posts, it could be argued that the Kazakh style of quasi-corporatism does not have the
capacity to develop into a partnership characteristic of a fully fledged corporatist system.
This however is not likely to happen in the immediate future.
The developments of the last few years have signalled an important departure for
the Kazakh regime from a situation in which informal politics based on personal contacts
dominate virtually every aspect of the regime-business relationships. In order to account
for how far this process has travelled further studies of various business associations and
their interaction with the respective state structures across today’s Kazakhstan are called
for.
Finally, this thesis argued that the regime in order to maintain itself in power in
the oil-rich areas formed tacit alliances with foreign oil companies. Initially, the main
objective of these alliances was to shift the burden of responsibility for the lack of
development in the oil-rich areas from the regime to the foreign oil companies. Later on
the objective was to jointly decide which local sub-contracting companies should be
granted access to the foreign oil companies’ contracts (thus implementing the local
content policy). The need for the latter stemmed from the concern on the part of the
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regime that if the process of awarding companies with contracts were not sufficiently
monitored, it would lead to the development of powerful interests outwith the regime’s
control. Nazarbayev’s regime was not the only one suffering from this kind of anxiety as
is evident from Thad Dunning’s studies of authoritarian rulers, which concentrated on
Mobutu’s Zaire and Suharto’s Indonesia. Dunning concludes that while authoritarian
rulers might wish to promote diversification of the economy – in Kazakhstan, the local
content policy was also partly introduced to achieve this goal – such diversification can
create a societal basis of power outside the control of political elites. He goes on to argue
that these may then facilitate future challenges to the political power of state incumbents.
Hence the rulers in the most extreme cases such as Zaire can instead favour de-
diversification of the economy in order to remain in power (2003: 4–5).
Leading on, the involvement of foreign oil companies in controlling oil-rich areas
is also hardly unique to Kazakhstan. Augustine Ikelegbe stated that in the Niger Delta,
foreign oil companies had paid off the traditional rulers, local elites and businessmen for
decades in order to preserve the social and political peace. Unfortunately, their actions
had quite the opposite effect, as access to these benefits has fuelled a deadly struggle
among many different groups and fractions (2005: 216). The Nigerian scenario is
unlikely to unfold in Kazakhstan, however, since the regime itself, through its local
agents, is directly involved into how contracts are being distributed amongst local
players.
2. A soft neo-patrimonial regime
The constant manoeuvring between different regime maintenance techniques is a distinct
feature of those authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes that tend to stay in power for
a considerable amount of time, as the examples of Indonesia (Crouch 1979), Panama
(Ropp 1992), Angola and Sierra Leone (Reno 1997) and Uganda (Mwenda and Tangri
2005) demonstrate. Although the Kazakh regime is engaged in a continuous process of
renegotiating its position, the label which in 2005 still best captured its essence was put
forward by Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai (2005): ‘post-Soviet neo-patrimonial
regime’. The authors’ description is accurate not only because patron–client relationships
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and corruption in Kazakhstan overwhelmingly dominate regime–society relationships (an
indispensable feature of any neo-patrimonial regime) – but also because of the systemic
use of other regime maintenance techniques that put Nazarbayev’s regime into the neo-
patrimonial category.
Most importantly, Nazarbayev’s regime conducts zero-sum politics, i.e. it does
not tolerate any kind of dissent. In the last decade or so media, political parties, and civil
society groups that display any degree of independence from the official line have been
either co-opted, divided or outlawed, and in the case of powerful political and economic
actors, also imprisoned. A good example of how far this policy has travelled can be given
with the case of Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga, whose party Asar was forced to merge
with the presidential party Otan, and whose media ‘empire’ was thus brought under the
government’s direct control. Not even the president’s family is allowed to function
independently any more.810 The groups that still operate outside the regime structure exist
because they usefully contribute to the political legitimacy of the overall polity. At the
same time, they do not pose any direct threat to the regime per se. Indeed, the opposition
in Kazakhstan, as in the Middle East, seems to largely work as a support cast for the
authoritarian rulers (Zartman 1988). As an effect of this policy, in recent years all protests
against the regime have been disorganised and sporadic. On its part, the regime mobilises
its supporters only during election time, and tightly controls them through the local
bureaucracy and the expanding security apparatus when the elections are over. Finally, in
recent years Kazakhstan has seen an increase in political violence, which while not
uncommon in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, has been steadily rising. Notably it has not
reached the same levels as in the most extreme versions of neo-patrimonial regimes, the
so-called Sultanistic regimes (Chelabi and Linz 1998). It should be added that when it
comes to the use of brutal force, the Kazakh regime also lags far behind its regional
counterparts.811
810 The spectacular downfall of Dariga Nazarbayev means that the ‘monarchist’ option, which was
successfully implemented in Azerbaijan in 2003, has been ruled out in Kazakhstan. Yet it is unclear which
scenario Nazarbayev will now decide to pursue. According to the opinions expressed by a number of
interviewees in late 2004, the president himself did not know who might potentially succeed him.
811 While Nazarbayev openly supported the uncompromising use of force by Karimov’s regime during the
Andijan events of 13 and 14 May 2005, it is highly unlikely that the Kazakh president would be prepared to
use the Kazakh security apparatus and army in the same way.
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Rather than resorting to hard coercion, in Kazakhstan soft coercion is being
applied on a day-to-day basis (Furman 2005). Nazarbayev’s regime, as any other petro-
state, in order to preserve the social and political peace, strives to negotiate some form of
social contract with the wider society.812 It was not accidental that when commenting on
the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyz ‘revolutions’, Nazarbayev stated: ‘As clear-headed
people, we understand the deeper reasons for these events. These reasons lie not in some
mythical plots by outside forces, but are the result of the logic of internal developments.
Poverty and unemployment ... are fertile grounds for people’s dissatisfaction with the
authorities’813. This statement, and numerous others that followed, are indirectly aimed at
communicating to the Kazakh people that they have no need to protest, since they are in a
much better condition than their counterparts. What is more, their prospects for the future
are bright. Still, what this petro-driven social contract is going to look like once it arrives
is not clear, and requires additional study.
3. Oil, regime maintenance and development
What has been much more visible is the way in which oil per se has enabled the Kazakh
regime to pursue a multi-vectorial foreign policy – one which aims at balancing the so-
called Eastern and Western interests (Cummings 2003b). This highly pragmatic approach
has won the regime the support of virtually every important player and greatly enhanced
its stability over the years. The most telling – though not the most important –
relationship that the Kazakh regime has conducted has been the one with the US. In the
midst of the US campaign against dictatorships and authoritarian regimes as part of the
bigger “war on terror”, Nazarbayev received a letter from President George W. Bush
which praised Kazakhstan’s stability and prosperity, citing it as ‘a model for other
countries in the region’.814 The regime received similar endorsements from Western oil
companies who, despite all the rows, still see the president as the best guarantor of their
812 ‘Kazakh president pledges political, economic reforms and better living standards,’ AP Worldstream, 18
February 2005.
813 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 9 (7), Part I, 22 April 2005.
814 Kazakhstan News Bulletin, Released weekly by the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1 August
2005 Vol. 5, No. 30 http://www.kazakhembus.com/080105.html. (Accessed October 13 2005).
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investments.815 According to a recent assessment by Martha Olcott: ‘Given the key role
of Western firms in developing Kazakhstan’s strategically important oil and gas reserves,
Western leaders will not press hard for democratic reform in Kazakhstan until they
believe that the non-democratic nature of the Kazakh regime is undermining its own
short-term security’ (2005: 205). However, the support of foreign oil companies and
Western governments has not been obtained cheaply.
The Kazakh regime, in order to originally attract foreign oil companies into
Kazakhstan, was willing to grant them far-reaching provisions – including low taxes or
exemptions from the oil contracts’ notations concerning the local content policy. While
some of those early provisions have been at least partly renegotiated in recent years, the
problems still remain in place. Significantly, local companies suffer from a lack of proper
access to contracts sanctioned by the foreign oil companies and their major sub-
contractors. The fact that this situation did not change radically after the increase in oil
prices – which gave the regime a substantial room for manoeuvre – places a question
mark on many issues, in particular that of diversification.
Local content, even if properly implemented, does not bring about a sound
alternative to the oil sector per se, but is a good start and as such, perhaps an illustration
of the direction in which the country would like to move in the long run. For instance,
Noreng Oystein (2004) stated that in Norway, the government policies that encouraged
partnerships between foreign and domestic companies contributed greatly to the
diversification of the country’s economy and its technological advancements.
Kazakhstan, however, seems to be heading in the opposite direction, mirroring the
example of Equatorial Guinea816 where: ‘The oil industry itself has generated few
linkages to the local economy, as most supplies, including even basic foodstuffs and
prefabricated buildings for expatriate compounds, are imported into the country’ (Frynas
2004: 540). Thus, Kazakh policy makers, despite all their knowledge about the failures of
the petro-state, still follow in its footsteps. So, while the Kazakh regime glances at the
example of the ‘Asian tigers’ and hopes to emulate them, it’s trajectory also bears strong
815 Bagila Bukharbayeva, ‘Revolution wave in ex-Soviet republics worries investors in oil-rich
Kazakhstan,’ AP Worldstream, 17 May 2005.
816 In recent years, Equatorial Guinea has been undergoing a period of an oil boom that, although not on the
same scale as Kazakhstan’s, nevertheless resembles it.
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Appendix 1: Introduction, Section 2.
Pipelines in Central Asia
Source: CES Studies, Warsaw June 2006
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Appendix 2: Chapter 1, Section 6.
Interviews
Kazakhstan August-December 2004
During my fieldwork I interviewed:
1. Companies Working in the Oil and Gas Industry of Kazakhstan – Local
Almaty: 18 Atyrau: 10
2. Companies Working in the Oil and Gas Industry of Kazakhstan – Foreign
Almaty: 14 Atyrau: 4
3. National Oil Company KazMunaiGas’ subsidiaries and governmental agencies
Almaty: 5 Atyrau: 3 Astana: 4
4. Associations and Trade Unions
Almaty: 2 Atyrau: 1
5. Opposition and NGOs
Almaty: 4
6. Embassies
Almaty: 7 Atyrau: 1
7. Oil Experts and Political Experts
Almaty: 3
8. Newspapers and Oil Magazines
Almaty: 4 Atyrau: 2 Astana: 1
9. Companies not working in the oil sector (General background)
Almaty: 2
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Appendix 3: Chapter 2, Sections 1 and 2.
History of the Kazakh Oil Industry
a) Kazakh Oil industry in the Soviet Union
1920 Nationalisation of the Kazakh oil industry
1930 Oil Technical School opens in Guryev (since 1992 Atyrau)
1931-35 Construction of the Emba (Caspiy)-Orsk oil pipeline 847 km
1934 Mechanical plant opens in Guryev, producing equipment for the oil industry
1943-45 Construction of the Guryev Oil Refinery
1950 Kazakh oil production reaches 1 million tons annually
1963 Production begins on the oil enterprise Mangistauneftegaz
1964 Production begins on the oil enterprise Uzenmunaigaz
1965 Creation of the Kazakh Ministry of Special Construction Works
1967 Production begins on the oil enterprise Aktobemunaigaz
1969 First oil and gas engineers graduate from the Kazakh Polytechnic Institute
Oil production in Kazakhstan reaches more than 10 million tons annually
1976 Opening of the Pavlodar Refinery
1974 Oil production in Kazakhstan reaches 21 million tons annually
1979 Discovery of the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil and gas fields
1981 Discovery of the Kumkol oil field
1984 Opening of the Shymkent Refinery
1985 Tengizmunaigaz begins work on Tengiz
1988 The Oil Ministry of the USSR and Chevron Corporation sign a preliminary
agreement on carrying out work to survey the Korolevskoye oil field located in the
North Caspian basin
1989 Production from the Kumkol field by the Yuzhneftegaz begins
1990 The Oil Ministry of the USSR and Chevron Corporation sign an agreement on the
development of the Tengiz oil field
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b) Kazakhstan Oil Industry since Independence (1991-2005)
1991 In a rating of 55 countries producing hydrocarbon raw materials Kazakhstan is
listed as the 24th largest producer
Creation of the Kazakh Oil and Gas Corporation, the Ministry of Energy and Fuel
Resources and the Ministry of Geology and Protection of Mineral Resources
Kazakh authorities cancel all agreements reached between Moscow and Chevron in
1990
Establishment of the Embavedoil, the first semi-private Joint Venture in Kazakhstan
1992 Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Corporation is renamed NOC Kazakhstanmunaigaz
Kazakhstan and Chevron Corporation reach a new agreement which culminates in
the establishment of the TengizChevrOil Joint Venture
Kazakhstan signs a contract with British Gas and Agip concerning the development
of the Karachagank gas oil field
Kazakhstan, Russia and Oman fund the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to
build a new export pipeline in order to carry crude oil from the Tengiz field
Kazakhstan adopts a Code on Subsoil Use and the Processing of Mineral Resources
which aims at regulating relations with foreign investors
Privatisation of the Kazakh Ministry of Special Construction Works
1993 Ravil Cherdabayev becomes minister of the Oil and Gas Industry (until 1994)
Establishment of the Kazakhstancaspishelf Company to conduct exploration works
in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea
Creation of the Kazakh-Turkish enterprise KazakhTurkMunai
Biedermann International signs a contract with Kazakhstanmunaigaz to develop the
Kenbai field in the Atyrau region
First annual Kazakh Oil and Gas exhibition KIOGE (Almaty)
1994 The Ministry of Energy is disbanded and replaced by the Ministry of Energy and
the Coal Industry, and the Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry
The NOC Kazakhstanmunaigaz is renamed Munaigas
Nurlan Balgymbayev becomes Minister of the Oil and Gas industry (until 1997)
Akezhan Kazhegeldin becomes the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan (until 1997)
267
The Kazakhstan Government adopts a program for the development of the
Kazakhstan oil and gas complex. The programme’s major priorities are as follows:
expansion of oil refining capacities, full supply of the country’s demand in oil
products and accumulation of export potential
1995 Nazarbayev dissolves parliament and strengthens powers of the executive branch
Creation of the State Investment Committee (SIC)
Kazakh parliament adopts Subsoil Law and Petroleum Law which aims at
regulating relations connected with the conduct of oil operations in the territory
within the Republic of Kazakhstan’s jurisdiction, including sea and internal
reservoirs
Government announces a tender for the sale of state shareholdings in the joint stock
companies Yuzhneftegas, Aktubinskneft and Shymkentnefteorgsintez
1996 The Canadian company Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd. and the State Property
Management Committee of Kazakhstan sign an agreement on the sale of a 90
percent interest in Yuzhneftegas JSC
Kazakhstan signs an agreement with Russia, Oman and a consortium of foreign oil
companies on the construction of the CPC export pipeline
Kazakhstancaspichelf completes topographical survey of the oil fields in the
Kazakhstan sector of the Caspian Sea shelf
1997 Creation of the NOC KazakhOil and the transport company KazTransOil
Nurlan Balgymbayev becomes the first president of the KazakhOil and later on in
the year Prime Minister of Kazakhstan (until 1999)
Timur Kulibayev becomes financial director and vice-president of KazakhOil (until
2000)
60 percent controlling interests of the Aktobemunaigaz are sold to the Chinese
National Oil Company (CNPC)
KazTransOil signs a contract with the CNPC on oil pipeline construction from the
Aktubinsk fields to Western China
60 percent controlling interests of the Mangistaumunaigas are sold to Central Asia
Petroleum Ltd.
Final PSA for the Karachaganak field is signed in Washington
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Signing of a PSA for the Caspian Shelf between Agip, British Gas, British
Petroleum and Statoil, Mobil, Shell, Total, and Kazakhstancaspishelf
A wave of social unrest sweeps through Kazakhstan including in the oil rich regions
Nazarbayev promulgates the message: ‘Kazakhstan - 2030. Prosperity, peace and
well-being for the people of Kazakhstan’
1998 The ‘Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company’ (OKIOC), is set up to
carry out exploration work in the northern part of the Caspian Sea
Kazakh parliament passes the Law on Employment of the Population which aims at
limiting the number of work permits available to foreigners
Russia and Kazakhstan reach a consensus on the issue of the division of the Caspian
Sea bed with common use of water surface
The foundation for an artificial island is laid in the open sea at the East Kashagan
structure
1999 Early parliamentary elections
Imangali Tasmagambetov becomes Atyrau’s akim (until the end of the 1999)
Attacks on the foreign oil companies in the Atyrau region begin
100th Year Celebration of Kazakhstani Oil
Kazakh parliament passes an amendment to the Subsoil Law which gives states a
greater role in the process of allocation of the sub-contracting contracts by the
foreign oil companies
Beginning of the Kazakhgate scandal: Swiss authorities begin investigating
Nazarbayev’s and Balgymbayev’s secret accounts
The CPC project enters the stage of its practical realisation, the cost of which is
estimated at $854 million
2000 The creation of a Consortium for infrastructural development of Kazakhstan’s oil
and gas industry
Further amendments to the Subsoil Law which aim at forcing foreign oil companies
to work with Kazakh companies primarily in the oil rich regions
The unravelling of Kazakhgate: Justice Department begins investigating the role of
James Giffen in the Mobil deal
269
2001 Formation of first major oppositional party; the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
(DCK)
Creation of the Engineering Companies Union of the Republic of Kazakhstan
During the session of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Investors Council Nazarbayev declares
that ‘the balance between the interests of the state and business’ should be observed
KazTransOil increases its pipeline tariffs by 50 per cent
Beginning of the dispute between Kazakhstan and Chevron over funding on the
expansion of TengizChevrOil’s activities
Kazakhstan produces approximately 800,000 barrels of oil per day from 55 fields
Oil and gas industry of Kazakhstan provides about 16% - 18% of GDP, 30% of
export and more than 40% of payments to the republican budget
2002 Establishment of the NOC KazMunaiGas (KMG)
Timur Kulibayev becomes the first Vice-President of KMG (until 2005)
Creation of the Contract Agency
Kazakhgate’s comes to the open: Prime Minister Imangali Tasmagambetov disclose
to members of parliament that the authorities have used revenues from the Tengiz
oil field in order to establish a secret fund
In an unprecedented move Chevron suspends works for three months on the Tengiz
field
2003 Chevron and KazMunaiGas finally reach an agreement, however the dispute
between the two marks a major turning point between Kazakh and foreign oil
companies’ relation
Agip-KOC blocks British Gas sale of its stake in the North Caspian Sea Production
Sharing Agreement to the Chinese companies
The Anti-Monopoly Agency fines PetroKazakhstan US$97 million for a number of
alleged violations, such as hiking the prices of fuel oil
Small- and medium-sized business become one of the government’s top priorities
2004 Parliamentary elections Kazakhgate fails to make an impact
Nazarbayev persistently criticises mega-holdings
Kazakh authorities begin a hostile campaign against British Gas and other members
of the Agip-KOC
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Kazakhstan’s parliament unanimously approves a bill giving the government
priority in buying stakes in energy projects that were put up for sale in the country
2005 KazMunaiGas’s acquires half of the British Gas stake of 8.33 per cent for the
market price of $615 millions
PetroKazakhstan acquires by the Chinese company CNPC for $4.18 bn
Establishment of Atameken, the Nationwide Union of businessmen and employers
of Kazakhstan
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Appendix 4: Chapter 2, Section 4.2.
Assets of the NOC KazakhOil in 2001
Name Profile Share
Uzenmunaigas JSC Production of hydrocarbons 90%
Kazakhoil-Emba ОJSC Production of hydrocarbons 85% 
Atyrau Refinery Oil processing 86%
Kherson Refinery Oil processing 60%
Kazakhoilpromgeophyzika OJSC Geophysical 90%
Kazakhstancaspichelf OJSC Geophysical 90%
Zhambai OJSC Geophysical 100%
Kazakhoil-Bureniye OJSC Drilling 100%
Kazakhoil-Trans LTD Transport-forwarding 100%
Aksaigasservice LTD Servicing 82,5%
Kazakhoil-Kurylys LTD Construction 100%
Kazakhoil-Telf JV Production of hydrocarbons 69%
Gyural JV Production of hydrocarbons 37,2%
Embavedoil JV Production of hydrocarbons 52,69%
Arman JV Production of hydrocarbons 50%
Karakudukmunai JV Production of hydrocarbons 40%
Tenge JV Production of hydrocarbons 69%
Kazakhturkmunai JV Exploration and production of hydrocarbons 51%
Steppe Leopard JV Production of hydrocarbons 50%
Aktobe Preussag JV Exploration of hydrocarbons 50%
KOS-Cementing JV Cementing of wells 50%
Source: Petroleum Magazine, April 2002
272
Assets of the NC Transport of Oil and Gas in 2001






International Airport of Atyrau OJSC 100%
Helicopter Aircompany Euro-Asia Air OJSC 100%
Transpetroleum CJSC 100%
KasMorTransFlot CJSC 50%
Intergas Central Asia CJSC 100%
Atyrau Aue Zholy OJSC 43,79%
KazStroyService CJSC 90%
KazTransCom OJSC 90%
North-West Pipeline Company MunaiTas CJSC 51%
Bailanys OJSC 3,5%
Source: Petroleum Magazine, April 2002
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Appendix 5: Chapter 3, Sections 2.1. ; 2.2. ; 3.1.
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the companies
b) Kazakh Oil-Supporting Industry: Key Companies in 2004
Name Management
Byelkamit Chairman of the Board Directors: Pavel I. Beklemishev
Montazhspetsstroy Director General: Uderbayeva Raya Prmagambetovna
KazGiproNefteTrans President: Vitaly Kolomeyets
ABE Corporation Director: Alibek Kh. Tupushev
DANK M. Kurmanbayev
Kazkhimmontazh
President: Aityshev Sergey Moldagalievich
First Vice-President: Tuleutayev Serikkazy Kadyrzhanovich
First Vice-President: Borissov Vladimir Ivanovich
Imstalkon President: Vladimir Kananykhin
Atyrauneftemash General Director: N. Burlirbaev
Prommontage General Director: Anatoly Zhivoglyadov
Gaszhobalau President: S.M. Kamalov
Azimut Energy Services President: Bulat Yelemanov
Munay Grafika Chairman of the Board of Directors: A.N. Mindeyev
KazSelEnergoProject
OJSC President: A.S. Trofimov
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Mekensak SPC General Director: E.K. Ayazbayev
NIPIneftegas CJSC Chairman of the Board of Directors: O.S. Gershtansky
NIPI CaspiMunayGas
OJSC President: A.A. Prosvirnov
Severodonetsky
ORGCHIM CJSC General Director: N.V. Koshovets
Kazakhstan Engineering Director: A.L. Tulegenov
S2 Research&Engineering
LLP Director: Makhtab Sarvar
Gidromash-Orion President: Valeryi A. Minchukov
Ziksto OJSC President: Arktika Glubina
Petropavlovsk Not Available
FMD Heavy Machinery Not Available
Zenit General Director: Vladimir P. Panfilov
Montazh Engineering President: Aidyn Tumyshev
ERC Holdings Not Available
SAM-EMRKZ LLC Not Available
Almaty Heavy Machine
Building Plant General Director: Alexander T. Filipishin
Kaskor-Mashzavod Not Available
Source: Oil journals and companies’ web pages
c) NOC KazMunaiGas: Key Players 2003-2004
Name Position
Uzakbai Karabalin President
Timur Kulibaev First Vice President
Makhambet Batyrbayev Vice President
Bakhytkozh
Izmukhambetov Managing Director, Investment Projects and Shares in JVs
Zhakyp Marabaev Managing Director, PSA Projects
Bakhytkozha
Izmukhambetov Managing Director, Investment Projects and Shares in JVs
Zhakyp Marabaev Managing Director, PSA Projects
Iskander Beisembetov Managing Director, Corporate Development
Daniyar Berlibayev Managing Director, Finances
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Kairgeldy Kabyldin Managing Director, Transport Infrastructure and Service Projects
Vladimir Miroshnikov Managing Director, Production and Technical development
Kanatbek Safinov Managing Director, Legal Issues
Source: Oil journals and KMG web page
d) Kazakhization of the NOC KazMunaiGas 2002-2003
In KazMunaiGas Description
KazMunaiGas directors Ethnic Kazakh: professional oil men from the Atyrau andMangistau region
KazMuaniGas directors’
affiliates
Ethnic Kazakhs: family members and friends from the oil- rich
regions
Young professionals Ethnic Kazakhs: children of ex-nomenclatura, predominantly fromAlmaty and Astana
Soviet times professionals Ethnic Kazakhs: worked in the oil related industries throughout theSoviet era
Out of KazMunaiGas Description
Soviet times professionals Non-ethnic Kazakhs: worked in the oil related industries throughoutthe Soviet era
Bureaucracy Non-ethnic Kazakh: bureaucrats, many close to retirement
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Stepnoi Leopard LLP 50
Zhambai LLP 100
Refineries:
Atyrau Refinery CJSC 86.7






Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLP 51
MunayTas LLP 51
Marketing:
Kazmunaygas Trade House LLP 100
KazRosGas 50
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Kazakhoil Petrol LLP 100







Atyrau International Airport OJSC 100
Kazakhoil Service LLP 51
KazTransCom OJSC 47.2












HSBK Pension Fund CJSC 20.8
Source: ‘Kazakhstan oil and Gas’, British Embassy/UK Trade and Investment: Almaty:
September 2003 Update
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Appendix 7: Chapter 6, Section 1.3.
Associations and Unions in Kazakhstan
Name Management
Forum of Entrepreneurs Chairman: Raimbek Batalov,Executive director: Timur Nazykhanov
Confederation of the



















expeditors Chairman: Esengarin Nigmadzhan
Association of independent
electronic mass media President: Taukina Rozlana
Association of pension
funds Chairman: Alibaev Ajdar
Association of best
business enterprises President: Shamsutdinova Svetlana
Association of Light
industry enterprises Chairman: Apenko Sergey
Association “KazAlko”






companies President: Bilseitov Galym
Association of furniture
and wood processing President: Bessonov Evgeny
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enterprises
Auditors' Chaber 1st Vice-President: Mamleev Etsher














dealers of Kazakhstan President: Lim Yurij
EAN (Europe Article
Number) Kazakhstan Director: Abdrahmanov Azat








Executive Director: Ajzhulov Tursun
National PR Association of






centre for businessman» General Director: Ermakov Vladimir
Association of Investors of




Kazachstan President: Sherman Alexander
Oil Union of Kazakhstan President: Tovshtein Valeriy
Association of TV and
radio broadcasters President: Zhumabaev Ajdar




Kazachstan Director: Dennis Prajs





Kazachstan President: Issyk Tatiana
Association «Machine
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